

Lines Upon A Map: An Analysis of the Imposition of the Western Concept of Dividing
Political Space in Tanganyika, 1884-1961.

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Abstract

This is a study of the international boundaries of Tanganyika: of the means by which they were implemented, of the effects upon the peoples of the region, and of the similarities between the two. Lines were indeed drawn on maps in Europe relating to the political division of Africa. This did not, however, bring about the boundaries in reality. For these lines to become tangible they had to be imposed. Policy differences became sharply demarcated and restrictions were applied, thereby making the boundary real. The effects were by no means entirely negative. Tax differentials and playing one colonial authority off against another allowed Africans to exploit the colonial partition of their continent. Many works have considered the making of Tanganyika with regard to the growth of a national consciousness and the campaign for independence. Little attention, however, has been paid to the making of Tanganyika as a territorial entity. This is the first substantive effort to fill that gap. This

I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and has been written solely by me.

Upon Africa and Africans. It also considers the impact of the partition upon African political, economic and cultural systems before discussing the extent to which the actions of the European colonialists and African borderlanders influenced each other. The conclusions have some relevance to colonial Africa as a whole but cannot be transferred automatically to the rest of the continent.

(London, April 2001)

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AAKA: Auswärtiges Amt, Kolonial-Abteilung (German Foreign Office, Colonial Section)

ADC: Assistant District Commissioner

BA: Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archives), formerly the Deutsches Zentralarchiv in Potsdam

CO: Colonial Office

DC: District Commissioner - colonial administrative officer who was responsible for a particular area

DO: District Officer - the official status of a DC. Some did not have their own areas to administer

DOA: Deutsch-Ostafrika (German East Africa)

DOAG: Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (German East African Company)

FO: Foreign Office

H.L.Deb: House of Lords Debates

JAH: Journal of African History

JBS: Journal of Borderland Studies

Mitt: Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten

PC: Provincial Commissioner

PRO: Public Record Office

RM: Rhodes House

RKA: Reichskolonialamt

TNA: Tanzania National Archives

TS: Tanganyika Secretariat

UJ: Uganda Journal

WO: War Office

ZNA: Zanzibar National Archives

ABBREVIATIONS

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GLOSSARY

Akida: Acting chiefs under Zanzibari rule. generally not native to the area they ruled; sometimes of Arab descent. Generally an inferior title to that of liwali. Many were maintained by the German rulers.

Askari: African soldier.

Bezirksamtmann: German version of the District Officer.

Elmoran: the plural of Moran - Maasai warriors.

Hongo: A word used in much of Africa meaning tax. It was generally paid for permission to do something; perhaps to pass through a particular polity or gain access to water supplies.

Jumbe: chief.

Liwali: Generally superior to the akida. Mostly of Arab descent, acted as district governors for the Sultan of Zanzibar, and continued as administrators under German rule.

Mfalme: chief.

Moran: Maasai warrior.

Mwalimu: teacher, given to respected headmen and other men in positions of authority, and in more recent times applied to Nyerere.

Reichkolonialamt: The German Colonial Office.


Rugaruga: African irregular soldiers, employed by both European and African armies, often composed of criminals and freed slaves.

Ujamaa: collective name for Nyerere's policies of African Socialism.

Uti possidetis: the principle by which newly independent states accepted the international boundaries of the territories which they replaced.

Vijijini: Ujamaa policy of collective villages.

Zanzibar: The collective name for a group of islands lying off the east coast of Tanganyika; the main two islands are Unguja and Pemba. Zanzibar Town lies on Unguja.



CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In the early 1870s, European involvement in Africa centred upon Livingstone's three C's: Commerce, Christianity and Civilisation. Direct European control of African territory remained limited, and more Africans lived under Ottoman or Arab rule than under British, French or Portuguese domination. The situation changed radically with the entry of several new powers upon the scene. German and Italian nationalists clamoured for overseas territories, while King Leopold's dream of his place in history led him to carve an empire in Africa. In addition, the French need for national success to turn attention away from the defeat of 1871, encouraged the government to step up support for their push into Africa. The number of powers involved, the perceived potential gains, and the cheapness with which these perceived gains could be bought, all fuelled activity to such an extent that a fourth 'C' quickly became dominant - Colonialism. Colonial partition led to more than thirty defined political units, mostly determined by fixed linear boundaries. The creation of these political boundaries in Africa is one of the greatest legacies of colonial rule.

Once the boundaries had been set up, certain challenges arose which had to be met, including forming relations with neighbouring territories, coping with existing African political and economic systems, and dealing with smuggling and with pastoralist movements. The mere existence of western-style linear boundaries provoked these problems and challenges. For Africans who had to live with the boundaries, the position was somewhat different. Colonial policies affected their lives: restrictions and regulations had to be avoided, by-passed or used to bring some advantage. The colonial authorities had to devise policies to counter these challenges and had to adapt them according to African responses and unforeseen circumstances. In addition to these reactive policies, the colonial administrations introduced pro-active policies in order to enforce new border functions, often intended to promote economic development, or to engender good relations with neighbouring territories.

The rest of this introductory chapter is divided into three main sections. Firstly, the historical context of the colonial imposition will be discussed. This study is a contribution to the reclamation of African history, a part of which is concerned with the reassessment of colonialism and the colonial partition. Secondly, the spread of western-style linear boundaries in Africa and throughout the world will be discussed alongside the relevance of African border studies. Finally, this chapter will move from the general to the specific, with an analysis of the main aims of this work, principally filling the gap in the historiography provided by the lack of a large-scale study of the history of Tanganyika's international boundaries.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

African History

The right of Africa to have its own history was long denied. Pre-colonial Africa was seen as "fruitless confusion", many assumed that modern Africa had nothing to learn from its pre-colonial past, and development was seen as an outside agency (Davidson, 1994: 281-2). As Basil Davidson so rightly comments, "For no other major branch of humanity has it been said that the past has no instructive value for the present or the future" (Davidson, 1994: 282). Non-recognition of the African past was allied to the flimsy European presumption of racial superiority. Both had been used to justify the slave trade and were used again to justify colonial occupation. Yet as recent works by such writers as Herbst have demonstrated, current African political structures and developments may have as much in common with the pre-colonial past as with the continent's colonial legacy (Herbst, 2000).

In the colonial period, assumptions of cultural superiority often stemmed from ignorance. In 1904, the German Bezirksamtmann (District Officer) Ewerback wrote

that Africans living along the Rovuma didn't lay any worth on permanent settlement, and moved freely back and forth across the river.¹ There was no suggestion that this may have been a more effective way of life in the area. The same doubts were raised over the effectiveness of nomadic pastoralism with regard to the Maasai in the north. Even in the mid-1960s, Henderson could write that the German East Africa of the early Twentieth Century was "A land which in the early 1880s had suffered seriously from the curse of the slave trade and had been rent by continual tribal wars was now a peaceful colony with an expanding economy" (Henderson, 1965: 155) - a statement so ridiculous that it can be answered in two words - Maji Maji. The 1905-7 Maji Maji rebellion, which was largely brought about by German oppression and cruelty, led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Africans.

In the 1950s, terms such as 'ethnohistory' and 'intuitive history' were used to acknowledge that Africa had some sort of pre-colonial history (Davidson, 1994: 4-7), but until relatively recently African history was a synonym for colonial history in Africa. Knowledge of African history continues to be rather limited in the world at large, and knowledge of pre-colonial history is almost non-existent among the general public. This should not be surprising. As Elizabeth Isichei writes, Africanists would do well "to reflect on the extent of their own ignorance of the history of Melanesia, or of Siberia" (1997: 6).

In academia, at least, Africa has now been granted a history, and gone are the maps with vast empty spaces filled only by *ibi sunt leones* - here be lions. Assumptions of western cultural superiority have been diminished if not expelled, and many Africanist commentators concur with Rodney when he wrote, "Who in this world is competent to judge whether an Austrian waltz is better than a Makonde ngoma?" (Rodney, 1972:

¹RKA: R1001 627: 177, 2nd Feb 1904. Letter entitled "Machemba-Leute" from DO Ewerbeck to the Imperial Government, Dar es Salaam.

42). Another example of the reclamation of African history is the abandonment of the segmentation of all Africans into tribes. Africans in pre-colonial times did belong to various ethnic groups, but these groups were often not nearly so permanent or definite as the colonialists seemed to believe.

It is also wrong to isolate pre-colonial Africa from the rest of the world. Attempts to do so are at best historically inaccurate and at worst another racist attempt to justify slavery and denigrate African achievements. Links between the world beyond the Sahara and central and southern Africa were limited but by no means negligible. Even the modern colonial intrusion into Africa has a much longer history than the partition and its aftermath. From the scattered west African trading settlements, the Cape and the Portuguese colonies of central-southern Africa, to Ottoman, Arab and Omani colonisation in the northern third of Africa and along the east coast, external influences penetrated Africa in many different ways.

Colonialism

It would be useful at this point to make a few observations about the nature of colonial rule in East Africa. When the rhetoric is stripped away, the colonial powers had only one justification for seizing and occupying African territory - and this is the first and last time that this work will quote Adolf Hitler - "By what right do nations possess colonies? By the right of taking them!" (Steer, 1939: 13). Military superiority and the technological imbalance between European and African powers enabled occupation on the cheap. The Europeans were progressively able to kill Africans more easily and with progressively reduced cost to themselves, and this knowledge aided the colonial take-over. German East Africa (DOA) and Tanganyika were territories of exploitation: the people, land and other resources were used to bring benefit to the colonisers. They were also developed in order to aid exploitation: a large transport

infrastructure was created and while the environment at independence remained a harsh one, the threat posed by famine and disease were surely less in 1961 than it had been in 1884.² As Koponen writes, colonialism created "a great deal of things which we take as development in the post-colonial context" - a transport system, a system for exporting peasant crops, and a limited education and medical system. However, this work does not seek to balance the pros and cons of colonialism. It aims to examine one aspect of colonialism, an aspect which continues to influence and indeed define modern Tanzania.

Borderlanders' experiences of colonial rule are somewhat different to those of colonial subjects elsewhere, in that they have two or more colonial powers to compare. These experiences can provide opportunities, whether for local benefits or for migration from rule in one polity to that in another. This was a similar situation to that which existed in pre-colonial Africa, where discontent citizens could flee one authority for another. Africans in one jurisdiction could easily be much nearer to the authorities in a neighbouring state than those in their own. For example, near the tripoint of DOA, Uganda and the Belgian Congo, the state of Kabale lay just inside the Ugandan border, yet there were five foreign posts closer to Kabale than any operated by the Ugandan British authorities (Hopkin, 1969: 217-8).

The study of colonialism is valid today for the massive impact that it has had upon the modern state of Tanzania. Colonial rule defined the country's borders, shaped the economy, and fostered its political leaders. It would be inaccurate to portray Africans as the passive recipients of colonial policy, and to contend that the success of any particular policy depended solely upon the abilities of the colonial powers. Colonial

² This work does not therefore, agree with Kjekshus' theory of ecological collapse (Kjekshus, 1995). Ecological problems were perhaps as bad, but more resources existed to combat them.

rule was a two-way, interactive process between the rulers and the ruled. Undoubtedly, the colonial authorities were more powerful than their African subjects, but the acceptability of policies to the people of the territory had to be taken into account in order to make them workable. Also, that African opinion and action during colonial times culminated in the struggle for independence, and thereby made a massive contribution towards the creation of a Tanzanian national consciousness, makes the study of colonial history relevant today.

The imposition of the western concept of political space

The role of the West in the imposition of linear boundaries upon Africa can be divided into two distinct periods: the colonial carve-up of Africa towards the end of the Nineteenth Century and the period of colonial rule; and its post-1945 role. It could be argued that large-scale western influence began well before the partition of Africa, but the opportunity to impose western concepts before about 1870, was limited to the few areas of the continent that were under colonial rule or influence. Even in these areas, western territorial interests actually conformed to the existing African structure, taking a form which was most appropriate to their location. Western influences ranged from formal control of territory with some recognition of boundaries, as at the Cape, to isolated outposts on the West African coast, which possessed little or no hinterland. There was also much control that was not at all closely defined, as with the Portuguese colonies of central-southern Africa, which had very vague notions of territorial extent.

The western system of linear boundaries was imposed upon Africa in much the same way as in the rest of the world. Colonialism led to fixed territorial entities which were protected by African political elites upon independence. However, there were some significant differences in the manner of the imposition. Large-scale colonialism came about somewhat later in Africa than elsewhere, and it developed at a much faster

pace. It is unlikely that the western colonial powers actively sought to impose linear boundaries upon Africa. They wanted to ensure control of territory because of perceived economic potential, because of the fear of missing out, and also for prestige; linear boundaries were a logical consequence of these factors. However, these territories were different from those in Europe, which had developed along ethnic lines, at least to some extent. As in Europe, however, many ethnic groups were re-arranged to fit the borders, rather than the other way around, although because of the fluid nature of many African groups, the impact of this was not as great as might be imagined.

During the closing decades of the Nineteenth Century, the colonial powers expanded their existing African colonies and protectorates, and founded new ones, and thereby came to govern the lion's share of the continent. Eight non-African powers were involved, although eighty percent of the continent's boundaries involved just two powers: Britain and France. The boundaries of North Africa had mainly been determined earlier, following the incremental but decisive exclusion of Ottoman influence from the continent (Dresch, 1982: 60). Further south, people had been more scarce than land in pre-colonial Africa, and so tended to be used to determine sovereignty. The colonial powers, however, were more interested in the land, its resources and the trade routes which exploited those resources, so the need for defined boundaries arose (Kopytoff, 1987: Ch.1). As territorial interests met, unilateral declarations were replaced by treaties and agreements, although borders were often not closely delimited. Even where precise lines were drawn, a surprising amount of adjustment occurred at a later stage. Effective occupation either by the colonial power concerned or through a subject African polity, was not required. In West Africa, the Anglo-German boundary reached the River Benue in 1886 and Lake Chad in 1893, but, "conquest and political control were left to the twentieth century" (Yearwood, 1993: 270). Even the one major African aggressor in the partition - Ethiopia - was forced to conform to European norms of territoriality. Those lands to which it did not

stake a formal claim were taken by one of the colonial powers. As political control strengthened and crept into new lands, colonial rule became more relevant to the everyday lives of Africans, often through the introduction of taxes and the plantation economy. In this way all land became owned by somebody and the notion of fixed borders became recognised in much of Africa.

The partition of Africa mirrored many facets of the imposition of colonial rule elsewhere. Economic activity led to chartered companies, which in turn often led to political rule because of political unrest; the British crown took control of India following the Mutiny, just as Germany stepped in in German East Africa following the 'Arab revolt' led by Abushiri and Bwana Heri (Iliffe, 1979: 93). This step by step approach is mirrored in the extension of political rule. The British firstly established protectorates in Africa, so that they could wait before deciding to assume full control (Herbst, 1989: 684), just as they gradually took control of the Moghul states and wore down the Punjab in India. The balance of military power remained the guiding principle behind the acquisition of territory: when the Sikh Khalsa was deemed to be strong the British held back, but the Punjab was invaded when it was perceived to be weak because of internal divisions (Carmichael Smyth, 1847). This principle was applied to the Maasai, with the British and Germans taking advantage of a Maasailand ravaged by disease. It also applied to fellow colonial powers, as was demonstrated by the erosion of Portuguese claims.

The Berlin Congo Conference of 1884-5 laid down two criteria for the occupation of territory in Africa (Herbst, 1989: 683-5). Although they were not legally binding, they provide an indication of the notions that were prevalent at the time, and were also used to justify claims to the interior (Katzenellenbogen, 1996: 29). These were that the other colonial powers must be officially notified of the occupation of coastal territory by one of their number, and that this must be followed by the establishment of some form of administrative authority, mainly in order to protect free trade. In theory, this

restricted the economic rights of a territory to a greater extent than in Europe, but in practice it rarely became an issue. All this serves to illustrate that the colonial powers chose to impose economic and political systems that they believed to be best for themselves in a particular situation, and did not always seek to impose a carbon copy of European ideas of territorial control. There had been no such arrangements for the partition of other parts of the globe, but a far larger number of colonial powers were involved in Africa and the avoidance of inter-European conflict was an important consideration.

Effective administrative control of the interior was not a requirement of colonial claims, thus signifying that the value of political space was not even. In DOA, British East Africa (BEA), British Central Africa and Portuguese East Africa (PEA), the interior was generally parcelled out to chartered companies. The concept of territory being generally more valuable at the coast than inland was certainly new to Africa. In pre-colonial Africa, some centres of importance had been at the coast but many had also been inland, such as around the shores of Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika, where a great trading network had developed. Indeed, the highest population densities in DOA were the furthest from the coast - in Rwanda, Urundi and Tabora (Calvert, 1917: Plate 219). It was also different from the situation in Europe, so the concept of political space which was created and applied during the era of the Berlin Conference was a concept that was specifically developed for use in Africa and on the colonial stage. The 'rules' that the colonial powers employed in Africa, allowed them to establish colonies and protectorates without having to base their extent upon topography and demography. Africa was divided from a position of ignorance on several counts, and lack of information meant that borders were not set according to the practicalities of rule. The division and governance of territory in Europe did take such factors into account. Historical factors often overrode them, but they were acknowledged and played a major role in determining the political map.

It is possible to overstate the extent to which the partition of Africa varied from the creation of colonies elsewhere, as the West has created similar boundaries within its own lands where information has been lacking or there are no obvious grounds for the division of territory. The U.S.-Canadian border runs as a straight line for 1800 miles and many of the internal U.S. and Australian borders are also unbending. These lines may have been drawn in what was then colonial territory, but they have mostly survived to the present-day. Such boundaries are more a function of the western lack of regard for pre-colonial polities than a lack of interest in the colonies and states which they were setting up (Manshard, 1981: 59), and can also be seen to be a function of low population densities at the time of partition. Except where European claims were based upon treaties with African leaders and involved the transfer of sovereignty over a specific area, Europeans usually did not recognise existing patterns of the division of political space in Africa and so created their own borders, based upon the need to avoid conflict with the other colonial powers. Topographical features were also used where available: few boundaries were demarcated by the use of mountains, but water features were often used, including for almost all Malawi's borders and most of Tanzania's.

There are many examples of the use of local factors, including topography and demography, to determine the boundaries. For example, in 1869 the South African and Portuguese authorities agreed on their common boundary running along the watershed of the Lebombo Mountains, although there was no tradition of these mountains forming any kind of political division (Prescott, 1987: 247). Elsewhere, an adjustment was made in the Taveta concession acquired by Harry Johnston on the DOA-BEA border, largely in order to avoid ethnic tensions (McEwen, 1971: 14-15). An 1890 Anglo-French declaration redrew the boundary from Say on the River Niger to Barruwa on Lake Chad so as to ensure that the Kingdom of Sokoto was not divided and could be transferred in its entirety to the Royal Niger Company (Prescott, 1971: 66-67). Also, the Bari had been divided by the Belgian Congo-Sudan border, so a

portion of the Belgian Congo was transferred to reunite the group. A new boundary commission was therefore required, and the commissioners were given express directions to avoid the division of other groups in the area (Blake, 1997: xvii). Such changes and agreements were more easily achieved when one power controlled both sides of a boundary, as revealed by British changes to the Kenya-Sudan border (Prescott, 1987: 250). Such alterations can be found elsewhere in the world. For example, following the division of Borneo between Britain and the Netherlands in the Nineteenth Century, demarcation commissioners moved the boundary by up to five miles in order to avoid cutting off bends in rivers, dividing headwaters, or partitioning one part of an ethnic group from another (Prescott, 1987: 289).

Other sensible agreements provided for cross-border access where African economic and cultural systems would be unnecessarily affected. One such example involves a treaty known as the 'Maud Line', which was signed in 1907 between Britain and Abyssinia. It allowed people from both sides of the border grazing rights and well-access in the Abyssinia-Kenya borderlands, and despite the agreement being dissolved in 1947, the privileges remained in practice for several decades afterwards (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 1989: 41-2).

Despite such changes for the good, boundary alterations aimed at easing the affect upon Africans and African structures usually, "coincided with the interests of the power in question" (Hargreaves, 1985: 23). For example, Britain supported the claims of the Appolonians against French support for the states of Kinjabo and Indenie, during the 1892 demarcation of the western border of the Gold Coast, because those claims coincided with British territorial claims (Hargreaves, 1985: 23-4). Such cynicism is entirely compatible with European actions elsewhere. Even in Europe itself, successive divisions of Poland, the Greater Bulgaria settlement of 1878 and the delimitation of the Franco-German boundary through Lorraine in 1871, paid heed to ethnology when it was convenient, and dismissed it when appropriate (Hargreaves,

1985: 25). More often than not, where ethnic groups were divided by initial boundary delimitation, it was they who had to move and not the boundary. The British-French exchange of notes on the Guinea-Sierra Leone boundary in July 1911 reveals that the local population had six months within which to move across the boundary, taking their "portable property and harvested crops" with them (Brownlie, 1979: 344).

On the many occasions when boundaries did cause a lot a difficulty for local people, ignorance was often as much to blame as exploitation. This could hardly have been otherwise given the speed of the partition. The term 'Scramble' is often deemed to be an inappropriate term for the partition of Africa, but it does encapsulate the breathtaking speed with which the continent was carved up during the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century. By contrast, British India remained a patchwork quilt of colonies, semi-autonomous dependencies and independent states, two centuries after colonisation of the interior had begun in earnest. The construction of many African boundaries as straight lines did have much to do with a lack of knowledge. It is worth repeating Lord Salisbury's much-quoted comment: "we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were" (Herbst, 1989: 674).

The Katanga-Northern Rhodesian boundary provides an excellent example of geographical ignorance. Article 2b of the 1894 Anglo-Belgian agreement which determined the boundary states that the boundary should be drawn along "the thalweg of the Luapula [river] up to its issue from Lake Bangweolo. Thence it shall run southwards along the meridian of longitude of the point where the river leaves the lake to the watershed between the Congo and Zambesi, which it shall follow until it reaches the Portuguese frontier."³ In fact, the Luapula does not flow into Lake Bangweolo and

³ From 'Agreement between Great Britain and His Majesty King Leopold II, Sovereign

as a result, the straight line boundary between the town of Mkuku on the Luapula to the Congo-Zambesi watershed cuts through several ethnic groups, creating an ideal situation for smuggling. Disputes over the location of the boundary and over smuggling in the region plagued relations in the borderland until Zambia and Zaire signed an agreement in 1989.

While it is true that many boundaries were agreed without reference to the geography and ethnography of Africa, the impact was often not felt immediately. For example, the division of the Maasai had little impact at first, but conflict with the authorities over grazing rights and water access caused increasing problems (McEwen, 1971: 147-9). Even today, forty-four percent of Africa's boundaries are straight lines (Herbst, 1989: 674-5), but the idea that they were created in total ignorance has more than adequately been shown to be false elsewhere, for example by Touval (Touval, 1972: 3-17).

Once the West had created a system of colonies within a framework of political space similar to that used in the West, it would have taken a major upheaval to change the system. It was possible that this could have occurred during the years immediately leading up to and following independence. An explanation for why it did not will be given in the next sub-section. In addition to the role of African leaders, the West has continued to seek the maintenance of the present system of political space in Africa. Through the pressure of individual western countries and through such western creations as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, the West has acted so as to guarantee international trade through the maintenance of peace. In this way, western principles and practices have been imposed upon Africa in general, and have led to a convergence of international political practice. Some commentators have

of the Independent State of the Congo, relating to the Spheres of Influence of Great Britain and the Independent State of the Congo in East and Central Africa. Signed at Brussels, 12th May 1894'. Reproduced in Brownlie, 1979: 693.

drawn a rather sharper line between modern concepts of political space in Africa and in the West than has been outlined here. Jackson and Rosberg perceive the Anglo-American idea of the international system as being one of international disorder against internal order, whilst Black Africa is portrayed as favouring international order over internal disorder (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 23-24). This does not make African perceptions any less western-dominated. The West would surely much rather see internal discord in African states than cross-border conflict: it does not present as much of a problem to international stability. Perhaps the West has succeeded in imposing a western concept of political space, but not an identical concept to that used in the West.

The Role of Africa

The influence of African polities in the partition of Africa was limited. The actual division of Africa took the form of unilateral, bilateral or multilateral agreements, with many more players than were involved elsewhere in the colonial world. Only Abyssinia and to some extent Zanzibar were considered to be major players. The preconditions for the seizure of territory were the same throughout the world. Britain and France took huge chunks of Africa because of military superiority, just as Russia took vast tracts of Central Asia and China, and the U.S. moved into the North American interior. Potential economic gain outweighed the military risk and so all of these areas came to be colonised. Ethiopia survived because it was recognised as an independent state by the colonial powers, whether as a result of religion, history or military power. The European powers could not discount African polities during the partition, but they paid far more attention to the other colonial powers than to the polities of the lands they occupied. John Hargreaves' view of African indigenous polities is probably accurate. He likens the colonial powers to fighting elephants, who are not unaffected by events at their feet (Hargreaves, 1985: 19).

Africans have played the key role in maintaining the state system of Africa since independence and thus in protecting the imposition of the western concept of political space in Africa. It is not merely that many African leaders have been brought up in a westernised way and act in accordance with the norms of the international state system, which are rooted in western concepts. They also have a vested interest in maintaining the existing system and the present structure of borders in general. Modern African leaders are generally in a weak position nationally and internationally, and therefore do not want to risk their own positions by upsetting the situation. At independence, the demography, ethnography and topography of many border areas made them politically unstable. Administrative structures were very weak and the resources to strengthen them were lacking, so it was difficult to impose territorial control. With such internal problems, African leaders were unwilling to resort to war to reset their boundaries - apart from notable exceptions in the Horn of Africa. Even where expansion was desired, most armies were too weak to do much about it.

This situation has not changed. Despite current events in central Africa, the vast majority of African leaders do not feel secure enough to risk changes to their borders. Change could be likened to Pandora's box - once unleashed, it would be impossible to stop. The entire continent could be thrown into chaos, as apart from the current structure, there are no universally recognised boundaries to revert to. The lack of national identity and national cohesion in Africa has left most African states feeling insecure about regions within their own boundaries. Even the most authoritarian and resource-rich states, such as Nigeria or Zaire, have faced major secessionist challenges. The main point is that if Africa's rulers do not feel strong enough to challenge the individual borders that were drawn by the West, then they will not be prepared to challenge the whole western-style state system in Africa. If any particular state wanted to introduce a new concept of political space, rather than merely to redefine the division of territory within the existing framework, it would be virtually impossible. As political space is concerned with international boundaries, a state would have to gain

the acceptance of its neighbours for any changes. As has been discussed, they would be loathe to do so. In addition, there are surely no African leaders who would be prepared to exchange the control - no matter how weak - that they are able to exert over their own countries today, for the looser kind of arrangement which was typical with pre-colonial polities. Therefore, the very people who are in positions where they could attempt to change the whole system of governance, rule and authority in Africa, have vested interests in the preservation of the western concept of political space and the system of borders that accompanies it. However, with the weakening of central government authority in countries such as Sierra Leone and Angola, rebel groups or ordinary borderlanders themselves can challenge the results of the partition. The lack of government control along the borders of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone is a prime example, but not one that is easy to assess because of military conflict in the area.

The Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) can be seen as an agent of the preservation of the international order and of the western concept of political space in Africa. Whilst this organisation is certainly against any border changes in Africa and works hard to prevent conflicts, it has no real power in itself and therefore merely carries out the wishes of its member states. It would be possible here to go through all that the O.A.U. has said and written on maintaining the status quo in Africa, and to go through the various border conflicts with which it has dealt. However, as its viewpoint is a consensus of the opinions of individual African leaders, this would add nothing to the argument. Some brief points are worth making on the subject, however, if only as a means of highlighting the opinion of African political elites in general. The O.A.U. is opposed in principal to changes to African borders, regardless of the rights or wrongs of the case. The principle of *Uti Possidetis* was adopted at the 1964 summit in Cairo: "The Resolution of the Heads of State.....Solemnly declares that all member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of independence" (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 1989: 40). Despite many resolutions supporting

pan-African ideals, the O.A.U. has consistently supported an Africa of separate and independent states, and has thus put national interests before international co-operation: true acceptance of western principles of politics and space.

Conclusion

The partition of Africa is certainly no longer seen as the dawn of African history by scholars and colonial rule is seen as only one period in Africa's history. Afro-centric studies have quite rightly become central to African history. It would, however, be a mistake to put the history of colonial Africa to one side. While European colonial rule lasted less than a century in most areas, and effective administrative control barely half a century in most of those, it was a key stage in the development of modern Africa. Firstly, because it occurred so recently, and secondly, because its effects were so profound. One of the greatest effects was the political division of the continent along western lines. This study will attempt to avoid the division into Afro- or Euro-centric focus. It is a study of man and men in a particular context and of their responses to given situations and circumstances. It is not a study of European and African history, of white and black, but of the struggle of men to impose their will upon other men and upon their natural environment.

BORDER STUDIES

The Study of African Borders

International boundaries can be divided into two groups: those in western Europe and those in the rest of the world. On paper, there is little difference: all international political boundaries share the same legal and theoretical basis. They do not, however,

share the same historical basis. Those in western Europe developed in situ, over a long period of time and in parallel with the evolution of western political concepts. Those in Africa and the rest of the world were to a greater or lesser extent imposed by western colonialism, both with regard to their positioning and with regard to the principles which underlay them. This vital difference is bound to have a substantial impact upon the nature of the boundaries and therefore also upon the study of them.

Pre-colonial methods of dividing political space were not obliterated by the proliferation of linear boundaries. These earlier divisions continue to influence the patterns of ethnography, trade and language with which contemporary linear boundaries must contend. Some of these pre-colonial methods were undoubtedly more flexible and sensitive to geopolitical change than contemporary rigid boundary lines. The difficulties inherent in imposing one system of political division upon the multitude which already existed in East Africa will be one of the major themes in this work, while pre-colonial means of dividing political space will be considered in some depth in Chapter Five.

Boundaries were imposed upon different parts of the colonised world in different ways. Although western-dominated international law has assured their legal basis, boundaries vary a great deal from continent to continent and also within continents. With regard to the study of African boundaries, the emphasis centres upon the adoption of colonial boundaries by successor states, and upon the difficulty or otherwise of imposing boundaries upon the existing African political landscape within the short timespan of colonial Africa. The United States-Mexico border apart, African boundaries are the most studied borders in the world. There are three main reasons for the different focus and intensity of approach: the fluid political character of pre-colonial Africa, the ways in which the western concept of political space was imposed upon the continent, and the relationship between the pre-colonial and

post-colonial maps of Africa. These factors will be recognised time and again throughout this study.

In accepting that the western concept of international boundaries is the predominant contemporary model of dividing political space, it is important to recognise that these boundaries are not fixed and to some extent remain in flux. Even in Europe, only ten states had the same boundaries in 1989 as in 1899 (O'Dowd and Wilson, 1996: 10). In addition to modifications in boundary delimitation, two apparently contradictory developments have occurred simultaneously as there has been movement between internal and external boundaries. Most of the federal boundaries of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have become international ones, while it is becoming difficult to determine at which point the internal boundaries of the European Union will cease to be international divisions. Certainly, they have already lost some of the functions which have traditionally been associated with international boundaries, such as customs posts and passport control. The re-ordering of boundaries in Eastern Europe was the third major re-alignment this century, so there is nothing permanent or definitive about political boundaries.

Associated with this, there is the possibility that globalisation is eroding the political foundations of the nation-state, as political and social activities increasingly transcend territorial boundaries (Anderson, 1995: 14). Many writers argue that modern boundaries are becoming obsolete: that they are becoming increasingly porous and so cannot fulfil their historic role as barriers to the movement of people, goods and ideas, and as markers of the extent of the power of the state (Wilson and Donnan, 1998: 1; Anderson, 1997: 2). Much has been written about the de-nationalising effect of the internet, and no doubt this process will continue. Boundaries have almost always been porous to some extent, but today there is more economic benefit in liberalising international flows.

There are many reasons for studying boundaries, but most centre around the notion that a country can best be understood through examining it in relation to its neighbours, and by studying how their populations interact. Wilson and Donnan claim that studying boundaries and borderlands shows the relative strengths of national ethnic identities. The gap between two neighbouring identities can become more visible when borders are open or closed (Wilson and Donnan, 1998: 16). Some go much further. Alvarez claims that the "borderlands genre is a basis upon which to redraw our conceptual frameworks of community and culture area" (Alvarez, 1995: 447). This thesis will be a study of the evolution of state functions as applied at the boundary. Prescott (1965: 58) gives this as the third aspect of boundary evolution, following evolution in definition and evolution in positioning, and considers that it is important because: "Variations in political systems are often accompanied by variations in regulations concerning economic activity and the movement of people, goods and ideas" (Prescott, 1965: 90).

Some borders have been the subject of particularly close scrutiny. The United States-Mexico boundary and the borders of Nigeria have received a lot of attention, partly because of the sharp economic and linguistic differentials which they indicate. Whether through warfare or the removal of economic barriers, borderlands are at the sharp end of international relations. They can be creators of goodwill or flashpoints for conflict. Nevertheless, even borders which appear relatively undivisive, such as the Dutch-German border, indicate many intangible differences in political attitude and social custom which are difficult to measure. There is always something worth studying.

Why study African boundaries?

The 1960s were an ideal time to study African boundaries: many states had recently become independent and there was great debate over the acceptance of colonial boundaries. From the 1960s onwards Africa's boundaries were guaranteed by a combination of western and African interests, and also by a fear of change. It could therefore be argued that this is a subject whose time has passed. However, there have been signs in the 1990s that the status quo is breaking down. Ali Mazrui lists three taboos that were broken during this decade, opening the way for change. The taboo of recolonization disappeared with the United Nations' and American intervention in Somalia; the taboo of secession was broken by Eritrea; and the taboo of retribalisation has begun to be weakened by Ethiopia's search for a federal constitution based on ethnic autonomy (Mazrui, 1994: 60). Moreover, many of the key players in the wars around the Great Lakes believe that the time has come to change the colonial boundaries. At the 1998 Franco-African summit in Paris, the Rwandan president, Pasteur Bizimungu, stated, "The colonial borders have had their day" (*Jeune Afrique*, 8-14 Dec 1998). This may just be rhetoric and it is impossible to estimate how much the political map of Africa will change, but the possibility of change indicates that this is a subject whose relevance is certainly not decreasing. In addition, as cross-border co-operation increases in many parts of the world, greater co-operation between African states is one of the most obvious ways of improving the fortunes of the peoples of Africa. Organisations such as the Southern African Development Community offer useful pointers towards a happier, more co-operative, integrated future.

The study of Africa's international boundaries is important. Political and socio-economic conditions in much of Africa are appalling and some of the difficulty arises from the nature of the continent's boundaries. However, it is easy to over-emphasize this point. Griggs is perhaps guilty of this when he writes that, "No

continent on earth has suffered more from bloodshed, war and misery arising from territorial disputes than Africa" and that these disputes normally arise because of the nature of Africa's boundaries (Griggs, 1995: 57). Apart from the doubtful notion of Africa being the continent to have suffered most from war, it is as easy to link all of Africa's conflicts to border disputes as it is to link them to ethnic conflict or colonialism. All of these issues are interlinked and there is no doubt that the partition of Africa is a major factor. What is surprising is that so many commentators are surprised by the unsettled nature of many African states. As far as this can be traced to borders, most of Africa's boundaries are only just over one hundred years old, and many are a good deal younger. It is unlikely that an entire continent could be divided into clearly defined cohesive polities within that time. Whilst it could be argued that this was achieved in North America, the boundaries of the United States and Canada moved westwards into territory that was almost devoid of people who mattered to the governments involved. African polities may not have counted for much with the colonial powers, but they did count for something. The frontiersmen of the North American continent were effectively moving into determined political space. Creating new polities out of an existing political landscape was a different matter entirely.

Definitions

The terminology surrounding border studies is subject to a certain amount of confusion. There have been numerous attempts to definitively determine the meanings of *boundary*, *border* and *frontier*, notably by J.R.V. Prescott (1965 and 1987), yet no accepted terminology exists which can reach across the academic disciplines, as well as across the North Atlantic. *Frontier*, for example, is used to refer to a line, an unconquered territory, a borderland, or an undeveloped area. As interest concerning boundaries has moved from linear features to the territories adjoining them, more recent boundary works, such as Malcolm Anderson's *Frontiers* (1997), have not

attempted such comprehensive definition. While it would be foolhardy to attempt to create yet another set of 'definitive' definitions, it would be useful to explain how these terms will be used in this work, and also to consider exactly what constitutes such features as boundaries and borderlands.

The *boundary* is the dividing line between two polities and is therefore also the point of contact between two or more sovereign territories, unless it lies on the coast, although international maritime boundaries are increasingly being delimited (Blake, 1987: xii). *Boundary* has only one meaning and its use as the preferred term for linear divisions is accepted as the norm by Prescott in his very useful survey of boundary studies (Prescott, 1965: 30). Various metaphors have been applied to it, of which Ratzel's vision of the state as the animal and the boundaries as the skin appears to be the most evocative (Prescott, 1965: 10), but such visualisations depict the state in isolation and do not appear to be particularly useful in boundary studies.

As the boundary is that which divides political space into polities, it seems as well to define *polity*. J. Anderson's definition can be accepted for the purposes of this work: "territorially bounded sovereign political communities", with a unified authority (Anderson, 1995: 14). However, even within the western concept of political space, there can be variation in the level of control within a territory (internal sovereignty) but not in the control of geographical extent (external sovereignty). For example, in Italy there is a great difference in the level of state control in Milan and in Palermo. The study of political space therefore involves two main factors: the level of control in a specific area, and the territorial extent of the area in question. *Polity* is a rather neutral term and therefore largely avoids the debate over the differences between states and non-states. In any case, this is not always a fruitful distinction to make.¹

¹ Koponen explores this in the Tanzanian context (1988: 192-209)

There seems to be little debate as to how clearly delimited and demarcated territories developed. Boundaries do not normally exist where one state ends and ungoverned territory begins, as it is the proximity of polities that requires the boundary to be determined, usually as the result of population pressure or conflict potential. Where there is a large gap between polities, a frontier exists and there is no need to define the edge of the state. The high population densities of Ancient Greece and Rome created closely packed settlements which were not generally separated by swamps, forests or uninhabited zones, and individual citizens and villages needed to determine the limits of their territory (Murty, 1978: ch5). This concept was carried across Europe by the Catholic church with its system of clearly defined parishes (Anderson, 1997: 14 and 17). Previously, the pattern had been one of a mish-mash of competing, localised authorities often with overlapping jurisdictions, all under the umbrella authority of Rome or the Roman church. According to Anderson, the previous concept of universal power in Europe became split between the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire, allowing nation-states to rise into the vacuum. They adopted the boundary concept of the church with the aid of the rise of record keeping and "introduced a precise sense of territorial identity and of territorial control" (Anderson, 1997: 18-25 and Murty, 1978: ch5).

Although boundaries have both barrier and conduit functions (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996), they must have originally developed as barriers. As population density and resource competition increased, so did state organisation and the ability to impose taxation. Taxation was accompanied by tax differentials between states, and the benefits of cross-border trade and smuggling became apparent. Greater state control allowed greater variation in policy and practice, and differences became more pronounced. Wage, commodity, tax, lifestyle and a host of other differentials encouraged borderlanders to interact with their neighbouring territory and neighbouring borderlanders, to perhaps a greater extent than they would do with their compatriots living the same distance away. However, at the same time the polities

involved are not able to control cross-border movements as effectively as they would like to. To take the most extreme example, Griffiths writes that there are 50,000 miles of international boundaries in Africa, with 345 official crossing points, or one for every 145 miles of boundary (Griffiths, 1996: 101). States bring people together within a state, extending commonality over a wider group of people than would otherwise have been the case. This creates sharp divisions at the fringes - divisions which borderlanders often do their best to undermine.

The recent work by Nugent and Asiwaju, African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities, has much to say, as one would expect, on the subject of the conduit and barrier functions of boundaries. The book considers how borderlanders exploit their location for trade, and access to medical services and schools, and do not therefore wish to see a change in their circumstances (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996: 390). The topic is complicated by the fact that it is not always easy to predict the effects of official policy. In West Africa, all the colonial powers attempted to restrict the supply of modern firearms and strong alcohol to the African population. However, the extent of the restriction varied, thereby creating regional differentiations. This had the unexpected side-effect of stimulating cross-border trade at the very time that many of the colonial powers were trying to minimise it, and in the very goods whose supply they aimed to restrict (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996: 3-4).

It is this western concept of political space which dominates today, and therefore European-style international political boundaries have become the norm. However, it would be incorrect to assume that the western notion of dividing political space did not exist outside Europe. It was common for many centuries among the Haya and Sukuma in north-western Tanzania, where the concept had entered the region from the Nile Valley (Austin, 1968: 6). There are countless other examples. The western concept was spread throughout the world by colonialism and then cemented by the creation of international organisations, such as the United Nations, and by international

law. Proof of general acceptance of this style of political division is provided by its adoption by colonial successor states, despite pre-independence condemnation and the emphasis upon international solidarity during the independence campaigns, most notably by Gandhi in India and Nkrumah in Africa. "In general it is remarkable how sacrosanct the former colonial boundaries became for African statesmen, despite their earlier nationalist criticisms of them as artificial and ethnically divisive" (Oliver and Fage, 1988: 260). In decrying the state formations over which they ruled, African and Asian political leaders would have removed the justification for their own positions.

Border is a term which most authors fail to define, perhaps because it is so difficult to pin down accurately. Determining the difference between border and boundary is a very subjective matter, but one concrete difference is that border must refer to international divisions while boundaries can be either internal or international (Ajamo, 1989: 37). Both refer to linear features which divide polities, although border has a tendency to allow for more breadth than boundary, an idea supported by Anderson (Anderson, 1997: 9). *Border* can therefore include all the paraphernalia of the most divisive boundaries: fences and ditches, customs posts and demilitarised zones, although in most cases even where demarcation structures are actually present, it can be very difficult to identify the boundary. It is often acceptable to use the two terms interchangeably, although there are exceptions. For instance, the difference between 'crossing the border' and 'crossing the boundary' is merely that the former is more usual; the latter is not incorrect. The term *boundary* is normally used when one wishes to be more precise; for example, when discussing the division of political space, or in delimiting or demarcating a boundary. The idea that *border* has more depth to it is emphasised by the use of the term borderland rather than boundaryland, when referring to a territory directly adjacent to the boundary.

The idea of natural boundaries is a discredited one. Even where suitable mountains or rivers exist, there is no intrinsic reason why a particular ethnic group should be

confined to one side of any particular topographical feature. Vegetation, rainfall and humidity differences are often far more effective obstacles than even the highest mountains (Prescott, 1987: 110). Indeed, "to mountain peoples, mountains do not necessarily constitute barriers. This is a concept of lowlanders" (Kirk, 1962: 156). In addition, rivers tend to facilitate contact not prevent it. Solomon writes that in the Mekong Delta, river dwellers often have much more in common with those living on the opposite bank, than they do with their terrestrial neighbours (Solomon, 1969: 18). In addition, the main proponents of the idea that 'natural' features should be the main determinants in locating boundaries, such as Ratzel (1897), Curzon (1907) and Holdich (1916), were writing at a time when military strategy was uppermost in the minds of political geographers, and when the concept of the static military defence had yet to be discredited.

Although the concept of natural boundaries is neither in vogue nor particularly useful, it does have a powerful effect on people's minds and it is easy to see why the concept has been so popular. It played a key role in strategic thinking until the First World War. As well as being a political barrier, a border is often far more powerful and evocative as a mental barrier. For instance, the Cheviot Hills form a substantial barrier between England and Scotland, yet at the same time they help to draw the people of the Anglo-Scottish borderlands together in a common culture. As the concept of natural borders was popular at the time of the partition of East Africa and during much of the colonial period, it would be unwise to dismiss it out of hand entirely.

The study of boundaries is intrinsically linked to that of borderlands: boundaries generally have to be studied within their territorial context, while borderlands can not be borderlands without boundaries. The *borderland* is the area next to the boundary; it lies within, and is part of a polity, and is often so marked by its proximity to another state that it develops a character different from the core territory of the polity. It

normally adjoins another borderland in a neighbouring polity. The term has only come into common usage in recent years, helped by the works of, among others, Asiwaju (1989, 1993). The boundary can be seen as the factor which divides polities, while the borderland can be perceived as an adhesive force, in that it encourages interaction across the boundary. The term *borderland* was certainly not current in colonial times, but it is commonly used in the field of border studies today and because it is the most accurate term, it will be used in this work. *Borderlanders* describes people living in borderlands, and is certainly preferable to the 'natives living in areas adjacent to the boundary' common in much colonial correspondence.

The term *frontier* has been used to describe a variety of concepts, but the meaning which is used in this work is purely a territorial one; linear features are adequately served by *border* and *boundary*. Adejuyigbe writes that, "frontiers are features of the period before boundaries are delimited or fixed" (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 1989: 28) and there is much to recommend this view. Most of the world's frontiers have disappeared as boundaries have been delimited, and as such are more likely to be involved in historical than contemporary studies. The frontier is an area of ungoverned land, which may or may not be sovereignly owned and which offers opportunities for expansion given favourable circumstances. Two types of frontier can be identified: open frontiers and restricted frontiers. Open frontiers are massive territories on the edge of polities, whilst restricted frontiers are areas of land lying between polities, and dividing them, but the main difference is a psychological one. All frontiers are ultimately restricted in that open land can never be limitless. Many of the borderlands of Tanganyika can be seen as frontiers - at least when seen through European eyes - as they were apparently without political control. Tanganyika as a whole can be seen as a frontier region in the Nineteenth Century, with people migrating into it from all sides.

Four terms regarding boundary creation are used in border studies and require brief definition. The following descriptions are based upon those given by Murty:

- delimitation: allocation of territory.
- definition: description of the boundary.
- delineation: marking the line upon a map.
- demarcation: physically marking the boundary upon the ground (Murty, 1978: 15).

THE THESIS

The Problematic

The primary aim of this thesis is to fill a major gap in the historiography of Tanganyika - namely, there is currently no large-scale study of the territory's boundaries. There are also no major studies of individual boundaries in the region. McEwen's International Boundaries of East Africa (1971) is very useful, although it is not specifically concerned with Tanganyika and mainly restricts itself to legal and diplomatic issues. Heinz Schneppen, who was the German Ambassador to Tanzania until 1998, has written a pamphlet on the creation of the borders of Tanzania (Schneppen, 1998). It is a fairly accurate account, but relies on existing works rather than any primary research. Tanganyika Notes and Records contains various articles on the boundaries of the territory, and these have proven to be of great use in particular areas of this study. Kjerland's unpublished thesis on the history of abaKuria (1995), contains a wealth of references and discussion on the borderlands with Kenya.

Despite the efforts of such works, the history of the territory's boundaries has yet to be addressed in its own right. Given the wealth of archival materials that are available, it seems that a major study is overdue. The main aim of this study will be to analyse the imposition of the western concept of dividing political space in Tanganyika between the initial colonial intrusion in 1884 and independence in 1961. Within the

framework of attempting to fill this gap, this thesis will tackle three main questions in order to focus the discussion:

- 1) To what extent did colonialism successfully impose the western system of dividing political space upon Africa?
- 2) To what extent were African political, economic and cultural systems affected by the boundaries?
- 3) With reference to the boundaries, to what extent did the actions of the colonialists and the borderlanders influence each other?

The issues surrounding each of these questions have been discussed earlier in this chapter, but there is some need for further comment. There is some overlap between each of them, but this may serve as an advantage rather than a problem, as it will help pull this work into a concerted whole.

- 1) To what extent did colonialism successfully impose the western system of dividing political space upon Africa?

The most central question to this work, this field of enquiry has already been considered in some depth in an earlier section. Political boundaries evolved in western Europe and were disseminated and imposed throughout much of the rest of the world through colonialism. Although linear boundaries were not unknown in pre-colonial Africa, they were merely one of many methods of dividing political space. What changed as a result of colonial rule, was that boundaries became the norm throughout Africa. Africans themselves have had much to do with the imposition. By maintaining the divisions following independence, African political elites have reinforced the notion of the linear boundary. The extent of the role of colonialism and the colonialists in the

imposition will be discussed in the case of Tanganyika. This work will examine the processes by which western-style boundaries were created, as well as the African response to the new divisions during the colonial period. Of course, it would be as foolish to generalise about Africa and Africans as it would be to do so about Europe and Europeans. However, as will be seen, there were certain similarities in African approaches to dividing political space, just as the system of linear boundaries is a broadly western European construct.

Their lack of regard for the Kenya-Tanganyika boundary has been well documented.

2) To what extent were African political, economic and cultural systems affected by the boundaries?

This study is not restricted to the theoretical niceties of the imposition of linear boundaries in East Africa. The impact of these boundaries is also a central pillar of the work. There can be little doubt that many African political, economic and cultural systems were disturbed, disrupted or destroyed by the new boundaries. The colonial political boundaries allied to colonial rule in general robbed existing African polities of their sovereignty and African political systems were almost totally undermined. Economic and cultural systems fared a little better. The imposition of the borders as economic barriers caused trade routes to be diverted and in some cases they disappeared altogether. Many pre-colonial cultural networks were divided by the boundaries, but links usually remained and in some cases the colonial authorities went to great lengths to avoid disruption. In other areas, however, division could be seen as an objective in its own right. This was particularly true with regards to pastoralists in the Kenya-Tanganyika borderlands, although the nature of the terrain, lack of manpower and the determination of the pastoralists usually scuppered any colonial attempts at control.

One of the main points to be considered is whether the colonial boundaries had a fundamentally detrimental effect upon Africans living in borderland regions. Until the

1980s, most studies portrayed Africans either as being passive or as strongly resisting the partition. Various classifications of resistance techniques were devised, but all emphasized the divisive, negative nature of the colonial borders. The past decade has seen a growing acceptance of the idea that Africans were actually able to exploit the boundaries for their own benefit. This study forms part of that growing trend. The Maasai are a prime example of a group who used the boundaries in a variety of ways for their own benefit; they will be considered in depth in Chapters Ten and Eleven. Their lack of regard for the Kenya-Tanganyika boundary has been well documented, but the actual means by which they took advantage of the boundary between the two territories have received much less attention.

3) With reference to the boundaries, to what extent did the actions of the colonialists and the borderlanders influence each other?

Of the three questions, this is probably the most difficult to assess. During the early years of partition, the influence of African borderlanders was minimal as the colonialists sought to militarily impose their authority. Their influence grew in later years, as the colonial authorities and colonial officials on the ground developed border policies which they attempted to implement. In practice, the response of the borderlanders to these policies often caused the authorities to rethink their plans. For instance, repeated attempts by the British authorities in Kenya and Tanganyika to control Maasai movements across their common boundary were eventually abandoned as unworkable. By the 1930s, control centred on the movement of cattle. The spread of rinderpest was a massive problem for everyone, and so the Maasai co-operated to some extent with attempts to tackle it. In the same way, the willingness of some local African leaders to co-operate with smugglers prompted the Dar es Salaam government to offer rewards to the leaders for information. Resistance to colonial border policies was not usually dogmatic. Where policies brought benefits, co-operation often

developed. Where they brought hardship and disruption, resistance in one form or another could be expected.

Strong political division could also benefit Africans. For several years German troops were unwilling to cross into Portuguese East Africa in pursuit of the rebel/resistance leader Machemba, who was therefore able to evade capture by utilising the boundary and the lack of Portuguese forces in the area. German forces eventually had to put the western concept of sovereignty to one side in their pursuit of Machemba. Also during the early years of colonial rule, borderlanders relocated across the boundary a short distance, in areas where one colonial authority imposed direct taxes and the other did not. There were very few occasions on which the colonialists were able to formulate a policy and impose it without problems. Interaction was very much the rule.

Structure

The core of this thesis is composed of an examination of political, economic and cultural aspects of the imposition. Under each of these headings, the pre-colonial situation will be considered before colonial policy and African responses are discussed.

Part Two is concerned with the political effects and impact of the imposition. While this is neither a detailed study of the partition in East Africa nor a diplomatic history, the actual creation of the boundaries requires some assessment and will be the subject of Chapter Four. Chapter Five will consider the nature of pre-colonial African methods of dividing political space, before examining the impact of the partition upon African politics and African responses to the situation. Chapter Six will examine the development of cross-border international relations in the light of the partition. The

new territories of East and Central Africa were faced with a variety of major problems and had to interact together in a new political landscape.

Part Three is a study of the economic concerns of partition. Chapter Seven will discuss the impact upon pre-colonial African economic systems and trade routes, while Chapter Eight will examine one aspect of trade that encompasses both the divisive and conduit nature of boundaries - smuggling. Previously legitimate trade became illegal with the partition of Africa, yet at the same time, tax, duty and policy differentials created opportunities for smuggling. This was one of the main challenges to the new borders and one of the methods that African borderlanders had of exploiting their position. This chapter will use Tanganyika's sea border with Zanzibar as its main case study. Chapter Nine will provide a concise examination of pro-active colonial economic policy relating to the territory's borders. It demonstrates how the colonial economic development of the territory and its boundaries played a major role in shaping the country and imposing the western state system.

Part Four will consider one of the main cultural challenges to the boundaries - pastoralism. As a socio-economic system, it can be seen as the antithesis of settled colonial rule and fixed linear boundaries. Where pastoral peoples occupied borderlands, the colonial governments were faced with major problems regarding their economic and veterinary policies. Chapter Ten examines attempts to control pastoral borderland groups, while Chapter Eleven will concentrate upon veterinary restrictions. Together, the two chapters will analyse how pastoralists attempted to defend their way of life from boundary divisions.

Chapter Twelve is the concluding chapter. Conclusions to the three main questions will be examined and the threads of the argument brought together, before the recent history of Tanganyika's borders is considered. The final conclusions centre upon the legacy for the African continent as a whole.

The division of the information into different chapters is partly artificial, and many case-studies could be placed into a variety of chapters. For instance, discussion between the Kenyan and Tanganyikan administrative officers on the movement of the Maasai could be placed in the chapter on international relations or that on pastoralism. As with the overlapping nature of the three questions, this can be seen as a strength not a weakness, as the chapters interlink and build upon each other.

Why Tanganyika?

Tanganyika offers a unique historical backdrop for this study. Firstly, it had wide exposure to colonial rule, from Arab, Omani and Zanzibari to Portuguese, German and British. It also contains a vast number of different African ethnic groups, and so was something of a melting pot of ideas and influences. Unlike other parts of East Africa, it possessed no large centralised kingdoms, such as Buganda or Bunyoro. Despite this, it gave birth to one of the greatest acts of resistance to colonial rule anywhere in Africa, the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905-7. In addition, it was controlled by two different European powers, and the accompanying political changeover exacerbated the upheaval of the Great War. No other African country suffered so much directly or indirectly from that conflict. Lastly, the voluntary fusion of two sovereign states - through the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar - to form Tanzania, is a unique case in Africa. Tanzania is often considered to be exceptional in African terms with regard to its national cohesion and lack of ethnic conflict.¹ All in all, Tanganyika offers a distinct colonial inheritance.

The territory's control by two different colonial powers allows scope for assessing the imposition of linear boundaries by the West as a whole, rather than by one power

¹ See, for example, Gwassa, 1969: 86.

in particular. This study will not, however, attempt a direct comparison of British and German border policies. German policy is much more difficult to assess because pre-1914 rule was weaker in scope and intensity, and because the boundaries were less identifiable and definite. More space in the work as a whole is therefore given over to the British period. It is also difficult to place German border policy in global context, as their non-African colonies were tiny and tended to be islands. Britain, on the other hand, had a long history of colonial boundary-making, and a large body of work exists on British boundaries in India. In practice, however, the key objectives of the two powers were not so very different: the control of their African populations, the development of a colonial economy and the maintenance of peace with neighbouring colonies.

Tanganyika was also a territory with a large number of international boundaries: it had eight neighbours during the British period, or nine if the sea boundary with Zanzibar is included. It has a variety of borders: from sea, lake and river boundaries, to watershed and astronomical boundaries lying in both lightly and densely populated borderlands. These borders divide a large number of ethnic groups, from the famous Maasai to the lesser-known Matambwe. It is also an excellent environment within which to study pre-colonial methods of dividing political space, boasting linear, zonal and ethnic examples, as well as combinations of all three. The long sea boundary is a particularly important component because it tied Tanganyika into the wider influences of the Indian Ocean. Links with Somalia, Oman and much of the Middle East remained strong throughout the colonial period, while trade with India increased greatly under British rule. This sea border also undoubtedly enabled a great deal of long distance smuggling, although, as Chapter Six will demonstrate, it was often difficult to distinguish whether contraband came from Zanzibar or from more distant lands.

Themes

A number of themes run through this work, permeating the argument and pulling the chapters together into a concerted whole. First amongst equals is the very harsh environment which dominates much of East Africa and which provides the backdrop to this study: animal and human disease, tsetse, aridity, humidity and famine; all exacerbated by African and colonial warfare and slave-raiding; all working together and acting upon each other. Jeffrey Herbst has explored the relevance of this for the development of polities and the division of political space (Herbst, 2000). He argues that the harsh environment is the main cause of low population densities in Africa. This in turn influenced the type of polities which developed, hindered the growth of cities and therefore also hampered the spread of European control through regional centres.

Man's struggle to impose himself upon his environment has probably been greater in Africa than on any other continent. Relatively recent works, such as Iliffe's *The Africans* (1995), stake a convincing claim for this being the main theme of African history. A whole subfield has developed around the topic with works such as Kjekshus' *Ecology, Control and Economic Development: the case of Tanganyika, 1850-1950* (1977) and Maddox et al's *Custodians of the Land* (1996), highlighting the role of disease and ecological balance in East Africa. In comparing the German colony created at the end of the Nineteenth Century, and the territory inherited by the British in 1919, the ecological disaster of the 1890s must be stressed. Rinderpest, smallpox and famine all struck with such effect, that areas of the country remain depopulated to this day. The extent of the disaster can be debated, but it undoubtedly had a profound effect on what was to come.

The second theme to be considered, is that the imposition of linear boundaries upon Africa came about because of military superiority and was maintained by military occupation. It is fruitless to try to dress it up as anything else. There is nothing

intrinsically natural or superior about western-style linear boundaries over other means of dividing political space. In addition, the European colonies and boundaries were not created in isolation on an isotopic, sterile plain, but in a living, breathing, politicised environment, and the colonial administrators spent more time responding to events than shaping them.

With regard to colonial rule itself, the dominant theme is of the remoteness and importance of the men on the ground. For example, the British Provincial Commissioner (PC) for Northern Province wanted to set up a post in the highly sensitive borderland occupied by the 'bad men' of the Maasai - the Purko and Loita. The man chosen had to be a bachelor, "for the first six months the situation will be delicate, and that bad political work might involve us in fighting; the area is so remote that I can really exercise no control over the officer stationed there, and we must therefore pick our man carefully".² As in most other cases, the man - for he was invariably a man - had to be a jack of all trades. The District Officer (DO) for Bugufi on the Burundi border emphasized the remoteness of many borderlands, when he wrote of his encounters with forest-dwelling pygmies who had never seen a white man (Lumley, 1976: 42). The same DO was forced to serve for seven years without a break during the Second World War; his term of duty was only brought to an end by a mental breakdown and physical exhaustion.

The qualifications for such a job were an Arts degree from a major university, apparent robustness, resourcefulness and an aptitude for the outdoor life. Such a job attracted many dedicated men. Major Delmé-Radcliffe, wrote while on duty in northern Uganda, "for the Empire I'd stay till I dropped" (Beachey, 1996: vii) and indeed he refused all leave, even when under pressure from superiors to take it. This

² TNA: TS10298/I: 94, 17th October 1927. Letter from PC Mitchell to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

seems extreme, but it is wrong to judge it entirely by the standards of today. Such men saw themselves serving a noble cause and had a "mystical faith in imperial destiny" (Beachey, 1996: viii). The actions of the men on the ground were crucial. Policy was formed in Dar es Salaam and in the metropolitan capitals, but a lowly administrative officer could be put in charge of a district of half a million people, and his decisions could influence the area for years to come.

7. Barnum, 1976: 1-11) Koponen writes that the problem is complicated by the abaKuria not conceiving of their inclusion within a 'tribe' (Koponen, 1983: 180). Where they do not believe in such labels, surely

Problems

Several problems were encountered in this study which should be mentioned at this point. Firstly, the statistics which are given in primary and secondary works present several difficulties. They are often impossible to check and it is easy to take apparently accurate figures at face value. The 1988 Tanzanian Census reached the pinpoint accurate conclusion that there were 341,146 abaKuria in Tanzania (Tanzania, 1988: 175), yet many pages of the census upon which it was based were found to be blank (SENSA, 1988). Even where figures can be cross referenced, other problems emerge. For example, it is possible to check migration figures against census figures and plantation records, but many non-Tanganyikan Africans came to assume a Tanganyikan ethnic identity, particularly where they were closely related to Tanganyikan groups. These included many of the largest groups to migrate into Tanganyika, such as the Barundi and the Makonde (Alpers, 1975: 377). The report on the 1957 Tanganyikan Census stated that, "it is clear that many Africans may say that they belong to one tribe at the time of one census, and to another at the next" (Tanganyika, 1963).

Confusion over the names of people and places has also proved to be a difficulty. For instance, the names of ethnic groups and the structure of groups and sub-groups are often confused, perhaps because several names are used for the same group or

because the name of a group has changed. Local studies are needed to cope with this, and still cannot be guaranteed to exclude inaccuracies. For example, the Bantu peoples speaking different dialects of igiKuria were variously named Wakuria, Watende, Bakuria and abaKuria in the colonial records. The Germans also used their totem name - the Elephant People - to refer to them. There is still some dispute amongst modern writers over correct usage (Kjerland, 1995: 7; Berntsen, 1976: 1-11). Koponen writes that the problem is complicated by the abaKuria not conceiving of their inclusion within a 'tribe' (Koponen, 1988: 180). Where they do not believe in such labels, surely they are in the best position to judge. Moreover, European attempts at ethnic categorisation were hampered by the fluid nature of ethnicity in Africa.

Place names are no less problematic. To take one example, the names of islands in Lake Nyasa were often changed. Papia island was previously known as New Heligoland and continues to have the alternative name of Mpuulu island (McEwen, 1971: 197). On occasion, DO's even invented their own names for places, either because they believed none other existed, because of difficulty in pronouncing African names, or out of sheer whim. Several discrepancies were only detected after extensive research during this project, so it is more than likely that others remain. Overall, however, it is remarkable how often African names for features were adopted. Spelling difficulties range from simple spelling changes such as Taveita to Taveta, to differences associated with the interchangeability of 'l' and 'r' in most Bantu languages, to differences in Bantu prefixes and suffixes, such as the use of Wakuria, Bakuria and abaKuria.

The archival materials which provide the backbone of this study also present several problems, regarding the choice of information to be recorded, and by whom, and also the selection of materials to be destroyed. This is important, because to a large extent the case studies chosen have been determined by the availability of material and information. This is acceptable, providing that the availability is not

knowingly biased. The archival materials are, however, highly biased. The vast majority of printed materials are written by Europeans, while the vast majority of those affected were Africans. Most of the documentation is European, while African sources are usually written from memory (Austen, 1968: 1-2). Even where African written statements exist, they are usually written under European conditions. The racism inherent in the colonial record often discounted Africans. For instance, a document may describe two soldiers crossing a border, causing problems and harassing natives. In reality, this can refer to two Europeans who may be accompanied by five, ten or thirty askaris.

Boundary records are biased towards those borders which experienced most problems, or which were governed by DOs who took a particular interest in recording useful information. Most recorded cases are those which came to the attention of central government, and this depends to a very high degree upon which DO was involved. In addition, a large proportion of the archival materials have been destroyed. The German records in Dar es Salaam have been particularly badly hit by selective destruction. Those saved are mainly financial records, and this must be kept in mind in the assessment of material. For instance, most of the smuggling and criminal files were destroyed, along with many of the court records, so that most of those which remain relate to the payment of rewards to those detecting smugglers. Such files contain useful information on the nature of smuggling and so can be of great use, but their bias towards the financial expenditure of government departments is always a factor.

Another difficulty apparent in this work is maintaining focus. A discussion of international boundaries inevitably turns to geopolitics, given that geopolitics is concerned with relations between polities, and that boundaries divide and link polities. There is therefore the danger of being pulled too far into the orbit of geopolitical theory. For example, borderlands are at the receiving end of any particular state's international policies, and relations between two adjoining borderlands are in turn a

major influence upon the formation of such policies. The danger is that this could lead to the study of relations between the two polities involved in general, and not just with regard to the boundary. The distinction between the two subjects is a fine one.

In considering examples of the imposition of European rule and European concepts in Tanzania, it is very difficult to generalise. At the end of the German period, groups such as the Baha were still engaged in primary resistance, while others had experienced twenty years of European rule. Some African polities were defined by territory and others by population. Some European administrators were deeply concerned about the welfare of the Africans under their rule, others were more interested in their own careers. This work aims to draw some conclusions about the nature of the interaction between Africans and Europeans, and between African and European concepts at the time of the colonial imposition, but every case must be taken on its merits, and there are often many exceptions to any conclusion.

Finally, there are great difficulties associated with the issues of ethnicity and statehood in Africa. One of the major disputes in pre-colonial African history is whether pre-colonial polities can be described as states and whether, indeed, this really matters very much. On balance it seems that there is no dividing line between states and stateless societies. Most African societies were not states in the European model, but some did exhibit many of the same characteristics, such as centralised bureaucracies. If the African groups of eastern Africa did live in stateless societies, this is not to say they were less advanced or sophisticated. States are generally not as flexible a means of human organisation as many forms of stateless societies.

In this work, it is difficult to talk about a particular group without giving it a specific name - a label. This can act to give it a cohesiveness and singularity which may have been absent. Although it is open to debate, there was probably not, for instance, a collective pre-colonial Makonde consciousness. Colonialism and the associated British

policy of indirect rule with the promotion of tribalism, encouraged the growth of ethnic consciousness.

One of the main effects of more fluid and flexible groups than those in Europe at the same time, is that it is often difficult to decide whether a particular group has been split by a boundary, or whether it has divided itself by partly moving across the line. Fluid African groups joined with other groups, split and reformed, so that although two neighbouring groups could have very similar systems of governance or lifestyle, they could also have very different ones. The one characteristic that they almost always shared was their adaptability. So where a boundary cut through a particular group, it may not have been especially homogenous in any case. What it lost was its flexibility.

Literature Review: Primary Sources

The subject of this research is a rather broad field of enquiry and far more relevant material exists than could ever be included. However, it is hoped that a representative cross-section of sources and aspects of the imposition has been considered. This work is largely based upon archival resources, with considerable support from secondary studies, and limited addition from personal observations. Many of the relevant archival files seem to have been unread, many others have been used only once or twice. Footnote references provide the relevant file, page in the file, correspondents and date of document. Where an impression is gained from the contents of a whole file, then only the file number is given.

References and information on Tanganyika's boundaries are widely scattered. One source is boundary commission reports, which often contain references to obscure matters reflecting the personal interests of the writer, ranging from flora and fauna, to

game hunting, to African history. In an article about the Anglo-German boundary commission on which he served, G.E. Smith includes various comments useful to this work, such as observations on the African political and military balance of power in Maasailand (Smith, 1907). Material has been used from five archives and over two dozen libraries, while newspaper cuttings from the Yorkshire Post to the Vossischen Zeitung have provided a wealth of material on colonial matters.

At the start of this research, it was assumed that the archives would contain references to cross-border service provision, but very little material was discovered. Education and medical provision was very limited, and even what existed was generally run by religious organisations. Some references to the use of Tanganyikan hospitals by inhabitants of Portuguese East Africa (PEA) along the Rovuma are included in this work, along with some information on famine relief, but otherwise there is little. This would be a more suitable field of enquiry in independent Africa, where borderlanders can and do exploit state differences.

The Tanzanian National Archives (TNA) in Dar es Salaam contained a great deal of useful material. A large quantity of district files are kept in Dar es Salaam, but as matters concerning international boundaries tend to involve neighbouring states, they are usually referred to the central government and so are also found within the Tanganyika Secretariat files. One problem was that a lot of what was listed in the archive guides did not exist or could not be found by the archivists. It is difficult to estimate the proportion, but perhaps forty percent was unobtainable. This was somewhat worse with regard to the German records kept in the TNA. Half of all the files which related to borders concerned the Kenyan border and half of these related to the Maasai. Other popular themes included migration, border disputes, disease control and demarcation. Only twenty percent of the district files were present, and of those which were identified many were mixed up, dates were confused, and contents incorrect. Of the other material in Dar es Salaam, the East Africa section of the

university library was well stocked, and contained the excellent and renowned Hans Cory papers.

The Zanzibar National Archives (ZNA) were well organised and presented, although much of the material was illegible. Many of the original record books had fallen apart, but a large-scale project to save the records had sealed each page in plastic. Despite these efforts, many pages were fragmented and faded, making much of the handwriting unreadable. In addition, many of the early German records had been written in shorthand or were hand-written in the original German script. Most of the material is from the German period, as Zanzibar is the main archive for Nineteenth Century colonial records. As in the former Potsdam and Berlin archives, the records are thorough, showing that the Germans had a great interest in record keeping. It also seems that they were more interested in the creation of the boundaries because they were surrounded by alien powers.

The Reichskolonialamt records contain a massive amount of boundary material; there are over 250 files directly concerned with the subject, and the average size of each file is 3-400 pages. The most studied boundaries are those with the Congo and British East Africa, and there is also a lot of material on the PEA border. The main files of interest are RKA: R1001 568 - R1001 638/2. Much of the information is concerned with demarcation, but there is a great deal else of more general interest. Apart from the RKA files, the Berlin department of the Bundesarchiv also contains the records of the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) or German Foreign Office.

Some use was made of relevant files from the Kenyan National Archive (KNA) - several relevant papers had been photocopied and placed in the TNA, while the thesis by Kjerland had made great use of KNA material (Kjerland, 1995). Copies of other KNA documents were obtained for the author. The other archives which were used

include the Tanzanian Central Library, the University of Dar es Salaam Library, the Zanzibar National Archives, SOAS archive and Rhodes House in Oxford.

Great use has been made of the primary materials contained within Hertslet (1909) and Brownlie and Burns (1979). Brownlie himself took a particular interest in the boundaries of Tanganyika, writing an article on the Tanganyika-Malawi boundary. Hertslet was the librarian at the British Foreign Office, and his three volume epic contains the numerous treaties and agreements by which Africa was partitioned, including many in translation.

Literature Review: Secondary Material

The main emphasis of African boundary studies has been upon the acceptance of colonial borders by independent African states, and upon the division of pre-colonial groups which this brought about. Boundary disputes have also been of great interest, but these are mainly a function of the first two areas. Early border literature largely ignored African boundaries. Lord Curzon concentrated upon Europe and the British Indian Empire in his famous treatise, despite writing at the end of the partition of Africa (Curzon, 1907). Later, African borders began to be examined from a Eurocentric point of view, with many studies of the diplomacy surrounding the creation of the boundaries (Asiwaju, 1985: v). Today, many African boundary studies are concerned with borderland socio-economics and tend to concentrate upon very small populations. Fewer writers are prepared to tackle the whole range of African boundaries in a single volume.

The number of colonial powers involved in Africa means that the modern boundaries are real symbols of differentiation. Portuguese, French, English and Arabic are all major linguistic forces, and each has been accompanied by legal, political and

cultural traditions. This differentiation has been emphasized by the distribution of the colonies and the political map of colonial Africa produced a patchwork quilt effect with the exception of the French West Africa. A result of this has been to make cross-border co-operation more troublesome; linguistically, legally and in countless other ways. In addition, the internal weakness of many African states means that they regard border problems as even more of a difficulty. In this way, the history and pattern of Africa's borders certainly explains the concentration upon boundary disputes.

Another effect of the number of colonial powers is in the methodology of research. Researchers must contend with various languages and legal and administrative systems. It is therefore much easier to examine a relatively small locality which requires coping with one or at most two systems and languages, or the whole continent, which does not require specialisation in any one region, than to study borders on a sub-continental scale. When cross-border African studies are attempted, they are mainly concerned with how one ethnic group is divided by a colonial boundary. Miles' Hausaland Divided (1994), Asiwaju's Western Yorubaland Under European Rule (1976) and Amenumey's The Ewe Unification Movement (1989) are prime examples. Such studies in other parts of the world tend to be concerned with the interaction between two ethnic groups and a boundary, such as Sahlins' Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (1989) - an excellent study of the historical development of a region influenced by two major states but very much retaining its own identity.

Despite the number of colonial powers with connections to the continent, it appears that African boundary studies is a field dominated by Anglo-Saxon and African writers. While historians such as Benmassaud (1989) and Igue (1977) have examined aspects of the genre, the subject does not seem to have excited the passions of the francophone world as much as historians from the United States and United Kingdom. German and Portuguese writers appear to have paid even less attention to the field.

When boundary disputes on other continents are studied, there is very much a feeling that these problems are solvable, but much of the material on African boundary disputes gives the impression that they are just one part of the eternal turmoil of Africa, and that they are unlikely to become settled in the foreseeable future. This may or may not be an accurate reflection of the state of Africa, but again the historiography appears to reflect perceptions of the current condition of African borders.

The selection of certain themes for close scrutiny in African boundary studies is usually a reflection of local circumstance. For instance, there have been many more studies of the relationship between pastoralists and boundaries in Africa, such as Markakis' Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa (1993), than elsewhere in the world. This is understandable, given that, "Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia rank first, third and fifth respectively in the world in terms of pastoral population size" (Markakis, 1990: 218). While not specifically a boundary study, Markakis's work shines a great of light upon the nature of boundaries and man's relationship with them. Pastoralists do have some sense of territoriality, but not being sedentary can in itself be a challenge to political control and to linear boundaries. There are fewer pastoralists elsewhere in the world, so naturally there are fewer studies of pastoralists and boundaries. However, other differences in historiography are not so easy to explain. For example, there have been several studies of the use of African boundaries to prevent the spread of disease, such as Amutenya and van der Linden's study of the Namibia-Angolan border fence (1992), but the subject has received little attention elsewhere. It may be that the kind of anti-cattle border fence which has been constructed in the southern half of Africa has not been attempted on other continents. There may be other reasons, or it may be that most unhistorical of explanations - chance.

Works which are directly concerned with Tanganyika's borders have already been mentioned, but a number of more general works have been a great help. Anderson

(1997) and Prescott (1965, 1987 and others) provide excellent general discussions on the nature of international boundaries - although they fail to reproduce any feeling of life in borderlands - while Kopytoff (1989) is the best introduction to pre-colonial African methods of dividing political space. Kopytoff draws examples from most of the continent and indicates the best awareness of the nature of pre-colonial African polities. Herbst's States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (2000), offers an interesting insight into the links between pre-colonial political systems and the continent's modern-day struggle with the nation-state. Tanzania/Tanganyika was one of the least examined African states until the 1960s; thanks in large part to the interest generated by Nyerere's policies, it is now one of the most studied (Kimambo, 1993: 1). Today, a large body of material exists on the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history of the territory. However, most studies look at the creation of Tanganyika from the point of view of the independence movement and the creation of a national consciousness. Little has been written on the creation of Tanganyika as a political entity - the carving out of a new structure and its imposition upon Africa and Africans. Coulson (1982) is an excellent study of contemporary Tanzanian decision-making in the light of its colonial history, while Koponen (1995) and Iliffe (1979) provide two of the best country histories anywhere in Africa. Koponen appears to be the most widely-read and thorough of those historians specialising in Tanzania. Of the general histories in German, Tetzlaff (1970) seems to be the best, although it is now somewhat dated.

The course of the research

The reasons for choosing Tanzania were given earlier, but it must also be admitted that it was selected because it is one of the more peaceful countries in eastern Africa, a fact which was forcefully brought home by the various eruptions among Tanzania's neighbours during the period of the research. The research and writing up of this thesis

took four years. The first year was spent in Edinburgh, studying Tanganyikan history, preparing the research and learning languages. Short visits were made to the Public Record Office (PRO) and Rhodes House Library before three months were spent at the Berlin and Potsdam archives. A further three months were spent learning Swahili and preparing for the research period in Tanzania.

The research in Tanzania itself was also archive based. Visits to border areas were made and some interviews were undertaken, but these were aimed at giving a feel for the areas in question, rather than as a mainstay of the research. It was not an attempt to provide what Elizabeth Isichei calls "a cosmetic veneer" of fieldwork for research essentially based upon archival materials (Isichei, 1997: 10). Fieldwork normally requires archival support, the reverse is not always the case. Spending some time in a borderland gives one person's experience of one place at one time, yet there can be no better way to get the feel of a place, and such experiences can therefore be invaluable. Following nine months in Tanzania, a similar period was spent studying in the PRO in London and in collating the collected material, before the thesis itself was written.

Terminology

Most of the problems concerning border and historical terminology and definition have already been discussed, but several miscellaneous terms will be defined here. *Tanganyika* is used to refer to the territory under both British and German rule. There are territorial differences between the two colonies, but it is useful to have one term to cover the territory for the entire colonial period. General colonial policies will be examined, so the separation of Rwanda and Burundi from Tanganyika does not prevent colonial comparisons. The term *German East Africa* or *Deutsch Ost Afrika* obviously refers only to the period of German rule.

Because it is not now fashionable to use the term *tribe*, and as the term has been much abused, it will not generally be used in this work. However, as the term was widely employed by the colonial authorities, it will be mentioned in certain contexts. Several terms can appear pejorative or patronising. For instance, it is debatable whether it is better to use subchiefdom or dependent territory or semi-autonomous region. It could be wrong to attach European political terminology to African concepts, but it is equally wrong to exaggerate the differences between European and African political structures by using different sets of terminology. This is not the place for a full discussion, but the term which seems most apt in each particular case will be used.

The names of Tanganyika's neighbours have changed at various times since the partition of Africa, and it may be helpful to provide some notes here:

a) Rhodesia as a whole came under British South African Company administrative control under Royal Charter in 1889, and remained so until 1923. British Central Africa Protectorate was the term used to describe Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland until 1897; following that year, it just referred to Nyasaland. In 1911, Northeast and Northwest Rhodesia were amalgamated to become North or Northern Rhodesia. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was composed of North Rhodesia, South Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was set up in 1953 and dissolved in 1963. Nyasaland became independent in 1964 and changed its name to Malawi. Northern Rhodesia also became independent in 1964 and adopted the name of Zambia

b) British East Africa (BEA) held the official title of the East Africa Protectorate until it was renamed Kenya Colony and Protectorate in 1920.

c) The Congo Free State became the Belgian Congo and then Zaire, although it was generally referred to as the Congo in East Africa.

d) Portuguese East Africa (PEA) was the colonial name for Mozambique.



e) Various spellings of Rwanda and Burundi were used, depending upon the period and the nationality of the writer or speaker. Ruanda and Urundi were the most common versions in the early colonial period.

This introductory chapter has examined the research within the context of border studies and the historical study of Tanganyika, as this work is located at the point where these two fields overlap. It has hopefully pointed out the need for a study of the international boundaries of Tanganyika. Firstly, although there is a large body of archival material relating to the boundaries of the country, it has largely been unexploited. Secondly, a large number of works discuss the development and functions of the borders in passing, and use can be made of them in this study. In addition, both Tanganyika and modern Tanzania provide interesting and worthwhile case-studies of the means by which the western concept of political space was imposed upon the continent of Africa. Finally, boundary and borderland studies is a growing and developing field, to which this study can hopefully make a small contribution.

PART TWO: POLITICAL DIVISIONS

The political division of East Africa was carried out on many levels, from European diplomacy on a grand scale, to local African and European manoeuvrings in the territory itself. The following three chapters seek to bring these strands together, not only in an attempt to explain how Tanganyika was carved out, but with the aim of analysing how international, national and local interests affected the actual implementation of the borders once their locations had been determined. Chapter Four will chart the actual creation of the boundaries, largely through European agencies. Chapter Five will analyse what effect the partition had upon African polities and politics in the newly determined borderland regions, as well as considering African responses to the division. Chapter Six returns to colonial geopolitics with an assessment of border relations between the colonial territory of Tanganyika and her neighbours.

As the three chapters build upon each other, it will clearly be demonstrated that colonialism did successfully impose the western system of dividing political space upon Africa. A previously flexible, fluid political landscape with a variable hierarchy of sovereignties was replaced by rigid linear boundaries, where all states were meant to be politically equal. The colonial powers and the doctrine of colonialism were indeed the chief agents of this transformation. Broadly determined spheres of influence gradually evolved into more accurately delimited territories. Even where colonial ignorance was high and disputed territories were of no apparent value, boundary delimitation and demarcation was pursued. This was certainly a radical break with the African past. On the ground, African polities could and did influence the details of partition, including the location of the boundaries, as European and African actions influenced each other. Even here, the broad pattern of the colonial map was determined almost solely by the European powers; most African objections - led to relatively minor - though numerous - adjustments. Yet with the western notion of dividing political space replacing African

concepts, and with political sovereignty passing from African polities to European ones, it was always unlikely that African political systems and structures could survive.

CHAPTER TWO: THE MAKING OF THE BOUNDARIES

The broad outline of Tanganyika's boundaries was largely determined during the early years of German rule, although minor alterations were made throughout the colonial period. It was therefore during these years that African methods of dividing political space were overridden. The main agents of the creation of the boundaries were the British and German governments, and to a lesser extent, those of France, Belgium and Portugal. A substantial role was also played by the chartered companies involved. The German East Africa Company led by Carl Peters, and the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) led by William MacKinnon both campaigned for imperial expansion on a scale which far exceeded the colonial zeal of their respective governments. The main players in the partition, therefore, were non-African, and both the European governments and chartered companies can be seen as agents of colonialism. As will be seen in the next chapter, African polities certainly had a role to play in making local alterations to the positioning and functions of the boundaries, but - the Sultanate of Zanzibar excepted - none were of sufficient political, military or economic weight to influence the general partition. Whether or not Zanzibar can be described as an African polity is open to debate, but by the time of the partition, the political ties which had linked Zanzibar and Oman had been broken, so the Sultanate can certainly be described as an African-based power.¹

¹ Zanzibar was not part of Tanganyika, but at the time of partition and during the early years of colonial rule, Zanzibar played a prominent if decreasing role in East African affairs. There is a Nineteenth Century Zanzibari saying:

"When the pipes play in Zanzibar

They dance on the lakes"

(From several sources including Hollingsworth, 1953: 6, and personal experience on

This chapter seeks to examine the processes involved in the creation of Tanganyika's boundaries. It does not seek to undertake a root and branch study of the delimitation and demarcation of the borders. This type of diplomatic study can be found in McEwen (McEwen, 1971) and the treaties are given in full in Hertslet (Hertslet, 1909). For those interested in the nitty-gritty of boundary delimitation and demarcation, the RKA and the PRO contain a wealth of material on the creation of Tanganyika, and this chapter has been largely based upon documents from these two archives, supported by the German records in the ZNA.² There is also a large historical literature concerned with the partition of East Africa. This chapter has made much use of Beachey's *A History of East Africa, 1592-1902* (Beachey, 1996). Coupland and Müller provide useful alternative perspectives (Coupland, 1939; Müller, 1959).

Beginnings

The way in which colonialism initially imposed western notions of political space upon Africa is a useful place to start this discussion. Many of the territorial and boundary claims were settled in the midst of Anglo-German colonial rivalry after 1884, when Bismarck endorsed German involvement in the colonial mission. Whether this rivalry was the result of genuine competition for colonies or the by-product of Bismarck's general diplomatic strategy vis-a-vis Britain and France is unclear. Domestic considerations, including electoral tactics, Germany's rapid industrialisation and the effects of the Great Depression all increased German colonial fervour - a fervour which was directed and channelled by German pro-colonial organisations (Ilfie, 1979: 88; Galbraith, 1972: 1-2). Developments in Africa also played a role.

Zanzibar).

The Sultanate of Zanzibar maintained a claim to vast swathes of the coast. As will be discussed later, these were gradually eroded during the colonial period.

² Correspondence to and from the British Ambassador in Berlin during the 1880s, Sir Edward Malet, is of particular interest.

German trade in West Africa was threatened from 1883, and during the following year, Britain and Portugal seemed prepared to close the Congo to German traders. The pressure for German colonies grew and Bismarck had every incentive to encourage expansion, so undoubtedly the broader geo-political scene was important. Through the 1884 seizure of South West Africa, Togo and the Cameroons, and the Carl Peters-inspired entry into East Africa in 1885, Bismarck gained a voice on the African stage and thereby the means to provoke tension between Britain and France (Iliffe, 1979: 89).

Although the British had been the dominant western power throughout East Africa in the years leading up to 1884, they did not press home their advantage. Gladstone's relatively anti-expansionist government of 1880-5 discouraged the staking of a formal claim to the region, and German interest was allowed to grow. Following the election of 1885, Salisbury's more pro-active colonialists took power, with the fate of East Africa still to be determined. However, British attentions continued to centre upon relations with France. The French were pressing for a total British withdrawal from Egypt, and Salisbury hoped to gain German support against such a proposal. The wider geopolitical picture was of even more importance. The death of Gordon at Khartoum and the invasion of Afghanistan by Russian troops in early 1885 weakened the British position and forced her to cultivate relations with Germany (Arnold, 1979: 79). In an attempt to secure Bismarck's goodwill, concessions were made over East Africa and Samoa (Kennedy, 1985: 97).³ The 1885-6 division of spoils was totally bound up with Britain's position in the world at large.

Meanwhile, British and German explorer-colonialists had been competing with each other to conclude treaties with African chiefs on both sides of the modern Kenya-

³ For more on the balance of power between Britain, France and Germany at this time, see Crowe, 1970.

Tanzania border. Carl Peters made his first treaty on the 23rd November 1884 at an Ngulu village inland from Sadani, and within three weeks he had another twelve treaties covering a notional 140,000 square kilometres. Peters appealed to Bismarck to declare a protectorate. Bismarck waited until the Berlin Conference had finished, and within twenty-four hours the Kaiser had granted imperial protection to Peters' enterprise, resulting in the formation of the German East Africa Company (DOAG) (Peters, 1940: Ch2-3; Iliffe, 1979: 88-91). Bismarck may have been prompted to act as a result of Leopold's increasing demands in Central Africa, in the weeks leading up to the declaration of the protectorate (Arnold 1979: 76). With British acceptance of the notion of a German protectorate in the south of the region, the DOAG set about its plans with energy and ruthlessness. It was able to overcome armed resistance through the superiority of its firearms and the lack of co-ordination among the African groups which opposed its expeditions.

The actual division of territory remained ill-defined, so the DOAG quickly established stations inland and pushed towards the sources of the Nile. Peters moved to Lake Victoria to break the power of the Arabs and to be on hand to act in Uganda. He claimed that the local Haya chiefs, Mukotani of Lesser Kyamutwara and Kalmigi of Kianja, both welcomed him with open arms as their deliverer from the Baganda, when at the same time both of these chiefdoms were appealing to the Baganda for aid against the Germans (Schweitzer 1898: Vol II: 41-2 and 121). The British consul on Zanzibar, Sir John Kirk, persuaded Sultan Barghash of Zanzibar to accept German claims to the interior (Arnold, 1979: 77). Despite the support of the British government for German claims, British colonialists on the ground were not so supportive of the arrangement. MacKinnon wanted to set the boundary on the Pangani, offering to help the DOAG build a railway in return, but Peters objected, describing the Usambara Mountains and Kilimanjaro as a "conditio sine qua non" in the territory and boundary negotiations.⁴

⁴ RKA: 8864, 20th September 1885. Peters to the German Foreign Office.

Partition

The division of East Africa into British and German spheres of influence, allied to the existence of British territories in the surrounding region, meant that the boundaries of DOA were largely determined by bilateral agreements between the British and German governments. Despite the infamous false treaties which many European expeditions encouraged African rulers to sign, most African polities were ignored rather than tricked during the principal carve-up of territory. In many ways, African political systems became almost irrelevant. Major Anglo-German treaties were signed in 1886, 1890, 1893 and 1900, and scarcely a year went by from 1886 to 1914 without minor adjustments being agreed, often preceded or followed by boundary commissions. A treaty setting out the broad extent of British and German spheres of influence in East Africa was agreed in 1885 and signed the following year. However, it was not until 1890 that the main delimitation took place, and even after this time many changes were made. The boundaries were determined relatively quickly but it would be grossly inaccurate to state that they were drawn overnight during discussions in Europe. The general division of East Africa, with the British in the north and the Germans in the south, had been achieved by the end of 1886, but much remained to be decided, not least the fate of Uganda.

Just as the concept of linear boundaries had been conceived in Europe, so the most important decisions on the positioning of East Africa's international boundaries were reached in the capitals of Europe's leading colonial powers. Despite the progressive development of the borders, it must be admitted that the boundary between British East Africa and German East Africa was largely set in 1886 at a series of meetings between Dr Kravel, a German Foreign Office official, and Lord Iddesleigh, the British Foreign Secretary. Agreement was reached and signed on the 29th October, and resulted in a boundary which has survived until today with only relatively minor alterations. This agreement was mainly concerned with the division of coastal

territories, but also fixed the border inland to Lake Victoria - a feat which was achieved with little dispute. Coastal territories were of greatest interest at the time and were also a prerequisite for expansion into the interior. The extension of the boundary inland as far as Lake Victoria was achieved with little dispute. One month later the southern border with Mozambique was broadly agreed with the Portuguese. The facility with which it was achieved, pointed to the weakness of the Portuguese position north of the River Rovuma, and to the general acceptance of major rivers as effective means of dividing territory. The poorly delimited boundary which was created was the cause of border disputes along the Tanganyika-Portuguese East Africa border almost continually until Tanganyikan independence in 1961.

The years 1886-1890 saw a lull in the treaty making, but these were perhaps the years of most frantic activity. DOAG sponsored expeditions reached out from their initial treaty territories to the north and south and especially into the interior, until they could reach no more. The level of resistance offered by African polities varied considerably, but in no area did the preservation of African political systems seem a possibility. The limit of westward expansion had already been fixed on Lake Tanganyika as a result of the 1885 agreement acknowledging the territorial extent of the Congo Free State,⁵ but there remained the fear that the British would outflank the Germans in an attempt to fulfil the Cape-to-Cairo dream. However, the main focus of urgency lay to the north-west, where British claims were pressing, although many, including Peters, still hoped to extend German rule into Uganda.

British colonialists in the field remained passionately supportive of the Cape-to-Cairo route, and despite the Berlin Conference 'hinterland' principle, still saw the possibility of making it a reality. They were so confident of the superiority of European arms and organisation, that the only question in their minds was how much territory

⁵ For a description of the borders of the Belgian Congo, see Jentgen, 1952.

each power could collect. The imposition of European rule and European norms of dividing political space was taken for granted. The celebrated colonial diplomat-explorer Sir Harry Johnston had served in Malawi before moving to Uganda, and had explored much of the territory to the east of Lake Tanganyika (McEwen, 1971: 174). His overriding aim in eastern Africa was to protect the southern flank of Egypt, and this had no bearing on expansion east of Lake Tanganyika (Pakenham, 1991: 338), but he still hoped to link Uganda to British Central Africa and pressed the government to intervene in the region. Despite a campaign in the German press which alleged imminent British action to secure the area in order to develop telegraph and railway communications between her northern and southern possessions⁶, there was little likelihood of official British intervention.

Firstly, despite the enthusiasm of such men as Johnston, Salisbury's attitude to the Cape-to-Cairo route remained sceptical at worst, and at best, uninterested. "I can imagine no more uncomfortable position than the possession of a narrow strip of territory in the very heart of Africa three month's distance from the coast", he is recorded as saying in a parliamentary debate.⁷ Secondly, in response to a request from Sir Edward Malet, the British Ambassador in Berlin, regarding Britain's position on the matter, he replied that he wished to "discourage annexation in the rear of any colonial power's sphere of influence", and stated that where one colonial power had already staked a claim to coastal territories, "the other could not without consent, occupy unclaimed regions in its rear".⁸ The hinterland doctrine was obviously therefore given some weight by the British government. As a doctrine, it can be seen as an European method of determining the control of political space, albeit one that had been designed specifically for use in Africa. It certainly did not have its roots in pre-colonial Africa.

⁶ RKA: R1001 637: 78, 29th August 1993. Article from unnamed newspaper, entitled "Ein deutsch-englischer kolonial-konflikt".

⁷ H.L. Deb. 3s: 10 July, 1890, col 1268.

⁸ FO403/142: 29, 14th June 1990. The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet.

Last, but by no means least, the wider geopolitical picture remained of overwhelming importance, and the British government had no wish to upset German sensibilities. There was no mistaking German desire for the region in question. Germany wanted access to Lake Tanganyika because it provided an entry point to the Congo, and the Congo was regarded as key to Central African trading prospects. If the British had driven a wedge between German territory and Lake Tanganyika, then German access to the Congo would have been thwarted. Despite the British resolve not to become involved, German fears of intervention continued until the mid-1890s.⁹

Needless to say, the legitimacy of African polities in the interior was never even considered. From decentralised economic groups such as the Nymawezi, to highly organised states such as Uhehe, military conquest - or at least conquest backed by military power - followed by occupation, was the accepted European method of judging the legitimacy or otherwise of their claims to sovereignty. Putting international boundaries to one side for a moment, the most common fate of African polities and political systems was destruction. Almost all groups retained a large measure of cultural and even economic cohesion, but their political power was sharply curtailed. The death of the Hehe leader, Mkwawa, in 1898, meant that the Germans controlled all the main population centres and lines of communication: now the aim was to extend authority over the many small-scale societies remote from the caravan routes - a very localised process (Iliffe, 1979: 116). Reaction by African groups varied: some like the Hehe resisted fiercely, others actually appealed for German intervention, often because of the local political situation. For example, disturbance on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria in the 1890s caused by the southwards migration of the Luo, caused a Kuria headman, Kibore Machera, and a Jita leader, Nyakulinga, to appeal for German support.

⁹ RKA: R1001 637: 78. See note 6.

In parallel with events in the interior, the years 1886-1890 also settled the fate of the one African state in German East Africa to be recognised by the West. These five years saw the steady erosion of Zanzibari power, so far as her mainland possessions were concerned. At the dawn of German and British colonial rule, Zanzibar extended its political, economic and cultural systems far beyond the islands. It is difficult to assess how much territory the Sultan actually lost during these years because the extent of his mainland dominions was rather vague. In any case, Zanzibar's position as the region's premier power was usurped by the arrival of the colonial powers and by the imposition of linear boundaries. In the interior, Zanzibar was synonymous with cultural and economic power rather than political influence. In particular, it was associated with Arab culture. Zanzibar was the greatest Arab powerbase in East Africa and the Swahili word for Arabness *Ustaarabu* was also the Swahili word for civilisation. The inland caravan trade with the islands was dominated by various entrepreneurs who were either nominally or actually servants of the Sultan. However, as Jonathon Glassman discusses in the seminal *Feasts and Riot*, these entrepreneurs did carry out political functions, often flew the blood red flag of Zanzibar and held the title of liwali (Glassman, 1995: Ch2). As they were usually members of the various Zanzibari trading families (Sheriff, 1987: 184-7), who were closely associated with the Sultan and his family, it may be best to place Zanzibar in a category of its own, and not to relate it to European notions of state and structure. This vague political-economic structure can certainly be seen as being closer to African than European notions of authority.

In order to legitimise the colonial occupation of East Africa, a joint commission was set up in September 1885 in order to determine the territorial extent of the Sultan's possessions. Britain, Germany and France sat on the committee, and thereby finally relegated Portugal to the status of a minor colonial power, despite her long involvement in Zanzibar and the wider region. The commission's report was produced in June 1886 and although the commission had merely been set up to determine the Sultan's mainland possessions, because Sultan Barghash was weak, its role extended

far beyond that (Coupland, 1939: 450). The report restricted the Sultan's mainland possessions to a ten mile coastal strip, although the DOAG was to be given control of Pangani and Dar es Salaam (Iliffe, 1979: 90). This enabled the signing of the Anglo-German Agreement on the first of November 1886 and the general partition of the region (Hertslet iii, 1909: 882). Barghash hoped to preserve his remaining territory but the coastal strip was leased to the Germans in 1886 under diplomatic pressure. The Germans occupied Dar es Salaam within a year to demand control of customs. This was granted by the new Seyyid in April 1888 under British pressure.

Apart from the influence of the British and German governments, Zanzibar came under pressure from two other sources. Economically, the Sultan made concession after concession to the DOAG and the British East African Association (McEwen, 1971: 139). Politically, the Sultan was forced to give up territory to the Portuguese. Although Portugal had been excluded from the International Commission in 1888, Germany decided to support Portuguese claims in the south of the region. Although Portuguese territorial claims were very much like those of the Sultan - rather vague, but with kernels of truth - Germany backed them.¹⁰ It is difficult to explain why it did so. An examination of the German colonial archives failed to reveal the reason, but it may be that the Germans wished to bring the Portuguese into the equation in order to balance British interests around Lake Malawi. The Portuguese provoked a crisis by seizing the Zanzibar steamer, "Kilwa", and appealed to Germany for help.¹¹ Germany immediately backed Portuguese claims and placed all Portuguese citizens on Zanzibar under its protection. The speed of the diplomacy suggests that the matter may have been pre-arranged.

¹⁰ RKA: R1001 614: 49, 5th June 1886. Article from the St. James Gazette, entitled "Sharp Practice in Diplomacy".

¹¹ RKA: R1001 625: This file gives the details of the case in various pieces of correspondence.

Meanwhile, DOAG pressure on the Sultan for greater control of the coast resulted in the transfer of administrative powers from the Sultan to the company in 1888 in return for tribute, and the coastal strip was eventually bought in 1890 for £200,000.

The role that Zanzibar played in the partition of East Africa was a major one. She was left with nothing on the mainland apart from a sense of cultural influence, but the manner in which her somewhat vague territorial possessions were eroded was a key component in the creation of Tanganyika and therefore in the creation of the boundaries. The relentless seizure of Zanzibari claims confirmed that a key element of the western concept of controlling and dividing political space was military might.

The years 1886-1890 also saw a strengthening of the British position. Whereas 1885 had seen a series of crises and challenges to the pax-Britannica, the situation in 1890 was much calmer and had resulted in a steadily strengthening British hand in East Africa. The main fruit of this improvement was to be the 'Pearl of Africa' - Uganda - falling into British hands. The details lie outside the scope of this study, but the British gain was a function of the broader picture. Peters had been earnestly competing with the British Frederick Jackson for Uganda, but Bismarck's fall from power in March 1890 brought Caprivi to power in Germany, and he was content to concede British influence in Uganda (Arnold, 1979: 81). With this, the northern extent of German East Africa to the east of Lake Victoria was determined. Anglo-German relations had also been much improved by British co-operation during the German suppression of the Abushiri rising of 1888-9. The strong British position also settled the general partition of central-southern Africa, where the Portuguese were "compelled by force majeure" to agree to British claims (Kennedy, 1985: 101). Northern Rhodesia was able to expand up to the limits of German territory, with the border being roughly determined as lying between Lakes Tanganyika and Malawi. One again, military strength proved decisive in the allocation of territory.

1890 was the year of delimitation. The spheres of influence which had been decided in the 1886 treaty were formally determined and the broad outline of Tanganyika which survives to today was decided.¹² The 1890 treaty encompassed not only East Africa, but also Togoland, Germany's Far Eastern possessions and fate of the North Sea island of Heligoland. The fact that it is often known as the 'Heligoland Treaty' indicates that East African interests continued to be subsumed in the wider picture. The occupation of East Africa and the effect upon African political, economic and cultural systems was important to the people of East Africa, but only a minor factor in European international relations. The 1890 agreement looks as if it was decided entirely on European grounds and indeed European considerations were paramount. In some clauses of the act, avoiding the division of African groups seems to have been a consideration for its own sake. The 1890 treaty contained a certain level of flexibility with regard to the barely explored Mfumbiro area; if further exploration "show it appears that the territory.... belongs to Ruanda then the whole of that territory shall revert to Germany".¹³ However, such factors were normally outweighed by the importance of the balance of power between Britain, France and Germany (Austen, 1968: 27).¹⁴ The main points of note for East Africa within the treaty were German recognition of British influence in Uganda and Zanzibar. Boundary delimitation was set down in the treaty, but - with some recognition of their common ignorance - the two powers made provision for future alterations. Indeed, it is probably fair to agree with Holdich when he wrote that the 1890 Agreement, "did not establish a precise boundary in East Africa between adjacent territorial sovereigns. Instead it delimited spheres of influence and it sets up a warning to trespassers" (Holdich, 1916: 96-7).

¹² The fate of Ruanda-Urundi had still to be decided, so it was not quite the outline of DOA.

¹³ RKA: R1001 635: 181, 14th May 1910. Notes on the Anglo-German Boundary Commission of 1910, written by the Boundary Commissioners.

¹⁴ See Hertslet, 1909: 899 for the treaty in full.

The resolution of disputed territory in the East African interior appears to have been achieved through the two Berlin Congo Conference criteria of the hinterland doctrine and the principle of effective occupation.¹⁵ Resolution of the hinterland of DOA brought two dreams into conflict: the Cape to Cairo scheme and the German Mittel-Afrika campaign, which sought to connect Dar es Salaam to the Cameroons (Gray, 1960: 281-97). The treaty balanced the claims of both countries, perhaps slightly favouring Great Britain. It would have taken a massive counter-offer from the British in order to secure the territory to the east of Lake Tanganyika, and in the end Salisbury's disinterest dashed MacKinnon's dreams, and the British formally recognised German sovereignty as far west as Lake Tanganyika.¹⁶ "All in all it was a clear-cut agreement which pleased most of both sides"¹⁷. It is important to differentiate between the general partition of East Africa and local disputes of boundary location. British interests in Uganda and Zanzibar were of considerable weight in the treaty negotiations; local boundary and territorial disputes were of minor importance in the grand scheme of things. In this way, colonial territorial ambitions were similar to pre-colonial African notions - the general extent of the area under control was normally more important than the precise location of the boundaries.

In 1890, the sway of African polities in the interior remained negligible, so disputes were generally determined between British and German diplomats. The initiative rested with the British because of the improved geopolitical situation and because Heligoland acted as a sweetener. As a result, they made the most of any gains. The Germans gave up various bargaining chips in order to secure their main objectives in the negotiations (McEwen, 1971: 141). The Sultanate of Witu had been somewhat of an anomaly as a

¹⁵ FO403/142: 29, 14th June 1990. The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet.

¹⁶ The British made a brief attempt in 1894 to create the Cape-to-Cairo route to the west of the lake, through a proposed treaty with King Leopold (Louis, 1967: 27-40; Austen, 1968: 109). It came to nothing.

¹⁷ FO403/142: 29, 14th June 1990. The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet. Also see Spellmeyer, 1931: 48-50.

German possession on the British coast, and was duly transferred to Great Britain (Arnold, 1979: 81). As one step in the process of making neat boundaries that made territories easier to govern, this certainly was part of the process of colonialism imposing the western concept of political space upon Africa.

The creation of linear boundaries was not always a smooth process. One of the main border disputes related to where the boundary was to meet the Indian Ocean. The River Umba had changed course, so the dispute centred on whether the boundary should follow the new route of the Umba or should be retained at the old point, now Ngobwe Creek. This is a prime example of the difficulties inherent in using water courses to define boundaries (Hardinge, 1928: 228-330). Following claim and counter-claim by local officials, the German Imperial Government conceded to British wishes. Another criterion of boundary-making, based on water sources and commonly supported at the time, was put forward by Carl Peters. In the 1890 Treaty, Britain gained the town of Taveta, but by 1892 Peters was arguing that it really should belong to the Kilimanjaro concessions on the basis that, "it is about 70 English Miles from the nearest water supplies in the British area."¹⁸

Geopolitical criteria may have been of primary importance, but western notions of dividing political space did allocate some weight to the idea of the natural boundary. Lake Nyasa was accepted as a natural boundary in the south. There had been a British presence on the lake since 1875, when a British steamboat, the *Ilala*, was launched there to support the first permanent Anglican mission. Although Germany had subsequently become interested in the lake, her decision to accede to most British claims led to it being excluded from the 1890 Agreement - a decision which was to have important consequences in the post-colonial period (McEwen, 1971: 178). The enthusiasm for 'natural boundaries' was widespread at this time, particularly because of

¹⁸ RKA: R1001 633: 201, 10th August 1909. Report on the Taveta area by Methner.

ignorance of African politics and ethnicity, and the colonial powers were quick to seek a useful mountain, river or lake as a means of demarcating boundaries. For example, in 1925 the Belgian authorities bemoaned the lack of natural boundaries between Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika (League of Nations, 1925: 10).

The Treaty of 1890 left German East Africa more encircled by British territories than ever: four out of her six neighbours were British, five out of seven if Zanzibar is included. While this did not seem to be of great importance to Berlin, it must have had an impact on how the Dar es Salaam government perceived its territory's situation and therefore also on how they saw their international boundaries. At this stage, the actions of foreign colonialists had a far greater influence upon the DOA authorities, than the actions of African borderlanders.

Although the rough outline of German territory had mostly been determined by the end of 1890, there was little effective occupation, and colonial disputes could have led to major challenges to the 1890 agreement. However, while local issues were generally settled peaceably, the wider geopolitical balance ensured stability, and metropolitan Anglo-German relations remained stable for most of the 1890s. Of the two power blocs created in Europe at this time, the British probably perceived the Franco-Russian Alliance as the greatest threat in the colonial field. Agreements were reached over the Suez Canal and the Pamirs, but nothing could diffuse the colonial tension between Britain and her two greatest colonial rivals in the way that the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890 had achieved (Kennedy, 1985: 102). European grand diplomacy had certainly been transferred to an African context.

With the German position consolidated vis-a-vis the British, the Dar es Salaam government felt strong enough to take a high hand with Portugal over a border dispute around the mouth of the Rovuma. The area which came to be known as the Kionga Triangle had been claimed by Portugal for centuries, but there appears to have been no

known Portuguese presence in the area before the 1880s. Zanzibari traders, however, had had permanent settlements there throughout the century, and the territory had been included in those lands transferred from the Sultan to German control (Thomas, 1951: 47-50). When German officials moved into the area, Portugal protested, and indeed insisted upon her claims to substantial territories north of the Rovuma. This was a turnaround in Luso-German relations from only two years previously when Germany had been supporting Portuguese claims. This reversal of German support for Portugal against Zanzibar can be explained by the improvement in Anglo-German relations. Germany had previously needed Portugal in order to check British expansion in the south, but now that Cecil Rhodes' push northwards had reached its limit, Germany felt able to seize what she believed she was entitled to. A vast correspondence exists on the matter in the Reichskolonialamt,¹⁹ and as one might expect, no value is placed upon the opinions of the people actually living in the Kionga Triangle. The extent of German, Portuguese and Zanzibari presence in the area are the only issues of importance.

Portugal believed her entire Central African Empire to be under threat. It is probable that an Anglo-German plan for a re-division of Portuguese territory at the expense of Portugal existed in the 1890s, but the British backed out (Koponen, 1994: 313). Earlier she had named the British, *Os Ladrones* - 'The Thieves'; now the term was applied to the Germans.²⁰ Germany made clear that it would not back down and in the end Portugal gave in to German claims up to the Rovuma, although she continued to make representations to Berlin over the Kionga Triangle until 1914. Once Portuguese sensibilities over her northern border had been provoked, she began to dispute the sovereignty of the islands in the Rovuma. The changing pattern of the river's course and the islands which lay in it demonstrate the total inaccuracy of the

¹⁹ RKA: R1001 623-628.

²⁰ RKA: R1001 616: 39. Article from The Times on 31st March 1887, entitled "Portugal and Zanzibar".

boundary delimitation, and the unsuitability of riparian delimitation in general. A settlement over the islands was reached in 1913, with islands above the confluence with the Somoni rivulet becoming German, and those below being retained by Portugal.²¹ However, minor disputes continued throughout the German and British periods and up until Tanganyikan independence in 1961. The idea of delimiting boundaries to the *nth* degree - despite the fact that nothing of value to the colonial powers existed in the disputed territory - is certainly proof that the new African polities were being determined according to western norms.

The original boundaries were more closely determined in the years between 1890 and 1914, often with the help of boundary commissions and demarcation, and several noteworthy changes were made. In April 1902, the Eastern Province of Uganda was transferred to Kenya to become Kisumu and Naivasha Provinces (McEwen, 1971: 147; Hertslet, 1909 i: 385; Kjerland, 1995: 145). Uganda's border with DOA was now restricted to the west of Lake Victoria. Further west still, the boundary with the Congo Free State (CFS) underwent some changes. Rwanda-Burundi had been included in German territory as a result of the 1890 Treaty and other agreements, but German rule in the region was never anything but indirect. While the border between the CFS and DOA was not to become a Tanganyikan border, German activity along the boundary gives an indication of German border policy, and so is of relevance to this study. The original Belgo-German border had been determined in 1885, when the easternmost limit of the CFS was determined by an astronomical line.²² Ten years later, the German government asked for this to be replaced by a natural boundary, leading to the almost forgotten Kivu dispute which will be discussed in Chapter Six. A settlement was not reached until 1910 when the CFS-DOA boundary was fixed along Lake Kivu and the

²¹ CO691: 109/5: 36-42, 31st March 1930. Letter from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, no correspondents given.

²² RKA: R1001 624: 60, 1885. Notes on the treaty of 8th November 1884 between Germany and the Congo Association. No author or specific date given.

River Rusisi (*Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, 1911: 613-17). The British and German authorities co-operated in negotiations over the area and made representations to the Congo State with their claims at the same time, and the Boundary Commission of 1911-12 was marked by co-operation by all three colonial powers in the area.²³

The 1919 Paris Peace Settlement saw not only a change in colonial ruler in Tanganyika, but also a territorial break-up of the colony and therefore changes in its borders. Rwanda-Burundi became Belgian almost by accident. The Belgians had wanted a stake in DOA as a bargaining chip and so continued to occupy Rwanda, Burundi and parts of what was to become north-western Tanganyika. The original British plan for dividing the spoils had been to give Belgium part of northern Angola so that it could construct a deep water port for the Congo (McEwen, 1971: 151-3). At the last minute, Belgium demanded monetary indemnity from Britain as a makeweight in the deal, but Britain refused and Belgium gained Rwanda-Burundi instead (Louis, 1963: 233). The territory thereby lost one third of its population. In the south, Portugal was finally able to gain possession of the Kionga Triangle, an area which it had disputed with Germany since the German entry into Africa. Many South Africans wanted to give Portugal the southern half of DOA so they could take southern Mozambique, but the Portuguese refused. Mozambique stayed intact and gained its small addition (Iliffe, 1979: 246-7; McEwen, 1971: 151-3). African influence upon the initial transfer of territory and partial dismemberment of the territory was virtually nil. The transfer of Tanganyika from one colonial power to another following a peace treaty was certainly in line with previous events in Europe itself, such as in 1815 and 1878. However, it is more than likely that such transfers also took place in fluid pre-colonial African politics.

²³ RKA: R1001 637: 22, 25th September 1912. Newspaper article from the Morning Post, entitled "Work on the Uganda Frontier".

Although the award of the main part of Tanganyika to Britain appeared to be something of a *fait accompli*, its long-term future as a British territory was in some doubt. That Germany was to lose all its colonies was taken for granted. "Wartime propaganda had stressed German colonial brutality and made annexation acceptable to humanitarians" (Iliffe, 1979: 246). Some in the British establishment wanted to annex DOA to prevent it being used as a future submarine base, but the main thing was to keep it out of enemy or potential enemy hands. Tentative approaches were made to offer the territory to the United States, but these were rebuffed. The idea of Tanganyika as an Indian colony also arose and it received support from Kenya, South Africa and Australia, who were keen to solve the Indian emigration problem. The Secretary of State for India put the concept to the Indian National Congress, who considered it before it was vetoed by Gandhi (Iliffe, 1979: 264).

British annexationists took up the idea of mandates to counter the anti-annexationist United States, and the idea was accepted. The terms of the mandates were not as restrictive as has sometimes been claimed, and Tanganyika could have become part of a customs or administrative union or federation, providing the other terms of the mandate were not broken. The Milner-Orts agreement of 30th May 1919 settled it, the Supreme Allied Council accepted it on 7th August 1919, and the League of Nations council confirmed the terms on 20th July 1922. The lion's share of the colony came under British rule under mandate from the League of Nations and became known as Tanganyika Territory. Belgium received Rwanda and Burundi, also under mandate, while Portuguese full sovereignty over the Kionga Triangle was assured. The systems of mandates was new to both the West and to Africa, but the idea of redistributing territories from a defeated polity among the victorious powers was new to neither of them.

From 1919 on, geopolitics and the balance of power became far less important in determining the boundaries of Tanganyika. The main decisions had been reached and

the big questions answered. It remained for the British to make the borders work in the ways that they wanted and to carry out the functions required. They could implement national and local policies in the knowledge that changes, while not impossible, were less than likely. It was during this later period that African polities were able to exert more influence.

The Results of the Partition

In order to assess the results of the partition of East Africa, it is worth considering the thinking behind the division of territory. Boundary identity along the lines of human identity, such as ethnicity or language, were totally ignored at this stage. As the table below shows, the principle of 'natural boundaries' predominated, with the use of mountains, lakes and rivers to demarcate the extent of the colony, with some astronomical or mathematical lines where no convenient relief feature existed. Astronomical lines, based upon degrees of latitude and longitude, and mathematical lines, based upon curves and distances from astronomical points had no tradition in pre-colonial Africa. However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the use of relief features to delimit political space was fairly common. The 2633 miles of boundary passed through generally lightly populated areas, with the main exception of the north-west, where volcanic soils are capable of sustaining some of the highest population densities on the African continent. However, the rivers and lakes which make up many of Tanganyika's borders support higher than average population densities for the region. Higher population densities meant more people affected by partition.

¹² Adapted from Reyner in Widstrand, 1969: 186-189 and Barbour, 1961: 306-7.

Table 1: Tanganyika's Land Boundary Lengths²⁴

Border (modern names)	Length (in miles)	Type of Boundary
Kenya	278	Mainly mathematical related to relief
Uganda	260	Astronomical line
Rwanda	130	Relief - various
Burundi	280	Relief - various, including mountains
Democratic Republic of Congo	285	Relief - lake
Zambia	210	Relief - stream and watershed
Malawi	520	Relief - lake
Mozambique	470	Short astronomical, then relief

The Rwanda and Burundi sections of the border with Tanganyika were not separated until 1964. All the boundaries were to some extent demarcated during the later years of German rule and early British administration.

There are a number of problems inherent in attempting to assess the effect of the partition upon the many ethnic groups of the Tanganyikan borderlands. Firstly, it is impossible to divide boundaries into those where ethnicity was taken into account by the colonialists and those where it was not. It is all a matter of degree. Secondly, it is impossible to produce the type of complete ethnographical map of Tanzania which was in vogue in the 1960s. The map below indicates which ethnic groups lived near or along the borders during the colonial period, but this can only be used as a means of locating the groups which will be mentioned in the rest of this thesis.

Thirdly, it is impossible to draw up a list of divided groups, although some authors - including Asiwaju - have attempted to do so (Asiwaju, 1984b). There is great difficulty in deciding which groups have been divided by the boundaries, and which have divided themselves by their movement since partition. The Nyakyusa, for example, are almost certainly an example of the latter. The fluid nature of most African polities and the widespread lack of a strong pre-colonial ethnic consciousness means


²⁴ Adopted from Reyner in Widstrand, 1969: 186-189 and Barbour, 1961: 306-7.

that it is very difficult to decide which is which. The drawing of a boundary through the middle of lands traditionally inhabited by a particular group may not have been considered a problem by the people involved because of the lack of cohesiveness within that group. In any case, the categorisation of all Africans into a series of tribes is today very much felt to be the product of colonial policy. Finally, an ethnic group may have several names or there may be dispute over the extent of a particular group. Such questions of ethnicity and ethnography will not be settled here, except where it is felt that an intelligent contribution can be made. In addition, some ethnic names have changed since 1880. Despite all these drawbacks, it would be useful to consider just how many groups are bisected by each of Tanganyika's boundaries. The list below has been compiled from sources ranging from 1885 to today, and it is therefore likely that it contains some mistakes regarding the names employed.

- Kenya: Segeju, Digo, Chagga, Maasai:, AbaKuria and Luo
- Burundi: Barundi/Baha, Batutsi
- Rwanda: Batutsi
- Democratic Republic of Congo: Rungu
- Zambia: Rungu, Lungu, Mambwe, Iwa and Lambya
- Malawi: Lambya, Nyakyusa and Nyasa
- Mozambique: Yao, Makonde and Matambwe

The locations of many of these groups are given in the map on the next page.

Of the various problems created by the partition of Africa, one should be mentioned at this stage. The Uganda-Tanganyika boundary was mainly formed by an astronomical line - the first degree parallel south - which produced several anomalies. The Kagera river snakes its way around the boundary, moving both to the north and the south of the line. The Kagera Salient was the name given to that portion of land lying to the south of the boundary, but to the north of the river, and therefore within Tanganyika. The



Map 3: Pre-colonial language groups and peoples c. 1890 (Koponen, 1988: 16-17)

660 square miles had formerly been attached to the Buganda county of Buddu, but following partition, became incorporated into Bukoba District of DOA, as Missenyi chiefdom. The Kagera Triangle, comprising fifteen square miles on the shore of Lake Victoria, had formerly been part of the Haya state of Kiziba, which now lay in Tanganyika, but was itself now included in Uganda. West of Buddu, the Kagera Loop left 240 square miles of Ankole in DOA. As the British Kagera Triangle contained the port of Mizanda and therefore held effective control of the Kagera, many argued that an exchange of the Triangle for the timber resources of Missenyi would be a fair swap.

The British boundary commissioner for the area, Colonel Delmé-Radcliffe described the Salient as, "a pitiless swamp, an expanse of virgin forest, and tsetse-infected, waterless, uninhabited jungle" (Delmé-Radcliffe, 1905: 76),²⁵ yet still believed that an exchange of territory would create a more stable boundary.²⁶ There was strong evidence that the two pieces of territory encouraged banditry, and there was a general feeling that the Kagera was a natural obstacle: it was impossible to cross without a boat and therefore a barrier to raids and border incidents (Brownlie, 1979: 906). It is doubtful whether the river was such a natural obstacle to the African inhabitants of the area, but is probable that it made administration by European officials more problematic. Little attention was given to the wishes of local inhabitants. "Those living in the Kagera Salient, at that time about 3,000 people, are referred to as 'of no particular value either to the British or the German Administration'" (McEwen, 1971: 279-280). Delmé-Radcliffe's recommendations did not prevail and these irregularities have survived along the boundary (McEwen, 1971: 280).

²⁵ It is a pity that Idi Amin did not share Delmé-Radcliffe's poor opinion of the area when he decided that it was worth fighting over.

²⁶ FO403/354B: 60-1, 1st October 1900. Major Gibbons in London to the Marquis of Salisbury.

The most well-known issue surrounding the delimitation of Tanganyika's boundaries is generally misunderstood. The story runs that Kilimanjaro was given to Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany by Queen Victoria as a gift, and was therefore transferred from Kenya to DOA. This myth has been more than adequately debunked elsewhere, notably by G.W. Hatchell. Hatchell writes that the Queen and the Kaiser did not get on very well, and that, anyway, Wilhelm did not accede to power until four years after the boundary had been determined (Hatchell, 1956: 41). McEwen suggests that the myth gained currency following the Great War, when European settlers on the slopes of Kilimanjaro hoped to be transferred to Kenya. They believed that to get around the mandate, they would need to show that the mountain had originally been designated as part of Kenya (McEwen, 1871: 135 and 147). This is possible but not proven. It has also been suggested by Hertslet that Kilimanjaro was conceded to Germany in exchange for the British claim to the Mfumbiro range in Uganda.²⁷ In truth, Kilimanjaro came to form part of DOA in much the same way as the rest of the territory: through treaties concluded with local rulers, often under duress, misunderstood, or concluded with the wrong rulers. It is possible that the story of Kilimanjaro as a gift gained credence because both the British and the Germans made treaties with chiefs at Taveta in 1885. Expeditions for the two powers tried to secure as many treaties as possible in order to strengthen their hands in the negotiations to come. The boundary came to bisect the area, with Moshi and Kilimanjaro lying on the German side and Taveta in the British zone (Johnston, 1886: 110). The 1886 treaty states that the boundary ran, "between Taveta and Chagga around the northern base of Kilimanjaro" (Hatchell, 1956: 41).

There has also been some misunderstanding about the location of the boundary with Uganda. Several works on the period have been somewhat confused on their

²⁷ FO367/10, 17th April 1906. Series of unlabelled newspaper cuttings on the Mfumbiro problem.

description of its location during the early years of the Twentieth Century. For example, Elizabeth Hopkins in her chapter 'The International Boundary as a factor in the extension of colonial control', asserts that in the 1910 agreement, Britain's gain was the adjustment of the Ugandan-DOA boundary from the first degree south to the course of the Kagera (Hopkins, 1969: 212). Such an adjustment was never made. Attempts to make such a change will be discussed in later chapters.

It is worth making some points about the Europeans who determined the nationality of millions of Africans. The people who created the colonies and boundaries of eastern Africa were a small group; the same names appear again and again, often first appearing in the historical record as explorers before resurfacing in the archives as administrators, engineers and boundary commissioners. For example, Sir Harry Johnston, who has already been mentioned, explored around Lake Rukwa before the formation of the German colony, and later served as an administrator in British Central Africa, before becoming Governor of Uganda. Work on the boundary commissions was akin to exploration work. The descriptions of their expeditions are often similar to those of the earlier explorers: the topography of the land was time and again very different to that expected, porters were seized by lions and cartographers fell into game pits. They often became involved in local politics and wars, occasionally having to fight military actions as they went. It was undoubtedly more difficult for the thousands of black porters carrying the creature comforts of the whites.

European explorers and boundary commissioners inevitably made many mistakes. A British boundary commissioner, G.E. Smith, writes that, "The name Atoringini given to one of the mountains on the boundary was the Masai expression for 'I forget'" (Smith, 1907). The Department for Foreign Affairs of the CFS was forced to admit that Lake

Kivu was marked on their maps as dry, much smaller than in reality, and in the wrong place.²⁸

Conclusion

The European powers determined the general outline of the borders of Tanganyika amongst themselves with little regard for the inhabitants of East Africa. African colonies were generally merely pawns on the European chessboard. Bismarck said: "My map of Africa lies in Europe" (Beachey, 1996: 127) and even German interest in East Africa was subservient to the wider geopolitical picture. However, many arrangements existed such as that pertaining to the Zambia-Tanganyika boundary, which was created from the division of spheres of influence, but with provision for the rectification in accord with local requirements (McEwen, 1971: 218). L.S. Amery stated the British government's position in unusually honest and accurate terms in 1935: "We are in Tanganyika by plain right of conquest and formal surrender, and shall remain there until someone stronger than ourselves takes it from us".²⁹ Might certainly was right. How much African pre-colonial politics played by another rulebook is not the subject of this work, but how much they were effected by and had an influence upon the positioning of the boundaries, is the subject of the next chapter.

It is interesting to consider why Germany and Britain wanted the territory and thereby created and maintained the boundaries. For Germany, the reason for holding the colony was its potential for creating economic wealth. With regard to the German state, however, it could be argued that the debacle of Deutsch-Ostafrikanische

²⁸ RKA: R1001 623: 158, 21st November 1899. Report by the Foreign Office of the Congo State on treaties relating to Lake Kivu. No author given.

²⁹ TNA: TS11459/I: 249-50. "Report on the British Government Position", no author or date given.

Gesellschaft (DOAG) rule had left it with no option but to take control of the territory and thereby avoid further embarrassment. As will be examined later, the inability of the DOAG to maintain control during the 'Arab Revolt' forced the Berlin government to intervene with military support. Political control passed into the hands of the German government, while the DOAG maintained only economic control.

Geopolitical considerations lay behind British control of Tanganyika, although it mattered not so much what Britain could gain, but what others could be prevented from gaining. Tanganyika was claimed to be useful in protecting communications with India, but many other territories were used for this purpose. More importantly, German ownership of Tanganyika had proved to be a thorn in the side of the British during the First World War; it had highlighted the soft underbelly of British control of the Indian Ocean. British possession of Tanganyika was therefore not so much a geopolitical advantage for Britain, as the removal of a geopolitical disadvantage.

Whatever reasons the two colonial powers had for taking the territory, they both expected the extent of their sovereignty to be accurately determined and the level of their sovereignty to be absolute. African political systems and means of dividing political space had therefore been superseded to the same extent that African polities had ceased to hold sovereignty over the land and people of Tanganyika. During the years of boundary creation, the actions of African borderlanders had a very limited influence upon the actions of the colonialists. The opinions and actions of the colonial authorities across the border were of far more importance. The level of influence which Africans were able to exert locally during the later years of political partition will be considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPACT UPON AFRICAN POLITIES: THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE

The imposition of European colonies upon the existing African political landscape was not a neat transition from one political map to another. The two political structures operated in tandem over most of the continent, but more often in conflict than in co-operation. Most Africans continued to look to their own political leaders rather than the colonial rulers. They were helped in doing so by the weakness of colonial rule, and also initially by the total lack of colonial administration over vast areas of the continent. However, as effective occupation became more tangible, the division of African polities by colonial boundaries became more and more of a problem. As Table 1 demonstrated in the previous chapter, an enormous number of African groups lived on or near the new boundaries. Whilst it is difficult to distinguish between economic, ethnic, political and linguistic ties in pre-colonial Africa, there was undoubtedly a political component involved in the cohesion of most of these groups. However, because many of these groups were not nearly as cohesive or as fixed as the colonialists believed, the impact of their division was not always traumatic. It is possible to view the impact of the partition upon African polities from two perspectives: firstly, on a theoretical level, as a clash between European and African methods of dividing political space, and secondly, on a practical level, by examining the impact upon individual African polities and peoples. This chapter will attempt to consider each of these in turn. Although this work is concerned with Tanganyika, few studies have been made of pre-colonial African methods of dividing political space, and so examples from the wider African scene will be employed where applicable.

Section One will examine African pre-colonial methods of dividing political space. The only way to understand how and why colonialism successfully imposed the western system of boundaries upon Africa, is to fully comprehend what this system of bordered territories actually replaced. This is also a vital component of examining the

impact of the boundaries upon African political systems. Not only were African systems different to those in the West, but the very principles upon which they were founded were startlingly different. The Gogo, for instance were able to combine fixed territorial entities with transient populations. Such idiosyncratic systems could never hope to survive the standardisation of colonial rule. In contrast, this section will also highlight some similarities in western and African notions; in particular, many states in both regions were founded on economic links.

SECTION ONE: THE THEORY.

This section compares East African pre-colonial methods of dividing political space with those of the West. An examination of both is central to this work: it is as vital to understand the nature of the boundaries which have been imposed, as it is to realise how radically they differed from what they replaced. Both western Europe and Africa are currently divided by the same model of political boundaries, but those in Africa are radically different from pre-colonial systems in that continent. It should also be pointed out that although this work is more concerned with external than internal sovereignty, the two are closely linked: the nature of rule within a polity often determines its level of territorial fluidity. Even so, the western state system has never operated so that political power was bounded by international borders. Geopolitics and the international political economy have seen to that.

An assessment of the extent to which African political systems were affected by the boundaries, must begin by acknowledging that there are no specifically African methods of dividing political space. Pre-colonial African polities were divided and governed by various methods, most of which were not related to western-style linear boundaries. It is difficult to differentiate between internal and external sovereignty in the pre-colonial African context, as a ruler's territory was often defined by the limits of

what his subjects occupied at any one time (Herbst, 1989: 680). According to Jeffrey Herbst, this was because of low population density and because land had no added value as agriculture was rain-fed (Herbst, 2000: 36). In addition, a ruler's subjects often broke away to form their own polity, joined another one, or avoided political control altogether. Igor Kopytoff has painted a picture of this very fluid situation, with states expanding, contracting or being absorbed into another polity (Kopytoff, 1989)¹. Kopytoff builds upon the earlier ideas of Davidson, who writes that people repeatedly moved and spread their numbers, often in very small groups; "there they would settle and begin a new life, work out new rules of law and order, redefine their morals and beliefs" (Davidson, 1978: 69). However, where Kopytoff argues that this leads to the commonality of ideas, Davidson writes that this explains the sharp variation in systems and beliefs of African polities, when it was quite usual for a state to have a completely different system to its neighbours. The truth probably lies somewhere between the two views. African pre-colonial division of political space took place in a very difficult environment and so there was more need for flexibility, yet the constant ebb and flow of political authority must have encouraged the spread of ideas. This again ties into the debate over the differences between states and non-states, and the lack of long-lasting African empires. "The notion that some special virtue lies in the politically 'small' becoming the politically 'large', whether by absorption or conquest of neighbours, may fit the conventional traditions of Europe and America: it has seldom fitted those of Africa" (Davidson, 1978: 75-6). Flexibility was the key in Africa.

This notion of ephemeral boundaries is not recognised by everyone. Apata argues that even if inhabitants had to flee for a long time, they still recognised the old boundaries upon their return (Apata, 1989: 11). Such differences in opinion probably arise from differences in the location of fieldwork, and emphasize the extent to which

¹ The concept of fluid African polities has also been accepted by such writers as Prescott and Anene, who both take for granted the fact that pre-colonial African states were elastic and ephemeral (Prescott, 1965 and 1987; Anene, 1970).

African concepts varied. As with so much else in African history, environmental differences probably played a large role.

Traditional African political divisions were often related to social and economic relationships (Moseley and Asher, 1994: 297). Cultural similarities and languages tended to develop between villages which traded together and political authority often evolved out of these links, as was the case with the Hausa (Kopytoff, 1989: 195-211), or in the Tanganyikan context, the Nyamwezi (Abrahams and Forde, 1967). This not only occurred where resources were plentiful enough for large-scale trading, but also in harsh environments, where it related to control of wells. Even in more cohesive polities, the division between protected subjects and those outside was based upon people rather than upon territory. Yet pre-colonial Africans did not lack the concept of territoriality - it was merely expressed mentally rather than cartographically. For example, the Asante measured distance 'anthropometrically' by the number of days travel from one point to another. Greater Asante was defined as being forty days travel in all directions from the capital (Wilks, 1992: 182-3).

This is not to say that precise delimitation between the territories of neighbouring polities was unknown. Modern-day Tanzania provides a wealth of examples, especially among the Haya and Sukuma of the north-west, where the concept had been common for centuries and which appears to have entered the region from the Nile Valley (Austin, 1968: 6). Although existing trees and bushes were normally used, there are examples of rows being planted, such as in Uhaya, where trees were placed every twenty-five feet (Oldaker, 1957: 129). Throughout East Africa, vegetation was used as territorial markers (McEwen, 1971: 4). Nomadic pastoralist societies could be considered to be the antithesis of the clearly delimited polity, yet according to Alan Jacobs there is strong evidence to counter this assumption (Jacobs, 1963: 38). The Maasai were composed of sixteen sub-ethnic groups, each with a clearly defined territory and individual water and pasturage claims. These territories rarely overlapped

although they were adjacent to each other, and were often divided by topographical features.

There is also evidence that the idea of authority being determined by territory rather than by people was becoming increasingly popular in some areas of East Africa. For example, it appears that the concept spread into Ufipa from Katanga about the year 1700, and then into other areas of the Great Lakes Region. The Fipa adopted it before they had any real central administration, implying that the notion had more to do with the territory and prestige of the king, than anything to do with economics (Willis, 1968: 83-4). Again, Ufipa's external boundaries were determined through reference to physical features, such as ridges and rivers. Even quite small streams were used, indicating that these borders did not develop out of any real physical obstacles, but rather out of a conscious desire to determine territorial extent. Despite this, African methods still differed from modern western practices, which demand to know exactly where in the river or on the mountain the border lies.

African perceptions of defined territoriality were neither restricted to Tanzania nor always demarcated by topographical and natural features. The Yoruba, for example, used man-made mounds to compliment the use of lakes and hills as markers (Adejuyigbe, 1978: Chs 1-2). Precise territorial awareness can also be identified in other ways. In the Congo, it was standard practice for European missionaries and explorers to be accompanied throughout a kingdom, from their point of entry until their precise point of departure; it would have been politically unwise for their guides to go beyond the limits of their own kingdom (Morel, 1909: 97). A.A. Oldaker, an enlightened British administrator, made a careful study of African concepts of territoriality in Tanganyika. He wrote that boundaries were usually not demarcated artificially, and that any marks which were made tended to be ephemeral (Oldaker, 1957: 129). He cites the example of Kasulu on the Tanganyika-Burundi border where the custom of beating the bounds was employed to provide later evidence of land

ownership. Although this example refers to individual land holdings, it indicates a high level of territorial awareness.

All these examples could be taken together to promote the case for the widespread existence of clearly bounded polities in pre-colonial Africa, but this would be incorrect. It would be more accurate to describe these cases as being examples of clearly marked points of contact or short stretches of contact between two polities, often employing trees or streams in some places and nothing at all in others. They rarely refer to states clearly demarcated for the entire length of any supposed boundary. Perhaps a more representative example comes from Abyssinia. In the Nile Valley, the Abyssinians identified exact points which marked the limits of their jurisdiction, but to the east in much more open country, the border remained undetermined (Crawford, 1950: 82). In addition, the vast majority of examples of clearly bounded pre-colonial African polities refer to boundaries between subdivisions of a closely related ethnic group. With regard to the Somali, Sukuma, Haya, Maasai, Fipa and Yoruba, there is evidence of demarcation between their various sub-groups, but little proof of the existence of clear divisions between them and other ethnic groups. This supports the idea that self-conscious ethnic identity was rare in pre-colonial Africa. Where Yoruba polities met Dahomey territory, there was a zone rather than a line of contact (Person, 1972: 22). While many ethnicities may not have thought of themselves as being a single cohesive ethnic group, commonly held belief structures encouraged the adoption of similar political structures, and therefore groups with close ties could more easily adopt the same methods of dividing political space. One of the few examples of a boundary line being employed between different ethnic groups, is that between the Maasai and the Kikuyu. Some stepping stones across the Nyrobi stream formed the traditional boundary between the two groups (Tunstall, 1999). This raises the question as to whether both groups had equal access to the stones.

While there is no single traditional African method of dividing polities, it is also true that the norms associated with political space in the West cannot be transferred to pre-colonial Africa. Even the two concepts of investing sovereignty in people and territory can be employed simultaneously in the most unexpected ways. The Gogo of central Tanzania evolved a linear grid system, dividing their subchiefdoms (*yisi*) by definite boundaries (*mbeyu*) (Rigby, 1971: 395-8). Despite the boundaries, the population moved from one area to another where they had kinship links or could prove them, and there was no tradition of fixed settlements. At the same time, there was no land inheritance, which would normally be expected to be associated with the linear boundary system. From a western standpoint, it is difficult to marry fixed territorial entities with transient populations; Rigby defines political association in this case in terms of "ritual affiliation" (Rigby, 1971: 399).

The lack of written and other sources has led to some misunderstandings. It has been written that the Somali, for example, cut marks in the bark of trees to divide the fixed territories of various clans (Lewis, 1955: 43), while other writers have cited the Somali as the supreme example of flexible territorial control. Prescott, for example, states that as their herds grew or declined, so the area of pasturage and therefore polity grew or declined (Prescott, 1965: 45-6). The truth probably lies somewhere in-between, and the confusion may stem from the misuse of western concepts in an alien situation. Somali clans may well have reduced their territorial range in times of difficulty, but this does not mean that they would welcome the intrusion of another group into territory that they had traditionally used as pasturage. It is also important not to draw western associations from foreign words. As was discussed in the first chapter, the English word *border* is loaded with negative divisive connotations. The Swahili word for boundary, *mpaka*, also means 'until' and is much more positive. It indicates something that reaches out or goes as far as a set point. Where Africans did adopt the idea of a boundary of exclusion, this was often a boundary between order and disorder, along the Chinese model, rather than between separate polities. The

Oromo states of the Horn of Africa, for example, were bounded by the *moga*, an uncultivated strip which was inhabited by brigands who were encouraged by the Oromo rulers to attack common enemies and recapture escaped slaves (Huntingford, 1955: 116).

Four major differences between African and European notions of political space have been highlighted by Nugent (Nugent, 1996: 53-6) and these shall be considered in turn. Firstly, whereas European sovereignties bordered upon each other, African centralised polities were normally separated by a sea of unruled territories and various decentralised polities. This notion is certainly valid. Many centralised states were surrounded by a series of client states, which existed within a relationship of interdependence with the core entity (Kopytoff, 1987: 3). Notable examples are the Nuer of the Sudan and the Tiv of Nigeria.² The next difference to be considered, is that whilst European boundaries were fixed, African boundaries were fairly fluid. However, the condition of African boundaries varied widely; a variety of fixed African boundaries have already been referred to, while many were indeed highly fluid. Also, during the latter half of the Nineteenth Century, European boundaries were only fixed in between periods of change, with boundary alterations being made in waves, usually following military conflict or as the result of unification. However, it is valid to state that the vast majority of Europeans knew where their local borders were.

The third distinction is that whereas Europe sees a broad link between states and peoples, Africa had very few polities that could claim to be nation-states. This meant that the loyalty of a people to a state was not fixed; people moved in and out of a polity's territory without feeling any sort of allegiance to the central authority. However, although the term 'nation-state' can be applied to many European states, it is

² See E.E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer* (London: Clarendon Press, 1940) and Paul Bohannan, *The Migration and Expansion of the Tiv*, *Africa* 24: 2-16, both quoted in Kopytoff, 1989: 3.

not applicable to the USA or to much of the rest of the western world. This proposition therefore requires some modification. The West certainly sees the alignment of state and people as being favourable, so that even where it does not exist, such as in the melting pot of the United States, the creation of a national identity to cement state cohesion is seen as advisable. This was certainly not a general characteristic of African polities. Indeed, it can also be argued that many African societies, such as the Gogo were not states at all, because of their lack of a central authority. Many writers, such as Isichei (Isichei, 1997: Ch1) and Asiwaju (Asiwaju, 1983: 44) strongly disagree with the division of African groups into states and stateless societies. They argue that such a distinction implies some inferiority on the part of African polities. It must be admitted, however, that the flexible nature of many African polities marks them out as being different to the bounded western European states of the same period. It does not therefore seem unfair to use the broader term *polity* when discussing most pre-colonial African political units.

Some African academics have described the Africa of 1880 as being composed of states and polities that were fully sovereign (Boahen, 1987: 1). Yet they often indirectly acknowledge that the territorial awareness of these sovereign states was not as great as that of European states and colonies. The political map of Africa in 1880 in African Perspectives on Africa, by Boahen is typical of many. On it, African states are only circled with a dotted line, in order to emphasize the inaccuracy of the polities' borders. The European colonies of the time, however, are represented by solid shapes with definite border lines and are shaded in (Boahen, 1987: 3). This is surely an indication of the indefinite extent of many African states, but it certainly does not indicate that societies with states are somehow worth more than those without.

The final difference between western and African concepts of political space listed by Nugent, is the western expectation that sovereignty should be as strong at the edges of a state's territory as it is at the centre. In Africa, there was usually a great difference

between power at the centre and in the provinces. While it may overstate the case to argue, as Herbst does, that few Africans had allegiance to any institution larger than the village (Herbst, 1989: 679), communication difficulties did restrict the level of internal sovereignty. Large polities tended to operate on a basis of devolved power, with authority divided by region rather than according to field of government. For instance, the Fipa had one overall chief, with several minor chiefs controlling the various regions of his kingdom, each dealing with relevant domestic and foreign affairs (Willis, 1968). The West had used similar political structures at one time, but modern western ideas of government are very different, involving the centralisation of power, which is then divided into national ministries. This requires precise knowledge of a polity's extent, and was enabled by technology, such as the telegraph, telephone and the railways. African polities did not have this option. However, internal sovereignty was not uniform in Europe at the time of partition, and even today, there is a great difference between the power exerted in Milan and in Sicily, for example. Nugent also mentions the idea of shared sovereignty in Africa, and gives the example of a border town between the Oyo kingdom and Ijesha, where the chief was appointed alternately by rulers of these two states (Nugent, 1996: 56). This is certainly not incompatible with western practice. Andorra, for example, is ruled jointly by the French president and a Spanish bishop.

Another difference between European and pre-colonial African concepts of political space can be added to this list. The West considers it necessary for the cohesion of a political entity, that there is a state monopoly of military power. This was often not the case in pre-colonial African states, where the king may have vassals or even vassal states under him, each with their own military force and the will to use it independently (Kopytoff, 1989). The Ekie kings maintained power through the use of a core-periphery arrangement. They personally controlled the core of the state, whilst vassal rulers used their independent armies to control peripheral regions, although in these out-lying districts the people were subjugated rather than governed (Fairley,

1989: 93). Supra-tribal units such as the Ngoni kingdoms or Mirambo's empire were created through military power and tended to last only until the death of the founder. However, this difference is only valid with regard to modern western states. The pattern of subject vassal and military states fits western Europe very well for much of the Middle Ages. It also applies to much of the rest of the pre-colonial world. Solomon portrays the use of this model in Indochina and, highlights the importance of the core territory over the peripheral provinces (Solomon, 1969: 20-23).

Indeed, it is not difficult to identify many similarities between western and African concepts of political space; similarities which indicate that the perceptions of political space throughout the world may not be so very different. Apart from the limited African use of defined boundaries, the origins of the development of polities in both regions are mainly economic. The modern western concept of political space was largely arrived at through the concept of economic space, the industrial revolution and the development of the nation-state. This was reinforced culturally by language development and the growth of national identities. Pre-colonial African states were also based on economics and trade, with common links being reinforced by culture. The early Omani sea-based empire finds a parallel in the Freisan culture of the North Sea, and at its peak possibly bears comparison with the Hanseatic League.³ The main differences were the longevity and stability of European polities in comparison with those of Africa. Geopolitics could create cross-border political linkages at least as effectively in Africa as in Europe. The Haya of north-west Tanganyika had no centralised kingdoms, so Buganda and Rwanda exploited this by turning the Haya kingdoms into satellite states (Temu, 1979: 108). For example, Kiziba became a client state of Buganda in the 1870s.⁴ It appealed to Buganda for help but received none, while Karagwe alternated between Buganda and Rwanda. The Germans also initially

³ The difficulties inherent in assessing territorial awareness in sea-based empires would be worth a thesis on its own.

⁴ In 1891, Kiziba became the first Haya kingdom to resist the Germans.

used a system of client states to bring the area under German rule, so African and European political methods were not so very different.

The various pre-colonial African boundaries and frontiers were generally marked by their flexibility through migrations, nomadic pastoralism, trade and wars, indeed many of the same mechanisms as in Europe. Major upheavals such as the Fulani jihads and the Ngoni wars brought about the establishment of new polities or the major expansion of existing ones (Asiwaju, 1983: 48), in much the same way as successive European wars toyed with the fate of Belgium and Poland, and led either to the expansion or contraction of Germany and France. There are also parallels to be drawn between the stateless Kurds and the Igbo, whilst the Cattle Fulani of West Africa have always straddled several polities in a similar way to the Lapps of the far north of Europe (Asiwaju, 1985: 237-8). The main difference is that the concept of linear boundaries was imposed upon the Lapps many years before their African counterparts were partitioned.

This section has hopefully established several points. Firstly, that the political landscape of pre-colonial Africa was often fluid, with the division of political space determined by a variety of sophisticated means. Secondly, that while linear boundaries were not unknown in pre-colonial Africa, the western system of boundaries delimiting territories in their entirety was something new. These two points demonstrate one of the essential effects of colonialism: that a revolutionary change was brought about when the flexible and piecemeal pattern of pre-colonial African states and ethnicities was overlaid with a rigid, determined system of colonies and colonial boundaries. Colonialism certainly was successful in imposing the western system of political space upon Africa. How this was achieved in practice will be discussed in the next section.

SECTION TWO: THE PRACTICE

The Upheaval of the early years

In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that the original partition of East Africa was brought about by European strength and competition for colonies and by the relative weakness of African opposition. Although German East Africa suffered instability and internal warfare until 1907, the actual implementation of the boundaries had begun in the 1890s. Partly in an attempt stamp their authority upon the colony, and partly in an effort to extend their territory where matters remained to be resolved, German officials made great efforts to impress upon African political leaders in borderland areas, that they were now living in German territory.

With the British authorities making similar efforts in their new colonies in the region, it became apparent to many African groups that the boundaries passed through the middle of their territory. As African methods of dividing political space were rarely as divisive as those in the West, the difficulties surrounding such division may not have been immediately apparent. In addition, German forces were still in the process of campaigning against 'disloyal' tribes, and so African leaders were not in the best position to negotiate. It was not until the British take-over of Tanganyika, when colonial rule in a peaceful sense become more apparent, that African leaders began to attempt to influence the boundary arrangements. This section seeks to examine the interaction between African polities and the colonial boundaries: how the boundaries affected them and how they affected the boundaries. The colonial perception of the problem of divided groups will be considered before several case-studies are analysed.

Before beginning to assess the political impact of the boundaries, it is worth considering the political map on the eve of the European colonial invasion. As a result of the fluid nature of polities in the region, it is impossible to provide an accurate

snapshot picture of East Africa in the Nineteenth Century. It would be useful however, to indicate the types of polities which were operating in the future borderlands. At the coast, the Zanzibari Swahili were the dominant group. As was explained in the previous chapter, the Zanzibar empire was primarily an economic entity, with a core of political control at its heart. Territorial control over stretches of the coast was strong, while the Blood Red flag of the Sultan continued to fly as far inland as the Great Lakes. Zanzibari sovereignty often overlapped with that of other polities in the interior, particularly with that of the stateless Nyamwezi, who dominated much of the interior. The relationship between the Swahili and the various Nyamwezi groups was very much built upon trading links. At various times during the Nineteenth Century, the Nyamwezi were gathered together under a succession of military leaders into a Greater Unyamwezi, which stretched as far as Lake Tanganyika and up to the modern boundaries with Rwanda and Burundi. The extent of their sovereignty and the level of cohesion within the group fluctuated according to the personal and military power of their leaders. For much of the time, there was no overall leader of the Nyamwezi and so no polity of Unyamwezi.

In the north-western borderlands of the future Tanganyika, the situation was very different. The polities of Buganda, Burundi and Rwanda were all strong centralised polities, while the smaller neighbouring Haya groups within the boundaries of the future territory exhibited far less cohesion. However, because many of the leaders of these smaller groups were ethnically related to the Baganda and Batutsi chiefs and kings, there was a large amount of interference in each other's affairs. As was examined in the previous section, the Haya states of Kiziba and Karagwe became client states at various times of Buganda and Rwanda (Temu, 1979: 108). Such arrangements were generally temporary and many of the smaller entities regularly switched allegiance.

In the north, the Maasai and other pastoralist groups had developed societies based upon cattle and cattle-raiding. With fluid political structures, based upon the strength of the various clans, the Maasai nevertheless recognised some linear boundaries.⁵ The state of the Maasai in the 1880s and 1890s will be examined in more depth below. To the east of the Maasai plains, in the upland regions around Kilimanjaro, the more sedentary Chagga had developed highly sophisticated systems of cultivation. Investing heavily in their land, they could be expected to be a more centralised, territorially aware group. Yet although they had a paramount chief, political ties and allegiances were very loose, and they exhibited few of the signs of a western-style state.⁶

The far south, along the River Rovuma, was dominated by the Makonde, who rarely had political allegiance to any unit larger than the village. There is no evidence either of linear boundaries or other methods of dividing political space in the region, probably because land was plentiful. In much of the rest of the south, it is difficult to attempt any description of political structures. Since the 1840s the Ngoni had forced their way northwards in a series of conflicts associated with Zulu expansion in South Africa. The interior of the southern third of future Tanganyika was in a state of chaos as Ngoni incursions uprooted whole societies. Refugees from Ngoni attacks often took territory from other groups. The situation was just beginning to settle down when the first DOAG parties were making their way towards the Great Lakes.⁷

One of the colonialists' greatest mistakes was to assume that the political map of East Africa had a regular or fixed pattern. If African polities had one common characteristic, it was that they were liable to change. Both the decades leading up to the original partition, and the changeover from German to British rule, were periods of

⁵ For more on the Maasai see Berntsen, 1976: 1-11.

⁶ For a detailed study, see Stahl, 1964.

⁷ For more information on the Makonde see Liebenow, 1981; for more on the Ngoni see Redmond, 1985.

great upheaval in East Africa. Warfare, disease, plagues of locusts and a series of other catastrophes struck the region, and none were more affected than the Maasai.

Maasai expansion during the early and middle decades of the Nineteenth Century had been considerable, "displacing or incorporating other farming groups" (Homewood, 1996: 122-3).⁸ Different branches of the Maasai - notably the Loita and Purko - began to compete with other groups and with each other for domination of the modern-day East African borderlands. This culminated in the Iloikop Wars which left the central Rift Valley grazing grounds in the hands of expansionist Maasai groups. By the early 1880s, however, the Maasai were already in trouble, and were gradually losing control of stock and grazing lands (Waller, 1976: 532), as the Kamba, Kikuyu and Kalenjin made inroads into Maasailand.

This may have been a short-lived downturn in Maasai expansion, but the region as a whole was ripped apart by a combination of human and animal pathogens. Rinderpest entered sub-Saharan Africa in 1887 at Massawa⁹ (Scott, 1996: 204) and by late 1890 the Maasai were raiding the coastal stock routes of East Africa to replenish their herds. They took cattle from their Kamba neighbours, but these had already been infected by cattle stolen near Lake Rudolf. Within months the Loitokitok herds had been wiped out, and several commentators estimate Maasai cattle losses at between ninety and ninety-five percent (Ford, 1971: 138-9; Waller, 1976: 530).

Problems were exacerbated by red locust attacks in 1893 and 1895 and the return of smallpox after an absence of perhaps twenty years (Coulson, 1982: 28). The lack of cattle turned pasture into tsetse infested woodland, while warfare between Maasai clans had weakened them overall and encouraged renewed opposition from their

⁸ See Being Maasai: Ethnicity and Identity in East Africa, edited by Thomas Spear and Richard Waller (1993).

⁹ With cattle bought in India for the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.

neighbours. The increased level of raiding helped further spread livestock disease, while famine and population movements helped to spread smallpox and other human diseases. This massive disaster is known as Emutai by the Maasai.

It cannot be doubted that rinderpest aided colonialism. A British visitor to Maasailand in the 1890s wrote, "Powerful and warlike as the pastoral tribes are, their pride has been humbled and our progress facilitated by this awful visitation" (Reader, 1997: 625). "The Maasai nation was so weakened that the British were able to extend their rule over the interior of Kenya without the risk of war" (Ofcansky, 1981: 32). Despite this, the Maasai were the only Kenyan group that made an agreement as a nation with the British government.¹⁰ When colonial administrators first ventured into Maasailand in the 1890s, they began to classify the Maasai into German and British Maasai. Some administrators optimistically believed that this division "will have less effect as time goes on, and the Masai gradually return to their old homes as the process of recovery from the great rinderpest and small pox proceeds".¹¹ This was to underestimate the power of the boundary, and indeed most administrators were attempting to impose this division of the Maasai.

It was difficult for the colonials to decide how much the scattered patchwork and ever-changing distribution of the Maasai throughout southern Kenya and northern Tanganyika was due to traditional distribution, recent developments or the scattering of the Maasai in the 1890s. Also, where the Maasai were increasing the size of their herds, it was impossible to determine whether they merely regaining their former numbers. The colonial policy of attributing particular resources to particular groups

¹⁰ CO822 2000: 1, November 1961. Report entitled "Secretary of State's Visit to Kenya - November, 1961. The Maasai Problem." The pages of this file are poorly numbered.

¹¹ TNA: TS10298/I: 3, 13th July 1927. Memorandum on Tanganyika-Kenya boundary problems by PC Mitchell of Northern Province, sent to the Chief Secretary at Dar es Salaam.

became important. "A harder-edged definition of Maasai identity emerged as boundaries became fixed and the question of who was or was not Maasai became for the first time an important determinant of right of access to scarce resources" (Homewood, 1996: 123).

Both the Germans and the British tried to estimate the extent of Maasailand based on a snapshot picture - and a picture at a highly irregular time. In addition, seasonal migrations for pasturage and water vary over twenty years or more. Whether or not the Loita were present in one area in 1895 or 1916, did not determine whether it was their 'ancestral lands'. The subsequent dispersal of the Maasai came relatively soon after their expansion, so any concept of a natural Maasai homeland is misplaced. At the same time as the Maasai had been pushing southwards, the militarised Ngoni had advanced northwards into the region, forcing other groups to move on out of their previous territories. Simultaneously, Yao and Swahili slave traders and raiders, such as Tippu Tip, became so powerful that they developed semi-autonomous personal empires in the interior. Their power bases grew and declined, often in conjunction with their economic fortunes, and this in turn had an influence upon their local allies and enemies.

In addition to all this, the German period was one of general social and economic upheaval. As Coulson writes, "Trade turned agriculturalists and craftsmen into porters; disease wiped out most of the cattle; and the fighting and turmoil between 1890 and 1920 depopulated large areas of the country" (Coulson, 1982: 27). All this was topped by various wars with the Germans and the accompanying scorched-earth policy. The outcome of all this was massive loss of life. It is estimated that three-quarters of a million people died of famine between 1895 and 1899 alone, and as a result some Ngoni areas remain under-populated to this day (Coulson, 1982: 29-31). Into this devastated landscape erupted the volcano of the Maji Maji rebellion. African political,

economic and cultural systems may have been affected by the boundaries, but they were affected by much else besides.

Divided tribes?

The debate over whether colonial boundaries split some African polities in two, or whether many of them divided themselves has already been discussed. The abaKuria on the Tanganyika-Kenya boundary provide an excellent example of confusion regarding 'divided tribes'. Following the First World War, British administrators in the area believed the division of the tribe to have been a great mistake. H.C. Stiebel, the PC for Mwanza District complained in 1927 that the Tanganyika-Kenya border had been drawn, "without any consideration of ethnological or physical conditions. The result is that tribes are cut up and chaos in Administration is the result".¹² In particular, he notes that the abaKuria have been, "distinctly hurt by an alleged order given to their people on the Kenya side that in the event of trouble with Masai they were not to assist their brothers across the border." "They have been arbitrarily split up by the straight line boundary", leaving 12-15,000 in Kenya and 40,000 in Tanganyika.¹³ Stiebel, his successors and his DCs almost all wanted an exchange of territory with Kenya in order to reunite the abaKuria,¹⁴ but were prevented by Kenyan unwillingness to consider a change and Dar es Salaam's timidity in pursuing the matter.

¹² TNA: TS10588: 1-2, 27th May 1927. Letter from the PC Mwanza, to the Chief Secretary at Dar es Salaam.

¹³ TNA: TS10298: 61, 22nd July 1927. Letter from PC H.C. Stiebel, to the Chief Secretary at Dar es Salaam.

¹⁴ TNA: TS10588: 8-10, 28th June 1927. Memorandum from Acting PC Northern Province on Discussions at Longido. See Note 13.

KNA: PC/NZA/3/7: 92. Report entitled "Boundary South Kavirondo", 1926.

This view was held despite the trouble which the abaKuria caused the British administrators. Internal abaKuria wars broke out intermittently in the 1920s and when not fighting amongst themselves, they fought with the Maasai (Kjerland, 1995: 160). The Kenyan DO for North Mara wrote in 1926 that it was easy for, "wrongdoers and those who are in debt [to] slip from one side of the border to the other".¹⁵ In response to a Tanganyikan request for a boundary change, the same Kenyan DO wrote to his DC, that Tanganyika, "already has 2/3 of the troublemakers [abaKuria], why should they be so keen on administering the entire group?"¹⁶ Both the Kenyan and Tanganyikan governments forced non-abaKuria chiefs upon the various sub-groups in order to minimise the endemic stock theft along the border (Kjerland, 1995: 95).

Despite all this, British administrators came to the area, saw abaKuria on both sides of the 1902 boundary, and because of the assumption that African 'tribes' had 'natural homelands', assumed that the boundary had cut through them. AbaKuria territory was assumed to lie between the Migori and Kuja rivers as these were the "natural boundaries" to the area.¹⁷ However, a recent thesis by Kjerland, based on extensive fieldwork with the abaKuria demonstrates that this was not the case (Kjerland, 1995). The abaKuria had, "divided themselves by moving across the border after it was established in 1902" (Kjerland, 1995: 92). Although Kjerland is not able to be certain why some sections of the abaKuria crossed from Kenya into Tanganyika, it may have been a case of taking advantage of the border by avoiding taxes and such like.

A similar problem exists with the Luo, who are neighbours of the abaKuria. They began to migrate from BEA to DOA at around the time of the partition, but the exact

¹⁵ KNA: PC/NZA/3/7, 28th July 1926. Report entitled "Early Days in Kisii".

¹⁶ KNA: PC/NZA/3/7, 28th July 1926. See Note 15.

¹⁷ KNA: PC/NZA/3/7, 28th July 1926. See note 13.

date cannot be ascertained.¹⁸ Whether they were divided by the boundary or divided themselves across the boundary is open to debate.

Even where migrations had not recently occurred, the colonial authorities had difficulty in determining the political make-up of many areas. The first degree south boundary between Tanganyika and Uganda left a considerable area of Buganda and Ankole in the German sphere. "The Buganda here continued to look to their chiefs in the British sphere, and Baganda rebels found it a congenial place to flee to; they could be among their own people but under the umbrella of German protection. British officials in Uganda emphasized the Kagera line as the natural frontier for southern Uganda as it would greatly assist in solidifying the 'Waganda', in checking an illicit trade in slaves, arms and powder and in halting German encroachment into British territory" (Beachey, 1996: 292). The Germans, for their part did not govern the Kagera Salient as part of their Buziba district, but constantly referred to it as German Buddu; Buddu was the name for the territory to the north, within British Uganda (Thomas, 1951: 78).

The complex of relationships, including client states and breakaway states, which existed around the Kagera, posed problems for the British, and these problems were exacerbated by the fact that each African polity had a different perception of the political breakdown of the area. In attempting to adjust the Uganda-Tanganyika boundary, Ugandan officials attempted to determine the southernmost extent of Buganda. The Baganda claimed the Kagera Salient and much of the territory to the south of the river to be within their jurisdiction.¹⁹ All the African groups now lying in Tanganyikan territory disagreed with this. In addition, the area was claimed by the old

¹⁸ CO822/1297, 17th March 1958. Report entitled "Enquiries concerning the Jatus Tribe Tanganyika" by Mr Mathieson.

¹⁹ TNA: TS13022: 211-16, 14th January 1926. Letter from W.F. Gowers, Governor of Uganda to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Kingdom of Ankole, which lay to the west. The Governor of Uganda, W.F. Gowers, came to the conclusion that the Baganda exercised jurisdiction and collected taxes from the Babumbiro within the Salient, but they only levied tribute on the Buhaya and Baziba to the south. It is difficult to decide which is true. Undoubtedly Buganda exercised some control over territories to the south of the Kagera: Karagwe, Kiziba, Buzinga, Serembe, Usui and others - the great problem is that this relationship was not fixed (Thomas 1951: 47-50).

In support of the employment of the Kagera as the boundary, it should be mentioned that the name 'Kagera' means 'the divider',²⁰ but in reality, the British had been seeking a pre-colonial linear boundary where none existed. African political relationships were more complicated than that. Patterns of responsibility, allegiance and domination changed over time, and any particular chief's view of the 'normal state of affairs' could be expected to differ from his neighbours perception. Kopytoff's vision of the fluid African political scene certainly seems to ring true in the Uganda-DOA borderlands (Kopytoff, 1987). Whatever the rights and wrongs of the issue, the case demonstrates that wherever the colonial boundaries were placed, they were going to cause resentment and partition. In most areas, Africans did not have a uniform picture of the political landscape of Africa or of their locality.

The Makonde pose a similar yet more simple problem, in determining whether or not the Tanganyikan Makonde and the Mozambican Maconde were one group prior to partition. In common with many commentators, Brownlie (Brownlie, 1971: 360) writes that they were one group, living alongside and bound together by the River Rovuma. They were then bisected by the arbitrary political boundary which was created along the river, yet in the same year as Brownlie was writing, Berry considered

²¹ RKA: F1001 627 39-41, 3rd October 1901. Letter from José Maria Martins Pereira of the Portuguese Government, to the Governor of Deutsch Ostafrika.

²² RKA: F1001 627 177, 2nd February 1904. Report entitled "Portugiesische

²⁰ WO181/252: 2, 28th October 1924. Letter from Maury to Colonial Winterbottom, concerning boundary delimitation on the British-Congolese boundary.

them to be two separate groups (Berry, 1971: 113 and 168). Throughout the colonial period, there had been constant interaction, and even if they were two separate peoples, such a situation is bound to lead to intermarriage and the building up of relationships on a personal scale.²¹ Indeed, most conflict between the two groups centred upon jealousy caused by intermarriage.²² If it is impossible to determine the difference today, it is difficult to blame the colonial authorities for any mistakes they may have made. In the most in-depth study of the question, Liebenow writes that differences in colonial rule emphasized the differences between the two halves of the Makonde, but did not create them. They had been different in pre-colonial times (Liebenow, 1971: 34), and in the absence of further evidence, it seems best to give Liebenow the benefit of the doubt.

British policy

The British policy of Indirect Rule influenced colonial perceptions of divided African polities. The basic tenet of Indirect Rule was to channel rule through existing 'native authorities', but these were not to be adopted lock, stock and barrel, and the government encouraged the fusion of native authorities where they were small and/or decentralised. The success of such attempts varied from the Bahaya, who embraced it with success (Hatch, 1972: 92) to the Gogo, who rejected it outright. It is interesting to note that the British ended up by adopting the pre-colonial *yisi* (borders) of the Gogo which were commented upon earlier (Rigby, 1971: 396), so that pre-colonial African methods of dividing political space were credited with some validity. Apart from inventing new tribes and the gross inaccuracy of identifying each African by his

²¹ RKA: R1001 627: 89-91, 8th October 1901. Letter from Jose Maria Martins Pereira of the Portuguese Government, to the Governor of Deutsch Ostafrika.

²² RKA: R1001 627: 177, 2nd February 1904. Report entitled "Portugisische Grenzsache; Mavia Einfall", by DO Ewerbeck and sent to the Imperial Government at Dar es Salaam.

tribe, the disorder of the colonial changeover meant that the 'legitimate chief' could often not be found. Charles Dundas, who occupied various roles in the Tanganyikan administration and who was a keen student of African cultures and languages, wrote that, "where we did not find such authorities we created them. In tribal areas in which there were no conspicuous leaders, almost any man who brought himself to notice or made himself useful might become a chief" (Dundas, 1955).²³ For example, the man who became Paramount Chief of the Kikuyo had been the donkey boy of an administrator. Indirect Rule preserved, or in some cases invented, African structures and traditions in so far as they did not offend European ideas or obstruct colonial schemes for development. It was in this context that British administrators attempted to settle delicate and complicated matters pertaining to African political structures in the borderlands of Tanganyika.

The Tanganyikan-Northern Rhodesian borderlands were populated by various small and intermingled groups which the British attempted to bring together in a series of Tribal Native Authorities. For example, the Nyakyusa occupied a mere handful of villages during the Nineteenth Century, but the British established a council of chiefs to rule a number of groups in the area in 1933 and the name Nyakyusa was applied as a collective name. Many of these groups had links across the border in Northern Rhodesia, and therefore the Nyakyusa are often perceived as being a divided group (Iliffe, 1979: 332). Indeed, African groups were cut through along the entire length of this boundary,²⁴ and particularly so in Rungwe, Mbeya and Ufipa districts.

The original delimitation and demarcation of the DOA-BCA boundary had allowed for rectifications in accordance with local requirements (McEwen, 1971: 223-4). In 1898, a demarcation party led by Captain Close recognised a series of anomalies along

²³ Quoted in Hatch, 1972: 90; no page reference is given.

²⁴ TNA: TS34050: 8, 3rd June 1947. Memorandum by the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

the boundary, but were more concerned with mistakes in the location of pillars (McEwen, 1971: 223) than with the social impact of the demarcation. Close made a detailed study of the African groups and their location along the boundary, and discovered, for instance, that the Wanamwanga under Chief Mfumu Mkoma had been divided, although he was little concerned with the division of groups. He wrote that it was too difficult to determine exact tribal divisions: "Villages of alien tribes are found in many places, and villages of mixed tribes have sprung up" (McEwen, 1971: 224). Villages of mixed peoples were probably not as unusual as Close assumed. Additional demarcation work ended in 1937, but it was more concerned with informing Africans where the boundary lay then with rectifying any local problems (McEwen, 1971: 225). Although there has been no study of the pre-colonial map of this region, the archives are full of references to the division of African groups in the area.²⁵

Chief Mkoma - probably a descendant of Chief Mfumu Mkoma - requested a readjustment of the boundary in 1946²⁶ because his people had been split in two. One part was ruled by his niece, Waitwika, in Isoka District of Northern Rhodesia,²⁷ while he ruled the remainder in Mbeya District of Tanganyika. Some of Waitwika's people had crossed the River Mpemba into Tanganyika within days of the Tanganyika-North Rhodesia Boundary Commission of 1932,²⁸ precisely so they could come under the sovereignty of Mkoma.²⁹ The Wanamwanga lived three or four miles over the border and such a claim may have been supportable. However, since Mkoma's claim stretched forty miles south of the boundary, a change was very unlikely, and both the

²⁵ Although there are several socio-economic studies of the area; notably Konter, 1974 and Charsley, 1969.

²⁶ TNA: TS34050: 4-6, 21st June 1946. Internal memo, no correspondents given.

²⁷ TNA: TS34050: 32, 4th November 1949. Memorandum by the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

²⁸ CO691/131/9: 19, 29th November 1933. Letter from Government House, Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia. Correspondents unknown.

²⁹ CO691/131/9: 40, 31st July 1932. Report "Suggestions for the Amendment of the Boundary", by an unknown Assistant Surveyor.

Tanganyikan PC, Oldaker, and the North Rhodesian Governor, Battershill, turned him down.³⁰ Mkoma then surprised the authorities by appealing the United Nations under the terms of the mandate,³¹ although this matter was not relevant to mandatory status. The mandate stated that the territory had to be administered in the interests of "the material and moral well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants" (Harlow and Chilver, 1965: 692-4) but there was no reference to maintaining or not infringing upon existing African structures.³² At that time development equalled development along western lines in the minds of many; a situation which is not so very different today.

According to Howe, the PC of Kasama, Mkoma made the claim because the Native Authority of Isoka had been reorganised, thereby reducing Mkoma's power.³³ A colonial official wrote that the Wanyamwanga, the Wiwa, "the Mixed Tribes of the Luangwa Valley and those of the area bordering Tanganyika and Nyasaland....have spontaneously and unanimously formed a Superior Native Authority" with all the groups in the area having equal status.³⁴ Mkoma therefore lost prestige in being made a coequal instead of paramount chief, and responded by vastly exaggerating the extent of his influence across the border. He had previously led the British to believe that he had been the Paramount Chief in the area, and so perhaps he was also making himself out to be more than he really was within Tanganyika itself.³⁵ It is difficult to determine whether Mkoma had exaggerated his status, or whether the other chiefs in the area had taken the opportunity brought about by Indirect Rule to reduce his power. It is also difficult to know whether to take this an example of an African leader responding to

³⁰ TNA: Dist. Acc.77: 5/6: 8, 31st March 1933. Letter from Acting PC J.L. Berne, to the Land Officer, Dar es Salaam.

³¹ TNA: TS34050: 32, 4th November 1949. Memorandum by the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

³² The requirement for the colonial mandatory to develop the territory could have been taken as encouragement to change African political authorities.

³³ TNA: TS34050: 41, 22nd February 1950. Letter from unnamed PC, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

³⁴ TNA: TS34050: 41. See note 29.

³⁵ TNA: TS34050: 41A. See note 29.

the opportunities provided by Indirect Rule, or whether it was just another act in the fluctuating fortunes of Mkoma, along the lines of traditional African pre-colonial politics.

The United Nations did not back Mkoma's claim, but Oldaker reached an arrangement with the North Rhodesian administration whereby Mkoma could visit his people in the neighbouring territory, "provided that he did not interfere actively in her administration"³⁶ and that he only exercised influence over the true Wanyamwanga.

One of the main reasons for the consolidation of African ethnicities was to enable the administration of tax collection. Several discrepancies in borderlands were hidden, as a result of assessing the number of people liable for tax to each Native Authority. In 1952, four to five bomas of Wakwavi people with 4-5,000 cattle at Katemba, originally believed to be in Lushoto district, were discovered to be five miles inside the Kenyan border.³⁷ The reason for this ignorance was that the people of Katemba paid tax to the Lushoto Sub Chief of Mbaramo, as they recognised him as their Native Authority. The Tanganyikan and Kenyan governments had therefore always assumed that the people of this remote area lay inside Tanganyika. African political arrangements were occasionally able to survive partition, whether through cases such as that of the Wakwavi, or because of arrangements allowing cross-border access by chiefs to their people.

³⁶ TNA: TS34050: 32, 4th November 1949. Memorandum by the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

³⁷ TNA: Acc.4: 723/III: 364, April 1952. "Note on Impounding, in March 1952, of 500 cattle at Katemboi by DC Voi." No author given.

Colonial considerations

Colonial recognition of the complexity and difficulties posed by the African political and ethnic make-up of Tanganyika, and by the western-style linear boundaries, gradually improved with time. During the early years of colonial rule in East Africa, appreciation of the level of difficulty posed to African groups by the boundaries was limited. A few rare examples are provided by missionaries operating in the south of the territory. J.W. Moir, who preached near the Nyasaland border, objected to the Anglo-German boundary along the 'Stevenson Road' from Lake Nyasa to Lake Tanganyika: "The road runs right through the very heart of several tribes, and it would be absurd to allow one half of such a tribe, because situated south of the road, to be British, while compelling the other half to submit to the Germans".³⁸ At this stage of boundary determination, both the British and Germans had other priorities.

The Germans were prepared to investigate and accept the extent of indigenous African polities, but only when it benefited them. When the British complained about German incursions into Uganda in 1900, Governor von Liebert replied that he believed that British territory only encompassed that of Buganda, and therefore did not reach the first degree of latitude south, as had previously been agreed as the interim border.³⁹ At the same time, however, there were a few examples of British concern for the division of African groups without apparent ulterior motive. Following the delimitation of the DOA-BEA boundary, some British officials wanted to change the boundary line to follow the River Umba near the coast, and as far inland as the Sorogoto Hills. Salisbury consulted Mr Smith of the recent boundary commission⁴⁰

³⁸ FO: Confidential Print 881/6146: 42, 20th June 1890. African Lakes Company to the Marquis of Salisbury.

³⁹ RKA: R1001 625: 164, 9th July 1900. Letter from DO Eibert, to the German Governor, Dar es Salaam.

⁴⁰ RKA: R1001 575: 46, 9th April 1897. Letter from the British Embassy in Berlin, to Baron von Marschall.

and Smith advised that under present arrangements, villages had been cut off from their plantations, but free access was allowed on a daily basis. Should the boundary follow the river, then people would be cut off from their plantations. Salisbury took Smith's view on board and the original boundary agreement stood. That matters could be referred to the highest authority and be determined along the lines of preserving existing African systems, shows that disruption of African arrangements was a criterion in local border agreements. However, in this particular case there were no other pressing colonial considerations, and that is the real reason behind Salisbury's decision.

The Kenya-Tanganyika border was another area of divided African groups, but even when 'African' considerations were valued highly, it was sometimes impossible to determine which African interests were of paramount importance. A Tanganyikan government report on boundary problems stated that they had "favoured tribes" throughout the territory, but that along the Kenyan border, two of these tribes had conflicting claims.⁴¹ The Chagga were admired for their economic skills, but the Maasai were the "pride of the plains." The dispute occurred around the farm at Ol Molog, where Maasai from Kenya and Chagga groups claimed grazing land as their own. The government's decision was that the Maasai could stay for a time because of drought across the border in Kenya, but that the area should gradually be taken over by Chagga overspill. This would also help to discourage border crossing in the long term.

⁴² RKA: R1001-633-65, 19th May 1909. Notes on the Delineation of the Deutsch-Oswalito-Uganda boundary, by the Boundary Commissioners.

⁴³ DCA: Acc.69: 732-62, 63, 2nd April 1955. Letter from the DC Moshi, to the Member for Local Government, the Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁴⁴ TNA: Acc.69: 732-624, 2nd April 1955. This is from a four page undated letter.

⁴¹ TNA: TS10298/I: 15, 30th June 1927. "Memorandum of Discussions at Longido on 27th, 28th and 29/6/27 on Kenya-Tanganyika Masai Boundary Question."

Case-studies in the Borderlands

The Chagga are very rarely mentioned in the secondary literature when it comes to divided groups, although they were very much partitioned by the Kenya-Tanganyika boundary. The 1888 agreement states that the boundary "passes directly through the territories of Taveta and Chagga",⁴² and the 1890 treaty confirmed the line. The bulk of Chaggaland was placed in Tanganyika, but Wachagga were left at Lasit and in the Rombo, now in Kenyan Maasailand, and also around Taveta. The Chagga Council appealed for a change in the boundary during the 1950s, but the matter was not seriously investigated by the colonial authorities, because the Chagga had not previously complained and because the German records contained no references to the matter.⁴³ However, an investigation by the Kenyan authorities revealed that Mr Jeremiah of Taveta, a member of the Kenyan Legislative Assembly, was in fact a Chagga.⁴⁴ In 1953 the people of Taveta sent a petition to the Royal Commission on Lands and Population, requesting to be rejoined to Chaggaland: they believed this to be easy because Britain ruled both Kenya and Tanganyika. Investigations concluded that they had continued to use grazing and grass-cutting rights to the east of the present boundary, at least until the Boundary Commission of 1906 had constructed boundary pillars.⁴⁵ They had now indeed lost access to that land. However, because of the longevity of the division, the two governments concluded that it was better for the boundary to maintain a more divisive nature, and the Chagga request was rejected.

⁴² RKA: R1001 633: 65, 19th May 1909. Notes on the Delineation of the Deutsch Ostafrika-Uganda boundary, by the Boundary Commissioners.

⁴³ TNA: Acc.69: 7/III: 62, 65, 2nd April 1955. Letter from the DC Moshi, to the Member for Local Government, the Secretariat, Dar es Salaam.

⁴⁴ TNA: Acc.69: 7/III: 62a, 2nd April 1955. This is from a four page unnumbered, untitled report placed between pages 62 and 63 in the file. It is attached to the letter in Note 39.

⁴⁵ TNA: Acc.69: 7/III: 62d. See Note 40.

The Maasai proved a far more difficult case for the colonial governments to deal with. The Maasai as pastoralists will be considered in depth in Part Four, but it is worthwhile considering them here from a political point of view. Whether or not the Maasai were organised politically to any great extent was a matter of some debate for the colonial administrators. The instigator of Indirect Rule as an official policy in Tanganyika, Governor Cameron, considered in 1926 that the division of the Maasai between Kenya and Tanganyika was not as much of a problem as other divided groups in Africa, because the Maasai were, "a tribe of pure nomads, occupying and owning no one particular area of land" and "they were not even under one single tribal authority - this essential to tribal cohesion was lacking".⁴⁶ The PC of Northern Province, P.E. Mitchell, agreed with Cameron: "it would be very desirable that the Masai should sort themselves out by sub-tribes, so that homogenous units remained in each territory".⁴⁷ The view that the Maasai were not already politically organised, contradicts sharply the research carried out by Alan Jacobs which was referred to earlier in this chapter (Jacobs, 1963: 38).

During the 1930s, it became apparent that the Maasai were the most important and problematic example of a divided group in East Africa. Indeed, several administrators came to believe that they were the only example. For instance, W.J. Lloyd, the Acting DO of Maasai District, wrote that, "the situation is unique in that we have a tribe which has been divided by an imaginary line".⁴⁸ Such exaggeration developed out of the almost unceasing trouble which DOs faced from Maasai cross border movements. Most of this trouble cannot be termed political in nature, but the Europeans came to

⁴⁶ CO691/86/6: 16, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions". No author or correspondents given.

⁴⁷ CO691/100/21: 22nd November 1927. "Note of the conversation at the Office of the Chief Native Commissioner, Nairobi, 22nd November 1927 - 10am" by P.E. Mitchell, Acting PC for Northern Province.

⁴⁸ TNA: TS10298/II: 479, 24th January 1935. Letter from W.J. Lloyd, DO for Masai District, to the PC for Northern Province.

recognise that the Maasai were organised into various subsections, and that the majority of these subgroups crossed the boundary in order to graze or water their cattle. Many even lived across the boundary for several years at a time. The challenge for both Kenyan and Tanganyikan DOs was to try to identify which subgroups were mainly based in Kenya and which in Tanganyika, and to try to constrain them within these territories, thereby creating 'Kenyan Maasai' and 'Tanganyikan Maasai.' Another difficulty lay in determining the true range of the Maasai. This was an impossible task given the volatile situation prior to colonial rule which was discussed earlier. There was no clearly definable 'Maasailand' as recognised by the Maasai, but even the most limited concept of a Maasai homeland, placed it around the Kenya-Tanganyika boundary.

Mitchell, the PC for Tanganyikan Maasailand, attempted to treat Maasai cross-border movement on a par with that of any other people, with no favours granted because of their pastoral lifestyle.⁴⁹ This proved to be totally unworkable, as much because of the tiny number of colonial administrators in the area, as because of the activities of the Maasai. Maasai political, cultural and economic structures were closely intertwined, and were mainly based upon survival in a very difficult and changeable environment. Where the division of agricultural groups could mean having to find new farming land, grazing land and salt licks were not replaced so easily, and the pattern of rainfall could not be influenced by the boundary. Various local arrangements were made which will be considered in Part Four, but it was not until the early 1950s that attempts were made to negotiate boundary arrangements with the Maasai as a whole on a political basis. The Boundary Committee first met on the second of November 1952, and consisted of Kenyan Maasai Chiefs, representatives of Tanganyikan Maasai Native Authorities, mainly from the Longido Council area, and Kenyan and

⁴⁹ TNA: TS10298/I: 1-16, 30th June 1927. "Memorandum of Discussions at Longido on 27th, 28th and 29/6/27 on Kenya-Tanganyika Masai Boundary Question".

Tanganyikan DCs.⁵⁰ By this time, however, veterinary restrictions had been agreed by the Maasai along the border, and this encouraged acceptance of the line as a political reality. There were now grounds for negotiation.

The African political make-up of north-west Tanganyika also posed problems to the colonial governments; in large part because although the region contained areas of little centralised authority, the centralised polities across the boundary exercised some sway. The problem of Bugandan influence along the Kagera has already been referred to, and indeed the general political orientation of the region was towards Buganda. From the Fifteenth Century onwards, the Bito dynasties in modern Uganda gave rise to a number of Haya kingdoms in modern north-west Tanzania. The most important of these, Karagwe, survived until the 1890s when it was badly affected by the rinderpest outbreak and by an accompanying series of violent succession struggles (Austen, 1968: 9-10). Despite its downfall, political links between the area and Uganda were maintained. To the south, from about 1700, people from Ruanda and Burundi had migrated into the lands of western Tanzania, and had come to dominate the people of Buha, Uvinza and Ufipa (Daley, 1993: 10). In the north-west, Kasulu and Kigoma districts continued to be subject to Tutsi hegemony until well into the colonial period.

When it became apparent that the German-Congo border would fall within this area, it was obvious that there would be problems in placing a boundary anywhere within the region. Dr Richard Kandt wrote in the *Vossischen Zeitung* in 1889 that, "The carving up of such a unified, organised kingdom as Rwanda contains in my opinion, the greatest dangers, should we think of actually exercising our rule in Rwanda" ⁵¹ However, in 1900, the German DC, Eibert, admitted that artificial boundaries in the north and north-west were unavoidable.⁵²

⁵⁰ TNA: Acc.69: 7/III: 519, 9th November 1953. Letter from DC Masailand, to PC Northern Province.

⁵¹ RKA: R1001 623: 80, 21st February 1889. The current author's translation. Kandt

In the event, the delimitation of boundaries in the north-west did not have a very great impact upon African polities because of the weakness of German administration in the region. Communications were poor and personnel too few to have much of an impact (Gwassa, 1969: 92), and an almost pure form of Indirect Rule was practised in Rwanda and Burundi, as the Tutsi monarchs of the two states were left in almost complete control. Tax collection and the recruitment of labour had not even begun by 1914, but Germany had great plans for coffee cultivation and had decided to extend the central railway line into Rwanda (Koponen, 1994: 74). The First World War intervened and German rule in the north-west left only a slight impression. This lack of intervention together with the weakly implemented boundaries, enabled an easy dismemberment of DOA between Britain and Belgium in 1919.

The original post-war partition of DOA led to the separation of the district of Kissaka from the Kingdom of Rwanda (McEwen, 1971: 154). The British had wanted to attach the district to Tanganyika, in order to enable the construction of the proposed Cape to Cairo railway through the territory. Following strong protests, apparently from the people of Kissaka, Great Britain agreed to a League of Nations request for the return of the district to Rwanda and therefore to Belgium on 31st August 1923 (McEwen, 1971: 155). The chairman of the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates' Commission, Marguis Reodoli, argued that the border was "hardly justifiable from the point of view of the well-being, political order, stability, and economic development of an African community already well organized."⁵³ The final transfer of 4,000 square

is an interesting commentator on the period, but his knowledge of the location of African polities leaves a lot to be desired. For example, he places Uhehe in the Congo.

⁵² RKA: R1001 625a: 148, 29th June 1900. Letter from Governor Eibert to the German Foreign Office.

⁵³ Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 2nd Session, 14th Meeting, 9th August 1922, Annex 8: 72. See also Correspondence Regarding the Modification of the Boundary between British Mandated Territory and Belgian Mandated Territory in East Africa, Cmd 1974.

kilometres and half a million people brought about the reunification of all the territory formerly under the sovereignty of Musinga, the King of Rwanda (Callahan, 1999: 88).

It took several years and treaties before the final delimitation was achieved, although customary fishing rights were enshrined within a 1926 agreement. Demarcation proved problematic - the Kagera river passed through papyrus swamps - and was not finished until 1931 (McEwen, 1971: 156). The treaty was signed in 1934 and came into force on 19th May 1938: all in all it was a very long and drawn-out process. In the event, the British were quite keen to hand the territory back. Despite good relations between British and Belgians officials on the border during the early 1920s, as they struggled to impose the boundary: "Murderers, political refugees and cattle-lifters used the inaccessible mountain frontiers to evade justice and create bad feeling".⁵⁴ However, the catalyst for the transfer was not banditry, and Touval is right to cite this as an example of ethnic considerations overcoming colonial politics (Touval, 1972: 9-10). It is, however, unlikely that the territory would have been handed over had a Cape-to-Cairo railway actually been projected to run through it. Ethnic considerations were real enough but did not carry as much weight as other factors.

On the Tanganyikan side of the new border, Watutsi continued to control African groups. D.K. Lumley was the first British DC in Bugufi⁵⁵ and later moved to the neighbouring district of Kibondo. He describes the local Bugufi people as Barundi, and their chiefs as Watutsi (Lumley, 1976: 24 and 32). "There are men of their strain among the ruling clans in Uganda and eastern Zaire, but they are most in evidence in western Tanganyika, Ruanda and Burundi, where they have supplied the rulers of nearly every tribe" (Lumley, 1976: 24). In 1948, the question of the status of Bugufi

⁵⁴ WO181/252: 2, 28th October 1924. Letter from Maury to Colonial Winterbottom, concerning boundary delimitation on the British-Congolese boundary.

⁵⁵ Bugufi is known as Ngora today.

arose. Mwambutsa, the Mwami of Bugufi, claimed that it was part of Urundi, but counter petitions were submitted by other people in the area. In the end, the colonial powers decided that most of the population wanted to maintain the status quo, although it is not known whether they made any substantive investigations into the issue (McEwen, 1971: 158).

The migrations from Rwanda and Burundi into Tanganyika, which had produced such great links between the territories, have continued to the present day. The 1948-57 census years revealed that the Barundi increased in number by 35% in ten years, the greatest increase in Tanzania. There were an estimated 46,000 Barundi in Kasulu District alone in 1956.⁵⁶ Moreover, colonial officers had difficulty in detecting the newcomers because the Barundi and Baha shared a common language and culture (Daley, 1993: 20). The DC at Kasulu wrote that, "Linguistically the border elements at both sides are closer to each other than they are to their fellow tribesmen of fifteen miles distance."⁵⁷ These links have also encouraged refugees to flee to the region following the series of massacres and upheavals in Rwanda and Burundi (Wayne, 1975: 316-32). Political boundaries can never prevent such population flows in areas like north-western Tanganyika.

Resistance to International Boundaries

Apart from appealing for changes in the location of the new boundaries, Africans responded to political division by using the boundaries and borderlands to protest against colonial rule. This idea has already been considered by Asiwaju, when he

⁵⁶ TNA: Acc.225: PA8.06A: 2nd February 1956. Letter from DC Kasulu to the PC Northern Province, at Arusha. The number of this file does not accord with other files. It presumably comes from an older system that has not been updated.

⁵⁷ TNA: Acc.225 PA8.06A: 2nd February 1956. See Note 51.

examined migration as a form of revolt in West Africa (Asiwaju, 1976: 577-94). Just as Africans migrated out of a polity during pre-colonial times, so they left French colonies in West Africa for a perceived better life in the British colonies of the region (Asiwaju, 1976: 578). Not only was French rule harsher, but higher taxes and military conscription encouraged mass exodus. Asiwaju even writes that French administration was much more aggressive in its reaction to existing African political systems (Asiwaju, 1976: 583). This was probably the result of the more direct pro-active style of French rule. Similar migrations occurred in eastern Africa, such as the movement of the abaKuria over the Tanganyika-Kenyan border, but the region also exhibits another phenomenon - that of using boundaries and borderlands to physically oppose colonial rule.

The idea of resistance is everywhere in Tanganyika: both in a physical sense and in a psychological sense. It is in the villages and in the towns, in the minds of the people whose lives have been shaped by the resistance of their forefathers. The whole history of the territory has been based around domination of one type or another, and around the resistance of African peoples which this has provoked. From Abushiri and Bwana Heri in the so-called Arab Revolt, to the biggest of all African anti-colonial uprisings - Maji Maji - to the peaceful anti-colonial speeches of Julius Nyerere, the legacy of resistance in the country have given birth to Tanzania's national identity and national cohesion. Resistance to boundaries went hand in hand with resistance to political domination in general, but it is possible to identify many examples of resistance specifically attributable to, or directly exploiting, the colonial boundaries.

As John Iliffe writes, many students of African responses to colonialism identify three types of resistance: armed resistance, negotiation and collaboration (Iliffe, 1979: 105). In the Tanganyikan context, however, it is impossible to isolate these methods or to classify the response of each African group by one of these methods. The more militarised peoples, such as the Ngoni and the Maasai were not necessarily more likely

to resist militarily. The reasons behind the adoption of the various methods are largely localised and mostly unknown. Iliffe's depiction of each group having its hawks and doves fighting for domination seems likely (Iliffe, 1979: 105-7), and it is impossible to know for sure the ins and outs of the political debate in each case.

The coastal uprising led by Bwana Heri and Abushiri bin Salim was named the Arab Revolt by the Germans in an attempt to attribute it to slave traders. As Glassman argues, the original German claim for formal control of the territory cited the need to suppress slave trading, which was organised by Arab merchants who operated throughout East Africa (Glassman, 1995: 6, 177). In fact, the most united stand against the German forces was at Saadani, a town which had also resisted Arab rule during the 1870s and 1880s (Glassman, 1995: 6). Moreover, many strands of coastal society came together to oppose the extension of German rule into the ten mile coastal strip, and as such can be partly seen as resistance to the erosion of the recently drawn up boundary.⁵⁸

Once German rule had been established, effective rule was so limited that borderlands could be exploited in order to continue resistance. When a German army came south to Lindi, they summoned many African leaders to visit them. A chief named Machemba on the Makonde Plateau replied, "I have heard your words, but I do not see any reason why I should obey you. I would rather die...If it is a matter of friendship I shall not refuse today and always, but I shall not be your subject.....I shall not come. If you are strong enough, come and get me" (Müller, 1959: 455-6). Several German expeditions were sent to the hinterland behind Lindi and Mikindani to destroy his power, as the Germans were keen to secure the economic potential of the south-east. They met with varied success, but were never able to defeat him, until he fled

⁵⁸ For example, escaped slaves at Kikogwe joined Abushiri at Pangani (Iliffe, 1979: 93).

over the Rovuma in July 1899 to live in the DOA-PEA borderlands (Ingham, 1965: 179). Although most of his people gave themselves up to the Germans, he was able to exploit the *Grenzwildnisse* and the boundary to raid both the Germans and the Portuguese. The Germans built a post on the Rovuma, but the two colonial powers were not able to cross the boundary in pursuit of Machemba, so he was able to avoid capture by using the division.⁵⁹

In 1904-5, the Portuguese promised to co-ordinate a military expedition against Machemba with a similar German attack, but they failed to do so. It appears that lack of resources and the heavy rains put them off, but there was also a large uncontrolled trade in gunpowder in northern PEA borderlands which led the local Portuguese commander to fear that Machemba was well armed.⁶⁰ Not only were the early colonial borderlands beyond political control, but also beyond economic control.

The upheaval brought about by the First World War encouraged several African groups to rebel against European rule, and the opportunities provided by the international boundaries figured widely in their actions. The Kionga people in Uganda had caused the British authorities a great deal of trouble during the early years of colonial rule. When news reached them that the local DC was on his way to meet them, they often fled over the border to DOA to avoid taxes and political control. Shortly after the Great War broke out, they moved their cattle into DOA and sat on the border hilltops in order to shout abuse at British forces in the area (Hopkins, 1969: 229). Simultaneously, some Batutsi chiefs in Uganda formally defected to DOA and moved across the border. The British responded by announcing that the ringleader, a man called Nyindo, would never be allowed to return to Ankole (Hopkins, 1969: 234-235).

⁵⁹ RKA 289/186. Full reference lost.

⁶⁰ RKA: R1001 628: 136, 23rd March 1905. Letter from Sturmman, in the German Foreign Office, Berlin, to the Imperial Government, Dar es Salaam.

Conclusion

African responses to the colonial boundaries varied as much as colonial responses to partitioned African groups. Some Africans were able to resist colonial rule and the colonial boundaries by crossing the borders, and occasionally - as Machel did - by fighting the colonial invaders. African polities were also able to retain some measure of identity and cohesion through their incorporation in the structure of colonial administration. Some boundary alterations were made because of the impact upon African states, as in Rwanda, and colonial administrators sometimes had an interest in, and sympathy for, partitioned African groups. As such, Africans could exert some influence over colonial policy. Ultimately, however, the majority of boundaries which had been determined during the early colonial phase were maintained intact, and the long list of bisected African groups which was given in the previous chapter was not shortened by a single name during the period of colonial rule. European decisions and requirements outweighed those of the indigenous peoples, as Britain and Germany, like all the colonial powers, extended their military superiority to encompass a moral superiority. They were far stronger than the African polities, so their political systems, methods of rule and morals must also be superior. As Galbraith wrote, "Civilized men did not need to rationalize their possession of lands occupied by lesser beings" (Galbraith, 1972: 2).

In the clash of African and European political systems and methods of dividing political space, there was only ever going to be one winner. Where existing African authorities were not suitable, new ones could be created, as it was not the adoption of African political authorities which mattered to the British, but the appearance of it. Existing polities were only allowed to exercise some control in order to limit the financial expense and physical requirements of attempting to closely govern the entire territory. As they only retained that level of control and those functions which the European powers granted them, they had lost all real power. African political systems

were no longer of a great deal of relevance politically speaking, although they often held a large amount of sway locally as cultural entities.

The colonial authorities did interest themselves in African politics, partly because of the demands of Indirect Rule, but also sometimes in the interests of settling matters amicably. Whether or not they tried to be even handed or even in the least bit concerned, depended upon the men on the ground. Oldaker, for example, does seem to have been concerned, and the evidence of his research indicates that he was not unknowledgeable about African affairs (Oldaker, 1957). Indeed, most of the PCs and DCs whose opinions and actions are recorded in the colonial records seem to have been interested in local African politics, but this may create an inaccurate impression. Those not interested may not have referred local problems to the Dar es Salaam administration, or even recorded them in their own records. Maasai problems always came to the attention of the central government because of the amount of interest in that boundary, but it is to be wondered if Mkoma's problems would have come to the attention of the Governor had Oldaker not been the PC concerned and if Mkoma had not appealed to the United Nations. How the points discussed in this chapter affected relations between Tanganyika and her neighbours is one of the subjects of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Coping with African political structures was not the only political aspect of the new boundaries which faced the colonial powers. While the Germans, and later the British, attempted to increase their control over Tanganyika and therefore to impose the boundaries which had been created, the same process was being undertaken in the colonial possessions to the north, west and south. Incidents of conflict and co-operation naturally occurred as the neighbouring colonial powers attempted to push their political control to the limits of their territories. In addition, relations between Africans across the new boundaries occasionally caused the colonial powers to become involved with one another. The development of European style cross-border diplomacy demonstrates the success of the colonial imposition of the western system of dividing political space. This chapter seeks to examine these international relations, to assess the role of the borders in these relations, and to discuss differences in approach and policy between the British and German administrations. Government border policies are greatly influenced by government foreign policies, but local factors such as the high level of autonomy of many colonial administrators and the actions of African borderlanders, meant that cross-border relations were to a considerable extent out of the control of central colonial administration. Interaction between the colonialists and the borderlanders influenced international relations to a greater extent than might be imagined.

Three main factors brought about differences between German and British rule in Tanganyika: the isolation of DOA; variation in the level of political stability in the region; and the difference between the territory's colonial and mandatory status. Yet an assessment of these factors highlights how the policies of both powers were built firmly upon western notions of political space. To take the first factor, DOA was surrounded by foreign possessions: Portuguese, Belgian and, above all, British. British Tanganyika, however, bordered four other British possessions, or five if Zanzibar is included, and

therefore great differences in approach are to be expected. However, although Kenya and Tanganyika were both governed by Britain, competition along their common border was, if anything, greater than along Tanganyika's other borders. Such competition was hardly likely to lead to war, as the German-Congolese conflict nearly did, but it was a very important feature of political rule in the borderlands of Tanganyika. It is probable, however, that the Germans saw their boundaries as being more restrictive than the British, largely as a result of this British encirclement.

Another major difference between the British and German periods was in the level of political stability in the region. All the colonial powers were loathe to become involved in a neighbour's territory, but the newness of the European partition in the German period, allied to geographical ignorance at the time of the partition, meant that changes to the boundaries and intervention in neighbouring colonies was more likely before the First World War than after it. Finally, Germany ruled Tanganyika as a colony, whereas the British ruled as the mandatory power. The influence of this difference upon international relations will be analysed after relations with each of Tanganyika's neighbours had been considered. The boundaries will be considered methodically one by one and chronologically, but reference will be made to other times and places as and where appropriate. Another lesser difference was the number of administrators in the field. There were never more than eighty German DCs, while this increased to 120 under the first British Governor Byatt and had risen to 185 by 1932 (Austen, 1968: 149, 203). However, because of the sheer size of Tanganyika, the benefits of this increase would not have been substantial. In addition, the African population increased markedly over the same period and British DCs rarely stayed in one district for long, so they had less opportunity to build up lasting relationships.

² The spelling of the German is *Deutsch*.

³ ZNA, 11/2/1911 to 11/2 (October 1911) Newspaper Article from the *Manchester Guardian*, No. 209.

Deutsch Ost Afrika-British East Africa

As a result of the competitive nature of the scramble for territory in East Africa, it could be expected that Anglo-German border relations would be rather strained. During the earliest years of colonial rule this was indeed the case, with several instances of pettiness marring relations. For instance, a British boat, the *Aramatta*,¹ which was on its way to Australia, became stuck on a sandbank off the coast of DOA. The Germans attempted to charge transit duties, but the British refused, claiming this was ridiculous.² However, in the years leading up to the First World War, co-operation between colonial officials increased and the British came to have more sympathy for the position of their German neighbours. It must be noted that before 1902, the DOA-British East Africa (BEA) border was somewhat shorter than it is today: the eastern provinces of Uganda on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria were only transferred from Uganda to BEA in that year.

To judge by the numerous references to African migration from the DOA side of the border to the BEA side, it seems likely that German rule was perceived to be the harsher of the two. Kjerland has studied the case of the abaKuria who moved across the border in great numbers during the early years of colonial rule, and she reports abaKuria people describing German cruelty as the main reason for fleeing to BEA. (Kjerland, 1995: 143). German resources were too limited to prevent this emigration and the British made no attempt to stem such an influx. There was widespread belief among British officials in the crudity of German rule (Lugard, 1903: 543-4). In the Autumn of 1910, two women from Sarungu in BEA went to fetch spring water across the border and were promptly arrested by a German border guard. The husband of one of the women tried to bribe the guard and was shot on the spot. The British Governor,

¹ The spelling of the *Aramatta* is uncertain.

² ZNA: AL2/55/1: 50, 31st December 1889. Newspaper Article from the Hannoversche Courier, No. 609.

Sir Percy Girouard, wrote to the Dar es Salaam authorities to question the severity of the crime.³ The German man on the ground "exercised full jurisdiction over 'natives'"; punishments were legally determined, but he decided for which offences they were applicable (Iliffe, 1979: 119). DOA rule was generally based upon force and few administrators travelled without armed escorts. That "their offices were massive bomas sited to command the best fields of fire" (Iliffe, 1979: 119), says much about the reactions which they expected to provoke. African borderlanders had little influence at this time.

It was often difficult for British objections over a particular border incident to reach the German authorities in Dar es Salaam within a reasonable amount of time, as communications remained a great problem. There was no direct cable between the two colonies and telegraph messages had to go via the Zanzibar station, which was not always in operation. The Germans did want to build a cable across the border to link Tanga with Mombasa but the British rejected the scheme on grounds of cost (Brode, 1911: 31). Poor communications discouraged referral of local matters to higher authorities, and the importance of the man on the ground remained extremely high.

The colonial records contain numerous similar examples. As a result of a series of border shootings by guards on both sides, the British abandoned the practice of employing border guards along this boundary - the crimes which they deterred or detected were of little note.⁴ Several administrative stations had been set up along the boundary during the 1890s, and as a result of cross-border friction between German appointees and the local people, the British closed their station at Karungu in 1907 and moved it further away from DOA to Kisii. Recognition of the agreed boundaries (by

³ From Kjerland 1995: 143-5. KNA: DC/KSI/3/3, 1910. Report entitled "The History of the District". No author given.

⁴ Again, from Kjerland, 1995: 143-5. KNA: DC/KSI/1/1, 1908. South Kavirondo District Annual Report.

DCs on the ground) made it unnecessary for the DCs along the border to operate almost within sight of each other, enabling such withdrawals. The boundary as an unseen barrier had been accepted by both sides.

When resources allowed it, the Germans introduced The Fugitive Criminals Surrender Ordinance in 1908 in order to restrict migration from DOA to BEA, by having an excuse to turn individuals back at the border. The British did not follow suit and this clearly infuriated the Germans. Crampton, the British DC for South Kavirondo District wrote in 1911: "The policy of our German neighbours occasionally gives rise to trouble and [is] a little difficult to understand. Their ostensible reason for the restrictions on Natives crossing the border is to prevent the spread of sleeping sickness, but in reality it appears to be directed towards putting a stop to border tribes emigrating to British territory".⁵

While the colonial records continue to cite instances of border incidents until the First World War, British attitudes towards the Germans seem to soften during the later years. One of the major instances of cross-border co-operation occurred in 1905 when German troops were transported to Mwanza via the British railway in order to fight in the Maji Maji War (Austen, 1968: 53). The slightly more relaxed German rule which followed Maji Maji may also have improved Anglo-German relations. Following the movement of 700 abaKuria to British territory in 1911 in order to avoid bushclearing work aimed at combating sleeping sickness, the BEA DC wrote: "I think we should endeavour to stop the continual influx from the German territory. It must make it difficult for the German authorities to enforce their orders, if the natives can find refuge in this District when they please".⁶

⁵ See FO403/173 in particular.

⁶ DKA: RJ001 627: 549, 7th February 1900. Letter from Lieutenant von Wulffen at Mwanza to the German Consul at Port Ugowe.

⁵ KNA: DC/KSI/1/1, 1995. See Note 4.

⁶ KNA: DC/KSI/1/1, 1911. See Note 4. Also from Kjerland, 1995: 147.

Deutsch Ost Afrika-Uganda

To the west, in Uganda, Anglo-German relations were rather more tense, and border incidents much more numerous. According to Austen:

"Around Lake Victoria the Germans and British not only respected each other's boundaries but actively assisted one another in the mutual task of keeping control over large African populations through frequent exchanges of information, supplies and even munitions" (Austen, 1968: 31-2).

This section seeks to disprove the accepted view of relations along this, albeit, little studied boundary. Although Austen's notion of respect does contain some measure of truth regarding the final years of German rule in East Africa, it has not been borne out by a thorough examination of the literature upon which this chapter is based.⁷

While the British and Germans were gradually increasing their grip on the new East African colonies, there remained much uncertainty over the precise location of the new boundaries - nowhere more so than along the Uganda-DOA border. Both sides became exceedingly worked up when the other party attempted to exercise their authority on the wrong side of the line. This precious attitude towards territorial sovereignty is inherent in the western system of linear boundaries. The colonial records abound with examples. During 1899-1900 German officials gave German flags to African chiefs in Utegi and Karungu, well within Buganda, with orders to fly the flags at all times.⁸ They proceeded to collect taxes in the form of food or labour in the same area and when sufficient taxes were not raised, proceeded to kill forty people in a punitive raid.⁹ When the Ugandan administration objected, the Germans advised the British not to involve themselves in German territorial matters. Such confusion is understandable

⁷ See FO403/173 in particular.

⁸ RKA: R1001 627: 54R, 7th February 1900. Letter from Lieutenant von Wulffen at Schirati, to the Stations Chef at Port Ugowe.

⁹ RKA: R1001 627: 4. From Hauptmann, to the Government Representative, at Bukoba.

when even the official maps of the area which were in use at this time vary wildly from each other. A German map of 1895 shows Koki and Ankole as being in German territory, when earlier agreements placed them deep inside the British protectorate over Uganda (Dietrich Reimer, 1895). Competition and not just ignorance fuelled conflict, and when a gold reef was discovered on the eastern side of Lake Victoria, the Germans did not hesitate to attempt to push the boundary northwards.

British incursions into German territory were also numerous. For example, shortly before his survey of the northern half of Lake Victoria, Captain Whitehouse visited the village of Shirati in German territory, gave the chief a medal and assured him that he was under British protection (Beachey, 1996: 292-3). Shirati was the German border post and actually named in a series of agreements as being in German territory. While both parties sought to extract the maximum possible territorial advantage from the situation, British policy was generally to abstain from setting up posts where any doubt surrounded an area, partly no doubt on grounds of cost, whereas the Germans always placed a post in disputed districts in order to support their claim.

During the lifetime of DOA, a large proportion of DOA-Ugandan communication concerned territorial encroachment by one side or the other - normally by DOA representatives and normally relating to exacting tax from British subjects or setting up bases on the British side. For example, in 1899, the British complained to the German government in Berlin that German forces had established a fort nine miles north of the boundary at Kakuto, in the Kikumbiro District in Uganda.¹⁰ They had used the fort as a base for cutting timber, which was then sent back to DOA.¹¹ The Governor of Uganda, Sir Harry Johnston told the German commander in the area that they could

¹⁰ RKA: R1001 624: 19, 13th November 1899. Letter from the British Embassy in Berlin, to Count von Bülow

¹¹ RKA: R1001 623: 139-140, 13th October 1899. From Franck Lascelles at the British Embassy in Berlin, to Count von Bülow.

have timber if they asked for it, but should not steal it.¹² Similar encroachments were made to the east of Lake Victoria. Johnston also wrote to this German counterpart to complain that although the German base at Schirati is six and a half miles south of the boundary, the German Commandant was attempting to exercise his authority up to twenty miles north of it.¹³ Johnston refrained from removing German flags or placing a post in the area to protect British African subjects, in the hope that the German Governor could sort it out. By early 1900, the Germans claimed to have withdrawn from the Kakuto post,¹⁴ but at the same time a force of 250 German rugaruga had occupied Southern Koki, some thirty miles north of the border.

The second major cause of poor Anglo-German relations was the activity of various African criminals, rebels or freedom fighters, depending on your point of view. A man named Gabriel who had been chief adviser to the Baganda king fled Uganda and began living as an outlaw in the borderlands of DOA. In one raid into Uganda, in 1900, he killed ten men and stole forty loads of merchandise from a trader named Ahmed bin Salim. The British attempted to extradite him under the Anglo-German Extradition Treaty of 1894.¹⁵ Probably as a result of poor relations between German and British officials along the border, the Germans replied that Gabriel was a political refugee and could not therefore be arrested. This became an intergovernmental matter with Salisbury appealing directly to Berlin, but Gabriel continued to shelter in Bukoba under German protection.¹⁶ This also led to the most important example of a British incursion into DOA. In pursuit of Gabriel and his allies, British troops entered DOA

¹² RKA: R1001 625: 125-8, 5th January 1901. Letter from Harry Johnston at Entebbe, to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

¹³ RKA: R1001 627: 41, 30th April 1900. Letter from DO von Liebert to the German Governor.

¹⁴ RKA: R1001 626: 30, 14th April 1900. Letter from Harry Johnston in Entebbe, to Lieutenant von Beringe in Bukoba District, DOA.

¹⁵ RKA: R1001 625: 62, 30th April 1900. Letter from Franck Lascelles to Count von Bülow. The German word for this type of treaty is *Auslieferungsgesetzvertrag*.

¹⁶ RKA: R1001 624: 45, 23rd December 1899. Memorandum on British-German relations on the Uganda-Deutsch Ostafrika boundary, by the British Embassy in Berlin.

where they robbed the Liwali Mhamed bin Ibrahim Turki, killing several people, including one of Gabriel's brothers, in the process.¹⁷ When Juma Wadi Sindi was accused of stealing 1000 rupees from the DOAG and fleeing to Uganda with it, the British refused to hand him over to the German authorities. They insisted that Gabriel must be given to them first. "Obviously the law of extradition must work both ways: if you refuse to extradite our Uganda criminals [sic], we cannot be held bound to return to you the persons charged with crimes who escape German territory".¹⁸ European norms of border protocol and extradition were quickly being transferred to Africa.

Obtaining the extradition of criminals or criminal suspects who had fled across the border was an ongoing saga in most East African borderlands. There are numerous examples of Africans and Arabs escaping across a border because they were wanted by the colonial authorities. They either returned after a time, stayed in the neighbouring territory, or continued to oppose the state from afar. Sometimes communication problems meant that they were not even informed that an 'offender' was at large in their district. For example, the experience of World War One caused fear among the population when the British began to seek recruits at the start of the Second World War. Many Wafipa vanished across the border into Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo (Kuczynski, 1949: 345-6; Kaniki, 1980: 335). Even on such a large scale, DCs in Rhodesia did little to encourage the men to return, probably because of a lack of co-ordination and communication among British possessions. What is not clear is how much neighbouring territories acquiesced in the use of their borderlands as centres of refuge and rebellion.

¹⁷ RKA: R1001 626: 79-83R, 10th October 1900. Protocol entitled "The case of Liwali Mhamed bn Ibrahim", from Lieutenant von Trotha, Usumbiro, to the Station at Bukoba.

¹⁸ RKA: R1001 624: 175-6, 23rd April 1900. From Harry Johnston at Port Alice in Uganda, to Cramer at Mwanza.

The cases of Gabriel and Sinda demonstrate that suspects were less likely to be returned when the colonial administrations in question were from different countries. Another example involves Marealle, who was paramount chief of the Chagga and had been a great ally of the Germans during the 1890s. The Germans were told by his enemies that he was likely to rebel. This was probably untrue and he was informed by friendly missionaries that he would be arrested and so fled to Kenya for a time. He returned later as chief of Marangu, but he never regained his paramountcy (Iliffe, 1979: 121).¹⁹ There is no record of the Germans appealing to the British to extradite him, nor any of the British offering help, so it seems that the Germans were content for him to be outside their portion of Chaggaland.

To return to the Ugandan section of the border, Harry Johnston wrote a report early in 1901 on border disputes with the Germans during the preceding eighteen months.²⁰ It leaves the reader in no doubt that colonial relations were strained. For example, Arab slave raiders under German protection entered Uganda and attacked the Kingdom of Ruzumburu ruled by Chief Makboré. Makboré forced the invaders out, so the Germans responded with a punitive raid by 200 askari led two by German officers. Johnston wrote that there had been numerous raids of this type across the border, and that the Germans knew they were transgressing the line, prompting him to appeal on several occasions for the German Governor to intervene. That the German Governor sometimes paid damages or changed personnel indicates some acknowledgement that German forces were mostly to blame for the friction.²¹ It also seems probable that German officials on the border were acting in a manner which was not known to the Governor in Dar es Salaam.

¹⁹ RKA: 700/93: 5.3.1905. Full reference lost.

²⁰ RKA: R1001 625: 125-8, 5th May 1901. Letter from Harry Johnston at Entebbe, to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

²¹ RKA: R1001 625: 122, 3rd May 1900. Twelve page report from the journalist Declé at Umtali in Southern Rhodesia, to The Daily Telegraph, London.

The German Governor accepted Johnston's appeal that something be done²² and replied that much of the misunderstanding resulted from confusion over whether the first degree south parallel or the River Kagera formed the boundary, as well as general geographical ignorance.²³ The setting up of a boundary commission was agreed and the Germans admitted to Johnston's claim that they had been acting as if it had already been moved to follow the course of the Kagera.²⁴ The Germans withdrew their Kakuto post and it was agreed that the Sultan of Kukika should fly both German and British flags until the boundary commission had reached a decision.²⁵

Incidents continued until the boundary commission completed its work in 1904. In one case, an unspecified group of Africans had their cattle seized in DOA during a German anti-rinderpest campaign. The Africans then crossed into Uganda and told the British that they had been robbed while in Uganda. The British took up the matter with the German authorities and an argument continued until the truth came out and Johnston had the good grace to apologise.²⁶ DCs from both sides of the border were involved in the boundary commission and this closer contact seems to have improved relations enormously.²⁷ This was achieved despite antagonism between the leaders of British and German parties, Delmé-Radcliffe and Schlobach respectively (Delmé-Radcliffe, 1947: 15).

²² RKA: R1001 625: 170-1, 18th August 1900. Letter from Franck Lascelles, to Herr von Derenthall.

²³ RKA: R1001 627: 62, 31st August 1900. Letter from Lieutenant von Wulffen at Shirati, to Harry Johnston, British Commander-in-Chief at Entebbe.

²⁴ RKA: R1001 626: 25R, 3rd October 1900. From Hauptmann at Dar es Salaam, to the Colonial Department of the German Foreign Office, Berlin.

²⁵ RKA: R1001 626: 78, 10th November 1900. From Hauptmann, Dar es Salaam. To the Colonial Department of the German Foreign Office, Berlin.

²⁶ RKA: R1001 627: 5-6, 30, 28th March 1901. From Hauptmann, to the Government Representative, Bukoba.

²⁷ RKA: R1001 586: 5, 22nd April 1904. Letter from G.E. Smith, H.M. Commissioner on the Anglo-German Boundary, Kisumu, Uganda, to Hauptmann Schlobach, Kisumu.

Deutsch Ost Afrika-Congo

The early history of the DOA-Congolese border is dominated by nearly continual disorder and an almost forgotten colonial encounter: that of the German-Belgian confrontation in the Lake Kivu region - a prime example of a western-style border conflict. The RKA files contain a vast body of material on this subject, including British, Belgian and German official correspondence, articles from numerous periodicals, and cuttings from newspapers as obscure as the *Yorkshire Post*.²⁸ There are perhaps 5-10,000 pages in all, highlighting that more attention was paid to this case than to any other DOA foreign policy matter. Despite this, secondary works very rarely mention the subject. Iliffe (1969; 1979) and Koponen (1994) make no mention of the dispute and German authors are similarly disinterested or ignorant. Only Beachey's recent work (1996) makes more than a mere passing reference.

The 1884-5 negotiations and agreements which brought the Congo Free State (CFS) into being, set the DOA-CFS boundary at the 30th parallel, which would have placed Lake Kivu well inside Congolese territory had its existence been known by Europeans.²⁹ However, it was not until the 1894-5 German expedition led by the Graf von Götzen that either the Germans or the Congolese became aware of the existence of Lake Kivu, so it was not mentioned in the 1885 treaty.³⁰ Von Götzen informed the Imperial government that Leopold had taken the western part of Rwanda and advised that Lake Kivu and the River Rusisi should be taken as the line of the new border. The Germans asked for negotiations, but the area was occupied by Congolese troops in 1896.

²⁸ This material is concentrated in RKA: R1001 620-638ii.

²⁹ Note: throughout the German and British archives, the Congo Free State is referred to as Belgian territory and the administration and military forces as being Belgian rather than Congolese.

³⁰ RKA: R1001 623: 119, 4th August 1899. Article from The Times, entitled "Germany and Lake Kivu".

That the lake remained undetected for so long demonstrates that both the lake and the boundary lay in an area more-or-less untouched by the European occupation. This made the area attractive to criminals of various types, to mutineers from the European armies and to numerous others who wished to avoid colonial rule. The area's isolation from German influence was ensured by it being flanked by Rwanda and Burundi, both of which were little influenced by the period of German rule in East Africa. In addition, Congolese military recruitment methods encouraged mutiny and rebellion. Most of their soldiers were conscripted, were involved in extremely violent and brutal actions and were usually drawn from the ranks of rebels and criminals. As the government of the CFS operated as a private company and exploited its territory with a private army, it should come as no surprise that sections of the army mutinied and tried to set themselves up in their own private kingdoms. The region can certainly be seen as a frontier region in true Kopytoff-style during this period. Yet the desire of DOA and the CFS to seize the area meant that it was only a matter of time before the frontier was closed and a linear boundary set up.

The first rebellion took place in 1895, when a Balouchi named Radjab refused to recognise Congolese rule and defeated or avoided several expeditions sent against him.³¹ The first reports of Congolese soldiers robbing and plundering in German areas appeared in 1895, but the first major rebellion occurred in 1897, when the Belgian commander, Dhanis, attempted to lead an expedition to the Upper Nile. His men revolted and attempted to set up their own state in the area between Lake Tanganyika and the Luamo River (Gann and Duignan, 1979: 111). Several Belgian expeditions against them were defeated until they achieved success in 1899. The mutineer's chief was killed and the remaining rebels sought refuge over the DOA border. The Germans were said to be in regular communication with the rebels and threatened on two

³¹ RKA: R1001 622: 113a, 1897. Series of correspondence on the Magid Affair, some of it written by the Congolese Foreign Office.

occasions to arm them against the Belgians and British.³² A German expedition under Captain Bethe reached Lake Kivu by mistake and staked a claim to the area, despite the threat of punishment from his superiors, although at that stage German forces made no attempt to occupy the area.³³ This was the first German attempt to link the activities of rebels in the area and their own claims over Congolese territory.

A further mutiny occurred in 1898, and the Belgian post of Uvira on the north-western shore of Lake Tanganyika was occupied by mutinous troops.³⁴ The Belgian commanding officer committed suicide and his successor fled to German territory, triggering further mutinies (Beachey, 1996: 241). The rebels, who became known as the Batetela mutineers, captured and burnt the Congolese posts at Lubenga and Luahilimta on the east shore of Lake Kivu.³⁵ Lieutenant Glorie, as the only Congolese officer remaining in the area, moved against the rebels but lost fourteen dead and thirty wounded. The rebels numbered at least 600, and seized a large amount of firearms and ammunition.³⁶ The German press blamed the poor quality of the Belgian askaris for their failure to put down the rebellion.³⁷

The Germans made the most of the Belgian difficulties. Claiming that the rebels had crossed the border and attacked the German Usambara post, German forces moved into Belgian territory (Beachey, 1996: 241). According to the British Foreign Office, the Congo rebels had never been within thirty miles of DOA, but the Germans had

³² FO403/354B: 3, 16th May 1900. From Declé at Usumbura to the Foreign Office.

³³ FO403/354B: 3, 16th May 1900. See Note 32.

³⁴ RKA: R1001 630: 15, unknown date. Report "Übersicht über die historische Entwicklung der Kivu-Grenzstreitfrage". No author given.

³⁵ RKA: R1001 623: 119, 4th August 1899. Article entitled "Germany and Lake Kivu", from *The Times*.

³⁶ RKA: R1001 623: 6, 11th August 1899. Letter from DO Fonck at Ujiji, to the Government at Dar es Salaam.

³⁷ RKA: R1001 623: 80a, 22nd February 1889. Second part of a series of articles in the *Vossischen Zeitung*, entitled "An der Grenze Deutsch-Ostafrikas und des Kongostaates", by Dr Richard Kandt.

merely exploited the opportunity to push westwards to the Rusisi valley and Lake Kivu.³⁸ This may be true with regard to the 1898 mutineers, but previous mutinies had crossed into DOA territory, and mutineers were undoubtedly involved in some of the rebel groups which raided DOA from across the border. Many groups began to co-operate with each other, and because of the volatile situation, the remote location and limited communications, it is possible that the German and Congolese authorities did not know who had raided what and when.

The German commanding officer at Ujiji took 400 men and moved towards Kivu in order to re-impose European control.³⁹ By the time 500 Congolese troops were rushed to the area under Commandant Henneberg, German forces were securely encamped along the line of the Rusisi and Lake Kivu. That this force was sent against the Germans rather than the mutineers indicates who was perceived as being the greatest threat.⁴⁰ The Times reported that German and Belgian forces faced each other and were ready to fight, but the Berliner Tageblatt denied it four days later.⁴¹ The Belgian force attempted to reclaim the area but were soon forced back (Beachey, 1996: 241), although there is no record of the number of casualties. It is difficult to decide if the lack of control on the Congo's borders was really such a problem for Germany. British forces did not attempt to intervene on this scale or at this time although the rebels were also operating from Ugandan territory. Although the Germans were keen to seize territory which had been assumed to lie within the territory of the CFS, because they were dealing with a nominally European power, they felt the need to recognise national sovereignty as an issue. They also felt the need to justify intervention on the grounds that the African inhabitants of the area would welcome a

³⁸ See file FO403/354B for more details.

³⁹ RKA: R1001 623: 6, 11th August 1898. Letter from DO Fonck at Ujiji, to the Government, Dar es Salaam.

⁴⁰ RKA: R1001 623: 119, 4th August 1899. Article from The Times, entitled "Germany and Lake Kivu".

⁴¹ RKA: R1001 623: 119, The Times, 4.8.99; Berliner Tageblatt, 8.8.99.

transfer to German rule because of the brutality of Congolese rule.⁴² In early 1900, Congo officials complained about German occupation of Congolese territory and the flying of the German flag by Chief Kakari within the CFS.⁴³ They added that the original reason for the German presence had gone because Congolese troops were now firmly in control.

At this point the Germans dropped the pretence of intervening to keep the peace and claimed the territory as their own. They were able to use uncertainty over which map had been referred to in the 1884 treaty, and claimed that Friedrichsen's map, which placed the boundary along the line of the Rusisi, had been the map employed in the treaty.⁴⁴ In fact, all the official German maps from 1885 to 1895 place the boundary at the 30° parallel. Moreover, the map in the treaty is not Friedrichsen's map, and neither the Rusisi nor Lake Kivu are marked on it.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, Germany tried to persuade the Congo to give up the area, and offered to compensate them with territory elsewhere. Both the Congolese and British authorities objected to the proposal. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Malet, wrote to the German government that Britain had previously attempted to obtain Congo territory for their Cape to Cairo railway project but Germany had, "objected to the alienation of any portion of the Congo State without the express consent of the Treaty Powers. If this principle held good then, it must be equally be valid now".⁴⁶

On the ground, events forced a change in German policy. In May 1900 the total number of rebels had been estimated at 2-300, but by August that year German forces

⁴² RKA: R1001 623: 83, 23rd July 1899. Article from a German newspaper, No. 171. Title unreadable, but the subject covers relations between DOA and the Congo State.

⁴³ RKA: R1001 630: 26, 18th November 1899. Letter from DO Hecq of the Congo State to the Captain of German Forces at Ujiji.

⁴⁴ From an article in *The Times*, 24th January 1900.

⁴⁵ RKA: R1001 624: 94, 24th January 1900. Article in *The Times*, entitled "Germany and the Congo State."

⁴⁶ RKA: R1001 624: 94, 24th January 1900. See Note 45.

reported that their numbers had swelled to 2-2,500,⁴⁷ possibly because of a number of smaller groups coming together in order to provide more effective opposition to the colonial forces heading towards the region, but also because of the addition of various bandits and local people, attracted by the mutineers' level of success. The Congolese and German troops joined forces because of the increased threat and under von Münchhausen moved against the rebels on both German and Belgian soil.⁴⁸ According to The Times, British troops moved into the Kivu region from south-western Uganda in order counter any attempted move towards their protectorate.⁴⁹

Increased co-operation on the ground encouraged Belgium and Germany to sort the matter out and a protocol was signed before the end of 1900, but here is no doubt that Germany was attempting to use its superior military strength over a weaker neighbour in order to seize territory, in much the same way as all the colonial powers had used their military strength to occupy the territory of African polities. The Daily Telegraph journalist, Declé, wrote at the time that: "Had the Germans acted towards a great European power as they have acted towards the Congo Free State, war would have been inevitable".⁵⁰ Germany also took over Rwanda at this stage, under the pretext that the ruler wanted German protection as the Belgians had abandoned the territory. Burundi and its king, Meuzi, had already submitted to Captain Bethé. Meuzi rebelled in 1903 but was defeated again by a German expedition sent against him (Beachey, 1996: 241).

⁴⁷ RKA: R1001 626: 16, 12th August 1900. Report "Bericht über die Entwaffnung der auf deutsches Gebiet übergetretenen Kongo-Rebellen" by Freiherr von Münchhausen at Ishangi.

⁴⁸ RKA: R1001 626: 16, 12th August 1900. See note 47.

⁴⁹ RKA: R1001 628: 7, 21st April 1904. Article in The Times, "The Congo State."

⁵⁰ RKA: R1001 625: 113, 3rd May 1900. Twelve page report from Daily Telegraph journalist Declé, written in Southern Rhodesia and intercepted by German authorities.

Once the Belgian forces had backed down and the Germans were left in control of the east bank of the Rusisi and the eastern shore of Lake Kivu, colonial attention returned to the rebels. The Congolese at last attempted to introduce some level of administration but their grip on the region remained rather tenuous (Gann and Duignan, 1979: 111). In 1901, the Ugandan rebel, Gabriel, and his men joined the Congo rebels.⁵¹ The Belgian Secretary General of the Congo appealed to the German Emperor for a full demarcation of the boundary in order to aid suppression of the rebels.⁵² It seems likely, however, that fears over German motives may have been the primary reason for his request. A German Foreign Office report listed all the problems in the Kivu area in 1905 in preparation for the boundary commission of that year. The report paints a picture of continuing instability in the area. The island of Kwisjui⁵³ in Lake Kivu was singled out by Congolese soldiers who repeatedly raided the island, killing and stealing as they went.⁵⁴ They also forced the inhabitants of the island and the eastern shoreline to fly the Congo flag, and it seems to be the flying of flags - as symbols of sovereignty - rather than the murder and theft which upset the German authorities. The Belgian Commissioner on the 1905 Boundary Commission admitted pillaging on the border by both his own army and by the mutineers. The askaris of both sides contributed to the general disorder, disrupting the work of the commission, and in one incident, a drunken German askari hit a Belgian officer.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, Congolese deserters who fled over the border into DOA in small groups were hunted down and carried back into the Congo by loyal Congolese soldiers who operated on both sides of the border. Although intermittent disorder continued for some years, the

⁵¹ RKA: R1001 626: 133, 20th April 1901. Report "Uebertritt von Kongo-Rebellen" by von Götzen, sent to the Colonial Department of the German Foreign Office.

⁵² RKA: R1001 623: 37-40, 22nd April 1899. Letter from the Secretary of State, in the Foreign Office of the Congo State, to Comte d'Alvensleben, the German representative in Brussels.

⁵³ Kwisjui island is now called Idjiwi.

⁵⁴ RKA: R1001 629: 157-163R, 1905. Report "Über die Grenzzwischenfälle in sogenannten 'streitigen Gebiet' an der Grenze Deutsch-Ostafrikas und des Kongostaats."

⁵⁵ RKA: R1001 629: 163R, 1905. See Note 54.

frontier had been closed and there was a new line upon the map of East Africa. DOA was now entirely defined by linear boundaries and African political systems had been subjugated by colonialism.

Deutsch Ost Afrika-British Central Africa

International relations along the DOA-Nyasaland/Rhodesian border were marked by the area's isolation from centres of colonial control. This isolation often led to a high level of co-operation between the British and German administrations on the either side of the border. Sovereignty remained defined by the boundary but the lack of causes for dispute and the sheer loneliness of the local officials, encouraged cross-border friendly relations. That Rhodesia was ruled by the British South Africa Company (BSAC), rather than directly by the British Crown seems to have made little difference to relations, except perhaps that the Company's officials were prepared to be more direct and pro-active in their actions. Communications between Dar es Salaam and the area were almost non-existent, so the Dar es Salaam government acquiesced in allowing German officials to rely heavily upon neighbouring British territories. Pre-colonial transport links and trade in the German borderlands were orientated towards the British territories rather than towards the rest of DOA and this arrangement continued throughout the German period (Hartmann, 1991: 19). The German taxes were mainly paid in the form of cattle, which German administrators then sold in Nyasaland (Zencke, 1925: 403). A German Berzirksamtmann at Tukuyu only found out about the outbreak of the First World War when his British colleague across the border told him about it (Hodern, 1941/I: 170; Iliffe, 1979: 119). Co-operation worked both ways. The Nyasaland administration borrowed the German steamer on Lake Nyasa for an expedition against Arab slave traders operating around the northern shores of the lake and on both sides of the boundary (Johnston, 1923: 299).

How well the two sides of demarcation commissions were able to co-operate was often important in setting the tone for colonial administration in borderlands. Some of the personnel involved were often stationed in the area as DCs. Captain Close wrote that German members of the DOA-BCA Commission were unco-operative and brutal, and often stole supplies. Such poor relations affected relationships on the border, but a change of personnel quickly improved the situation (McEwen, 1971: 220). On the other hand, at a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society on 7th May 1906, the leaders of the 1904-5 Anglo-German boundary commission - G.E. Smith and Hauptmann Schlobach - came together to discuss their work. The President of the society summed it up: "During that expedition of a year and eight months the most perfect harmony existed between the German and British sections of the expedition.....it is one more proof that Englishmen and Germans, when not incited by over-zealous newspapers, can work together just as harmoniously as they did in the days of Frederick the Great" (Smith, 1907: 269). The first part of this line is almost certainly an exaggeration, and the second part a piece of poetic license, but the fact that the two men could come together after spending a year and a half almost constantly together indicates that relations must have been fairly friendly.

Many of the recorded instances of dispute revolved around anti-slavery actions along an undemarcated and uncertain border. One example of the pro-active nature of the BSAC administration occurred in 1896. An Arab caravan with slaves and ivory, and led by a man called Feruzi evaded two BSAC stations in order to avoid paying duties.⁵⁶ A BSAC party under one Mr Drysdale set off in pursuit, crossed the River Songwe which marked the border and captured the caravan. It was able to seize a number of slaves in chains who they promptly set free, and 1000 pounds of ivory was also taken. The German authorities found out about this violation of their territorial

⁵⁶ RKA: R1001 624: 26-9, 3rd October 1896. Letter from Alfred Sharpe, Acting Commissioner, Zomba, British Nyasaland, to the Acting Administrator, German Nyasaland.

sovereignty,⁵⁷ and the German officer at Langenburg wrote to the BSAC at Blantyre to complain.⁵⁸ The BSAC did not accept the complaint, and because of poor communications two further years passed before von Götzen wrote to W.H. Manning, the Commissioner and General-Consul at Zomba in Nyasaland.⁵⁹ The matter passed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, who in turn put pressure on the company to agree compensation. Eventually compensation of £650 was agreed in 1903, for Faffer Somar, one of those who had lost property.⁶⁰ Mainly as a result of this and other lesser incidents caused by confusion over the location of the boundary, the BSAC persuaded the DOA government to act with them in the 1898 detailed demarcation of the boundary (McEwen, 1871: 223). Full territorial sovereignty was one of the many functions of international boundaries which the colonialists imposed.

There was no dispute over the Lake Nyasa boundary at the time, probably because neither side wished a confrontation. It was noted that uncertainty existed over the possession of islands in the lake, but the earth was poor and opportunities for development limited, so neither side attempted to settle the matter (Praeger, 1905: 153). Uncertainty over whether the boundary lay at the midpoint of the lake or on the shoreline was to prove a source of strife in the immediate post-colonial period.

⁵⁷ RKA: R1001 624: 30, 29th March 1899. Letter from Deputy Administrator, British South Africa Company, Blantyre, to the Administrator, the Imperial German Government.

⁵⁸ RKA: R1001 628: 26, 21st July 1904. Letter from Graf von Bülow, to the German Foreign Office.

⁵⁹ The Commissioner was the official government representative for British Central Africa. RKA: R1001 627: 81, 22nd August 1901. From von Götzen, Dar es Salaam, to W.H. Manning, British Commissioner at Zomba.

⁶⁰ RKA: R1001 627: 134, 11th January 1903. Letter from unknown author to the German Embassy in London.

Deutsch Ost Afrika-Portuguese East Africa

The DOA-Portuguese East Africa (PEA) border was also marked by its isolated location and lack of colonial administration. German administration in the area was limited to Lindi on the coast, while it can be argued that there was virtually no Portuguese administration in the area. The Makua on the border only became aware of the permanent Portuguese presence in East Africa around 1905 (Eliot, 1905: 250), although the Portuguese had claimed sovereignty over area for some 400 years. According to Portuguese sources, it was only during the First World War that the Portuguese authorities occupied the Maconde plateau to the south of the Rovuma, and it was not until 1922 that they began to administer it (Dias and Dias, 1964: 23). German-Portuguese communications on a local level were therefore almost non-existent. Moreover, the Rovuma valley which defined most of the boundary was a very difficult area to administer. The course of the river changed repeatedly as mudbanks emerged or islands were washed away. There were countless islands in the river, and in the 1890s the Germans began to tax the Matambwe who lived on many of them.⁶¹ The western idea of a linear boundary dividing one polity from another can only be said to have existed in a most vague sense. The 1909 Boundary Agreement and 1913 treaty pay testimony to difficulties in determining the geography of the area. The nature of the borderlands encouraged their use as a refuge for rebels and bandits, and further complicated border disputes which arose between Germany and Portugal. Most of the intergovernmental correspondence relates to a series of disputes, followed by agreements and then followed after perhaps a two year interval by a delimitation and/or delimitation commission. With so little territory in dispute, it is incredible how many times the two colonial authorities were able to clash over the position of the border.

⁶¹ RKA: R1001 576: 100, 25th July 1907. From the Governor, Dar es Salaam, to the German Foreign Office, Berlin.

The dispute over the Kionga Triangle was referred to in Chapter Two, and negotiations over the disputed territory dominated Luso-German relations in East Africa from 1892 until the end of the Great War. During the period of Luso-German co-operation which oversaw the carve up of the southern Zanzibari possessions, Portugal had merely used German influence - they had certainly not been real allies. Portugal viewed the British colonialists as thieves of its African Empire.⁶² Likewise, Germany had used Portugal's ancient claims to East Africa as a tool in its efforts to dislodge the Sultan from the mainland. As such, it was a rather blunt instrument, for Portuguese claims were vague and indistinct enough to be barely visible. However, western claims were certain to outweigh African or Arab claims, just as German erosion of Portuguese territory could not have been halted by Portuguese efforts alone. Article II of the 1886 Luso-German Treaty decreed that the boundary should follow the line of the Rovuma, but German desires on the potential of the Kionga area for port development caused the Germans to revive previous Zanzibari claims to the area. All the proceeds from the dismemberment of firmly established Zanzibari mainland possessions had passed to Germany and the German authorities therefore concluded that the Kionga Triangle should also be theirs.

While German claims to the area stretched credulity, Portuguese insistence upon their own effective occupation proved equally unlikely. While the Portuguese claimed to have withdrawn their civilian and military personal to allow an unbiased investigation into the ownership of the parcel of land, it seems that no withdrawal was necessary because their presence in the area fluctuated between minimal and non-existent.⁶³ Diplomacy over border disputes involved many of the niceties, exaggerations and bluffs of diplomacy in general. Even once the area had been annexed by the Germans in 1894, trouble over the Triangle continued to dominate Luso-

⁶² *Commercio de Portugal*, 21st July 1894: 495.

⁶³ RKA: R1001 573: 17-17R, 30th August 1894. Letter from the Comte de Bray, Lisbon, to Ribeiro, President of the Council of Ministers.

German relations along the border.⁶⁴ During 1902, following the handover, Portuguese soldiers seized German flags at Matakadan,⁶⁵ while at Lilhute in DOA, officials of the Portuguese Nyasa Company demanded hut taxes.⁶⁶

Such actions heightened German suspicions that the Portuguese authorities condoned or even supported the guerrilla campaign which the Yao leader, Machemba was carrying out against DOA from the Portuguese side of the border. Machemba's forces had repeatedly crossed the river on slave raiding expeditions.⁶⁷ The Portuguese lacked a post in the area, so the Germans suggested that the Portuguese set up a district police post at Mchichira, as well as one on the edge of the Kionga. German reports claimed that Portuguese state employees and askaris led the raids, and so Germany reminded Portugal that she was a signatory of Article Nine of the Congo Act and Article Three of the Brussels Antislavery Act which forbade slave raiding. German pleas for Portuguese action increased in intensity from 1902 until 1905, during which time Machemba had been causing havoc deep into DOA. The German administrator Sturman believed that Portugal was incapable of governing the area,⁶⁸ and so sent a strong expedition to the German side of the border in 1905.⁶⁹ Despite the strained relations, the expedition continued to respect Portuguese sovereignty and did not cross the boundary. Even in PEA's Niassa Province, control was not assumed until 1912 because of armed resistance by Yao slave and ivory traders. This explains the lack of activity between Germany and Portugal in local administrative correspondence (Justino, 1936: 563-75).

⁶⁴ It was not demarcated until 1908 and not ratified until 1909.

⁶⁵ RKA: R1001 612: 12, 26th August 1905. Telegram from DO Zencke, to the Governor, Dar es Salaam.

⁶⁶ RKA: R1001 576: 100, 25th July 1907. See Note 61.

⁶⁷ Some documents refer to the Machemba or Matschemba as a people; presumably in reference to those people led by Machemba himself. RKA: R1001 627: 93

⁶⁸ RKA: R1001 628: 136, 23rd March 1905. Letter from Sturmann of the German Foreign Office, Berlin, to the Imperial Government, Dar es Salaam.

⁶⁹ RKA: R1001 612: 4-5, 14th July 1905. Letter from the DO at Neu-Langenburg, to DO Schulz.

Numerous other incidents continued to plague relations along the border. In 1901, two Portuguese soldiers were seized in DOA by the Chief of Matakadou; their weapons were seized and they were released. The Portuguese wrote to request the return of the arms and claimed that the men had merely been lost.⁷⁰ This was often trotted out as an excuse for soldiers operating in neighbouring countries, so the Germans investigated the case and found out that the Portuguese soldiers had been trying to extract taxes from the people of the area.⁷¹ One of the main functions of international boundaries was to delimit the extent of range of those officially sanctioned to bear arms, and to enforce the state monopoly of military power. It therefore forbidden throughout colonial Africa for soldiers and police of one territory to act in the neighbouring territory.

While Portuguese-German tensions were often brought about by the actions of their askaris on the border, African conflicts also destabilised the region. When Chief Mtarika of Sasawara, the Yao Sultan of Kandulu, died in June 1903, the Portuguese named his son, Said, as the new Sultan. Mtarika's brother, Kwirasee and his nephew, Mtarika II, contested the succession and war broke out. In one battle, an estimated 900 men were put into the field on each side, and Kwirasee lost fifty-two dead.⁷² Mtarika's territory included land on both sides of the border, and the war encouraged Germany to become involved. Bezirksamtman Ewerbeck at Lindi led enquiries into discovering who was the rightful heir. The Portuguese, however, continued to support the pro-Portuguese forces. Although the final outcome is not known, the case demonstrates that German officials were prepared to take African politics and politics into account, despite the mildly negative effect that it had upon German-Portuguese

⁷⁰ RKA: R1001 627: 89, 8th October 1901. Letter from José Maria Martins Pereira, of the Portuguese government, to the Governor of DOA.

⁷¹ RKA: R1001 627: 90-1, 8th October 1901. See Note 69.

⁷² RKA: R1001 627: 177, 2nd February 1904. Report "Machemba-Leute" by DO Ewerbeck, sent to the Imperial Government, Dar es Salaam.

relations. The Germans may, of course, have become involved just in order to rile their Portuguese neighbours.

World War One

While the soldiers and police of one power occasionally crossed into the territory of another, apart from the Belgian-German conflict over the Kivu region, it was not until the First World War that colonial armies crossed the international boundaries of East Africa in any number. The great fear had been that conflict in Europe could develop out of African disputes, but in the event the reverse happened. The Great War in East Africa has been the subject of some academic attention, but there is surely a need for an up-to-date full-length monograph on the topic. This section, however, will merely restrict itself to making some comments about the role of international boundaries in the conflict.

First and foremost, it would be inappropriate to discuss the colonial boundaries during the conflict without placing the importance of this topic into some sort of perspective. The idea of the East Africa First World War campaign being the last gentleman's war, as if in some kind of a colonial game,⁷³ is total nonsense. The German scorched earth policy, the incredibly high mortality rate of African porters and soldiers, and the ensuing cauldron of famine and disease killed perhaps 500,000 Africans.⁷⁴ The disregard for African life and African lives was incredible.

It could be argued that the results of the colonial partition of East Africa were one of the main causes of this high casualty rate. DOA was surrounded by enemies on all of

⁷³ For example in Lettow-Vorbeck, 1920; Schnee, 1919.

⁷⁴ See Iliffe, 1979: 269-72.

its five borders: the British and Belgians and later the Portuguese.⁷⁵ This persuaded the German Governor in 1914 that the colony was indefensible (Iliffe, 1979: 240-1) and convinced the head of the army, General Lettow-Vorbeck, that only a guerrilla campaign could hope to keep the German forces active for long enough to keep a large number of Allied troops occupied in East Africa. As a result the campaign lasted the entire course of the war. Major engagements were few and far between, but the constant movement of troops and the supply caravans which enabled this, acted as an agent of disease and killed porters in droves.

The boundaries were used during the war as they would have been in Europe. All borders and borderlands were placed under military command during the war and freedom of movement was heavily curtailed. People living close to the border in some areas, such as at South Kavirondo in BEA, were forced to leave their homes and were unable to return during the course of the war (Kjerland, 1995: 188). The first border raid came as early as August 1914, when Lettow-Vorbeck seized Taveta (Iliffe, 1979: 241-2), although the first blow had come on the eighth of that month when the British had shelled a wireless station near Dar es Salaam. In September 1914, the town of Kisii in the BEA borderlands was taken by German forces, although British troops arrived after several days and ejected them (Kjerland, 1995: 187). German raids into BEA continued throughout 1914 and early 1915, but seem to have inflicted much more harm upon Africans than upon the British - for example, at Isebania in January 1915, where German askaris burnt African houses and raided stock.⁷⁶ The only attack over the DOA north-western border by German troops was a thirteen hour attack on an Anglo-Belgian installation in Kigezi in October 1914. If nothing else, it caused all the petty jealousies between Britain and Belgium in the area to dissolve as they came together to fight the common enemy, although there were rumours that Belgian

⁷⁵ This takes British Central Africa to be a single entity.

⁷⁶ KNA: DC/KSI/1/2. Nyanza Province Annual Report 1906/07.

soldiers told borderlanders not to help or supply British forces in any way (Hopkins, 1969: 219).

The lake borderlands of DOA quickly fell into British hands and as German forces were gradually forced southwards, the Allies positioned a large number of soldiers along each of the boundaries to prevent Lettow-Vorbeck crossing into another territory (Iliffe, 1979: 242). Towards the end of 1917, the Germans were pushed towards the Rovuma and PEA. The Portuguese army advanced into Newala District of DOA (Justino, 1936: 563-75; Martins, 1935) and "While the Germans were still some distance to the north the Portuguese had spoken confidentially of being able to resist them, but when Lettow-Vorbeck crossed the Rovuma their confidence ebbed rapidly" (Ingham, 1965: 259). Part of the British forces pursued the Germans into PEA while the remainder tried to secure the Rovuma to prevent the Germans from re-crossing. However, the length of the boundary, its remote location and the relatively few men involved enabled Lettow-Vorbeck to slip back into DOA and then out again into Northern Rhodesia. By this time the war had ended and Lettow-Vorbeck surrendered.

While thousands of Africans enlisted or were forced into all of the armies involved and the clearances removed Africans from many border areas, Africans were involved along the borders of DOA in other ways during the conflict. Some abaKuria enlisted as Kariokoo (Carrier Corps) or Kinyume (spies) along the border, because the Germans had raided their cattle and they wanted to look for them across the border. The Germans discovered that two of the Kinyume, Makori Nyakobosa and Burure Mwita were acting as spies for both sides and publicly executed them in Shirati. The British uncovered Chacha Wangige as a double spy but the British merely responded by withdrawing his pension. Wangige became known locally as Musika Mbili, or the man with two identities (Kjerland, 1995: 188). Further west, the Germans hung Ntale, the King of Karagwe, when he appealed to the British for help, yet on other occasions, no

action was taken against Africans suspected of giving information and supplies to the British across the Kagera (Austen, 1968: 113).

Notions of territoriality changed somewhat during the war. The Allies were very keen to prevent the violation of their borders, although it would probably have been easier to defeat the Germans had they faced them on their own territory, in BEA, BCA or in the Congo. The borders became militarized and depopulated, and the Allies perceived the invisible boundaries as lines of defence. There was no specific reason to choose the boundaries as points of defence, especially where German troops were hundreds of miles away, but the military situation heightened perceptions of territoriality. The Germans, on the other hand, realised that they could not hope to hold any of their own territory because they were heavily outnumbered and so wandered throughout East Africa, crossing and re-crossing borders as they went. Without a sense of secure space - a sense of territoriality - the idea of linear boundaries became much less relevant. This supports the notion that boundaries are normally the product of a sedentary lifestyle.

Also, both sides expected the Africans who lived on their side of the border to show loyalty, although they could only be termed 'British' or 'German' Africans by accident of birth and by the force of the partition. Territoriality was deemed to contain a sense of belonging and loyalty in occupied peoples. The war also contains a wonderful example of the use of flags in neighbouring territories. Just after the outbreak of the war, two Afrikaners named Pretorius and Marais crossed from PEA into DOA and raised the British flag, attempting to persuade local Africans to give up German rule in the process.⁷⁷ The flag was merely symbolic, but it was perceived as a

⁷⁷ RKA: R1001 637: 147, 1st February 1915. Report "Grenzzwischenfälle in Deutschafrika im August 1914". Sent from Dr Reuter at the German Consulate Lourenco Marques, to Reichskanzler von Bethmann Hollweg, in Lisbon. Also noted in the Lourenco Marques Guardian, 19th October 1914 and the Johannesburg Evening Chronicle, 4th December 1914 and 7th December 1914.

violation of German territory and German sovereignty and was therefore a strike against the enemy.

Tanganyika-British East Africa/Kenya

Following the end of the war, relations between the new British administration in Dar es Salaam and the Nairobi authorities may be expected to have been co-operative and friendly. In fact, relations between the two territories were marked by disputes and disagreements, and there seems to have been far more inter-territorial correspondence and disagreement than there was between DOA and BEA. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, relations were expected to be close; they were both British territories and many in the Tanganyikan government and administration had previously worked in Kenya. This expectation allowed competition between the two to produce disagreements on a regular basis. Secondly, the border between the two was plagued by problems such as smuggling and cattle disease prevention relating to the Maasai and other groups. These border problems were the chief cause of poor colonial relations.

Thirdly, the two governments were able to disagree so regularly because there was no great threat to the British position in the region. A settled, peacetime situation can produce such squabbling, and it is perhaps most accurate to picture the bickering as sibling rivalry. The boundary was seen as less divisive than boundaries between different colonial powers. Both in colonial correspondence and on colonial maps, the boundary is consistently referred to as an 'inter-territorial' border rather than an international one.⁷⁸ It is normally marked with a dashed line as opposed to the solid,

⁷⁸ For example, TNA: Acc.4: 723/III: 366. "Note on Impounding, in March 1953, of 500 cattle at Katemboi by DC Voi", from the Member for Lands and Mines, to the PC for Arusha.

thick lines which represent international borders.⁷⁹ It is difficult to draw parallels between this type of boundary and those in the West, as the two territories concerned were colonial territories owned by the same power; but it must be recognised that the boundaries were less than international as they did not divide two sovereign powers. However, the competition and precisely defined division of sovereignty which the boundaries engendered, is surely indicative of the western concept of dividing political space, from which boundaries are drawn.

On one major border issue the two powers were entirely in accord, possibly because it was organised by the Foreign Office. An Anglo-German Treaty regarding relatively minor modifications to the Kenya-DOA boundary had taken many years to prepare and had been drawn up and agreed in 1914, only for the war to intervene to prevent signature. In 1925, Britain confirmed to the League of Nations that it wished the treaty to stand,⁸⁰ and both territories agreed to make the relevant alterations to the administration and demarcation of the boundary. This was as far as the concord stretched.

Kenya-Tanganyika relations became consistently soured when Cameron took over as Governor of Tanganyika in 1926. He maintained his authority and continued to implement his own innovative policies, in the face of the expectation in Nairobi that East African affairs should dance to the Kenyan tune. At the 1926 meeting of East African Governors, the distinction between Kenyan and Tanganyika Maasai policies was hotly discussed. The Kenyan Governor, Grigg, made it clear that it would be easier if all Maasailand was transferred to Kenya but Cameron responded angrily, denouncing Kenyan Maasai policy as unfair. Kenyan Maasai taxes were high at twenty

⁷⁹ Such as is contained in TNA: TS13569.

⁸⁰ RKA: R1001 308: 14-15, 11th November 1925. Communiqué "Frontière entre la colonie du Kenia et le territoire du Tanganyika", from the Secretariat of the League of Nations to its members.

shillings per person, yet the next highest in Kenya was twelve shillings. Cameron also believed that it was unjust that the Maasai were banned from carrying their traditional weapons, and adds that it was not his problem if the Maasai cross the border in order to enjoy the more liberal Tanganyikan policy.⁸¹ Personality and ideological differences undoubtedly affected border relations at the top as much as between DCs.

Relations deteriorated in 1927, and Kenyan restrictions on the cross-border movement of the Maasai prompted the PC for Mwanza to write to Cameron: "Our policy is to reunite rather than disintegrate tribes and I beg to suggest that the matter be woken up with the Government of Kenya".⁸² Conversely, Cameron was angry with the lack of Kenyan quarantine measures along the border.⁸³ This proved to be the greatest source of dispute and will be discussed in Chapter Nine. In 1927, Tanganyika agreed to allow Kenya Maasai access to Tanganyikan water, grazing and salt licks along the border, but as a result of poor veterinary practice in Kenya, many of these concessions were withdrawn in 1934.⁸⁴ The Kenyan authorities responded by writing to Dar es Salaam, stating that they had enjoyed better relations with DOA than with the British Tanganyikan government.⁸⁵ The Kenyan-DOA agreement which allowed Maasai of both sides access to traditional resources had been a "friendly arrangement".⁸⁶ The matter provoked a rapid exchange of letters and was eventually referred to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The tone of the letters is cordial and in line with administrative protocol, but there is a strong underlying sense of

⁸¹ CO691/86/6, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions", no author or correspondents given.

⁸² TNA: TS10588: 1-2, 27th May 1927. Letter from the PC for Mwanza to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁸³ CO691/86/6: 10, 11th September 1926. "Memorandum in regard [sic.] to the Masai Question". No author given.

⁸⁴ TNA: 10298/II: 430A, 28th July 1934. "Extract of a demi-official letter.....addressed to Mr Fontaine by Mr Mitchell."

⁸⁵ TNA: TS10298/II: 462-6, 26th November 1934. Letter from the Acting Colonial Secretary, Kenya, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁸⁶ TNA: TS10298/II: 466, 26th November 1934. See Note 84.

exasperation with each other. From the correspondence it is difficult to tell whether it is local or national officials who are pushing the dispute, but local correspondence is somewhat more heated and the men on the ground seem to be fuelling personal antagonisms at a higher level.

Other disagreements, such as the competition between the two railway networks for trade from the Arusha and Moshi area (Brett, 1973: 96-9), occurred throughout the 1920s and 1930s but never reached the level of that over veterinary and Maasai policy. From 1936 on it seems that relations improved and annual meetings were set up between PCs and DCs along the border. This coincided with reduced tension regarding differences in veterinary practice and also with a change in personnel.⁸⁷ Throughout the period, however, the impression remains that the two administrations could come have together in the event of a greater threat and that they were all Britons acting out the imperial mission in the face of great difficulties. The impression also remains that resources and manpower were severely limited and that DCs in borderlands, as elsewhere, were faced with an incredibly hard job. When World War Two began, Africans fled from Kenya to Tanganyika or to islands in Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria in order to avoid conscription. There was little opportunity or will to force the men back, despite the common enemy which had emerged to finally drive the two governments together (Kjerland, 1995: 203).

Tanganyika-Uganda

Relations along the Tanganyika-Uganda border were not characterised by anything like the same problems as on the Kenyan-Tanganyikan border during the British

⁸⁷ TNA: TS10298/II: 496, 27th January 1936. Letter from The Secretariat, Nairobi, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

period. Disputes and opportunities for co-operation occurred from time to time, but relations were generally cordial. The main cause of dispute was territorial: Uganda claimed north-western Tanganyika while Tanganyika had a more modest claim - to two small areas north of the Kagera. At the 1926 Governors' meeting which was referred to earlier, the Ugandan Governor, Gowers, put forward a strong argument for the transfer of north-west Tanganyika to Uganda.⁸⁸ He pointed out the close relations between the people of Bukoba District in Tanganyika, and the Banyoro, Batoro and Banyankole of Uganda, and considered that on ethnological, economic and administrative grounds they should be transferred. Just as Grigg had done, Gowers strongly advocated maintaining the territorial and administrative integrity of African groups when it suited him. Even if the area was not transferred, he added, Uganda should have economic rights over the exploitation of the Kagera salient and its newly discovered mineral resources.⁸⁹ Both Uganda and Kenya seem to have viewed the transfer of Tanganyika from German to British rule and the creation of its mandatory status as a green light to take what they wanted from the territory. It was not viewed as an equal partner. They may have succeeded in the demands had not Cameron been appointed Governor of Tanganyika. He proved to be an able and generally popular governor, and he was adept at defending Tanganyika's interests. Uganda tried again in 1929, arguing that as Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were so far from Lake Victoria, that the latter should come under Ugandan administration. The "placing of the whole littoral under the control of one administration would promote from every point of view the well being and prosperity of the inhabitants of the lake basin both indigenous and non-native".⁹⁰ Once again, the benefits for Africans were used as an argument for transfer, and once again the request was rejected out of hand.

⁸⁸ TNA: TS13022: 211-6, 14th January 1926. Letter from W.F. Gowers, Governor of Uganda, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

⁸⁹ TNA: TS13022.

⁹⁰ TNA: TS10856/III: 662, 21st January 1932. Letter from W.F. Gowers, Governor of Uganda, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Disagreement between the two territories and dispute over the sovereignty of the north-west continued until 1932 when Cameron retired from the governorship and his successor, Symes, went to meet the Ugandan governor personally.⁹¹ Relations on the ground had generally been rather better than those at government level, but the level of cross-border co-operation increased markedly after 1933. To take one example, game wardens on both sides of the border co-operated in a 1933 campaign to save rhinos and prevent ivory smuggling across the border.⁹²

Tanganyika-Belgian Colonies

While African groups on the Ugandan-Tanganyikan border were greatly interrelated, the links were probably even greater between north-west Tanganyika and Rwanda and Burundi. This has already been discussed in Chapter Three, but it had a dominating influence upon the actions of the colonialists in the area. These borderlands were very remote from centres of colonial power, and in spite of their high population density, the number of colonial officers was even lower than normal. DC Lumley in Bugufi region was the only British administrator in an area with a population of hundreds of thousands. In general there seems to have been less cross-border contact between the DCs than on other borders and there also seem to have been few major problems. Administrators in the area were faced with such massive responsibilities and heavy workloads that they had little time for petty jealousies.

⁹¹ TNA: TS13022: 283-6, 10th September 1932. Letter from the Acting Chief Secretary, Entebbe, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁹² The wardens on both sides seem to have been passionate about preventing the depopulation of rhino in the area, but their work was merely to save the rhinos for European guns. Talk of conservation and sustainability belong to another time. TNA: TS13595: 24, 23rd June 1933. From an Acting Game Warden, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. Also TS13595: 30, 19th June 1933. From C.R.S. Pitman, Game Warden (Uganda), to the Game Warden, Arusha.

On a territorial level, links were rather limited. The major source of dispute was Belgian claims for compensation from Britain for territories in north-west Tanganyika occupied by Belgium during the Great War and then transferred to Tanganyika. Belgium had been granted commercial 'sites' at Dar es Salaam and Kigoma,⁹³ but she pressed her claims for reimbursement of the costs of administration during the years 1917-20 and for the cost of improvements made to buildings, mainly in Kigoma. The case dragged on and on during the 1920s and 1930s, with Britain eventually paying 747,327 Belgium Francs.⁹⁴ This matter apart, intergovernmental correspondence was rare. During 1930-1, the Belgian authorities indicated that they would like greater co-operation between the two territories, and made a series of suggestions relating to medical, veterinary, agricultural, communication and transport matters.⁹⁵ An exchange of visits followed and some plans for a central African railway across the continent drawn up, but apart from improved road links, few concrete benefits came out of it.⁹⁶ Apart from the compensation matter, the only real point of dispute occurred over the meaning of the "mid-stream of the Kagera" in the demarcation of the boundary in 1928.⁹⁷ The general cordiality of relations was referred to in the League of Nations 1924 Report on the two mandates, which mentions that the two administrations had co-operated over a series of minor border incidents (Société des Nations 1925: 10).

The improved road links on the ground referred to a single road built through Bugufi in Tanganyika to the Ruanda-Urundi border. The DC for the area, Lumley, surveyed, planned and designed the road and supervised its construction by local Africans (Lumley, 1976: 46). Lumley's relations with his Belgian counterparts were

⁹³ CO691/95/6: 37. "Note on History and Present Position of Belgian 'Old Claim' in respect of permanent Improvements", by the Colonial Office.

⁹⁴ With an exchange rate of 55Bfr = £1 at that time.

⁹⁵ CO822/37/15: 16-19, 11th January 1937. Note on the Governors' Conference of 1930. No title or authors given.

⁹⁶ CO822/6/6: 20-23, 21st November 1927. Letter from Maxwell, Governor of Northern Rhodesia to L.S. Amery at the Colonial Office.

⁹⁷ See file CO691/99/6: 68.

amicable but limited. Barundi in Ruanda-Urundi destroyed four out of the seven boundary pillars by taking the cement for pottery making in 1929. A chief on the Tanganyikan side of the boundary told Lumley who had destroyed them, so Lumley suggested that the Belgian government impose collective punishment.⁹⁸ This was achieved by punishing the chiefs and forcing Barundi to repair the pillars. During the same year, Lumley's Belgian opposite number, André de Beys, helped him to stop, or at least restrict, ivory smuggling in the area. Rhino horns were being smuggled from Burundi into Tanganyika to avoid taxes.⁹⁹

Problems developed, however, during the series of famines which struck Bugufi during the 1920s and 1930s. During one undated disaster, according to Lumley: "The drought and accompanying famine had spread over Burundi and Ruanda even more savagely and starving tribesmen were coming to our side for food....Although the Belgians were operating their own relief across the border, many of these people slipped to our side to be fed. These intruders were soon detected and sent back. Every available pound of food had to be reserved for our own people" (Lumley, 1976: 37-8). The slow Belgian response to the famine annoyed Lumley, and his expulsion of Barundi refugees brought about attempts upon his life. Lumley's road from Bugufi to Biharamulo was partly built to enable future famine relief (Lumley, 1976: 44).¹⁰⁰

During the 1930 boundary survey and adjustment relations remained good. The leader of the boundary commission, Laws, wrote that, "it was only through the spirit of cordial co-operation and goodwill with which the Belgian representatives approached

⁹⁸ TNA: TS12907.

⁹⁹ TNA: TS13595: 1-2, 28th June 1929. Letter from André de Beys, Belgian Consul, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

TNA: TS13595: 13-14, 29th August 1929. Letter from E.K. Lumley, Assistant DO for Bugufi, to the Acting Director of Game Preservation, Kilosa.

¹⁰⁰ This road remained the main road link between Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi until it was partly washed away during the floods of November 1997; as witnessed by the author.

each problem that we were able to reach a wholly satisfactory agreement" (Laws, 1932: 244). It is interesting to note that relations on the Belgian-British borders seem to have been more friendly than along wholly British inter-territorial borders in East Africa.

Anglo-Belgian relations to the west of Lake Tanganyika seem to have been solely channelled through Rwanda and Burundi. The boundary through Lake Tanganyika had been poorly determined, but this caused no problems during the colonial period. According to McEwen, the absence of a detailed lake boundary may be because the lake lay within the watershed of the Congo Basin and was therefore free for navigation. International law presumes in favour of equal rights, and therefore the median line, in the absence of any treaty stipulations (McEwen, 1971: 226).

Tanganyika-British Central Africa (BCA)

Relations between the British and Tanganyikan administrations and those in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were much more friendly than those on the northern boundaries of the mandate. This may partly be attributed to good relationships between the respective DCs and PCs, and also partly to the lack of difficulties in the area. The boundary had been delimited in 1901 but was not to be demarcated until the exploitation of copper and tin deposits made it necessary in the early 1930s (Laws, 1932; Peake, 1934; Prescott, 1965: 70). The appeal by Chief Mkoma for the transfer of the village of Tontera and a rectification of the boundary which has already been mentioned, does not appear to have affected inter-colonial relations in any way. Minor alterations were made to the boundary in 1935 and 1937 with little disagreement between the two parties.

The unusual delimitation of the boundary in Lake Nyasa first came to light in 1951. Colonial officials could not believe that Nyasaland was responsible for landing places on the Tanganyikan shoreline, and decided that there must have been a mistake.¹⁰¹ The East African Railways and Harbours Commission had improved the facilities at Mwaya (Itungi) on the northern shore of the lake without any complaint by the Nyasaland authorities. The Colonial Development Corporation's maps placed the boundary in the lake, but rather nearer the Tanganyikan than the Nyasaland shoreline.¹⁰² The PC for Lindi Province pointed out that the islands of Mbamba and Lundu in the lake are not administered by either Tanganyika or Nyasaland. He wrote that: "I do not think we need take matters up with the Nyasaland Government as no incidents have arisen".¹⁰³ No action was taken, but the matter continued to be discussed during the 1950s in an academic fashion rather than as a matter of any urgency.¹⁰⁴ It is easy to point out with the benefit of hindsight that such complacency was misplaced, but as the border was an inter-territorial one between two administrations on friendly terms, it is perhaps understandable that no action was taken.

The importance of the men on the ground has already been mentioned. DCs very often acted almost autonomously because of problems of distance and communications, and the most remote areas of Tanganyika - the areas most distant from Dar es Salaam - were the borderlands of the territory. Although matters had improved immeasurably since German times, when orders could take months to reach officers in borderlands (Iliffe, 1979: 119), the diaries and autobiographies of such men

¹⁰¹ CO1015/411, 9th January 1952. From M.A. Willis in London, to F.W. Winterbottom of the Colonial Development Corporation.

¹⁰² CO1015/411, 9th January 1952. See Note 100.

¹⁰³ TNA: TS34207: 39, 12th August 1953. Letter from the PC for Lindi, to P.H.W. Haile, Local Government Branch, The Secretariat, Dar es Salaam.

¹⁰⁴ CO822/1555: PE 5/1, 29th June 1959. "Opinion: On the Tanganyika/Nyasaland border on Lake Nyasa". No correspondents given.

as Lumley reveal the isolation of many DCs (Lumley, 1976). They lived almost as chiefs themselves, although usually without any military support. The nearest European neighbour to a DC could often be a Belgian or Portuguese DC over the border, and co-operation between officers was vital. On Lake Tanganyika, the Nyasaland government vessel *Ilala II* was only in use fifty percent of the time, so use of the boat was given to the Tanganyikan government.¹⁰⁵ This was the type of co-operation which might be expected to have been the norm between British colonial administrations, but which was often lacking between Tanganyikan officials and their northern neighbours.

Tanganyika-Portuguese East Africa (PEA)

Tanganyikan-Portuguese administrative contacts were much more substantial than DOA-Portuguese links had been. Portuguese activity in the north of their colony allied to more widespread implementation of improved means of communication, such as motor vehicles, saw a marked increase in Portuguese influence on and around the Makonde Plateau and the Rovuma River (Alpers, 1984: 370; Justino, 1936: 563-75). This in turn led to more normalised western-style cross-border relations, although this is not to say that relations were cordial. Relations between the two administrations were generally not particularly friendly: the British regarded Portuguese rule as incompetent and brutal, while the Portuguese believed that the British were undermining their rule south of the Rovuma. Three matters affected relations: the ongoing dispute over the sovereignty of islands in the Rovuma, migration from PEA to Tanganyika throughout the colonial period, and the support of Tanganyikans for Mozambican independence towards the end of the colonial period. In addition, as on all colonial borders, differences in policy were regularly exploited by Africans. For

¹⁰⁵ See file CO/37/129/14

¹⁰⁷ See FO37/91235 for more information. There are no page numbers on the documents in this file.

¹⁰⁵ TNA: Dist 11/271 Lindi: 19, 21st August 1950. Letter from the PC for Lindi, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

example, the mwabvi poison ordeal was made illegal in British territories under witchcraft legislation, but continued unmolested across the Rovuma (Wilson, 1993: 2). Also, taking credit from Indian traders was periodically banned and then re-legalised by the two governments: differences in policy enabled borderland Africans to obtain credit across the border at times when it was unavailable to them within their own territories (Wilson, 1993: 4).

The PEA authorities often complained to the Tanganyikan government about the level of migration over the border. Migrants came to Tanganyika because of a combination of harsh Portuguese policies and better economic conditions in the British mandate. The British authorities were generally favourably inclined towards such migration: it helped to repopulate areas devastated by the First World War, and the migrants easily fitted in because they were Makonde, like those living in the Tanganyikan borderlands.¹⁰⁶ Problems arose when touts for such organisations as the Tanganyikan Sisal Labour Bureau (Silabu) began to operate in PEA, to the irritation of local officials.¹⁰⁷ The Portuguese began to patrol the Rovuma in order to prevent Mawia¹⁰⁸ labour from crossing the river and to discourage the activities of Silabu recruiting agents. In one instance during 1951, thirteen Tanganyikans were robbed, beaten and detained by Portuguese Police at Chikundi in the sub-district of Mocimboa do Rovuma.¹⁰⁹ The captives overpowered their guards after one and a half days and escaped. They reported the incident to the British DC at Newala, claiming that they were going to buy castorseed and riceseed, and to get rice for the Maulidi celebrations from their relations in PEA. Intermarriage and interaction across the border was commonplace, as all the people of the area were Wamatambwe, a branch of the Makonde. The attempt to disrupt this interaction was a clear attempt to disrupt

¹⁰⁶ See file CO691/124/14.

¹⁰⁷ See FO371/97238 for more information. There are no page numbers on the documents, but it's a thin file.

¹⁰⁸ Mawia is and was the derogatory term used for the Portuguese Maconde.

¹⁰⁹ See FO371/97238.

existing cultural systems. The DC for Newala approached his Portuguese counterpart in an attempt to restore friendly relations and to reach an amicable settlement. Even if the detained men had been Silabu agents, it is likely that the DC would have supported their story, but the outcome is not known.

Portuguese fear of emigration stemmed from insecurity, a lack of control and a loss of taxable population. In 1922, reports from Dar es Salaam and Zomba cited "maladministration and ill-treatment" as the main causes of the large numbers of Makua, Yao and Nyasa fleeing Portuguese Nyasaland for British Nyasaland and Tanganyika.¹¹⁰ Similar reports appeared during later years. In 1933, the PC of Southern Province of Tanganyika wrote to Dar es Salaam that, "oppressive measures adopted by neighbouring Authorities", including, "the seizing of Native womenfolk," was causing considerable movement of Natives across the Rovuma into the Tundura District" (Alpers, 1984: 370). At the same time on the coast, a senior Matengo headman fled into Tanganyika after some female Matengo were seized by the Portuguese.¹¹¹ This seems to be another example of Asiwaju's concept of migration as rebellion (Asiwaju, 1983). It is also an excellent example of the way in which the actions of the colonialists and African borderlanders influenced each other. Harsh Portuguese colonial rule encouraged Portuguese Makonde to migrate into Tanganyika; this in turn provoked the Portuguese into increasing the function of the boundary as a line of division.

Further proof of the lack of Portuguese control of its borderlands is provided by Portuguese attitudes to the presence on their soil of those wanted for crimes in Tanganyika. In East Africa as a whole, examples of neighbouring colonial officers, police or military, co-operating in order to extradite suspected criminals are extremely

¹¹⁰ CO691/55: 400-401, 27th May 1922. Letter from the Acting Governor, Dar es Salaam, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

¹¹¹ TNA: TS21484.

rare. Sometimes neighbouring states did not help to apprehend 'criminal fugitives' in their territory because of the lack of resources or even of any active administration. This was partly to blame in the Portuguese borderlands. During the 1920s, a man from the village of Natuno in the south of Tanganyika killed his wife and fled to Mozambique where he lived unmolested for three years (Lumley, 1976: 105). There was no effective Portuguese administration in the northern provinces of Mozambique at that time, but the level of political will must also be questioned.

For several years after World War Two, the Portuguese relaxed their labour laws and increased wages in PEA in order to attract workers back. Luxuries were also more readily available in PEA at this time because of Portugal's ample dollar reserves (Alpers, 1984: 374), and so large numbers of PEA Africans re-crossed the Rovuma to find work in PEA. However, this flow of migrants did not last for long. From 1950 onwards, sisal and cashew production rose dramatically in Tanganyika (Iliffe, 1979: 451-54) and the resulting labour shortage encouraged Tanganyikan plantations to compete to offer the best working conditions. A flood of Wamatambwe re-entered PEA and the PEA authorities became concerned about the large numbers who did not return (Alpers, 1984: 376). Again they stepped up controls on the border.

The story of PEA migration to Tanganyika was not simply one of British encouragement and Portuguese opposition. As part of the border dispute over the ownership of the Rovuma islands in 1932, the Portuguese authorities threatened to restrict the rights of Tanganyikan citizens to cross the river for salt and fishing.¹¹² Governor Symes was not a supporter of immigration from the south: "an epidemic of burglaries and assaults invariably ensues on their arrival",¹¹³ and responded by threatening to prohibit the large number of PEA immigrants from working on the sisal

¹¹² CO691/124/14: 18, 17th October 1932. Letter from Governor Symes in Dar es Salaam, to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies.

¹¹³ CO691/124/14: 18, 17th October 1932. See Note 111.

plantations. The Portuguese quickly backed down as the remittances which the workers brought home were the mainstay of the local economy. The Portuguese needed the migrant workers but did not like the way that their colony appeared to be dependent upon the British. They may have had political sovereignty up to the Rovuma, but the Tanganyikan economic area stretched well over the border.

The 1913 DOA-Portuguese Agreement guaranteed the rights of Africans along the border to fish, fetch water and take salt on either bank.¹¹⁴ At the end of the First World War, the Portuguese had occupied all the islands in the Rovuma, and as they were of no real use to the British, no attempt was made to reclaim them.¹¹⁵ However, when the Portuguese threatened the rights of Tanganyikans on the river, disputes began to arise over the location of the boundary as a result of changes in the course of the river (McEwen, 1971: 213). These problems soured relations along the border for many years, but when MacMichael assumed the Tanganyikan governorship in 1935 he concluded that the Tanganyikan Wamatambwe wanted to maintain their access rights to the south bank in order to smuggle. He agreed to negotiate favourably with the Portuguese, much to their surprise, yet had no sympathy for the Portuguese, writing that "it is difficult to contemplate the local Portuguese authorities taking the initiative over anything".¹¹⁶ The boundary agreement reached in 1938 closely mirrored the 1913 German-Portuguese Treaty, and the inhabitants of both banks retained all rights vis-à-vis fishing and transport. The Portuguese seem to have been so surprised by British co-operation that they conceded many British requests. The case indicates that the

¹¹⁴ CO691/124/14: 26. No date or author given. Gives Governor Cameroon's view of the Tanganyika-Portuguese East Africa border dispute.

¹¹⁵ CO691/109/5: 36-42, 31st March 1930. From the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. No author given.

¹¹⁶ CO691/143/17: 2-3, 15th March 1935. Unlabelled notes without any correspondents. Subject: the rights of the inhabitants of P.E.A. to use the waters of the Rovuma.

colonial authorities were prepared to put a great deal of time and effort into defending existing African practices where there was no other pressing influence.

The post-war years were relatively quiet on the Rovuma, but the lead-up to Tanganyikan independence highlighted Portuguese fears of isolation, and British acquiescence with most African nationalist and independence movements led to a severe deterioration in relations. Many of the Mozambican migrant workers in Tanganyika were influenced by Tanganyikan trade unions and the dream of independence. Ideas were particularly easily transmitted by the large numbers of workers who normally lived in PEA but who worked in Tanganyika. Many were members of the Tanganyikan African Workers Union and the Mozambican African National Union. The Portuguese police arrested those with membership cards if and when they tried to re-enter PEA. Such tight controls and restrictions indicate the enormous increase in presence by the Portuguese authorities in comparison with the pre-First World War years and the early days of the British mandate. The increased presence was undoubtedly partly caused by fear. Tensions increased in March 1960 when a Tanganyikan African policeman, Martin Petro, who was investigating robberies in Tanganyika by Mozambican natives, crossed the border and brought the suspects back with him.¹¹⁷ This was undoubtedly illegal.

Matters came to a head on the 10th June 1960 when some 2-5,000 Maconde who had previously worked in Tanganyika held a meeting outside the Maeda District office in PEA to protest for independence. The Portuguese army and police moved in and 152 were shot dead. The Portuguese authorities responded to British condemnation by blaming Tanganyikan revolutionaries and the high level of freedom of speech in Tanganyika.¹¹⁸ No less than 300 other Africans were killed in subsequent

¹¹⁷ CO822/2877: E16, 13th June 1960. Letter by F.H. Crowther, Consul General, to the Governor General Lourenco Marques.

¹¹⁸ CO822/2877: E17, 6th July 1960. Letter which appears to be sent by K. Unwin to

shootings. British DCs in the area still hoped for good relations between Tanganyika and PEA;¹¹⁹ but the tone of Tanganyikan-Portuguese relations during the independence period had been set. The boundary had become more of a dividing line than ever and the western system of dividing political space had undoubtedly been imposed by the colonial authorities.

Deutsch Ost Afrika/Tanganyika-Zanzibar

There is little of note regarding relations between the Sultanate and the mainland colonial authorities - Zanzibari relations with the Great Powers were of far more importance. Zanzibar-DOA correspondence largely concerns the erosion of the Sultan's mainland possessions which has already been dealt with. Zanzibar-Tanganyika correspondence is dominated by the issue of smuggling, and will be considered in Chapter Six. It would be ill-judged, however, not to point out that the neighbour with whom Tanganyikans had the most contact was Zanzibar. The ethnic origins of most of the population of Zanzibar lay on the mainland, and even after World War Two perhaps twenty percent of the population of the islands had been born in Tanganyika (Kaniki, 1980: 370-2). Such close blood ties inevitably brought about a great deal of trade, notwithstanding the pivotal role that Zanzibar had played in the East African pre-colonial economy. In 1902, Zanzibar still took sixty-seven percent of DOA's exports and supplied fifty-seven percent of its imports (Iliffe, 1979: 128). Pre-colonial political ties may have been severed between the mainland and islands, but cultural and economic links survived into and beyond the colonial period.

F.H. Crowther at Lourenco Marques. Sent c/o the British Embassy in Addis Ababa.

¹¹⁹ CO822/2877: E14, 7th July 1960. Telegraph from an agent in Lourenco Marques to the Foreign Office, on disturbances in P.E.A. (File closed until 1991).

The Role of the Mandate

One factor which is often cited in discussions about the international relations of Tanganyika is its status as an international mandate under the League of Nations and later as a trust territory under the United Nations.¹²⁰ The mandate is considered to have prevented political union in East Africa, or indeed any transfer of territory involving Tanganyika. This subject has been widely considered elsewhere but this section aims to consider the relevance of Tanganyika's mandatory status to its international boundaries. Wilson's stand at Versailles, with the, "optimistic message of hope for the eventual freedom of colonial peoples in the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific Ocean" (Dumbuya, 1995: xiii) may have challenged the acceptability of the colonial mission, but it did nothing to challenge the international boundaries which colonialism had created. Neither their legitimacy as a means of dividing political space nor their actual positioning was effected by the mandatory system which came out of the spoils of the First World War. The legal status of mandates was different to that of colonies or protectorates, but in practice they were ruled in more or less in the same way.¹²¹ Differences are difficult to pinpoint, but the lack of urgency with which mandates were governed certainly marks them out.

The unification of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika would have either removed Tanganyika's international boundaries, or more likely, it would have altered their status from international or inter-territorial boundaries, to provincial divisions. The mandate has generally been perceived to have prevented a union which was favoured by many politicians and administrators at that time. During the 1920s Ugandan and Kenyan administrators pushed for closer integration or union with Tanganyika. Indeed, Sir Edward Grigg had been appointed Governor of Kenya with that intention in mind

¹²⁰ See Chidzero, 1961; Dumbuya, 1995; Callahan, 1999.

¹²¹ They had been allocated by the Victorious Great Powers in May 1919, not by the League of Nations which was not founded until 1920 (Ingham, 1965: 545).

(Ingham, 1965: 588). The Tanganyikan Governor, Cameron, however, fiercely fought his corner in maintaining the mandate's political integrity. "His opposition to closer union, which grew steadily, was based.....upon his fears of its effect upon his own programme in Tanganyika and more particularly upon his native administration policy" (Ingham, 1965: 588). He could not, however, prevent economic dependence upon Kenya, a fact which is widely perceived to result from his disinterest in economics (Coulson, 1986: 96).

The world-wide recession of the 1930s had varied effects upon the clamour for union. The Ugandan governor, W.F. Gowers, agreed with the Kenyan governor, J. Byrne, and with the findings of the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa when he wrote in 1932 that the development of East Africa, "as a whole can best be assured by each of the three territories continuing to develop upon its own lines".¹²² The expense of unification coupled with Tanganyikan opposition probably brought about this change of mind. At the same time, however, Kenyan economic interests began to push for much closer integration in order to increase the size of their markets, thereby softening the blow of the economic depression. The 1934 resolution of the Association of Chambers of Commerce of Eastern Africa, based in Nairobi, sums up opinion:

[The] "time has now arrived when the community of economic and social interests of the territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika demands a completely unified system of administration, under which the welfare of them all may be the more certainly assured.....This Association therefore urges the Imperial Government to constitute the territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika into a customs

¹²² TNA: TS10856/III: 761-2, 8th December 1934. Letter from the Association of Chambers of Commerce of Eastern Africa, Nairobi, to the Chief Secretary.

¹²² TNA: TS10856/III: 660-9, 21st January 1932. Letter from W.F. Gowers, Governor of Uganda, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The records do not mention Zanzibar as a potential state for federation; it was generally not seen in the same light as the other East African territories, possibly because it was ruled indirectly.

union....provided that the measures....do not infringe the provisions of the Tanganyika Mandate".¹²³

The reference to administrative union seems designed to overcome Tanganyikan government opposition. This appeal indicated that the mandate was an obstacle to union, but that it could be overcome. Opponents of union consistently made reference to the terms of the mandate as a reason for denying closer integration.

The effect that the mandate had on Britain's ability to act in Tanganyika has been much discussed. The British government accepted that the primary obligation of the mandatory powers was "to promote to the utmost the moral and material welfare and social progress of the inhabitants of the territories themselves".¹²⁴ This did not however impede the British from federating Tanganyika with her other territories in East Africa, a fact which was admitted on several occasions by the Foreign Office. Article Ten of the League of Nations mandate stated that, "The Mandatory shall be authorised to constitute the territory into a customs, fiscal and administrative union or federation with the adjacent territories under his own sovereignty or control; provided always that the measures adopted to that end do not infringe the provisions of this mandate".¹²⁵ The union of East Africa need not have infringed upon the other articles.

The situation did not change markedly after the Second World War. Although more attention was given to the "vigorous application of the principles of tutelage and international accountability" (Chidzero, 1961: 133), the British government remained free to include Tanganyika in any union of its East African possessions. The terms of

¹²³ TNA: TS10856/III: 761-2, 8th December 1934. Letter from the Association of Chambers of Commerce of Eastern Africa, Nairobi, to the Chief Secretary, Tanganyika.

¹²⁴ TNA: TS11459/I: 72, 27th April 1936. Extract from the Official Report of 27th April 1936 on Mandated Territories, from the House of Commons.

¹²⁵ Article 10, British Mandate for East Africa, League of Nations C.449(i) 1922

Article Ten of the League of Nations Mandate were repeated in Article Five of the 1946 United Nations Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Tanganyika.¹²⁶ However, as a result of the vested interests of the colonialists of each of the British territories in the region, union seemed less likely than before the war. With hindsight, it is possible to see that the most likely time for union was during the immediate aftermath of Tanganyika's transfer from German to British rule.

The original source of the belief that the mandate prevented union is unknown, but the Permanent Mandates Commission itself surprisingly ruled in 1933 that Britain was not authorised to include Tanganyika in an East Africa Federation (Dumbuya, 1995: 154). In addition, one effect of the mandate was to open British policy up to international scrutiny, and according to a recent study by Dumbuya, the German colonial associations formed in the 1920s to campaign for the return of their pre-war colonies were a leading cause of the failure of the federal scheme in 1933 (Dumbuya, 1995: 153-5).

Whatever the origin of the belief that union was forbidden by the mandate, fears of Kenyan domination consistently outweighed any perceived benefits. That Tanganyika remained largely underdeveloped was largely the result of the lack of exploitable resources, of better opportunities for entrepreneurs elsewhere in the British Empire, and of the pull of Kenyan economic interests, but uncertainty over Tanganyika's future because of its mandatory status undoubtedly played a role in discouraging investment. Its role in discouraging political union is a matter which requires further research.

African views on union are more difficult to gauge, although two examples help to give a taste of opinion. As part of the Hilton Young Commission on integration in

¹²⁶ United Nations Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Tanganyika (1946), Article 5.

1927, a delegation was sent from Tanganyika to London to express local opinion. This delegation contained three Africans: one Muslim, one Christian and one 'animist' - all three were dead set against integration.¹²⁷ The only opinion polls on the matter with any relevance for the colonial period were carried out in 1963 and 1965 (Marco Surveys Limited, 1965). They demonstrate that support for union was high throughout East Africa at around ninety percent, but this is probably more a reflection of pan-Africanist sentiment than of the desire for closer ties with Kenya.

The mandate was also a factor in border alterations. Changes in border delimitation were considered too troublesome to contemplate because of the mandate although there was some pressure for the alteration of the section of the Kenya-Tanganyika border which divided the abaKuria. However, despite the support of the local DOs throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Kenyan and Tanganyikan governments blocked change, citing the mandate on each occasion (Kjerland, 1995: 92-5). In November 1946, the PC Lake Province (Tanganyika) wrote to the DO of North Mara concerning the problems of the mandate: "I have to inform you that after discussion of the matter during my recent visit to Dar es Salaam, it has been agreed that the difficulties involved in the transfer of a portion of Kenya are so great that it is not worth pursuing the problem further" (Kjerland, 1995: 94). The mandate may have been perceived to be a genuine obstacle to change, but more often than not it was merely used as an excuse by the territorial governments who zealously guarded their possessions and whose petty jealousies sometimes prevented co-operation.

¹²⁷ Although bearing in mind that Cameron was Governor at the time, the three men may have been chosen because of their views on union.

Conclusion

The imposition of boundaries continued throughout the period of colonial rule. The creation of European-style sovereignties led to the development of western-style cross-border diplomacy. Once the region had been partitioned and the boundaries had been determined, the new colonial governments had to live alongside one another. In the few areas where the borders had not been settled, as on the DOA-CFS boundary, then conflict could still develop. As with European occupation of the continent, military strength was always the determining factor. It is interesting to note the unlikely grounds upon which the colonial powers based their territorial claims. For instance, the Germans based their claim to the Kionga Triangle upon Zanzibari territorial claims which all the colonial powers had previously dismissed as vastly exaggerated. Generally, the British could afford to be more relaxed in their dealings with neighbouring states because of their more secure geopolitical situation. The German authorities, on the other hand, had generally more uneasy relations with their neighbours, with the exception of the far south-west, where the isolation of both the British BCA officials and their German counterparts led to almost continually good relations. Perhaps because of mistrust between colonial officers, one aspect of western style cross-border diplomacy which never took hold was the principle of extradition.

During the First World War, the boundaries were used as they had been in Europe. As a result of heightened wartime tensions, awareness of territorial sovereignty grew markedly and borderlands became much more sensitive and militarised zones. Boundaries became symbols of statehood and troops were placed along the borders even where the British knew that there were no enemy forces for hundreds of miles. Such symbolism mirrors the use of flags during the early years of partition. Along the DOA-BEA border, for instance, the British and Germans played a game of cat and mouse, setting up their respective flags in borderland villages in order to stake their

respective claims. Where there was uncertainty, they somehow felt that a national symbol supported their case.

Some Africans responded to the colonial boundaries and harsh colonial rule by voting with their feet and migrating. The governments involved attempted to control border crossings, but the lack of manpower and nature of the terrain meant that any determined emigrants were likely to succeed. Although African borderlanders were able to exert some influence upon colonial border policy, the actions of neighbouring colonial governments had far more influence than any African politics upon the Tanganyika colonial authorities

Relations between Tanganyika and her British neighbours were certainly more friendly than those between DOA and her neighbours. In a political sense, the boundaries were not really international boundaries at all, but rather inter-territorial divisions. What is most striking, however, is that British inter-territorial relations were not more friendly. The lack of direction from London and the freedom which colonial governors and governments were given over policy allowed each territory to develop its own character and objectives. The experience of the First World War, when British and Empire troops invaded DOA from Kenya, may have given weight to the impression that DOA was being taken over by Kenya. Cameron did not accept this, and his stance, together with the impact of Tanganyika's mandatory status, ensured that the territory stayed politically independent. Great Britain may have ruled all three of the East African territories, but this did not prevent the continued imposition of the political division, and the independence of the three governments guaranteed the survival of the colonial boundaries.

CONCLUSION TO PART TWO

Pre-colonial East Africa was composed of hundreds of different polities, many of them interlinked and some of them owing allegiance to the Sultanate of Zanzibar. They were divided by a variety of means, but were generally characterised by their fluidity and adaptability. The colonial powers took them over by a variety of means, all of which were backed by military power. African methods of dividing political space continued to exist within the framework of Tanganyika but were subject to gradual erosion. In fitting African states into the colonial structure, the colonial authorities removed much of their African character by standardising them and placing them within a single system. As divisions between pre-colonial groups came to matter less and less, the political boundaries between Tanganyika and her neighbours became increasingly important. With regard to these issues there was little difference between British and German rule. The greatest result of the imposition of the colonial boundaries at the expense of the pre-colonial boundaries was the creation of a new territorially-bounded country. Tanzania has changed somewhat following the union with Zanzibar, but its land boundaries essentially remain those of the colonial partition. The creation of Tanganyika and the other successor states in Africa is perhaps the greatest legacy of colonialism in Africa.

One great similarity between the development of European and African polities in the continent stands out. African polities often expanded along the lines of trade routes, so political connections followed in the wake of trade links. In East Africa, the IBEAC and DOAG not only opened the region up to western influences, but actively encouraged the involvement of their respective governments in taking political control of territory. The territories which they targeted formed the cornerstones of the later sovereignly owned lands of their governments.

The broad brushstrokes of the division of Africa were determined almost solely by the colonial powers. To put it bluntly, it was Europeans and Europeans alone who determined that the northern part of East Africa would be British and the southern half would be German. This in conjunction with the transfer of sovereignty from African to European polities, meant that African political systems were almost entirely overridden by colonialism. However, the situation on the ground in the borderlands was markedly different. African polities were able to influence the location of the boundaries in some areas and to some extent. The influence of African borderlanders grew throughout the colonial period, even though the ability of the colonial powers to impose policies also grew over time. The British government as a whole even became convinced that the division of pre-colonial African ethnic groups and polities was something to oppose. They did take some steps to prevent division, but only where there were no other issues at stake. On the other hand, the broadly African system of flexible, fluid polities did not survive the partition, although some would argue that it is attempting to reassert itself today (Herbst, 2000).

PART THREE: ECONOMIC DIVISIONS

One of the principal reasons for the development of boundaries throughout the whole world, was as a means of controlling the import and export of goods from any particular polity. Control of the movement of goods enables governments to impose duties and taxes, and thereby increases their income. In Tanganyika, as elsewhere, the colonial authorities were eager to promote this as a function of the new borders. As such, economic considerations played a large role in the political division of East Africa: they provided much of the impetus for colonialism and were major factors in the imposition of the borders. It should not be forgotten, however, that trade duties were nothing new to East Africa. The African system of *hongo* required traders to pay duties to the rulers of polities through which they passed, either in the form of goods or money. The main difference between European and African duties was that the payment of European duties was normally arranged at the border, while *hongo* tended to be paid in the capital of a polity. Chapter Five will consider the impact of the boundaries upon existing African trade routes and economies. Often previously legitimate trade was made illegal by the colonial occupation and the new boundaries. The introduction of the colonial economy, customs duties at ports and on borders, allied to western technology and an economy heavily weighted towards European traders, often left Africans with little option but to trade by smuggling. Chapter Six will examine the nature of this smuggling, discuss the methods by which it was carried out and consider European responses to illegal trade. On this issue, the actions of the colonialists and African borderlanders were by far the most important influence upon each other. The role that the creation of the colonial economy had in reinforcing the boundaries will be the subject of Chapter Seven. This chapter will also consider the idea that borders between two territories with the same colonial power were less divisive than those ruled by different powers. The western system of dividing political space does not generally recognise international boundaries as existing within the territories of one sovereign power.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE IMPACT UPON PRE-COLONIAL ECONOMIES AND TRADE ROUTES

Introduction

The impact of colonial boundaries upon African economies and trade routes was profound but was only one component of the impact of the western-dominated international economy. The ivory and slave trades had begun to change the economy of the interior before the first European colonialists arrived in East Africa, and western products had already begun to make indigenous goods uncompetitive. Once colonial rule had been imposed and East Africa partitioned, trade was re-routed as the colonial powers sought to develop colonial economies which would be of most benefit to the metropolitan states. African borderlanders also suffered more localised effects as villages became divided from their crops and taxes were demanded by a different colonial government to that which ruled them. A wealth of literature exists on pre-colonial East African trade routes, such as that by Gray and Birmingham (1970), Isichei (1997) and Koponen (1988). When the pre-colonial history of Tanzania first began to attract widespread attention during the 1960s, various local and large-scale studies of trade between the interior and the coast were undertaken. There is no need to repeat their conclusions, but this chapter will briefly consider the nature and development of pre-colonial trade before turning its attention to the impact of the colonial boundaries.

Juhani Koponen was quite rightly scandalised when he read in a 1961 World Bank report that, "The history of modern economic development in Tanganyika is extremely short, having begun.....in 1884 when Karl Peters founded the Union for German Colonisation".¹ Although somewhat on the periphery, Tanganyika had long played a

¹ Koponen, 1994: 9 and World Bank, 1961: 19

role in world trade. Some writers, such as Alpers (1969: 48), trace the origins of the caravan trade to the 1820s, but such estimates are based upon Zanzibari records, and it is likely that caravans had traded between the coast and the interior since before that time. Until the Eighteenth Century, the East African interior was one of the most isolated parts of Africa, but further west, the Kongo kingdom - which had long traded with Europe - was exporting the ivory of 3-4,000 elephants and up to 40 tons of copper per year in the Eighteenth century. Such levels would qualify as mercantile autonomy in Europe, but were achieved in Africa without the trappings of such European developments (Feierman, 1993: 179). Before the Eighteenth Century it is likely that most goods which were traded between the Great Lakes and the coast passed through several hands (Ishichei, 1997: 435), but during the Eighteenth Century, the Yao and then the Nyamwezi began to carry goods as far as the coast (Ishichei, 1997: 431). Salt, iron and iron products such as hoes were both the chief commodities and main currencies. The Nyamwezi, amongst others, used hoes to pay hongo and to buy food (Liebenow, 1971: 19; Alpers, 1969: 50-1).²

During the Nineteenth Century, coastal entrepreneurs took control, as two main commodities began to dominate the caravan routes: ivory and slaves. Ivory was the most important of the two. Slaves were traded in their own right, particularly for labour on the islands, but were often used to transport the ivory. It was only then that the coastal Swahili began to take control and so Zanzibari records naturally begin to speak about regular caravans to and from the interior from this time onwards.³ By the 1870s an economic system based upon ivory and centred on Zanzibar reached out to cover modern-day Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, eastern Zaire, northern Zambia, Malawi and northern Mozambique. The strength and importance of this system is indicated by the level of cohesion in this area today. Many links remain, from patterns

² For more on pre-colonial trade, see Richard Gray and David Birmingham, 1970.

³ For more on this, see Roland Oliver, "Africa on the eve of partition", in The Cambridge History of Africa (1965).

of labour migration to the use of Swahili as a regional lingua franca (Kaniki, 1980: 42). Only Rwanda remained outside this system, playing the role of the China of central Africa - rejecting long distance trade and closing itself to most foreign influences (Iliffe: 1995: 183). As Swahili and Arab traders came to replace the Yao and the particularly the Nyamwezi, and "the commercial policy of the Sultan of Zanzibar turned them into the porters, rather than the financiers or entrepreneurs" (Coulson, 1982: 27), it could be argued that this was no longer an African economic system. However, just as the African influence in Ancient Egypt has been underestimated, so the generally African origin of the Swahili traders has often been lost in the tales of the 'Arab East African Coast'. The autobiography of the most famous trader of them all, Tippu Tip, seems to depict an African with some Arab ways, rather than an alien to the continent (Tippu Tip, 1966).⁴ In addition, the Yao continued to control long distance trade around Lake Malawi, where their domination was only broken by the armed intervention of colonial forces.

It is, however, possible to overestimate the importance of the caravan trade to the economy of East Africa as a whole. Elizabeth Isichei estimates that even long distance traders accrued more benefit from local trade than interior-to-coast trade (Isichei, 1997: 431). Many African groups who were perceived as 'advanced' by the West did not take part in long distance trade. For example, the Chagga traded locally, but were more interested in their banana groves and irrigation systems than contact with the coast or lakes.⁵ Isichei is probably correct when she writes that the exaggerated domination of the caravan trade probably results from the fact that most contemporary commentators were based at the coast (Isichei, 1997: 433). Nevertheless, it seems that there was some economic cohesiveness within the wider East African region; a

⁴ This autobiography is an excellent source for the history of the region and of the period.

⁵ From Isichei, 1997: 431 and from personal conversations with Chagga elders in Dar es Salaam and Moshi during 1997.

cohesiveness that did not sit easily with the colonial partition of the region. It was into this combination of local trading systems and long distance caravan routes, already greatly influenced by western trade at the coast, that the colonial powers attempted to carve up the region and to regulate patterns of trade to their own advantage.

The Colonial Impact

While the imposition of linear boundaries played a major role in disrupting African and Afro-Arab trade patterns, the intrusion of western economies and trade was altogether on a much grander scale. Pre-colonial economies did not die overnight, although the introduction of mass-produced goods such as iron hoes did bring about collapse in certain sectors. This occurred without the support of colonial rule, but colonialism hastened the deterioration and encouraged it in all areas of production, not just with regard to manufactured goods. Many agricultural techniques and the production of textiles, iron and salt were all destroyed by a combination of colonisation and an increasing number of imports. "Trade turned agriculturists and craftsmen into porters; disease wiped out most of the cattle; and the fighting and turmoil between 1890 and 1920 depopulated large areas of the country" (Coulson, 1982: 27-8). The thirty years of upheaval wrought by an alliance of famine, disease and war hastened economic change. The volatility and change of those years affected indigenous economies and made change seem inevitable. Despite this, it took German and other European traders over forty years to gain control of the entire economic area from Zanzibar to Katanga (Sheriff, 1979: 42-3) and the smelting of iron survived among the Bemba and Fipa into the 1920s.⁶

⁶ From personal communication with Roy Willis of Edinburgh University.

German interest in East Africa was largely fuelled by the economic potential of the region. As DOAG expeditions moved towards the lakes, German control spread out along the lines of pre-colonial trade routes. Stations were set up at key trading points such as Tabora, and by 1912 the DOAG as a company had expanded into pre-1885 Zanzibari spheres of influence to the west of Lake Tanganyika (Rodney, 1979: 140). Arab and Swahili traders in the area who wished to avoid German control were cut off from their ivory markets in Zanzibar and were confronted by the Congo Free State. In DOA, African chiefs feared the loss of the caravan tolls between one chiefdom and the next known as hongo (Alpers, 1975), and African control of political and economic space was replaced by European boundaries, duties and taxes. Along international boundaries, Africans who had their fields separated from their villages, or who had become detached from the main part of their village, group or polity, were generally given six to twelve months to return to harvest their crops, collect property and claim compensation. This period was actually legally fixed at six months for problems caused as a result of boundary changes in the 1890 Treaty.⁷

The actual details of the economic impact of the international boundaries would make an interesting topic for local, detailed studies, but it is worth citing several case studies here which were typical of the information gathered. The BEA-DOA boundary offers many examples, possibly because it has been the subject of much attention in general. The BEA-DOA boundary at the coast offers two contradictory examples of the use of western communication to aid cross-border links. African and Arab traders at the coast were largely dependent upon the trade winds to move their goods any considerable distance up and down the coast. Western traders disturbed this trade as they did not need to rely on the winds. The larger Swahili boats lost their role although smaller vessels continued to dominate local trade. Overland trade also existed along

⁷ RKA: R1001 635: 182, 14th May 1910. Notes on the Anglo-German Boundary Commission of 1910, by the Boundary Commissioners.

the coastal strip, mainly between Mombasa and Tanga. The journey took four days but it was cheaper than paying the cost of a sea journey. In 1916 the DOA and BEA tried to set up a postal service between the two towns, with runners meeting at the border to exchange post. It was quickly abandoned, however, because of the regular movement of African traders, both overland and at sea, who were able to carry post (Brode, 1911: 30). The colonial authorities were prepared to incorporate some aspects of pre-colonial trade in their new economies. Despite this, the general colonial opinion of cross-border DOA-BEA trade remained that, "it is limited merely to an occasional exchange of the daily needs of the natives, and remains uncontrolled" (Brode, 1991: 33).

The major pre-colonial trade route in the north of DOA passed through Taveta on its way from Lake Victoria to Mombasa, and so Taveta was one of its key targets in the area. Following partition, the route crossed the border into DOA on its way to Taveta. However, the British and German authorities tried to direct trade flows to remain wholly within their territories and began to implement duties on a more effective basis. Random patrols caught many unwary merchants, sometimes putting them out of business. This route therefore became much less important as goods bypassed the area, and Taveta lost its importance to the British. Its remote location made it something of a burden.⁸

While the colonial authorities actively sought to break up trade routes which crossed boundaries, they were sometimes prepared to act to preserve local means of production. The 1890 DOA-BEA boundary commission had determined that a small woodland near the Losaoyai River, assumed to be in the DOA, should be transferred to BEA because the nearby Wataveta of BEA hung their beehives there.⁹ The transfer

⁸ RKA: R1001 633: 201-2, 10th August 1909. Report on Taveta area by Methner.

⁹ RKA: R1001 587: 181R, 22nd August 1898. Letter from Kaiserliche Stationschef Johannes, to the DOA government, Dar es Salaam.

was carried out but in 1898 the Germans requested that the land be returned on the grounds that it would simplify the boundary. Compensation would be paid and the Wataveta would have the opportunity to cross the border to become German citizens.¹⁰ The outcome is unknown, but from conversations with people from Moshi it seems that this area of land was transferred back to DOA, although the famous beekeeping Wataveta remained in BEA. It seems that both colonial powers were prepared to support African economic access if it supported their own case. The German authorities backed a Chagga claim for more land to the north of Kilimanjaro. They did not have enough grass to cut for their cattle and considered that they had been cut off from their traditional lands.¹¹ Also, some of their traditional watering places lay twelve to fifteen miles north-east of the boundary. The Germans requested the transfer of all the land in question, arguing that it would save the British the trouble of trying to administer such a remote area. Needless to say, the German offer was rejected.

Further west, on Lake Victoria, African trading vessels were hit in much the same way as at the coast. Despite Stanley's assertion that he had been the first to recognise the trade potential of the lake in 1878 (Stanley, 1878: 223), by 1882 the Baganda were transporting ivory and slaves across the lake to Kagei near Mwanza (Wilson and Felkin, 1882: 189) and it seems reasonable to expect that this trade pre-dated Stanley's arrival in the area. Also in 1882, Arab dhows of Said bin Saif were spotted on the lake (Ashe, 1890: 43). Large-scale African trade, however, was decimated when a steamer was launched on the lake by a company called Boustead and Ridley (Ford, 1955: 19); several others arrived within five years. European competition and the imposition of duties between Uganda and DOA badly hit the dhow trade, and this was compounded

¹⁰ RKA: R1001 587: 39, 22nd October 1905. Report by G.E. Smith on the Anglo-German Boundary Commission.

¹¹ RKA: R1001 637: 115-6, 11th March 1914. Letter concerning border disputes from the DOA Governor, to all DOs.

by the suppression of the slave trade and the construction of the British Uganda railway. The only way to compete was on a small scale and by avoiding the main ports.

To the south-west, a pre-colonial trade route mainly used for transporting ivory led from the Congo Free State through Kivu area and into Rwanda.¹² The Belgian authorities made no attempt to stop the trade despite having administrators on the ground.¹³ However, by the early 1890s, European ivory hunters were using the route to carry ivory into DOA and BEA. The envy of Belgian officials at the great profits which this illegal trade brought to the Europeans involved increased until 1895, when an ivory trader named Stokes had his goods seized and was murdered by Congo Free State officials.¹⁴ Pre-colonial trade routes could be used by Europeans and Africans alike, and colonial objections seem to have been determined on a case-by-case basis, rather than through any inherent support for all European trade per se.

One of the great pre-colonial trades was slave-trading, although it could be argued that large-scale slave-trading and raiding was partly the product of Zanzibari colonial rule. Anti-slavery sentiment, as personified by Livingstone, had been one of the primary catalysts behind European involvement in East Africa. However, despite military campaigns by the colonial powers against 'Arab'¹⁵ and Yao slave traders, localised slave trading continued, and often seems to have made use of the new boundaries. Africans from one group could be seized and carried across a border and sold to another group. The difference in jurisdiction and sovereignty made it difficult to reclaim a lost wife or child. In one notorious case, a wife of the Sultan of Kigoma was captured and taken to Belgian territory.¹⁶ There is no record of her ever being

¹² As an ivory route, this may have been relatively new trade route.

¹³ RKA: R1001 630: 14R, date unknown. Report "Übersicht über die historische Entwicklung der Kivu-Grenzstreitfrage". No author given.

¹⁴ RKA: R1001 630: 14R. See Note 13.

¹⁵ The term Arab was often mistakenly applied to Arabs and Swahili people.

¹⁶ RKA: R1001 622: 112b, 1897. Report by the Congolese Foreign Office on the

returned. Lack of manpower and resources during the early years of colonial rule prohibited colonial intervention. In one of the few cases of the prosecution of slave-traders, a Swahili called Magid ben Said was put on trial for his role in slave trading to the east of Lake Tanganyika. Documentation from his interrogation by DOA soldiers and subsequent trial provide a great deal of interesting information about life in the borderlands of DOA.¹⁷ His courtroom statements confirm the general impression of lawless borderlands, where rebels against colonialism, slave traders, mutineers and bandits were very often one and the same. As with the case of Gabriel in Uganda, which was discussed in Part Two, Magid ben Said was outlawed because of slave trading, and later became caught up in the series of mutinies of Congolese troops in Kivu region, which dominated political and military policy along the north-western borders for several years.¹⁸ Whether such figures are seen as African nationalists, fighting the colonial oppressors with whatever means were at their disposal, or as outlaws and bandits out to get what they could, they did exploit the existence of the new borderlands. These borderlands, however, had more in common with the pre-colonial African frontiers portrayed by Kopytoff (1987) than with western-style linear boundaries. The African frontier died hard. The weakness of colonial rule made the borders zones rather than lines, and these borderlands were exploited by various Africans in various ways, whether economic or political, for good reasons or for bad.

On the BCA-DOA border during the 1890s, British commentators consistently mention German economic exploitation and brutality as the reason behind African migration into BCA, and record various instances of moving economic assets into BCA to avoid seizure by the German authorities. Unfortunately, there are no German

Magid Affair.

¹⁷ RKA: R1001 622: 111-143, 1897. Series of documents on the Magid Affair: a mainly printed copy of court evidence. Many of the documents are written by the Congolese Foreign Office.

¹⁸ Photocopies of all the above-mentioned documentation are in the possession of the author.

or African witnesses to balance the picture, and this must be borne in mind when considering the following examples. Captain Close, whose observations have already been mentioned, cites the example of the Chief of Kaponde keeping his cattle on British territory, although Kaponde lay in German territory.¹⁹ The Germans had not introduced taxation at that time, yet Close writes that the chief has already been flogged for not producing enough rubber and feared the loss of his cattle. Chief Chikanomalino of Namwanga, the most influential chief on the border, followed suit and moved his cattle across the border. While Captain Close was in the area with the Demarcation Committee, the chiefs of Luma, Zwalo and other groups asked to be transferred to British territory, as under the boundary agreement, Africans had a period of ten months to settle where they wanted to. Close wrote that, "Zombe, the Chief of a group of villages south of the Kalambo River, displayed the greatest anxiety not to fall into German hands....and a considerable exodus from German into British territory" is expected.²⁰ There does, indeed, appear to have been some level of movement from DOA into BCA, but probably not on the scale predicted by Captain Close. As was mentioned in Chapter Five, with regard to the village of Tontera on the same border, people often wished to change from the authority of one colonial power to that of another, but by moving the border, rather than by leaving their current site for another across the border.²¹ African ties to land and awareness of territoriality were often considerable. This would certainly make an interesting topic for further, localised research.

¹⁹ FO881/7115: 34, March 1899. "Report by Captain Close R.E., on the Delimitation of the Nyasa-Tanganyika Boundary in 1898". An excellent thirty-five page report full of information on the geography and peoples of the border area, as well as technical details on boundary delimitation.

²⁰ FO881/7115: 34, March 1899. See Note 19.

²¹ CO691/131/9: 19, 29th November 1933. From Government House, Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia. Correspondents unknown.

Pre-colonial economic links encouraged the preservation of ties between various regions. For example, the links between southern Tanganyika and PEA had been great - Yao traders had operated throughout the region, creating a network of trade routes. According to Alpers, Makua from the Cabo Delgado hinterland had traded over the Rovuma as well as trading with the Portuguese-controlled Ibo since the early Nineteenth Century (Alpers, 1984: 371) and Makua elephant hunters had travelled throughout east and central Tanganyika throughout that century (Alpers, 1975: 12 and 183-5). Even the Makonde, whose territory has been described as the, "Cinderella region of a Cinderella territory" (Liebenow, 1971: 1), were drawn into inter-regional trade as the demand for their gum copal and wild rubber increased from 1880 onwards. Makonde exports of these goods had been unknown in 1874.²² Such trade continued under colonialism, and the problems which this created between the colonial authorities has already been discussed. Trouble in the region was usually caused by the boundary and by the attempts of the colonial powers to divide the people along the line of the Rovuma. This manifested itself in differences in colonial policy. For example, following the transfer of the Rovuma islands to PEA, British pressure forced the Portuguese to back down²³ and accept customary rights, when the Portuguese wished to prevent Tanganyikan Africans from fishing in the Rovuma lakes in PEA and also from gathering salt on the PEA side.

Differences in colonial policy could also provoke dispute between Africans. In 1903, a Makonde raid from the Portuguese side of the Rovuma upon their Liwali who lived on the DOA bank, was investigated by the German authorities.²⁴ According to

²² See file FO84:1453.

²³ CO691/140/2: 1-3, 7th September 1934. Memorandum on problems on the Tanganyika - P.E.A. boundary. Untitled and with no author, but sent to Sir C. Bottomley.

²⁴ RKA: R1001 627: 158, 9th October 1903. Report entitled "Portugisische Grenzsache; Mavia Einfall", from DO Ewerbeck to the Imperial Government, Dar es Salaam.

the local German administrator, the *liwali* had chosen to live on the northern side of the river and had taken some of his people with him. The Makonde who stayed in PEA did not like their relatives in German territory being forced to pay the German hut tax, part of which went to the *liwali*. Differences in German and Portuguese policy - in this case, between high and low taxes, or high and no taxes - coupled with the wholly unsuitable method of ruling through alien *liwalis*, created problems on the border. Border differentials could provide opportunities, such as for the DOA chiefs who kept their cattle in British territory, but they could also promote discord and dispute within African groups.

In addition, as many Africans came to pay taxes to the colonial administrators instead of tribute to their African rulers, it seems safe to assume that this was a great loss to African rulers. Although some income was sometimes channelled back to them, many must have been resentful, especially when taxes were paid to colonial authorities across the border. Unfortunately, no examples have been unearthed and so this point cannot be taken any further.

Conclusion

In conclusion, pre-colonial African trade routes and structures were greatly disrupted and impeded by colonial boundaries and colonial policies. Some adjustments and local instances of co-operation to prevent the extent of this disruption becoming too great have been recorded, but in the final analysis, a requisite of colonialism was the construction of territorially based economies. Africans could do nothing to prevent the colonialists from imposing economic boundaries. Pre-colonial trade which involved more than one colony was not welcomed by the European powers, especially where it crossed from the jurisdiction of one power to that of another. How Africans were able

to use the boundaries for their own economic advantage is the subject of the next chapter.

Introduction

Smuggling was an undelimited activity in the pre-colonial period and boundaries. The level of resources used for control is less important as that state that was considered smuggling was merely not defined as such. When the boundaries were introduced, and trade duties and regulations were imposed. However, a large proportion of smuggling developed as a direct result of the opportunities provided by the creation of the boundaries and the sanctions applied to them. The perception of smuggling and the level of anti-smuggling activity are highly relevant because they provide excellent indicators of government attitudes towards their territorial borders. This chapter seeks to achieve three things. Firstly, to assess how Africans attempted to oppose the western boundaries, secondly and linked to the first point, it seeks to consider how African economic systems tried to overcome the borders, and finally, it examines how the actions of the smugglers and colonial anti-smuggling forces influenced each other.

In many ways, Tanzania is a paradise for smugglers. It has long land borders with a variety of neighbouring states, which are "almost impossible to police effectively, and many widely dispersed ports serving an extensive range of countries, as well as three major lakes with a shoreline, shared by adjacent countries" (Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa, 1990: xi). When the rather limited scale of colonial and post-colonial anti-smuggling forces and the knowledge that eastern-central Africa's pre-colonial trade routes almost all led to Tanzania's lac added to the brew, it can be seen that smuggling in the area is and was very difficult to prevent.

It would be wrong to assume that there was no smuggling in pre-colonial times. Smuggling occurs where duties are imposed and so had certainly occurred for

CHAPTER SIX: CHALLENGES 1: SMUGGLING

Introduction

Smuggling was an undoubted challenge to colonial rule and to colonial boundaries. The level of resources used to counter it bear testament to that. Much that was considered smuggling was merely pre-colonial trade made illegal when the boundaries were introduced, and trade duties and restrictions were imposed. However, a large proportion of smuggling developed as a direct result of the opportunities provided by the creation of the boundaries and the functions applied at them. The perception of smuggling and the level of anti-smuggling activity are highly relevant because they provide excellent indicators of government attitudes towards their territorial borders. This chapter seeks to achieve three things: firstly, to assess how Africans attempted to oppose the western boundaries; secondly and linked to the first point, it aims to consider how African economic systems tried to overcome the borders; and finally, it examines how the actions of the smugglers and colonial anti-smuggling forces influenced each other.

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It would be wrong to assume that there was no smuggling in pre-colonial times. Smuggling occurs where duties are imposed and so had certainly occurred for

centuries in East Africa. The Sultanate of Zanzibar imposed duties at the coastal ports, while various African polities demanded hongo from caravans and other traders. Some traders would undoubtedly have attempted to avoid paying these duties. The imposition of the colonial boundaries, however, almost certainly increased the potential and the motive for smuggling. Linear boundaries demarcate different authorities and laws, and therefore create tax, duty and price differentials which in turn create opportunities for either trading to make money, or for softening the blow of government taxes.

Little attention has been paid to the history and methods of smuggling in Tanganyika. Most major histories, such as Iliffe's A Modern History of Tanganyika (1979), ignore the subject entirely. MacGaffey has written a number of works on modern smuggling in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1991, 2000), but colonial smuggling has received very little attention.¹ Despite this, the Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar archives provide a wealth of primary sources concerning smuggling across the borders of Tanganyika. By far the most popular location for this is the sea border with Zanzibar, and a thorough survey of the files concerned reveals that fifty percent of all smuggling references related to this border. Whether this is a fair reflection of the true level of illegal cross-border trade or merely the result of better record keeping on this border is impossible to ascertain. What seems beyond doubt, however, is that the high level of pre-colonial trade across this border coupled with the ease of transporting goods large distances over water, enabled more smuggling across this border than across any other.

As with most subjects, matters regarding smuggling only tended to come to the attention of the central government in Dar es Salaam when payments were required to

¹ One very useful document in the research for this section has been a list of laws and duties applied to cross border trade; Laws of Tanganyika, 1928: Volume 1, Chapter 57: Customs

be made out of government resources, or when relatively large amounts of money were added to government resources as the result of the sale of cargoes seized by the anti-smuggling authorities. As a result, most documentation approaches the subject from a financial point of view. Moreover, under British and Tanzanian administration, subject areas which were deemed to be of low importance were periodically destroyed. Sadly, German smuggling records - including court records - have been destroyed, so little evidence remains from the German period. The bulk of the non-financial British smuggling documents - including most court records - have also been destroyed in these periodic culls. As a result, this chapter will concentrate upon the British period.²

Government expenditure relating to smuggling includes the payment of rewards to informers, to policemen and to customs officials; the employment of coastal guards; and the purchase of equipment for these guards. Luckily, in discussing the payment of rewards, government administrators often included details or even whole reports on particular instances of smuggling, as well as discussion of smuggling in general and the fight against it. Such limited records inevitably portray a somewhat one-dimensional picture of smuggling in East Africa. Rather more petty smuggling will have been excluded where no rewards were paid, as will any larger scale activities that were too efficient to be identified, or intercepted, or which received support from corrupt officials. The problematic relationship between smuggling and the smuggling record are much the same as that between modern crime and crime figures. It is unlikely that much smuggling was connected to high ranking government officials. The colonial government wrote many of its laws as it went along, and so could raise or lower levies and taxes as it wished. It is however, highly likely that smuggling which was carried out at the expense of neighbouring territories could be overlooked.

² Interviews were carried out with several elderly men in Zanzibar who claimed to have been smugglers and/or customs officials. The information used in these interviews has been used as background information, but will not be used directly in this chapter.

This chapter will consider the nature of smuggling in Tanganyika during the British period and will consider examples from each of the territory's borders. The central case-study, however, will be the Zanzibar-Tanganyika border. As well as being the most popular area for smuggling and the best documented case, it has been possible to cross-reference the documentation in the Tanzanian and Zanzibar archives in order to build up as accurate a picture as possible of smuggling activity. Many documents refer to smuggling from the sea; in practice, this almost exclusively refers to smuggling from the islands of Zanzibar. There was probably some level of smuggling across the Indian Ocean but as the official record rarely distinguishes between that from Zanzibar to the mainland, or that from India or Indonesia, it is difficult to estimate the level. What is certain, is that until the later years of colonial rule in East Africa, Zanzibar was the most important port after Mombasa in East Africa, so many of those cargo ships and dhows which put in on the Tanganyikan coast from Zanzibar had actually started their journeys much further afield. As far as the Tanganyikan customs officials were concerned, it mattered little whether contraband had been taken on board in India, Oman or Pemba. Apart from cross-sea smuggling, the other main form of illegal trade during the colonial period was that of cattle smuggling. This will be considered in some depth in Chapter Ten.

The German Period

For most of the German period there is little recorded evidence of smuggling, but this is more a reflection of the lack of efforts to check it and the lack of records, than of an absence of smuggling. In fact, the sheer weakness of colonial rule in all the colonial territories of eastern Africa suggests that many Africans continued to trade as before, and in borderlands this could easily mean trading with those on the other side of the line. During the early years of the colonial occupation, the German authorities complained about smuggling on the eastern side of Lake Victoria and therefore wanted

the Boundary Commission to determine the boundary to aid control.³ Far to the east, as was mentioned in Chapter Seven, Taveta lay on a pre-colonial cross-border route which crossed the boundary.⁴ In correspondence concerning German efforts to prise the town away from the British, the German authorities in Moshi make it clear that German possession would make it easier to suppress smuggling in the area.

For the years leading up to the First World War, instances of smuggling in the colonial records are far more numerous. Undoubtedly there were more colonial officials to identify and counter illegal activity, but increasing colonial efforts at economic exploitation also meant that taxes and duties encouraged some forms of smuggling. In 1910, overland trade between Bukoba District and Uganda passing through the military station at Kifumbiro was estimated at a paltry £200 per annum: mainly salt, bark cloth and a little ivory. The German Vice-Consul at Entebbe was convinced that additional unmonitored trade by-passed the post and also the duties, but he had no resources to investigate or intervene (Brode, 1911: 61-2).

On the other side of Lake Victoria, there were practical reasons for not paying duties. The abaKuria in Kenya were far from markets in Kenya, but near to the Tanganyikan market in Tarime, North Mara (Kjerland, 1995: 193). The amount of registered trade was small, but this does not mean trade was low level. The South Kavirondo District Annual Reports for the years 1908-12, indicate a high level of smuggling, with the result that enormous number of English Rupees ended up on the German side of the border.⁵ The 1912 and 1913 Annual Reports from Nyanza Province and South Kavirondo District Reports 1910, 1912 and 1913 "all mentioned smuggling and trade along the border.... Cattle were cheaper on the Tanganyika side of the border; the difference was estimated to be 30% in 1913. Large quantities of

³ RKA: R1001 627: 56, 28th February 1900. Letter from Lieutenant von Wulffen at Shirati, to Harry Johnston, British Commander-in-Chief at Entebbe.

⁴ RKA: R1001 633: 202, 10th October 1909. Report on Taveta area by Methner.

⁵ Kjerland, 1995: 194; KNA: DC/KSI/1/1. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 1908.

English Rupees were in circulation on the German side and it was believed that 'natives' had a central position in this trade".⁶ The First World War and vastly increased border tensions and borderland activity probably put an end to this flourishing trade.

Smuggling along traditional trade routes and newly inspired by the international boundaries, could be perceived as a form of resistance, as protest against colonial rule and colonial boundaries. Certain borderlands were lawless enough to be able to be used by rebels and criminals alike. During the 1890s, the DOA-Uganda-Congo borderlands were ruled by three colonial powers and ruled effectively by none. They provided a ready asylum for raiders, smugglers and outlaws whose crimes would have rendered them outcasts in any political authority. They attracted those of a criminal nature and anyone opposed to European colonialism (Hopkins, 1969: 279). In addition, the physical location of the DOA-Uganda border was ambiguous. "Despite a general spirit of Anglo-German co-operation in such major concerns as the Uganda uprising and mutiny of 1897-99, criminals, smugglers, slave traders and rebels also found the border zone a useful device for escaping apprehension."⁷ Of the African rulers who did rebel against colonial rule, the vast majority were those who had the most to lose. It was not so much protest against colonial, alien or European rule, as protest against the loss of their power, loss of face and a fight to maintain their economic power and prestige. Maintaining existing trade in the face of colonial rule often meant smuggling.

The Uganda-DOA border was the scene of various disturbances between 1896 and 1902, including attacks by dervish raiders who operated with Kabarega, King of

⁶ Kjerland, 1995: 186; KNA: PC/NZA/1/1/6. Nyanza Province Annual Report 1911. KNA: DC/KSI/1/1. See Note 5.

⁷ From an unpublished paper by Ralph Austen entitled "The Kagera Boundary: History versus Nature", in the possession of the author.

Bunyoro. Mwanga, King of Buganda, had been convicted in December 1896 of smuggling ivory into the German sphere, "in a moment of aberration under evil advice so he claimed" (Beachey, 1996: 288).⁸ He was fined and his finances were placed under close surveillance. He disliked this immensely, "and he was soon conspiring with Gabriel, his Mujasi (head of police) and with Manyuema raiders in western Uganda, to join him in common cause against the European." The Commissioner in Uganda, Colonel Colville, sent troops to Buddu. Mwanga fled and was declared an outlaw; his infant son Daudi Chwa was named as his successor. Successful military operations forced him to flee to German territory, and "the Germans, embarrassed by this unwelcome guest, placed him under restrictive residence at Mwanza" (Beachey, 1996: 288). In December 1898 he escaped with 250 Sudanese mutineers who had taken refuge there. They were gradually defeated by the British, and Mwanga and Kabarega were exiled to the Seychelles. That Mwanga and Kabarega, two sworn enemies, could give up their respective kingdoms and fight a united struggle against colonial forces, indicates that they had something important to fight for. Whether or not this was African independence, such actions can be cited today as instances of African primary resistance against oppression. Most smuggling, however, had one aim only - profit.

Nature of Smuggling

It is worth considering the nature of smuggling in Tanganyika. A 1985 ILO report on the Informal Sector in Africa found that smuggling was much more common away from urban centres throughout Africa, although it supplied many of the goods sold in towns (ILO: 1985: 11). Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa agree, and conclude that, "border populations tend to ignore rules of international trading transactions" (Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa, 1990: 74). Opportunity and distance from metropolitan

⁸ The information in this paragraph is largely drawn from Beachley, 1996: 288.

control are surely the main causes of this. They add that most transactions involving smuggled goods do not pass through well known border markets. "Rather there are several hidden smugglers' routes which in fact outnumber official border posts. Smuggled goods may be transported by caravan, or by boats across rivers and lakes, by head or by mules across uncontrolled territory at night. They may also go through officially controlled posts through collusion with border-post officials" (Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa, 1990: 102) The exploitation of international boundaries by Tanganyikans took many forms, but smuggling above all could be widely and easily exploited by borderlanders.

The means of smuggling were many and varied. With regard to most small scale smuggling, people merely walked over their local boundary with whatever goods they wished to trade. With regard to the colonial record, dhows or other traditional sea-going craft were the preferred form of transport. In some cases, dhow passengers were arrested, but the crew and owner were not. As dhows could be used to transport various people and goods at the same time, it seems possible that the crew were not involved. In many of these cases, playing cards and other small goods were smuggled, but in one case in 1939, a man was convicted of smuggling sugar on a dhow.⁹ Canoes are often mentioned, although it is unclear if they travelled directly from Zanzibar to the mainland, or were used to transport goods from a dhow to the coast.¹⁰ The type of canoes called *ngalawa* are still used on the open sea between the islands and the mainland, and so could certainly have been used for the longer voyages.¹¹ In one case, a taxi was used by a smuggler to transport goods over a short distance, but it can safely be assumed that this was not the norm.¹²

⁹ TNA: TS12402/II: 65, 24th April 1939. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

¹⁰ TNA: TS12402/II: 40, 6th November 1940. Letter from the Acting Comptroller of Customs, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

¹¹ From the author's own observations.

¹² TNA: TS12402/II: 13, 16th October 1948. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs

Research for this chapter in the Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar archives has revealed the following items as the most commonly smuggled contraband: matches, playing cards, salt, sugar, earthenware pots, gold, khangas, tobacco, tins of dates, whisky, bundles of wearing apparel (presumably clothes), jewellery, bangles, betel leaves, gramophone records, dried fish, ivory, skins and hides, spices and distilling apparatus.¹³ The most popular items throughout the German and British periods were matches, sugar, ivory and playing cards. A great deal of attention was paid in correspondence to the import of distilling apparatus.¹⁴ Bearing in mind the ease with which various forms of incredibly strong liquor are produced throughout Tanzania without imported distilling equipment, this level of attention seems misplaced.

The only secondary work with which this list can be compared is Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa's account of smuggling in post-colonial Tanzania (1990). Although a study of a slightly later period, this work has much relevance for the pre-colonial period. Smuggling patterns in the mid-1960s almost certainly correspond to those from the 1950s, although those in the 1920s were a great deal different. The main difference is that from the 1970s, consumer goods began to make up a large proportion of the goods smuggled. The following list of what is smuggled where, has been gleaned from Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa (1990):

- Zanzibar and Pemba: exit routes for spices, cloves and fish going to Kenya and elsewhere.
- Dar es Salaam: ivory, hides and skins, gold, diamonds and sea food to Europe and elsewhere.
- Lindi and Mtwara: supply ivory, hides and skins to Dar es Salaam for onward shipment.

to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

¹³ From various files, mainly TNA: TS12402/I-III.

¹⁴ eg. TNA: TS11950/I: 285-7, 22nd October 1935. Letter from the Acting Chief Secretary to the Commissioner of Police, Dar es Salaam.

- Tanga: spices (particularly cardamom), fish and other seafood and coffee to Kenya and around the Indian Ocean.
- Arusha and Moshi: centres for delivering hides, skins and livestock, maize, beans, ivory, gemstones and gold to Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Arusha for transshipment.
- Bukoba and Kagera are centres for smuggling coffee to and from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.
- Kigoma ships ivory, skins and fish to Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire.
- Mbeya and Rukwa ship rice, maize, coffee and fish to Zambia.

The two lists of smuggled goods given above have two things in common - most of the goods had traditionally been traded in the region and most were of relatively low value. This indicates that most smuggling was merely an attempt to preserve pre-colonial economic systems and to make some money. As such it did run counter to colonial attempts to restrict cross-border pre-colonial trade routes and to secure import and export duties.

Reward and punishment

An examination of the means by which the government attempted to prevent smuggling provides an excellent case study of the means by which the colonial authorities attempted to impose western-style boundaries. As was stated earlier, available records concerning smuggling in colonial Tanganyika are largely composed of reward and expenditure correspondence. The following section has therefore largely been based upon such material, and mainly relates to smuggling from Zanzibar to the Tanganyikan coast. Given the long history of trade between Zanzibar and the coast it is no wonder that smuggling occurred on a large scale - it was merely the continuation of pre-colonial trade. Even though one of the major trading goods - slaves - had been outlawed, trading routes had been set and the coast remained the obvious outlet for

goods to the rest of the world. Colonial duties on the mainland may have encouraged trade, but duties had long been imposed at the coastal ports by the Sultan, so this was not a new phenomenon. In addition, it was probably easier to smuggle on the sea border than on land over any great distance, but it was probably also easier to detect. This probably explains the larger number of smuggling references to this border than to any other in the official record.

The colonial anti-smuggling forces were composed of a number of different groups: customs clerks, customs police, baggage room clerks, customs watchmen, water police, Dar es Salaam C.I.D. and the police. There was no single co-ordinating authority for these groups, but all rewards linked to smuggling were meant to be referred to the Comptroller of Customs in Dar es Salaam, so he must have had as good an idea about the situation as anyone. The records of successive comptrollers have been consulted for this chapter. The vast majority of anti-smuggling personnel were located at the coast, and not surprisingly most apprehensions were made there. However, it is not certain whether fewer cases are recorded from the land borders because there was less smuggling elsewhere, or because detection rates were lower, or because cases elsewhere have not been recorded as faithfully. It seems likely to have been a combination of all three factors.

The Comptroller of Customs determined the level of the reward, and the Governor was officially meant to sanction them (Tanganyika, 1928/I: Ch57), although in practice it seems that all appeals by officials for their men to be rewarded were granted. Many rewards were made to customs police and to civilian employees such as baggage handlers, most of whom appear to be of Indian origin, and some names appear time and time again as recipients of rewards. The most popular in the Dar es Salaam records is Mr J.K. Gohil, a Grade IV Baggage Clerk at Dar port, who seems to have been the bane of Swahili coastal smugglers. A 1931 document lists at least nineteen instances of smuggling detected by Mr Gohil which had netted 480/- worth of goods and 1931/- in

finer, probably all in the same year.¹⁵ Mr Gohil is awarded a reward of 100/- for his efforts of that year; not a particularly large sum in view of his efforts. Whether this was because of his rank, the fact that he was a civilian, or because he so regularly caught smugglers, is difficult to ascertain.¹⁶ It was not only at the coastal ports that sharp-witted officials gained substantial rewards. Mr Joshi, a customs officer at Kigoma caught a gold smuggler with goods to the value of £162, for which he was given a £10 reward. The reward was so high because the value of the goods was high and because his vigilance was so good.¹⁷

Certain members of the government seem to have been naive in the extreme. Following years of steadily increasing anti-smuggling measures and ever-greater seizures along the coast, the Government Auditor, H.N. Lee suggested in 1934 that perhaps there might be some smuggling from Zanzibar to Tanganyika, and that fines should possibly be increased so that informers could be paid. That this practice had been being pursued for several years shows that some government officials were totally out-of-touch.¹⁸ The massive amount of attention paid to rewarding those employed to catch or deter smugglers, points to the dishonesty or at the very least the inactivity of government employees. There seems to have been great effort put into securing a balance between the rewards paid on the one hand, and the value of the goods and the fines paid by those convicted on the other. Again, this indicates the dishonesty of government employees and the realistic nature of government policy; anti-smuggling

¹⁵ TNA: TS12402/I: 10, 20th August 1931. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs, Dar es Salaam to the Chief Secretary.

¹⁶ TNA: TS12402/I: 12, 27th August 1931. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

¹⁷ TNA: TS12402/II: 9, 10th November 1948. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs. Unknown recipient.

Where files have been given an updated page numbering system, this has generally been employed in this work. However, for this file (TNA: TS12402/II) the updated system is difficult to decipher, so the original pagination will be given.

¹⁸ TNA: TS12402/I: 38-9, 15th January 1934. Letter from J.H. McQuade, Comptroller of Customs to the Auditor.

employees were, in effect, paid a percentage of the contraband seized. The Dar es Salaam Comptroller of Customs wrote in 1934: "In the Kenya-Uganda Customs service a reward of 25 per cent of the value of goods seized is invariably recommended, and approved. It has not hitherto been the practice in Tanganyika to reward Customs officers made in the ordinary course of their duty, but such rewards have been approved in cases in which exceptional intuition and intelligence has been shown".¹⁹ In many cases, it is difficult to identify any exceptional intuition or intelligence in the actions of officials.

At the start of 1935, the Comptroller of Customs, Dar, wrote: "The District Officer proposed to make widely known throughout the district the fact of the payment of rewards in [smuggling] cases....I consider that the general dissemination among Coast natives of the knowledge that substantial rewards may be paid for information leading to the detection of smuggling is the most valuable, and probably the only practicable, means of checking the smuggling which is undoubtedly endemic on the whole littoral between Dar es Salaam and Tanga".²⁰ Other measures were introduced in 1935: policemen were to pay no hut or poll tax,²¹ and *HMS Azania* was to be used to help with anti-smuggling duties in addition to its main duties of ensuring the safety of international shipping on the coast.

Despite the Comptroller's protestations to the contrary, the Kenyan-Ugandan model was generally followed from 1935 onwards, as part of increased anti-smuggling efforts. Rewards were not to be more than twenty-five percent of the value of the goods, but they should be set at levels which appeared substantial to the recipients. This indicates that the income, rank and status of the recipient was indeed a major

¹⁹ TNA: Smg/2824, 28th August 1934. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

²⁰ TNA: Smg/107: 54-5, 10th January 1935. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

²¹ TNA: Smg/107: 55, 10th January 1935. See Note 20.

factor in determining the level of rewards.²² For example, when the Jumbe of Kaole, Mwalimu Musa Pishok single-handedly caught a smuggler with cloth, shoes and playing cards, a 150/- fine produced a 50/- reward. The Comptroller of Customs wrote: "The reward is generous, but justified by the courage and presence of mind which was exhibited by the captor, and will no doubt encourage local natives in anti-smuggling activities".²³ Upon receiving the Comptroller's letter, the Assistant Secretary to the Governor, D.W.I. Piggott, wrote: "The Jumbe no doubt deserves a more generous reward than a plain native who would get only about Shs 10/-".²⁴ Rewards to messengers in the customs service were actually set at twenty-four shillings each, "in view of the comparatively low scale of pay drawn by them".²⁵ One point comes to mind: if the level of rewards for a particular individual were known, then smugglers must have known the level at which to set their bribes: this could have been an advantage when dealing with headmen and customs officials. Even a single reward equal to 25% of the value of the seized goods, would not be worth as much as a regular 5% bribe to a customs official.

As a result of the very dry nature of many of the reports of anti-smuggling actions, it is difficult to decide whether or not these were only given for exceptional actions. In one case, Constable Yessak of the Customs Police and Constable Nooli of the Water Police were commended for preventing the illegal removal of 124 packs of playing cards from customs' premises.²⁶ This hardly seems like outstanding work, especially given that it was their job. One interesting point about this case is that although the government were very keen to prevent the circulation of playing cards among the

²² TNA: Smg/107: 55, 10th January 1935. See Note 20.

²³ TNA: Smg/4678: 89, 4th November 1938. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

²⁴ TNA: Smg/4678: 89, 4th November 1938. See Note 23.

²⁵ TNA: Smg/107: 58, 21st January 1935. Letter from the Acting Chief Secretary to the Comptroller of Customs.

²⁶ TNA: TS12402/I: 23-4, 12th March 1932. Letter from the Supervisor of Customs, to the Comptroller of Customs, both Dar es Salaam.

populace, the cards were sold off at auction for a total of 103/90 to an unnamed bidder. Where reward exceeded the standard percentages, the seizure was either particularly daring or the reward was partly given in recognition of a series of smaller seizures. When Corporal Mohamed discovered a goldsmith called Alabakhas smuggling thirty-one gold earrings he was given a reward of 25/- based upon a fine of 50/- and the sale of the earrings for 150/94. In most cases, informers were generally awarded lower rewards than those given to government employees. In 1928 two Indian informers were paid 50/- as a result of two Indian smugglers being fined 2000/- each.²⁷

The counter side to rewards was the punishments meted out to miscreants who were apprehended. These usually composed a fine, a combination of fine and imprisonment, or more often than not, a choice between imprisonment or fine. In the case of a smuggling ring handling goods from as far afield as Java, the two ringleaders were given 500/- fines or 5 months imprisonment.²⁸ They paid the fine, although less wealthy smugglers often had to go to jail. The choice between imprisonment or fine was not always as easy as it might seem. Even where the smugglers could have raised the necessary funds to pay off the fine, it was sometimes perceived as better business to save their money and accept the term of imprisonment. In one case in 1929, Mrisho bin Hamis of Zanzibar, the owner of a dhow which had brought sixty-five 218 pounds bags of sugar ashore at Mnanzani, seven miles south of Tanga, was sentenced to six months' hard labour or a 1000/- fine. He seems to have chosen the prison sentence because he could not face more losses following the loss of the 680/- worth of sugar, as well as suffering the seizure of his boat which was worth 300/-.²⁹ That the cargo of

²⁷ TNA: TS12402/I: 7-8, 29th June 1928. Letter from John L. Woodhouse, DO for Bagamoyo to the Comptroller of Customs, Dar es Salaam.

²⁸ TNA: Smg/4258: 29, 22nd March 1933. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

²⁹ TNA: TS12402/II: 30-1, 4th April 1941. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

sugar had more than twice the value of the dhow indicates the value of sugar. The seriousness of different crimes is not easy to assess; even such classic contraband as ivory smuggling did not always attract particularly harsh punishments. For example in 1940, Salim bin Abdulla was caught putting six rhino horns onto a dhow in Dar harbour without going through customs, and received a fifty shillings fine or thirty days imprisonment.³⁰

Smuggling defences

Smuggling through the major ports had a character of its own. Crews often held contraband in their stores, aiming to dispose of them as and when the opportunity arose at the various ports that they passed. This was as true on the Great Lakes as it was on the east coast and in the islands. In Dar es Salaam harbour, valuable goods were either concealed on the person or in light hand baggage in order to take them past customs officials.³¹ If an opportunity arose, they could also pass goods directly from boat to dockside. Most articles were of a high value and carried in small quantities, such as perfume, liquor and gold. In one case, seventeen bottles of Goa Liquor and three bottles of perfume were brought on the S.S. Karanja from India to Dar es Salaam. The goods were hidden in a shore boat and were collected by a local Goanese resident.³² This form of smuggling was combated by a variety of measures: day and night patrols on the harbour front, examination of baggage in the Baggage Room and 'rummaging' of dhows, *ngalawa* and other small craft in and around the waterfront - exactly the same methods, indeed, that are employed at Dar es Salaam

³⁰ TNA: TS12402/II: 42, 25th June 1940. Letter from the Acting Comptroller to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

³¹ TNA: Smg/1119: 69-71, 9th MArch 1938. Report "Smuggling in Dar es Salaam Harbour" by L.J.D. Smith, sent to D.W.I. Piggott, Assistant Secretary.

³² TNA: Smg/4678: 89, 4th November 1938. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

harbour today. As efforts to counter smugglers increased through the course of the 1930s, the number of surprise checks rose sharply. One major problem particular to Dar es Salaam and Kigoma harbours was the existence of Belgian concessions. These were effectively pieces of Belgian territory, the equivalent of embassies - a curious form of sovereignty that had no known parallel in pre-colonial Africa. There were, however, no fences between these pieces of territory and the rest of the ports in question, and as customs controls were handled by two different sets of officials, neither could be aware of all cargoes that were passing through the port at any one time. As a result, smuggling across the two jurisdictions was rife.³³

While smuggling into the main harbours was a popular pursuit because the main coastal harbours were also the main coastal towns and therefore also the main coastal markets for contraband, the numerous creeks and inlets on the coast continued to be the main entry points for both large scale organised smuggling as well as more petty operations. The intricate network of waterways in the Rufiji, more than anywhere else, "makes customs preventive work difficult".³⁴ When J.D. Smith became Comptroller of Customs in 1938, he recognised that while anti-smuggling forces were concentrated at the main ports, the lion's share of smuggling occurred in the most isolated places on the coast between Dar es Salaam and the Kenyan border. Customs police and watchmen were posted at the four main ports: Dar itself, Tanga, Pangani and Bagamoyo, with watchmen at Moa, Sadani and Mbwani.³⁵ Apart from that, the whole 300 miles of coastline was vulnerable. He devised an ambitious and faintly comical scheme for a chain of watchmen on bicycles to patrol the previously unguarded sections of coast, and thereby link existing defences together.

³³ TNA: Smg/1183: 72, 12th March 1938. Addition to letter given in Note 32.

³⁴ TNA: TS12402/II: 36, 4th April 1941. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

³⁵ TNA: Smg/1924: 83, 3rd May 1938. Report "Customs Coastal Patrol" by L.J.D. Smith, Comptroller of Customs, sent to all PCs.

W.S. Marchant, the Acting P.C. for Coast Province commented that he believed that the watchers should be watched, further confirming problems of the reliability of employees - or at least, perceived problems. He also foresaw problems in the use of bikes as the coastline was broken by creeks and mangrove swamps at regular intervals. The modern coastline seems to support Marchant's reservations. Although track-like roads trail the coast to the north and south of Dar es Salaam, they normally lie a couple of miles inland and so would not serve Smith's plan.³⁶ In the event, the new patrols were introduced, but the Second World War intervened, so there was little time in which to determine their effectiveness. The few cases which did come to light as a result of the increased manpower, reveal collusion between smugglers and local headmen on remote stretches of the Swahili coast. In one case, four tusks were seized at Bagamoyo, leading to the arrest of headman Hamisi Vuwaji.³⁷ Overall, the bicycle watchman scheme was not an effective means of imposing the western system of dividing political space.

The policing and suppression of smuggling in colonial Tanganyika was often carried out with the help of the native authorities. This obviously often depended upon whether the authority in question was benefiting from a trade route or particular transaction. To take one example, the native authority at Kitopeni near Bagamoyo caught a man smuggling twenty-five gross boxes of matches. He was handed over to the police and rewards were paid through the headman.³⁸ By the same token, smuggling could even be organised by native authorities. In one case in 1934, a large-scale smuggling ring was broken which had supplied goods from as far afield as Java. Lorries were used to deliver and collect goods on Zanzibar and at Msasani Bay, north

³⁶ TNA: Smg/1924: 88, 6th May 1938. Letter from W.S. Marchant, Acting PC, to the Comptroller of Customs, Dar es Salaam.

³⁷ TNA: TS12402/II: 57, 29th June 1939. Letter from the Chief Secretary, to the Comptroller of Customs, both Dar es Salaam

³⁸ TNA: TS12402/I: 48: 11th August 1934. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs, to the Chief Secretary, both Dar es Salaam.

of Dar es Salaam, while a dhow was used to transport the goods across the sea. A distribution network was used to disperse the goods on the mainland. Superintendent Hornett of Dar es Salaam CID wrote to the Dar Commissioner of Police, "It would.....be idle to pretend that the Native Authority at Konduchi or along the coast is not conversant with what is taking place".³⁹

According to the colonial records, askaris and customs officers were rarely hurt during the course of operations. Even in organised gangs, smugglers seemed to give themselves up quite easily. This seems a little unlikely, but interviews with elderly men on Zanzibar seemed to confirm that violence with the authorities was rare, even amongst criminals. It is possible that the memories of old men remember the good times and forget the bad. However, as there is no evidence to counter their argument, they must be taken at their word.

Regional Examples

Now that smuggling and anti-smuggling has been examined in general, each of the borders can be considered in turn. The previous paragraphs have largely been based upon smuggling from Zanzibar, but a few points are worth making about smuggling on Zanzibar itself. There is an almost total lack of smuggling cases in the Zanzibar court files; either they are not recorded, have not been retained by the Zanzibar archives, or smuggling was almost all one way, that is, from the islands to the mainland. A few cases begin to appear in the records from 1958 on, mainly concerning high value goods. For example, in 1958, there was an instance of merchants smuggling wirelasses

³⁸ ZNA: AB43/36 14th May 1958 Letter from A. Bishop, Comptroller of Customs, to the Chief Secretary, Zanzibar

³⁹ ZNA: AB43/29, 28th January 1937 Letter from G.D. Wynnapp, Comptroller of

³⁹ TNA:12402/I: 44, 16th February 1934. Letter from Superintendent C.A.T. Hornett, Criminal Investigation Department, to the Commissioner of Police, both Dar es Salaam.

from the mainland to Pemba, avoiding the duties current at that time.⁴⁰ Apart from such cases, the Zanzibar smuggling records seem more concerned with the wrongdoings of customs staff, than with the activities of smugglers. Subjects include pensions for retired customs officers, a few theft cases by employees, and above all, mentions of customs officers being drunken and disorderly. The main smuggling activity involved Zanzibar's main crop: cloves. Cloves were moved around the harbour or along the shore to boats at anchor in order to avoid duties.⁴¹ This did not directly affect Tanganyika as the cloves were not taken there. However, the clove smuggling problem in the 1950s led to more customs patrols, including the use of motor boats, and it is likely that this helped to check smuggling to the mainland by dhow.⁴²

Cattle culture and pastoralism will be considered in Chapters Eight and Nine, but this section would be lacking if it did not mention cattle smuggling. Pure pastoralists were a small minority of the East African population, but a substantial proportion of the population - perhaps the majority - were involved in cattle raising to some extent, and often invested the bulk of their wealth in this portable commodity. As Tanganyikan prices were generally lower than in Kenya, it was natural that cattle would be taken from Tanganyika to be sold in Kenya. Following the Great War and the British take-over, smuggling of cattle was considered to be widespread along the whole length of the border. A Kenyan DC wrote in 1925: "I am informed that cattle running from Tanganyika to this Territory is on the increase and cattle are openly sold in the trading centres. It was found impracticable to patrol the enormous boundary between this District and Tanganyika and the Tribal Retainers who were from time to time employed on this work were taken off".⁴³

⁴⁰ ZNA: AB43/36: 14th May 1958. Letter from A. Bishop, Comptroller of Customs, to the Chief Secretary, Zanzibar.

⁴¹ ZNA: AB43/29, 28th January 1927. Letter from G.D. Kirsopp, Comptroller of Customs. Unknown recipient.

⁴² ZNA: AB43/29: 89, 28.1.27. See Note 41.

⁴³ KNA: DC/KSI/1/3. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 1927.

Kenya officials estimated that fifty percent of stock slaughtered in Kenya in 1937 came from Tanganyika.⁴⁴ This is probably an exaggeration, but the fact that such a figure could be considered indicates the scale of the problem. Pastoralism will be considered in the next part, but it is as well to debunk one myth that has survived in modern literature. Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa write of smuggling of livestock over the Kenya-Tanzanian border being carried out smoothly, as by nomadic Maasai pastoralists, "sometimes unaware that they are indulging in illegal transactions" (Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa, 1990: 102-3). This cannot be true. They must have known it was illegal under colonial law; they either didn't recognise the law or were prepared to take the risks. Many other items were smuggled over the same border, including maize, sisal and cloth. For example, sisal was cheaper in Kenya than Tanganyika by a large margin: ten shillings a unit as opposed to twenty-five in Tanganyika, demonstrating that price differences could work both ways.⁴⁵ Smuggling was easier for some groups than others. The abaKuria and Luo lived right on the boundary and so often smuggled goods bought and sold by other groups, such as the Kisii, who were without their knowledge of and access to the boundary (Kjerland, 1995: 195). However, cattle were such a key part of society for many of the peoples of the area, that smuggling from Tanganyika to Kenya was probably of most importance overall, both economically and socially.

Problems of stock smuggling continued throughout the colonial era and beyond. "In the 1950s border committees were established to deal with the difficulties. Various attempts to solve the situation was [sic] tried out. In 1957, for example, it was suggested at a Border Committee meeting that a special court be established which could bear trans-border jurisdiction and which can enforce its judgements in cattle theft

⁴⁴ Kjerland, 1995: 194; KNA: DC/KSI/1/4. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 1937.

⁴⁵ KNA: DC/KSI/1/12. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 1950.

cases" (Kjerland, 1995: 95). "Their effectiveness was hampered by lack [sic] of legal means of enforcing their decisions" (Prazak, 1992: 82).

Although Tanganyika had no land border with the Congo, social and economic interaction between the two was vibrant, with Lake Tanganyika acting as an ideal conduit for trade and for smuggling, much as it does today. The archives contain countless examples of customs' seizures but two examples give the flavour of most of them. In 1937, Customs Watchman Shabani bin Imiri caught a man smuggling matches which were being transported on the Congo steamer S.S. Duc de Brabant, at Kigoma. He was given 5/- for his troubles. It later emerged that an Indian shopkeeper was working through Africans to smuggle matches to Kilwa.⁴⁶ The organisation and geographical reach of this scheme, indicate that matches were a valuable product and one certainly worth smuggling. On various other occasions, luxury goods were seized as duty had not been paid upon them. Sixty-four gramophone records were seized on the TRS Mwanza at Kigoma by Idi bin Ibrahim, a crew member and Sadiki bin Songwe, a customs watchman. As a customs informer, it seems surprising that Ibrahim's name was publicised, particularly as a fellow crewman was involved.⁴⁷ It is not recorded if he kept his job. Smuggling by canoe on Lake Tanganyika was also very popular: matches, cards, earthen pots and the ubiquitous "wearing apparel" were the chief contraband which were seized.⁴⁸ Again, most smuggling was merely the continuation of pre-colonial trade. Unlike with the suppression of African political systems, it proved impossible for the colonial authorities to clamp down on trade routes they disapproved of. There were surely many instances of successful smuggling for every example of seizures.

⁴⁶ TNA: Smg/4678: 65, 18th April 1936. Letter from the PC for Eastern Province to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁴⁷ TNA: Smg/4678: 72, 12th March 1938. Report "Smuggling in Dar es Salaam Harbour" by Smith, Acting Comptroller of Customs, to Piggott, Assistant Secretary.

⁴⁸ TNA: TS12402/II: 65, 24th April 1939. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to the Chief Secretary, both Dar es Salaam.

There are several instances of the usual matches and cards being seized on the Tanganyikan border with Rwanda-Burundi,⁴⁹ but most attention was paid to the smuggling of rhino horn into Tanganyika. The last rhino in Rwanda was probably killed during the early 1920s; they were at any rate, very rare after the First World War.⁵⁰ Despite this, 820 kilos of horn were exported through the post at Muhinga in 1928 alone. It was therefore believed that most ivory exported from the Belgian colony to Tanganyika must have originated in Tanganyika,⁵¹ particularly as horns and ivory were freely admitted into Rwanda-Burundi. Tanganyikan game wardens believed that they were shot in Tanganyika, smuggled into Rwanda-Burundi in order to obtain an Export Declaration⁵² from Belgian Customs officials; then re-exported to Tanganyika to avoid controls and duties.⁵³ The DC at Bugufi, Lumley, confirmed that the trade was common, and added that it employed the new road that he had built across the border. He recommended the setting up of a customs post on the road at the Chizange River, and wrote that there were rhino around Bukoba, in Tanganyika, and that these must be the source of the horns. The Chief Secretary refused his request for a post. The border was 350 miles long and in very rough country, so smugglers could have circumvented the road anyway.⁵⁴ In such remote areas, there was little opportunity for colonial control of the borders.

Game scouts were withdrawn from Bukoba District in 1932 - one of the effects of the cuts caused by the world-wide recession from 1930 - thereby giving the poachers and smugglers *carte blanche* to kill rhino. The scouts had been used to patrol

⁴⁹ TNA: Smg/2193: 78, 23rd May 1938. Letter from Comptroller of Customs to the Chief Secretary, both Dar es Salaam.

⁵⁰ TNA: TS13595: 30, 23rd June 1933. Letter from C.R.S. Pitman, Game Warden, Uganda, to Game Warden, Arusha.

⁵¹ TNA: 13595: 30, 23rd June 1933. See Note 50.

⁵² Called an *Acquit de Déclaration a l'Exportation* by the Belgian authorities.

⁵³ TNA: TS13595: 1-2, 28th June 1929. Letter from André de Beys, Belgian Consul, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁵⁴ TNA: TS13595: 13-14, 29th August 1929. Letter from E.K. Lumley, Assistant DO Bugufi, to the Acting Director of Game Preservation, Kilosa.

smuggling routes and watch the borderlands themselves.⁵⁵ Many of the smugglers and poachers were Europeans, including two Italians who were convicted of poaching in Bukoba District in the 1920s, and were caught again in the early 1930s by undercover scouts under a European captain. Tanganyikan police wrote that rhinos were shot, "in Karagwe, taken over to the Congo and registered, and produced back in this country as Congo rhino".⁵⁶ Unfortunately, nothing else could be discovered on this subject. The undercover scouts were probably police who carried out this kind of operation on an occasional basis, as it is highly unlikely that a dedicated force would be used for this matter, when there was only one DC or administrator for the entire region of nearly half a million people.

Government employees sent to the border for other work were sometimes asked to keep an eye open for smuggling. For example, on the North Rhodesian border, an office messenger named Shabani Kunguni was sent to supervise road work on a road across the Northern Rhodesia border from Ufipa, and asked to check for illegal imports at the same time. The goods are not named, beyond being "piece goods".⁵⁷

This border was also a popular transit route for Europeans carrying goods from southern to eastern Africa, and on occasion they were also caught smuggling. The Conference of East African Governors in 1943 discussed the smuggling of luxury goods, such as cosmetics, scents and silk stockings, from the Belgian Congo to North Rhodesia via Tanganyika. The Chief Secretary to the Governor of Tanganyika wrote: "All ranks are warned that they should not buy goods in one territory for the deliberate

⁵⁵ TNA: 13595: 24, 23rd June 1933. Letter from the Acting Game Warden, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁵⁶ TNA: TS13595: 26, 21st January 1933. Letter from Game Ranger, M.S. Moore, to Superintendent of Police, Bukoba.

TNA: TS13595: 29, 27th July 1933. Letter from the Acting Game Warden to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁵⁷ TNA: TS12402/II: 53, 5th August 1939. Letter from the DO for Sumbawanga, Ufipa, to the PC for Western Province, Tabora.

purpose of taking them into another territory, except such as they have to purchase of necessity for their own personal use".⁵⁸ Smuggling occurs whenever duties are applied at borders, and smugglers come from all backgrounds.

The border with Portuguese East Africa was involved in a very high level of smuggling, partly because of the strong ethnic links across the border and partly because of the lack of colonial control. German control of the Kionga Triangle before the First World War gave them great control over exports and over the prevention of smuggling from DOA, but they also gained Portuguese trade. "Safaris used to come regularly from as far as Mataka's country mainly with ivory, tobacco and beeswax, which was smuggled across the Portuguese border, and sold to the Germans at Kionga" (Thomas, 1951: 50). The Germans acquiesced in this trade because it benefited them. Such smuggling had been more difficult before the transfer of the Triangle from Portuguese to German rule, because it required boats to cross the unfordable river. The Germans at Kionga paid better prices than the Portuguese, and they paid in German silver which could be used anywhere. The Portuguese had lost their outlet to the sea in the area, and rather than pay the area's very high porter costs which resulted from a shortage of labour, most traders - Europeans, Africans and Indians - sold their goods to the Germans on the Ruvuma or smuggled them into Kionga District. This smuggling continued into the war years (Thomas, 1951: 50-1). The imposition of the boundaries was not always as important as economic benefit during the early years of colonial rule.

This was also an elephant hunting area. Several Europeans were convicted of smuggling ivory from PEA into Tanganyika. One individual under investigation was Mr. J.R. Woods, who had been hunting elephants in PEA for over two years,

⁵⁸ TNA: TS31744: 1, 4th October 1943. Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Conference of East African Governors, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

importing it into Tanganyika and then selling it. He had not been following the regulations, and moreover, had been working with a man called 'Dynamite Dan' Eldridge of the Ruvuma, who had been deported two years previously by the Tanganyika police, and who was a prohibited immigrant. The previous DC at Songea had issued Certificates of Ownership to Woods, but the new official, H.C. Baxter, recognised that this wasn't legal, and that the ivory had to go through a customs post at either Manda on Lake Nyasa, or at Lindi, both of them many days travel distant.⁵⁹ As the previous DC had cleared the trade, it was decided to only charge Woods on a "technical charge", and he escaped imprisonment. His ivory stocks were seized, but as he was alleged to be virtually destitute, most of them were returned to him. It is hard to overcome the feeling that an African - destitute or not - would not have been treated in such a lenient manner.

The later years

A 1947 customs report on smuggling gives a good picture of the post-war situation.⁶⁰ During the first eight months of the year, income of £3,000 from seizures and fines had been accrued, while five percent of this, some £150 had been paid out as "a good investment" to customs personnel and informers. This was far less than the Kenyan and Ugandan norm of twenty-five percent, despite the apparent adoption of this level by the Tanganyikan authorities during the mid-1930s, indicating that rewards continued to be paid in only a minority of cases. "The number of successful cases has greatly increased, largely (I consider) by reason of the impression which seems to have been created that rewards will be paid for reliable information received." These informers are described as being a "secret weapon", although "somewhat unsavoury."

⁵⁹ TNA: TS20495: 2-27, 23rd Jyly 1931. Letter from J.H. McQuade, Comptroller of Customs, to the Director of Game Preservation, Kilosa.

⁶⁰ TNA: 040/88: 21. Customs Report on Smuggling in Tanganyika 1947.

After 1945, all informants' names are withheld in the archives, so it is impossible to discover much about them. Departmental officers continued to be rewarded where exceptional initiative or vigilance were shown. During the same year, one of the largest recorded seizures was made when an Inspector and Sergeant Major of the Customs Preventive Force received twenty and ten pounds respectively for their role in the seizure of goods worth £789. Unfortunately, the type of goods was not mentioned.⁶¹

An interesting smuggling case came to light just as the days were being counted down to Tanganyikan independence. It involved the Katangan bid for independence, and as a case study it could just as easily be placed under international relations.⁶² The Katangan 'state' complained to the Tanganyikan government in mid-1961 about the activities of Congolese soldiers operating out of Tanganyika. They feared that Tanganyika was being used as a launch pad for an invasion of Katanga, and that these forces were being aided by TANU. There is absolutely no evidence that this was true. According to British colonial records which had remained closed for over thirty years, the men in Tanganyika were actually Congolese deserters and had been smuggling arms in Tanganyika to sell. They were conveyed over Lake Tanganyika by an unnamed African who had a fleet of six canoes fitted with outboard motors. A Belgian named Houart, employed by the Katangan government on anti-smuggling operations, is believed to have machine-gunned a number of Tanganyikans, but no trace of this incident could be found in the Tanzanian archives. Despite British certainty that no invasion was being launched or planned from Tanganyikan soil, they promised to stop any smuggling in both directions.

⁶¹ TNA: TS12402/II: 25, 7th July 1947. Report by the Inspector of the Customs Preventative Force

⁶² CO 822/2074: 8, 9th August 1961. Telegram from Governor's Deputy to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Conclusion

The effectiveness of anti-smuggling measures is difficult to assess, although smugglers were caught on a regular basis. The efforts of the coastal police and customs officials more than covered the costs, and the efforts of men like Baggage Clerk Gohil certainly brought the Treasury a tidy profit. There is, however, no backdrop against which to set these efforts, no perspective in which they can be set, as it cannot be estimated how much smuggling went undetected and unobserved. Anti-smuggling efforts were substantial and could have been even greater, but as J.H. McQuade, the Comptroller of Customs wrote: the smuggling is, "practically confined to sugar, matches, playing cards and tobacco, and is not therefore considered to be of such magnitude as to justify the considerable expense necessary for the organisation of even a moderately efficient preventive service".⁶³ That smuggling of high value goods was perceived to be a matter of some concern, while customs avoidance with common or garden contraband was seen as of lesser importance, indicates that smuggling was a problem mainly because it reduced treasury income, rather than for any notion of violating the boundaries. In addition, that Kenya and Uganda felt able to operate a joint customs department when they felt unable to countenance many other moves towards union or federation, indicates that it was not a strong symbol of sovereignty.

Colonial attempts to curtail pre-colonial trade routes which involved crossing boundaries, together with the imposition of duties, was an obvious strand of the many-layered attempts to impose the western system of dividing political space upon Africa. It is true that boundaries define political space, but much of the motivation behind wanting to control territories with boundaries is connected to economic control. It allowed the Tanganyikan government to raise income and to protect its own infant

⁶³ TNA: TS12402/I: 38-9, 15th January 1934. Letter from J.H. McQuade, Comptroller of Customs, to H.N. Lee, the Auditor.

production of certain articles if it so wished. Africans did attempt to preserve existing economic systems through smuggling and this could never be entirely eliminated by the authorities. Indeed, the introduction of new anti-smuggling staff and policies is proof of the influence that African borderlanders had upon the colonialists. However, as will be seen in the next chapter, the colonial economy quickly came to be of more importance to the territory as a whole than any amount of smuggling. Colonial trade routes never entirely overrode pre-colonial routes, but they did come to overshadow them.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE MAKING OF THE COLONIAL ECONOMY

Introduction

The economic implications of the colonial boundaries are discussed in various chapters of this thesis; this chapter is purely concerned with border aspects of the development of the colonial economy. Building on the chapter on international relations, it will examine the idea that the borders between Tanganyika and other British colonies mattered less than those elsewhere because of the relatively close integration of the British territories. This is surely one of the basic tenets of the western system of dividing political space - namely that boundaries are only truly international boundaries when they divide different sovereignties. The British colonialists were therefore right to describe the Tanganyika-Kenyan boundary, for instance, as an interterritorial border, rather than an international one, because it was less divisive. Both Tanganyika and Kenya were ultimately ruled by Great Britain

In order to examine the relative importance of the boundaries to the colonial economy, it is necessary to discuss the nature of the colonial economy. One of the primary reasons for setting up the colonies was to bring economic benefit to the metropolitan power, and the colonial governments generally put most of their efforts into developing the economies of their respective territories in order to achieve this. As was discussed in the previous two chapters, the international boundaries were used to contain economic development within the territory, and cross-border trade by Africans was generally discouraged. Large scale trade, whether by Africans, Europeans or others, was only encouraged where it would bring benefit to the territory in question - normally through taxes and duties. Colonial economic development policies were chiefly aimed at the development of export goods; these goods were usually crops, such as rubber, sugar and coffee in the case of Tanganyika. They were grown in one part of the country and exported via Tanganyika's ports, normally in either an

unprocessed or semi-processed state. They were then often shipped to either the metropolitan power, or perhaps to another of the power's colonies, where processing would take place. It was at this stage that much of the value was added.

The production of these crops within Tanganyika was largely undertaken by private European companies and individuals, although several crops were also produced on a large scale for export by Africans. Government policy was therefore aimed at removing obstacles to the production of these crops and preventing their export via the ports of other colonies, particularly where export duties could not be imposed. Above all, it was aimed at developing the transport infrastructure to enable the movement of goods from areas of production to the ports and then overseas. It was vital that enough produce was transported along the transport system to recoup the initial investment and running costs of the system. The transport networks of Tanganyika and the other territories of East Africa therefore developed internally, and took the form of river systems, with the international boundaries appearing as watersheds. The road and rail patterns linked many areas of the territory, reaching out towards the borders but rarely crossing them. This was a major factor in the development of the colonial territories as independent entities, and made for territorial cohesion and international differentiation. These colonial routes superseded the pre-colonial trade routes which had crossed the new boundaries, but which survived in various forms.

There were two great differences between the development of the British and German economies in Tanganyika. Firstly, the German colonial economy and infrastructure had to be imposed upon an already vibrant African economy. Most of the crops, roads and railways which the Germans constructed, formed the basis for British colonial economy, which did not have such strong African structures to overcome. Secondly, the proximity of other British territories to British Tanganyika was in marked contrast to the isolation of the German colony. As has been seen in relation to political matters, the British colonies of East Africa did not co-operate

nearly as much as might be expected. There was however, much more co-ordination between the development of the Kenyan and Tanganyikan economies under the British, than there had been between BEA and DOA in German times. British Tanganyika not only bordered four other British territories in the interior, but faced an Indian Ocean packed full of British colonies, protectorates and trading posts, from Zanzibar, Mauritius and the Seychelles, to India, Singapore and Australia. All offered potential markets and trading partners which were favoured by the Foreign and Colonial Offices in London. There was often dispute between Kenya and Tanganyika, however, as it was generally perceived within the Empire that Tanganyika should be developed in order to benefit Kenya.

Excellent economic studies on colonial Tanganyika exist elsewhere¹; indeed Tanganyika is usually studied historically from an economic point of view. This short chapter will make no attempt to follow or explain the entire economic development of the territory. It will however consider the boundary implications of the development of the colonial economy and vice versa.

The Colonial Economy

For better or worse, Tanganyika received little colonial economic development in comparison with many colonies around the world, and even in comparison with the other East African colonies. The limited number of German colonialists certainly made a big impact in the territory during the thirty or so years of German rule, but there was little private investment in DOA. There were several reasons for this. The DOAG, which initially governed the colony and later maintained economic control, did not have the resources for widespread investment, and Carl Peters limited the number of

¹ See Coulson, 1982; Iliffe, 1979; Koponen, 1995.

shareholders in order to maintain his control. Secondly, East Africa was little known to German financiers, while industrialisation was underway in Germany itself and there were great profits to be made there. Finally, the failure of other colonial companies discouraged German and European entrepreneurs (Kimambo and Temu, 1969: 104), while the production of export goods by Africans themselves was discouraged. Even when the German government assumed sovereignty of the territory, the DOAG retained economic rights and maintained its protectionist stance.

As has been discussed, by 1920 mass-produced imports had destroyed most traditional craft skills in Tanzania (Coulson, 1920: 70), while large quantities of iron hoes and clothing had been imported from India since pre-colonial times. This trade continued throughout the German and British periods, and was accompanied by even cheaper Japanese exports. Within the British Empire, Tanganyika was seen as providing a market for goods from elsewhere, notably Kenya and India, and most branches of the economy were not protected. During the early decades of the colony, protectionism within certain key industries was vital. The British economy did not have the vigour to transform the territory; it was only one out of many territories and Britain could no longer expand. Oil or major gold reserves would have attracted investment, but British entrepreneurs had a vast array of imperial territories to choose from, and moreover a large proportion of their investments were made outside the empire. British economic development policy in Tanzania did not go far beyond attempting to balance the books, and "Continuing poverty was British Tanganyika's leading characteristic" (Iliffe, 1979: 261). What effort went into making the economy benefit the colonial power encouraged Tanganyika's development as a satellite of Kenya.

Those sectors which were developed were generally those which produced raw materials on European plantations, while support for African production varied over time, but was rarely very high. Cameron wanted advancement in the material conditions of Africans, to improve health, education and security, but believed that this

was best achieved through agricultural development. He considered that industrialisation would destabilise Tanganyika altogether (Cameron, 1939: 165-6). Little attention was therefore given to the development of industrial enterprise, and those goods which were prohibited or restricted were those which were perceived as threatening disorder. A list of such items from 1935 includes alcohol, opium, certain types of matches and distilling equipment.²

The Development of Ports and Railways

The railways of Tanganyika were to be the main means of transporting export goods from the regions to the ports. The development of the railway system was therefore a vital component in the development of the state and the development of economic sovereignty. Three main ports developed in East Africa to enable the export of goods: Dar es Salaam and Tanga in Tanganyika, and Mombasa in Kenya. Each had a hinterland which supplied produce for export. There was a little overlap between the hinterlands of Tanga and Mombasa, but the absence of railways or reliable roads during the early years of the colonies prohibited a great deal of competition. The situation changed when the Uganda Railway reached the shores of Lake Victoria in 1901. Many African and European producers in the north and north-west of DOA had easier access to Mombasa via the new railway than they did to either Tanga or Dar es Salaam, and so Uganda and Kenya effectively impinged upon Tanganyika's economic sovereignty. Much of the valuable coffee production around the southern shore of Lake Victoria had previously been exported via Kenya because of the ease of export via Lake Victoria, and this fact encouraged the construction of the railway. The

² TNA: TS11950/I: 5, 22nd October 1935. List showing prohibited and restricted imports and exports. Sent to the Dar es Salaam Commissioner of Police by the Acting Chief Secretary. The list in this document also contains one inexplicable oddity: "shaving brushes manufactured in or exported from the Empire of Japan."

railway captured the whole of this market and the lack of protection for the DOA economy helped to siphon off even more of Tanganyika's exports (Coulson, 1982: 38). The railway authorities marketed their line aggressively and by 1909 the contest had become very unequal. The transit of DOA goods through Uganda and BEA was worth £323,109 to the Uganda railway, equal to twenty percent of its income (Brode, 1911: 65), so that northern Tanganyika, in an economic sense, had become part of its northern neighbours.

The German authorities in DOA responded by speeding up the construction of the Usambara Railway in DOA, which was to link Tanga with the sisal plantations of Usambara, then to Moshi and Arusha nearer the Kenyan border. Until the Usambara railway reached Moshi just before the Great War, only ivory was worth exporting from Tanga in any great quantities (Brode, 1911: 44), but the Kenyan authorities still perceived their position to be under threat: it was only due to, "the wise tariff policy of the Uganda Railway that this line can still compete with the Usambara Railway" (Brode, 1911: 44-5). Such attitudes assumed Kenya's right to compete within DOA.

Under British rule the situation did not improve. Even once the Usambara line had been completed, connecting to both Tanga and Dar es Salaam, pricing on the Kenyan railways meant it was as cheap to send goods to Mombasa as to Dar. In addition, the Kenyan line was extended into Northern Tanganyika, demonstrating that Kenya had the right to compete for Tanganyikan exports but not the other way round. This would surely not have been permitted under German DOA rule, and can be seen as a weakening of the divisiveness of the border. As economic development in East Africa had centred upon Kenya, there were more processing plants in Mombasa, and a greater number of ships departed from there, so where tariff charges were equal, Tanganyikan producers often continued to choose Mombasa ahead of their domestic ports (Coulson, 1982: 75).

A proposed extension to the Tanganyikan Central Line to Mwanza was mooted, but this was blocked because of the threat to Kenyan trade (Coulson, 1982: 40). The official reason given was the technical difficulties inherent in building such a line, yet the construction of the Central Line to Kigoma in 1914 had been a far greater feat. The real reason was protectionism; Kenyan development and Kenyan economic sovereignty were certainly favoured above that of Tanganyika. Cameron became Governor of Tanganyika in 1926, and had a somewhat more positive attitude towards development, showing some interest in the Mwanza extension. At the Governors' Conference of 1926, however, he was asked by the Kenyan and Ugandan governors to block construction of the railway line to Mwanza, on the grounds that it would adversely affect the revenues on the Kenya-Ugandan railway. (Cameron, 1939: 124-5).

Other proposed railways were also turned down. The celebrated geographer Gillman proposed a railway to link Dar es Salaam with Manda on Lake Nyasa, the first of many proposals to link Dar es Salaam or the Central Line with the south-west (Hoyle, 1987: 186). As late as the 1950s, the construction of such a line was proposed to aid the burgeoning trade with Northern Rhodesia. Considerations of cost and lack of enthusiasm for cross-border co-operation scuppered the project (Hoyle, 1967: 93), and it was not until the Chinese-sponsored TAZARA scheme that the line was finally completed in 1975.

After the Second World War, Tanganyikan inferiority in the economic and infrastructural development of East Africa was maintained with the setting up of the East African Railways and Harbour Administration (EARH) with its headquarters in Nairobi. Under this organisation, the railways and ports of the three East African territories operated as one system, which were largely dominated by Kenyan interests (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 1961: 283). This was an important and long-lived example of cross-border co-operation in East Africa. "The unified system is financially stronger, the utilisation of its rolling stock and

equipment is better, the administration, staff establishment, offices and other services are cheaper and tariffs lower than would have been the case if the systems had continued as separate identities" (IBRD, 1961: 284). As an example of pooled sovereignty, this is another indication that the internal East African boundaries were inter-territorial, rather than international in nature.

Despite the presence of this body, the greatest effect of the pattern of transport infrastructure in East Africa until independence continued to be the use of the Ugandan railway to export goods from north-west Tanganyika. Coffee, cotton and other exports were transported via Bukoba, over Lake Victoria to Kisumu and on to Mombasa. They could have been transported as easily via Mwanza to Dar, but were not (Hoyle, 1967: 94). The Uganda Railway transported the produce at a very favourable rate and export duties across the border were small or non-existent. For the entire period of British rule in East Africa, and for much of the German period, much of the benefit of the agricultural production of the highly populated and highly fertile north-west was accrued by Kenya Colony and by the Ugandan Railway. The revenues which were paid helped to support the railway and thereby also aided other development, while the processing of exports such as coffee took place in Mombasa. It is true that there was a shortage of railway rolling stock on the Tanganyikan Central Line and that superior facilities were available at Mombasa, but this was at least as much an effect of the use of the Ugandan railway by Tanganyikan exporters, as a cause, and also resulted from the total lack of protection for the territory's infant economy and infrastructure during the early years of colonial rule. In the 1960s, the hinterlands of Dar es Salaam and Mombasa continued to overlap. Moshi and Arusha were both within the economic orbit of Nairobi rather than Dar es Salaam, and coffee continued to be exported via Mombasa rather than Tanga.

There was some correlation between the distance of each of Tanganyika's ports from Mombasa and its ability to develop. Tanga's expansion was limited by the

proximity of Mombasa, but it was located in an economically developed area, and grew to become the territory's second largest port. Dar es Salaam expanded a lot during the post-war years. Although the influence of Mombasa retarded its development, it was the main entrepot between Mombasa and Mozambique, and it was connected to Lake Tanganyika via the Central Line. It therefore came to be used by Northern Rhodesia, the Belgian Congo, Rwanda and Burundi (IBRD, 1961: 288). In an attempt to develop the southern third of Tanganyika and to provide margarine for a hungry empire, the infamous Groundnut Scheme was devised in the 1950s. A deep-water port was built at Mtwara to supply the needs of the scheme, but the collapse of the project left the port almost redundant. The lack of development in Portuguese East Africa (PEA) meant that there was little opportunity for Mtwara to fulfil the role in its hinterland that Mombasa did further north. Despite the economic nationalism of the Estado Novo, the weakness of Portuguese administrative and economic presence in the north of PEA prevented the pursuit of an aggressive economic policy in the region.

Deutsch Ost Afrika Relations with Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar

As has already been discussed, initial trade links between BEA and DOA were affected by the somewhat strained nature of BEA-DOA relations. To take one example, five African traders were travelling from the interior of BEA to the BEA coast in 1892, and passed through Moshi on the main trade route. They were assailed by German authorities on Chagga land, which was governed by Carl Peters, but under Article IV of the General Act of Berlin of February 26th 1885 they should have been

free from duties³ Although such pre-colonial trade routes were forced out of legal use, 'legitimate' cross-border trade developed in the 1890s.⁴

Most trade involved agricultural production: BEA exported ghee from Jubaland and potatoes from the highlands near Nairobi, while DOA exported grain, especially rice, and sugar, salt and tobacco. It also exported hides, skins, ivory and rubber to BEA for re-export (Brode, 1911: 32-3), establishing the pattern of BEA domination of processing in the region. Most goods were taken by sea as transport links across the border were poor. The relative advantage which BEA had over DOA in economic development meant that the German authorities were not keen to improve links, thereby helping to protect their trade. Until the construction of the railways, and even then with regard to small-scale trade, the main border crossing point between BEA and DOA was at Taveta, between Voi and Moshi (Brode, 1911: 41). Most traffic between the two towns was by cart, with donkeys used as relays on the British side and replaced by oxen on the German side. Porters had been used in the earliest years of colonial rule, but the carts proved to be cheaper. During the first decade of the Twentieth Century, various schemes to start a regular motorcar connection across the border were attempted, but without any sustained success. The British government spent a lot of money on its portion of the route, but loose sand and bad foundations created poor roads on the German side. The state of the roads was a function of German protectionism. A German trader who had traded in BEA for over ten years, tried to set up a transport company but lacked capital and received no support from the DOA government. At least with regard to production around Moshi, the lack of good roads drew trade away from the Uganda Railway and to the Usambara Railway (Brode, 1911: 41-2).

³ RKA: R1001 570: 89, 18th January 1892. Letter from G. Portal, German Diplomatic Agent, Zanzibar, to Baron von Soden, the German Governor. They were also free from duties under Article VIII of the Anglo-German agreement of 1st July 1890.

⁴ Much of the information in this section is taken from Brode, 1911.

There is little recorded information on the state of cross-border trade between Uganda and DOA. An Anglo-German agreement on the Uganda-DOA border in 1910 made provision for the free movement of population with goods over the boundary within six months of the end of boundary demarcation, but was not signed before the outbreak of the First World War (McEwen, 1971: 273). Overland trade between Bukoba District and Uganda was estimated in 1910 at £200 per annum passing through the military station at Kifumbiro - mainly salt for bark clothes and a little ivory (Brode, 1911: 61). Official trade was rather limited, but this had rather more to do with lack of opportunity than government restrictions.

DOA's most important trade partner was Zanzibar. It provided roughly half of DOA's imports in the 1890s and took about half her exports.⁵ DOA even used Zanzibari currency. Such reliance upon Zanzibar by DOA did not seem unnatural given the former's recent status as regional heavyweight. The German government made no attempt to establish its monetary sovereignty, and it was left up to the Zanzibar government to make the break. In 1903, the German rupee ceased to be accepted by the Zanzibari government because of its slightly lower silver value. (Brode, 1911: 11-2). Another factor in the slackening of relations was the outbreak of plague in Zanzibar in September 1905, which caused the German government to issue regulations prohibiting the dhow traffic between Zanzibar and the coast. When trade was finally resumed, it never assumed its former importance. Between 1899 and 1904, more than 2,000 German dhows a year called at Zanzibar; by 1906 it had fallen to 286, and the following three years registered figures of 772, 1120 and 1020, and the Deutsche Ostafrika Linie moved its headquarters from Zanzibar to Dar es Salaam (Brode, 1911:14). Financial difficulties on Zanzibar caused by reduced trade with the mainland

⁵ Zanzibar imports: Rs. 10,823,082 and exports Rs. 6,705,040 in 1892 (Brode, 1911: 8).

saw the general import duty of five percent increased to seven and a half percent in 1908, which further deterred trade.

Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika relations

Despite the lack of German investment in Tanganyika, the range of production achieved by the Germans during World War One was not matched until the 1960s. In the meantime Nairobi and Mombasa became the leading centres of industrial growth in East Africa (Coulson, 1982: 73). What industrial development did occur with Tanganyika, tended to be either related to agriculture or run by Kenyans, or both, and it very often failed. To take one example, the government of Tanganyika supported a firm called Meat Rations Ltd, which was owned by Kenyan settlers (Coulson, 1982: 76-7). It received enormous support: £15,000 of its £30,000 start-up capital came from the Colonial Development Fund; it was given a 5000 acre farm at Maswa, near Mwanza, by the government; and it was awarded a monopoly on meat processing in the Lake area. Despite all this help it was wound up in 1935 with losses of nearly £6000. Moreover, British policy was to discourage non-British and non-agricultural associated industrialisation, including that of Asians, so that a proposed clove-oil factory was blocked on Zanzibar in 1924.

During the German and early British periods, Tanganyika imposed small tariffs on imports to raise revenue, but they were too low to protect her own infant industries (Coulson, 1982: 73). Kenya, by contrast, imposed protective duties at this time on products which it thought it could develop, such as wheat, sugar, meat, dairy produce, beer and tea. The Government of Tanganyika "was persuaded to impose the same duties, and to abolish duties at the Kenya-Tanganyika border." Tanganyika formally joined the Kenya and Uganda customs union in 1927, but there were effectively no tariffs on the Kenya-Tanganyika border from 1923 until 1967. This is certainly an

example of less division at the boundary. "Throughout this period, Tanganyika suffered because of the greater degree of industrialisation in Kenya" (Coulson, 1982: 73). The loss of revenue from the Kenyan border duties alone was estimated to be 1,200,000 shillings in 1931. By the late 1930s Japanese imports had begun to replace many British ones, and some duties were imposed: twenty-two percent on blankets in 1935, and up to sixty percent on some woollen goods (Coulson, 1982: 74).

To take another case-study, maize from Kenya was being imported into Arusha and other areas in northern Tanganyika in 1930 via the railway, and was effectively flooding the market.⁶ Kenyan maize had cost between twelve and eighteen shillings per bag the previous year, but this had fallen to six and a half in 1930, including transport costs. It was feared that this would devastate local production, so the Acting PC for Northern Province, Mr Longland, appealed for restrictions to be introduced. He argued that the Kenyan government forbade export during times of shortage, so Tanganyika should forbid it now, in the time of plenty.⁷ The Dar es Salaam government responded that if the Kenyan farmers can pay their far greater transport costs and still out-do Tanganyikan farmers, then the producers of Northern Province deserved to loose out.⁸ The Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda governments hoped to avoid this kind of situation by bringing about levelling out in food prices in the borderlands and especially on the lake shores, where smuggling was easier. They had no definite plans for this apart from the improvement of cross-border transport links, but even these links were not substantially developed prior to independence.⁹

⁶ TNA: TS11950/I: 136-139, 21st July 1930. Report "Export of Maize From Kenya To Arusha", by F. Longland, Acting PC for Northern Province. Sent to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁷ TNA: TS11950/I: 138, 21st July 1930. See Note 6.

⁸ TNA: TS11950/I: 138. See Note 6.

⁹ TNA: Dist 11/271 Lindi: 31. "Record of a Conference of Provincial Commissioners from the Tanganyika Territory, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Held at Lilongwe, Nyasaland on 18th and 19th June 1950."

Cameron fought East African political union, but he accepted the customs union in 1927. "He may have regarded it as the price for political independence; more likely he was simply against industrialisation" (Rweyemanu, 1973: 117). It was introduced by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the London government was widely acknowledged as favouring Kenyan interests. What industry was required for East African development, could therefore be concentrated in Kenya. This vision had not been shared by the rest of the Tanganyikan executive. In 1924, the Tanganyikan Treasurer and Comptroller of Customs officially, "advised against a customs union on the ground that it would make this country a commercial satellite of Kenya, and subordinate Tanganyika to Kenya influence." (Yaffey, 1970: 231). The common market arrangements did provide small economies of scale - most notably in transport and communications - but the spill-over effects of Kenyan industry tended to strengthen the satellite-centre relationship.

With regard to an analysis of the colonial economy it is possible to compare the import, export and production statistics, but it is difficult to determine how much they reflect reality. For what they are worth, Tanganyika's imports from Kenya and Uganda were 72.5 million shillings in 1951 and 180.8 million in 1958, while exports were 2.3 million in 1951, growing to 72.5 million in 1958. It is as difficult to assess the effect of the customs union, as it is to determine whether the territory's position in the economy of East Africa was improving (Yaffey, 1970)

The other borderlands

The other borderlands of Tanganyika provide various examples of the economic effects of the colonial borders. In Bugufi on the Burundi border, in 1927, coffee was grown across the border in Burundi, but not in Tanganyika which had the same climate, rainfall and soil, and where Lumley, the DC, was looking for an export crop to

aid local development (Lumley, 1976: 27). The nearest market was four days' journey, at Malagarasi on the central railway line, but Lumley believed that production was viable (Lumley, 1976: 25). He imported one hundred trees himself from Burundi, but this contravened the Plant Pests and Diseases Ordinance and he was ordered to destroy them. He reported their destruction, but kept the plants and learned not to report too much. The whim of a local administrator could influence the crops cultivated in any one region, and on the borders this could create a startling difference in economics, lifestyle and even landscape on either side of the boundary. In the 1929 Bugufi famine, five hundred people died and the government decreed that food crops were to be grown in preference to export crops (Bryceson, 1988: 37-46). This policy was not adopted on the Belgian side of the border and countless thousands died as a result.

Apart from the northern territories, the most important cross-border economic input into the Tanganyikan economy undoubtedly came from the Belgian territories of the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. In "western and southern Tanzania, the political boundaries....set a general limit across which only small amounts of traffic reach the ports at irregular intervals" (Hoyle, 1967: 93, 131).

Migration

One of the most valuable economic resources in colonial Africa was its population. In most instances, the colonial powers could not stop the inward or outward flow of migrant labour because their boundaries were almost entirely porous. Although Tanganyika was by no means a prosperous colony, it was more a recipient of migrant labour than a source of it. Even in German times, large numbers of men from Mozambique, the Congo and Northern Rhodesia came to work on plantations.¹⁰ Some

¹⁰ Such movements were part of a wider pattern of labour migration in southern

were borderlanders who worked across the border in the neighbouring colony, but most travelled further afield. For example, the Bemba from Northern Rhodesia made up a sizeable proportion of the workforce on the Pangani Sisal estates in 1914 (Iliffe, 1979: 162).

Some Tanganyikans left the territory to work elsewhere. By the 1930s, some 10,000 Tanganyikan men were working on the Copperbelt and the Rand. This was not encouraged by the government - indeed the Tanganyikan authorities preferred workers to remain in Tanganyika¹¹ - but it was impossible to prohibit. Throughout the British period, far more migrants came to work in Tanganyika than Tanganyikans sought work elsewhere. Many plantations were located in the south-east of Tanganyika, around Lindi, and these were originally staffed by Tanganyikans and a limited number of migrant labourers. However, the decline in wages in the 1930s depression led to growth in the peasant sector and many Tanganyikans did not return to plantation employment, when the economy improved. The replacement labour came from PEA; the Tanganyika authorities, "were helped in this by the backwardness of the political economy of Portuguese East Africa, which forced thousands of Makonde and some Yao to stream across the border" (Rodney, 1979: 151).

In 1937, when Lumley became DC for Lindi District in the south-east, very few of the sisal plantation workers were local. Most were Makonde and Mwera from Mozambique, and Yao from Nyasaland. The fact that many came from a non-British colony and that their remittances left the Empire does not seem to have been a factor.

Africa. Most migrant workers from central and southern PEA worked in South Africa and Rhodesia, and in increasing numbers following the Kimberley diamond discoveries in 1870 and the gold strike on the Witwatersrand in 1886. Apart from the obvious financial attractions, there were a number of push factors in the movements: famines, drought, the declining importance of the ivory trade, plus the 1896 rinderpest epidemic. (See Lloyd, 1998 and Patton: 1995).

¹¹ TNA: Dist 11/271 Lindi: 29. See Note 9.

Labour was needed, and where it came from was immaterial (Lumley, 1976: 99). The number of PEA Africans working on Tanganyikan plantations continued to grow. During the 1930s, increasing numbers were working around Dar es Salaam and Morogoro, and by the 1940s, they were the mainstay of the industry in Tanga.¹²

In the north-west, the men of the Haya did little manual work, so Africans from Belgian Rwanda came into the region to work on the coffee and banana plantations. By 1950 the Belgians estimated that 157,000 migrants from Belgian territory were working in Tanganyika, but it was difficult to be certain because of the uncontrolled nature of the flow of migrants and because of confusion with resident Barundi and Banyaruanda (Daley, 1993: 21). As most work was on the sisal estates at Tanga, Dar es Salaam and on the coast, this was where most were to be found. Again, migrant labour was mainly not a borderland affair.

Minerals

Another economic aspect of Tanganyika's boundaries was the mineral assets located in and around the rivers which were used to delimit its boundaries. Tanganyika has few natural resources apart from its landscape and wildlife, but it does have some mineral resources. While delimitation was still taking place, a German named Scheffler who lived in Nairobi heard of possible mineral wealth around a soda lake on the proposed DOA-BEA border, and advised the DOAG to try to include the area in the Boundary Commission negotiations.¹³ It is unknown whether this played a role in the delimitation of the boundary around Lake Natron.

¹² TNA: TS21484.

¹³ RKA: R1001 586: 38R, December 1903. Report by F.G. Scheffler in Nairobi on mineral wealth along the British East Africa-Deutsch Ostafrika boundary. Sent to the German government in Dar es Salaam.

Several disputes over mineral deposits occurred during the British period, but the most important of them concerned the Ankole-Karagwe tinfield on the Kagera boundary which divided Tanganyika from Rwanda-Burundi (Laws 1932: 244). The boundary was being modified in 1930 in order to re-unite several African groups, when the tinfield was discovered in an area which existing plans would have placed in Tanganyika.¹⁴ John Scott, the Acting Governor, wrote to Downing Street asking about which method of delimitation to use for the boundary, as tin prospecting had begun on the river, and mining companies were applying for water rights.¹⁵ The final treaty placed the resources within Tanganyika, but the deposits did not turn out to be particularly valuable, and Belgian demands that Africans of both countries should have the right to navigation and fishing on the boundary turned out to be of more importance.¹⁶

Impact on Africans

The impact of colonial economic policies upon occupied Africans was massive and has been dealt with in some depth elsewhere, so this brief section will highlight effects specific to Africans in borderlands. When the boundaries were originally laid down, differences in taxation and duties created some startling disparities. Two of the central planks of revenue generation by the colonial regimes were the hut and poll taxes. These were applied to Africans throughout the territory, often at varying rates. Proximity to an international boundary provided Africans with a chance to avoid the

¹⁴ CO691/110/5: 11, 26th September 1930. Letter from Chancery at the British Embassy, in Brussels, to the League of Nations. Concerns problems in modifying the Rwanda-Burundi - Tanganyika boundary.

¹⁵ TNA: TS20538: 1, 2nd January 1929. Letter from John Scott, Acting Governor, to L.C.M.S. Amery MP, Downing Street.

Also CO691/110/5: 11, 26th September 1930. See Note 13.

¹⁶ TNA: TS 20538: 88-89, unknown date. Letter from Acting Governor, Tanganyika, to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, Usumbura.

tax. For example, the report by Captain Close on the Delimitation of the Nyasa-Tanganyika Boundary in 1898, revealed that the hut tax of three shillings in North Nyasa (modern Malawi) had caused some people to move across the border to German territory or to as yet untaxed British territory.¹⁷ At that point there were no taxes in Northern Rhodesia, but he considered that when they were introduced, there would no doubt be an "exodus of short-sighted natives into German territory".¹⁸ This could not be avoided when tax differentials were created in borderlands, but as with many colonials, he seems to underestimate Africans' sense of territoriality. Permanent migration was different to flows of temporary migratory labour.

Migration with the purpose of avoiding taxes continued in the area throughout the colonial period, and even under British rule, substantial tax differentials existed between Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For instance, the respective 1950 hut taxes were: ten shillings in Nyasaland, six in North Rhodesia and eleven in Tanganyika. This obviously made Northern Rhodesia the target of immigration. The Nyasaland government estimated that more than half of the able-bodied men in Central Province were abroad at any one time.¹⁹ To counter this, the government of the Nyasaland Protectorate introduced a minimum wage of seventeen and a half shillings in 1951, and this had the effect of both increasing wages and discouraging emigration. Unfortunately, the hut tax was also increased to seventeen and a half shillings per annum.²⁰

¹⁷ FO881/7115: 26, March 1899. "Report by Captain Close R.E., on the Delimitation of the Nyasa-Tanganyika Boundary in 1898".

¹⁸ FO881/7115: 31, March 1899. See Note 16.

¹⁹ TNA: Dist 11/271 Lindi: 22, 18th June 1950. "Report on the Conference on Inter-territorial Relations".

²⁰ TNA: Dist 11/271 Lindi: 20-32, 18th June 1950. "Record of the Conference of Provincial Commissioners from the Tanganyika Territory, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland".

Sir John Gray gives the example of where the Uganda-Tanganyika boundary runs through a village on Rubabu Point on the shore of Lake Victoria. The villagers migrated from north to south when the Ugandan poll-tax collector visited, and back again when his Tanganyikan counterpart arrived (Gray, 1959: 196-7). Emigration from Kenya to Tanganyika, which was estimated at 1,200 in 1934, was attributed by the DC to lower taxes and other fees in Tanganyika, and because cattle were seized and sold in Kenya when the payment of taxes was not forthcoming (Brett, 1973: 197).²¹

The place of African traders and trade within the colonial economy often created problems. For instance, an agreement was reached in November 1937 with the dhow owners on Lake Victoria not to transport goods class I-IV (luxury goods), from Kenya or Uganda to Tanganyika, in order to help Tanganyika railways. However, lorries soon began to undertake the trade, provoking complaints from the Dhow Owner's Syndicate.²²

Impact on Europeans

Taxes did not impact upon Europeans in nearly the same way as upon Africans. Firstly, the colonial economy generally favoured Europeans over Africans, as they were the potential bringers of economic growth. Hut taxes did not apply to Europeans. The duties on the import and export of goods, could, however, impact upon Europeans. For instance, settlers in south-west Tanganyika, on Lake Tanganyika, had to ship their exports via Mpulungu in Northern Rhodesia, before they were sent on to Dodoma and Dar, and they therefore had to pay customs duties and suffer customs

²¹ This is a field of study that is worth consideration in its own right; a subject perhaps best suited to concentrated local studies.

²² TNA: TS25682: 1-2, 24th February 1938. Letter from the President of Dhow Owner's Syndicate, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

restrictions.²³ This made European enterprise difficult in that remote area of the territory. On other occasions, European settlers seemed to have less to complain about. Kenyan Europeans who came crossed into Tanganyika in the 1920s and 1930s in order to shoot animals complained that border regulations were imposed on them. They argued that there was no convenient post for them to go to to obtain permits, licenses and ivory export licenses.²⁴ The Commissioner Of Tanganyika Police and Prisons wrote that there were two types of European who crossed illegally: criminal poachers and ignorant people who didn't know they had to have permits or who didn't know where the border lay.²⁵ Some Kenyan safari companies organised hunting trips without obtaining any paperwork, while J.M. Silvester, the secretary of the East African Professional Hunter's Association wanted to do away with all restrictions for white people.²⁶ It is creditable that the Tanganyikan government at least attempted to apply border restrictions to everybody, regardless of colour.

Conclusion

This chapter has hopefully demonstrated that there is no place in the western system of dividing political space, for international boundaries to exist within the territories of one sovereign power. It is true that the British territories of East Africa competed over economic development and trade routes, just as they had competed over territory, but there are several indications from their actions which demonstrate that they viewed the internal boundaries in a different light to those with other colonial powers. Firstly, despite all the bickering, transport development was considered to

²³ TNA: TS22980.

²⁴ TNA: TS11779/I.

²⁵ TNA: TS11779/I: 5-10, 9th January 1928. Letter from the Commissioner of Tanganyika Police and Prisons, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

²⁶ TNA: TS11779/II: 249-51, unknown date. LEtter from J.M. Silvester, Secretary of the East African Professional Hunters' Association, to the Game Warden, Nairobi.

some extent on a regional basis. Elsewhere in colonial Africa and in much of the rest of the world, railway systems are very much matters of national concern - the rail authorities of one country rarely extend their networks into neighbouring states. It is true that the initial cross-border railway line was built during the German period, but there were no other lines in the area at the time, and the German authorities needed to make use of the Ugandan railway in order to access the riches of the Lake Victoria area. Secondly, despite the failure of attempts at unification and federation, the two most important economic functions of the boundaries were placed under a common authority. The effective customs union which lasted for almost all of the British period in East Africa, coupled with the unification of transport provision, means that a regional economy was able to develop. Finally, that the colonialists insisted upon using the term interterritorial rather than international to describe the internal divisions of East Africa indicates that they considered the borders to be less than international.

CONCLUSION TO PART THREE

The economic partition of East Africa reinforced the political division. There was, however, one important difference. Whereas African pre-colonial polities and political systems were almost entirely replaced by western notions of dividing political space, African economic structures proved more durable. It is true that colonial developments became the most important factors in the regional economy, but African trade routes continued in legal and illegal forms, and were never entirely suppressed. Many pre-colonial African trade routes had followed lines of political and ethnic affiliation, and where the borders crossed these routes, links were often affected. In several instances, the colonial authorities attempted to reduce the impact of the boundaries upon African

groups where there was no other issue at stake. Often, however, rivalries with neighbouring territories and the need to control disease or crime encouraged the authorities to impose divisions to the detriment of borderlands.

Despite this, political and economic colonial rule remained weak in many borderlands for much of the colonial period and many border transgressions must have gone undetected. That all the recorded instances of smugglers being caught on Lake Tanganyika occurred at the port of Kigoma, surely indicates that a high level of trade continued across the lake, across the border and away from the main port. This enabled the continuation of trade between the Congo Basin and Tanganyika which had formed such a large part of pre-colonial trade in central Africa.

In any event - disease prevention apart - the colonialists were only moderately concerned with the prevention of smuggling. Their main interest was in the loss of treasury income rather than in the violation of the boundaries as symbols of national sovereignty. In addition, that Kenya and Uganda felt able to operate a joint customs department when they felt unable to countenance many other moves towards union or federation, indicates that customs' duties were not a strong symbol of statehood. Such joint efforts are also supportive of the concept of the inter-territorial boundary in East Africa. The inter-territorial boundaries divided competing governments who tried to out-do each other in many way, it is true, but they answered to the same Colonial Office and it is unthinkable that they could go to war with each other. They did not, in any case, have independent armed forces. In any hierarchy of boundaries, the boundaries between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika were not particularly divisive.

PART FOUR: CULTURAL DIVISIONS

Pastoralism seems to be the antithesis of the sedentary, tax-paying societies which were organised neatly into the tribes so beloved of the colonialists. Moreover, pastoralism in borderlands can be seen as being in conflict with the fixed linear boundaries which colonialism brought about. As such, it can certainly be seen as a major challenge to the colonial boundaries, and if the contents of the colonial archives are anything to go by, it was the major challenge following initial imposition. Despite this challenge, pastoralism as a concept and as a way of life was generally not targeted by the colonial authorities. In practice they opposed it in many ways, but only rarely did colonial officials express the view that as a way of life, it ought to have no place in the new colonial society. Chapter Eight will consider these colonial responses to pastoralism in the Maasai dominated Kenya-Tanganyika borderlands, and will assess the reaction of the Maasai and other groups of the area to the imposition of the boundaries. It was in this region that the African borderlanders were able to have most influence upon the colonialists. The pastoralist borderlands were perhaps also the region of Tanganyika where colonialism had least success in imposing the western system of dividing political space. Chapter Nine will then discuss one particular function of western-style boundaries - stemming the spread of disease - which hit pastoralist societies particularly hard.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CHALLENGES TWO - PASTORALISM

Introduction to Pastoralism and the Maasai

Pastoralism is a way of life that has almost disappeared in the West and continues only in a somewhat altered form on the northern fringes of Scandinavia and Northern America. It can therefore be difficult to envisage it as anything other than an historical

way of life whose time has passed. However, nomadic pastoralism was a way of life that was eminently suitable to Maasailand - economically, politically and environmentally - as it is to much of Africa. Even today it can generally support a larger density of population than an agricultural lifestyle on many of the plains of East Africa. Apart from the effectiveness of pastoralism, forced sedentarization is doomed to failure because of the resistance of people to lose a very strong way of life.

Most of the cattle peoples of East Africa were and are not purely pastoralist in nature: most practice a mixture of agricultural production and livestock holding. Such a lifestyle has been given a variety of names, including cultivating-pastoralism (Rigby, 1969) and agro-pastoralism (Brandström, 1985; Koponen, 1988). Despite the impression given by tourist guides, Tanzania is not one of the main pastoralist counties of Africa. Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia all have a far greater percentage of their population leading a pastoralist lifestyle. However, a large proportion of Tanzanian societies, while not leading a purely pastoralist lifestyle, have traditionally derived some of their income from raising cattle. There was a temptation in the colonial period to see a vast chasm between the Maasai and their more sedentary neighbours, such as the Chagga. Yet both groups depended to a large extent upon their cattle, and traded with each other in order to obtain goods that they could not produce locally. Moreover, some branches of the Maasai, including the Warusha, did turn to agriculture and were known as Kwavi. The difference between agriculturalists and pastoralists is not absolute but graded.

While the number of Maasai in the borderlands of Tanganyika and Kenya was not overwhelming, the number of cattle which they owned was very substantial. To take one example, in mid-1928, the number of Kenyan Maasai known to be in Tanganyika was 2,400 men, women and children, and between them they owned an estimated

60,000 cattle, which required a lot of grazing and water to sustain them.¹ Such a high ratio of cattle to people is borne out by the fact that in 1919, Tanganyika Maasai District was composed of 18,470 square miles, with 41,822 people and 779,306 cattle.

Examples from the Kenya-Tanganyika boundary have been used sparingly in the other chapters of this work, although there are many problems on this particular boundary which could be considered apart from pastoralism. In practice, many of these problems are caused by pastoralists and their lifestyle. Moving back and forth across the boundary, sometimes with thousands of cattle, without allegiance to any political authority but their own, their presence was a major challenge to the colonial authorities and colonial boundaries of the day. The question of pastoralism and boundaries in Tanganyika inevitably brings up the Maasai: they are the largest, most famous pastoralist group on the borders of Tanganyika, and certainly one of the most famous pastoralist groups in the world. There were also other pastoralist groups on the border, notably the abaKuria, and these will also be considered in this chapter.

It is possible to divide the history of the Kenya-Tanganyikan boundary into four phases. Firstly, the period of German rule in Tanganyika: from the paper division of Africa until 1918, during which the imposition of the boundaries varied little from that in other areas. Secondly, there was a period of low activity, from 1918 until 1926, when little attention was paid to pastoralist movements. This was followed by a period of more intense enforcement from 1927 until the late 1930s, when the British authorities attempted to stamp their authority - or should it be authorities - upon the Maasai and the other peoples of the region. Disputes over grazing and water concessions hampered British efforts to impose the boundary on the ground. Lastly, from the onset of the Second World War until the end of colonial rule, efforts to

¹ TNA: TS10298/I: 312, 21st August 1928. "Report on the Migration of Purko and Loita Masai of Kenya Colony into the Sonjo Area of the Tanganyika Territory", by G. Webster, Acting PC, Northern Province.

impose more stringent control were made only spasmodically, because of the more peaceful nature of the borderlands, because colonial rule had to some extent already imposed the boundary in practice, but also because the effort required to suppress illegal activity was more than justified intervention. Several Maasai groups continued to cross the border in search of grazing, but on a much more limited scale than during previous years. Taken as a whole the four phases can be seen as the taming of a frontier and the imposition of the boundary, although the Maasai were never completely brought under control.

As the rest of this chapter and the next will demonstrate, the Kenyan and Tanganyikan authorities bickered a great deal over cattle and Maasai policy and it seems that some officials on the ground began to treat each other with nothing short of downright hostility. The fact that the whole of the borderland came under one colonial power, however, was used to some effect, and conflict between the colonial authorities and the Maasai emanated from the efforts that were made to impose control in the area, particularly with regard to making the boundary a barrier in the minds of the people who lived in the borderlands. The Maasai were to be either 'Tanganyikan Maasai' or 'Kenyan Maasai'. This was nigh on impossible, as it would probably be easier to list those Maasai groups which were not divided by the boundary than those that were. In addition, most groups had allegiance with other sub-subsections and there was a great deal of interaction. The colonial powers could not get around "The fairly obvious fact that sex attraction is immeasurably stronger than national policy" (Fraser, 1971: 8). The water and grazing concessions granted access for 'Kenyan Maasai' to Tanganyika and vice versa, in order to alleviate hardship. In reality they maintained a limited amount of the freedom to move in search of water and pasturage that had been enjoyed prior to European colonialism.

As far as the colonial authorities were concerned, there were two main problems with the Maasai: their habit of increasing stock and not selling it off when it caused

overgrazing; and unrest accompanying circumcision ceremonies. Both are linked to boundary problems. A lack of grazing encouraged groups to cross the boundary in search of better grazing; and following circumcision, the young men often tried to prove themselves by crossing the boundary and either attempting to reassert control upon one section of their people, or undertaking widespread cattle raiding.² On one occasion in March 1928, the British DC, Mr Murrells, heard that fifty Loita Il Gitatin (recently circumcised warriors) had come from Kenya to force members of their clan back over the border. This convinced him that a permanent post was required in the area; he chose Loliondo as the best place for this, as it held good command of the area and had ample access to water supplies.³ He was so concerned about possible fighting that he asked for a King's African Rifles' (KAR) detachment to be sent to the area. One of the leaders, Sendeyo, learnt that he had been declared *persona non grata* in Tanganyika and decided not to cross the boundary. The KAR troops were withdrawn as things calmed down.⁴

One of the main difficulties associated with studies of the Maasai is the durability of two opposing visions of them in western literature and film. On the one hand they are seen as the Lords of Africa, tall and proud, feared by other Africans and respected by Europeans. Their claim to all the world's cattle led to problems, but as this was associated with their confidence and respect; it could be understood if not entirely tolerated. On the other hand, their more recent portrayal is of a people who have lost their *raison d'être* and who have become destitute. Bereft of their lands and vast herds, they are to be found as alcoholics in every town from Dar es Salaam to Nairobi, and also on their traditional lands, where they pose for photographs for money from the passing tourists - tourists for whom they are a side-show in comparison with the

² CO691/86/6: 6, 11th September 1926. "Memorandum in regard [sic.] to the Masai Question". No author given.

³ TNA: TS10298/I: 304-5, 21st August 1928. See Note 1.

⁴ TNA: TS10298/I: 306, 21st August 1928. See Note 1.

wildlife on view. It is true that the Maasai were feared and respected by Europeans and other Africans during the colonial and pre-colonial periods, but the awe in which Europeans held them can perhaps be exaggerated. A reading of the colonial archives reveals exasperation with them at every turn. Today, even many of those Maasai who have migrated to the big cities of East Africa continue to be respected and to live as pastoralists. The northern suburbs of Dar es Salaam contain thousands of young Maasai men who guard their cattle and dress as they have done since pre-colonial times.

Colonial images of the Maasai fill the archives. One DC wrote that the Kenyan Maasai must have used the wells across the border in Tanganyika "from time immemorial".⁵ This was patently untrue, as the Maasai had only lived in the area for three to four centuries. The romanticisation of the Maasai by the British was misplaced, but it is not difficult to see why they did it. Many earlier secondary works on the Maasai either comment upon their proud nobility or describe them as people, "who have shown themselves so reluctant to adopt western ways" (Hughes, 1963: 16) often with a not-so-sneaking admiration. This admiration led many colonial officers to treat the Maasai with more respect than other groups and on several occasions, serious crimes committed by Maasai were not dealt with as harshly as might have been expected. The archives as a whole contain a great deal of documentation on the Maasai in particular and the Tanganyika-Kenya border in general. For example, files TNA: TS10298/I-II: 1927-1936 on "Grazing and water facilities for the Masai on the Tanganyika-Kenya border" in the Tanganyikan National Archives contain some 1200 pages. This chapter will not plough through all of the proposals and counter proposals, additions and negotiations for arrangements, although it looks like the division of Maasailand would make a good topic for a full-scale study of its own.

⁵ TNA: TS10298/I: 5, 13th July 1927. Memorandum on Tanganyika-Kenya boundary problems by PC Mitchell of Northern Province. Sent to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

There have been numerous studies of the Maasai and other pastoralists in East Africa. Those of most use include the ideas of Homewood, which are synthesised in her 1996 work where she considers Maasai responses to the imposed boundaries, as well as ecological indicators of the impact (Homewood, 1996). A great deal of information on the western sector of the Tanganyika-Kenya border and on pastoralism and cattle raiding can be found in Chapter Three of Kjerland, a study which was mainly based upon Kenyan sources (Kjerland, 1996). One of the best studies of pastoralists in border areas in East Africa is Dietz's study of Western Pokot on the Kenya-Uganda border 1900-86; yet this, like many other works, is a study of pastoralists who happen to live in a border area, rather than a direct study of the influence of the boundary.

While cultural and economic aspects of Maasai life have received their fair share of attention, political issues have received far less coverage. Maasai relations with other groups, relations between the various clans or sub-groups, and relations between the various strata of individual sub-groups have all been largely by-passed. The Maasai proper were divided into three sections: the Kaputiei, the Laikipia and the En-aiposha. The latter was the largest branch; based in the Rift Valley, it had two main groups, the Loita and the Purko (Beachey, 1996: 404). When the colonial authorities attempted to negotiate with the Maasai, they talked to the elders, but the elders did not control the rest of the people. Politically speaking, the elders were generally the main force, but there was also the Laibon - a kind of chief with a role more ritualistic or prophetic than political (Hughes, 1963: 17). They were most important among the En-aiposha. There was also the Aigwenak - a kind of spokesman, who was often believed by the colonial officials to be the chief. In addition, conflict always existed between the elders and the Elmoran (warriors); and while the colonial administrators negotiated with the elders, it was the Elmoran who carried out attacks (Homewood, 1996: 126). The greatest problem for the Maasai elders was to keep control of their warriors.⁶ On some

⁶ TNA: TS10298/I: 310, 21st August 1928. See Note 1.

occasions, a very complex situation could develop, with the Tanganyikan and Kenyan central authorities, their DCs and PCs, the different Maasai groups, their warriors, elders and Aigwenak, all taking a different standpoint. In one case, Purko elders in Kenya allied themselves with the Kenyan Government against the Tanganyikan DC and their Elmoran, because they wished to force the return of their Elmoran from Tanganyika.

Cattle raiding as cultural

From the outset, cattle raiding was one of the main features of the Anglo-German boundary. The initial European view of the area was formed during the period of the massive Maasai stock-replacing raids of the 1890s. The colonialists were more or less passive observers at this time because they had few stations in the area and little or no control or knowledge of the situation. The Maasai legend that all the cattle in the world had originally belonged to the Maasai and that they were merely regathering them reveals that cattle raiding was part of their culture. It was widely stated by the Maasai before the boundary was drawn and was repeated for decades afterwards. The effect that the raiding had upon the boundary was to destabilise it, but the effect that the boundary had upon the raiding is more difficult to assess. Certainly, colonial rule suppressed raiding, but the location of the boundary encouraged raids in various ways. Firstly, two relatively unco-ordinated colonial powers faced difficulties in suppressing it, and secondly, the division of the Maasai into yet more subgroups - that of the Kenyan and Tanganyikan Maasai - created more room for division and another reason to steal cattle. Thirdly, the boundary reduced the control that the elders had over the Elmoran, in that the Elmoran could move into the neighbouring jurisdiction, making it easier to escape the law. Lastly, the boundary created tax and policy differentials which encouraged the movement of cattle across the boundary and also greatly encouraged

cattle smuggling. Overall, the general sense of unlawfulness did not create a situation in which it was easy to make cattle raiding unacceptable.

Cattle raiding was the source of much worry for the colonial authorities. "No other activity in abaKuria received more attention from the British than stock theft, but they have left East Africa without having curbed it" (Kjerland, 1995: 67). The attempts of the authorities to control pastoralists in border areas, as well as their perception of pastoralists as a threat, was to a great extent caused by cattle raiding within each territory, but also encouraged because of the location of the border. Kjerland writes of several groups along the western border, such as the Kisii, as being loyal to the British and disciplined, except with regard to their "lust for stealing cattle" (Kjerland, 1995: 68-9), and indeed, she titles Chapter Three of her thesis: "Cattle Theft: An Obsession beyond Cure?" (Kjerland, 1995: Ch3). Numerous other works describe the Maasai and abaKuria love of raiding. Lumley writes of: "the Masai who lived across the border and who were notorious for their habit of raiding neighbouring tribes and stealing their women and cattle. Indeed, a few days before there had been a Masai raid, but the intruders had met with stout resistance and been driven off." (Lumley, 1976: 91).

In 1945, in response to cross-border unrest caused by cattle smuggling, the abaKuria were appointed with a government sociologist "to try and find out what was wrong in the Kuria area where internecine stock theft was such a running sore" (Winnington-Ingham, 1950: 10). That sociologist was the respected Hans Cory. Cory gave four reasons in his report for the disturbed nature of the area, one of which was the proximity of the boundary: "Cory states that the boundary was not a boundary to thieves. It was simply a boundary to those administering justice. He presented a long list of names of thieves and receivers of stolen stock and pointed out BuRege location as one location in which it was obvious that there was a connection with Kenyan receivers and Tanganyika thieves" (Kjerland, 1995: 103). His description marries closely with other cattle raiding cultures around the world, such as the border reivers

of the Anglo-Scottish borderlands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries.⁷ Cory was not openly critical of his government, but he made recommendations on major changes in the way the area was governed. For instance, he was concerned about the appointment of native officials and suggested closer supervision. He also recommended the amalgamation of the Kuria petty chiefdoms in Tanganyika (Kjerland, 1996: 104-5). The most positive colonial depiction of the abaKuria comes from H.C. Stiebel, who was PC for Northern Province. He describes them as "a very nice tribe", but is forced to add that they "are confirmed cattle thieves", who maintain an average of sixty prisoners in Musoma gaol. "Nevertheless they are a good wholesome people and only require closer administration to become useful members of society".⁸

While smuggling and cross-border raiding were common, it is difficult to disagree with Kjerland when she writes that it was not worse than could be expected in any isolated areas remote from centres of law and order (Kjerland, 1996: 109). The DC Kenyan Maasailand, M.P. Gordon, concurs: "This location has always been a very difficult one, owing to its remoteness, the proximity of the Trans-Mara Maasai area which is a happy hunting ground for bad hats of all neighbouring tribes, and the ease with which a malefactor can escape over the Tanganyika Territory border".⁹ The remoteness of the region also meant that it was difficult to set up a station in close proximity to each of the peoples who were present. The abaKuria, for instance, were administered from Ikoma, seventy miles from the area.¹⁰

⁷ See also: "Report on the General Situation in the Kuria Chiefdom of North Mara 1945" by Hans Cory, Cory Collection, University of Dar es Salaam.

⁸ TNA: TS10298/I: 61, 22nd July 1927. Letter from H.C. Stiebel PC to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁹ KNA: DC/KSI/3/3, 1910. Report "An Outline of the History of the District 1780-1946", by M.P. Gordon. Unknown recipient.

¹⁰ TNA: TS10298/I: 62, 22nd July 1927. See Note 8.

One of the greatest environmental difficulties was the lack of water along much of the border. Between Engare Naibor and Lake Natron, there was virtually no water and the country was uninhabited, although this can also be attributed to the presence of tsetse. In Maasailand itself, there were only two permanent rivers: the Ruvu (Pangani) and the Ewaso Nyiro. Attempts were made to demarcate the extent of Maasailand with rivers but this proved impracticable. The Tanganyikan Veterinary Officer for the area persuaded the government to use watersheds instead, but even this was problematic.¹¹ Water and pasturage were nearly sufficient in Masailand for all, but not without the constant cross-boundary movement which was opposed by the colonial authorities.¹² Despite the lack of water in the borderlands, the ecology and landscape of Maasailand is very varied; it is not only the monotonous semi-arid savannah that many imagine. There are great mountains and the Rift valley, and the elevation of the region varies from 645 metres above sea level at the Rift Valley lakes to 3,300 meters in the Ngorongoro and Mao highlands.¹³ This variation means that a variety of temporary water supplies exist in different areas at different times. The variety within the region made pastoralism an ideal lifestyle, although this is not to justify raiding. Nothing can be said about the morality of the raiding culture in this work - merely that it happened, it was endemic and it was accepted as part of life by many of the groups affected.

Raiding was certainly culturally-rooted, and it was part of the region's culture that the British authorities tried to eliminate. Punishments were often meted out to ethnic groups as a whole, so towards the end of the colonial period, several instance of raiders attempting to blame other groups for their misdeeds were recorded. In one instance in July 1955, a Luo was killed by a cross-border raiding party. The police believed it was a Maasai raid, but "later investigations uncovered that they were abaKuria dressed like Maasai" (Kjerland, 1995: 107-8). It is possible that the police

¹¹ TNA: Dist 723/I: 18. Unknown date and correspondents.

¹² TNA: TS10298/I: 2, 13th July 1927. See Note 5.

¹³ From personal observation and Coulson 1979: 137.

could confuse them, but in this case it seems as if this was a genuine case of imposture. After this time, "The Kuria continue cheerfully and unrepentantly with a complex system of intervillage, interlocation and interterritory stock thefts with an attendant huge rate of cracked skulls".¹⁴

The limited scale of problems with mainly non-pastoralist groups, indicates that pastoralist groups and the colonial borders were not easy bedfellows. The largest group apart from the Maasai on the border were the Chagga. Based around Moshi in Tanganyika, they also grazed their cattle in BEA and cut grass there, and were not stopped in doing so by the German authorities before 1914.¹⁵ The Luo, who were much troubled by the pastoralists, had migrated across the border into Tanganyika at the time of partition, but did not cause any particular problems, despite being a divided people. Moreover, they could not easily be returned to BEA because they possessed *vyeti vya kukaa* or residency permits.¹⁶ The Maasai did not have *vyeti vya kukaa*, but were much more difficult to eject. The only non-agricultural and non-pastoralist group on the border were the Wandorobo, who lived south of the *abaKuria* on the coast of Lake Victoria. They lived on game and did not pay taxes, but this was considered acceptable. The only problem that the colonial authorities had was in attempting to stop them from making grass fires, as it helped the spread of sleeping sickness.¹⁷

¹⁴ KNA: DC/KSI/1/20. South Nyanza District Annual Report 1958.

¹⁵ RKA: R1001 587: 37, 22nd April 1905. Report by G.E. Smith of the Anglo-German Boundary Commission.

¹⁶ See CO822/2974, which contains lots of information on "Independence Celebrations in Tanganyika".

¹⁷ TNA: TS10298/I: 61, 22nd July 1927. Letter from H.C. Stiebel, PC, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

The Maasai, Maasailand and the boundary

As was mentioned in Chapter Three, it would be a mistake to assume that East African pastoralists did not have a very highly developed sense of territoriality. The various sub-groups did have a strong attachment to particular areas, and these areas were sometimes demarcated by geographical features. It is difficult, however, to identify the extent of Maasailand. The area occupied by the Maasai fluctuated an enormous amount in the century leading up to partition, while the colonial vision of the extent of Maasailand was coloured by the great upheavals of the 1880s and 1890s which decimated the Maasai. At the time of greatest colonial worry over the boundary, during the latter part of the 1920s, Maasailand was meant to contain the vast majority of the Maasai, yet outside Maasai District, they were found in Lake Province (Maswa and Musoma districts), Eastern Province and Central Province (Mpwapa). They were there for traditional and economic reasons, but not because of, "as is sometimes suggested.....a continual and irresponsible desire on the part of the Maasai for fresh pastures".¹⁸ A definition of ethnic Maasailand is even more difficult today: in the hundred and twenty years since partition, its official extent has shrunk as some territory has been evacuated and declared conservation area (Homewood, 1996: 129) while other areas have been turned over to both large and small scale farming. It is therefore best to assume that while each group may have had a strong sense of its territory, the extent of this territory varied greatly over time.

One thing is certain, whichever definition of Maasailand is employed: it lies partly in Kenya and partly in Tanganyika, and is divided by an international boundary. The Hilton Young Commission of 1929 states that, "The boundary cuts this people in two, with no more concern for their ideas or for the justice or convenience of their

¹⁸ TNA: Dist S7/I/II: 250, 21st February 1940. Memorandum on Masai problems by DO Masai District.

administration than the scythe has for a blade of grass" (HMSO, 1929: 300). Partition occurred in 1886, but it wasn't until 1904-5 that demarcation occurred. When the Maasai were informed of the division, they refused to accept it but were told that it wasn't up to them to decide (McEwen, 1971: 148). After the demarcation of 1904-5, the Maasai continued to move back and forth across the boundary. It seems likely that they knew where the Europeans had drawn their boundary, but that they didn't care, found it amusing, or were hostile towards the idea. During the early years of colonial rule, there was little that the colonial authorities could do to stop them, but they considered that pastoralism was by definition a challenge to linear boundaries. Several commentators, such as Markakis, agree with the view that pastoralist movements regularly generate conflict (Markakis, 1994: 220). The western European notion of political space is generally based upon a sedentary lifestyle, for taxation purposes amongst other reasons. Movement within a territory was problematic enough, but crossing international boundaries did not fit with the colonial division of land and people.

The colonial powers made several attempts to reduce the impact of the boundary, but their desire to control the pastoralists outweighed everything else. In the 1920s, consideration was given by the Permanent Mandates Commission to the idea of unifying the Maasai people under one administration. The options under discussion were: annexation of the entire Maasai area to Tanganyika; attachment of Tanganyika Maasai District to the Kenyan administration without altering its status as part of a mandated territory; or creation of a special Maasai area, administered under a separate mandate (McEwen, 1971: 149). Kenyan opposition to any loss of land, Cameron's opposition to any loss of control to Kenya, and doubt over the future of the mandate scuppered any changes. After the Second World War, petitions were made by the Maasai to the British government seeking unification and independence, and in a 1960 meeting in Kenya, the Maasai requested Britain to stay in Maasailand after the rest of Kenya became independent. Both pleas were turned down, chiefly because of white

Kenyan influence. It is also highly unlikely that the post-independence governments of Tanganyika and Kenya could have accepted such a suggestion.

The 1886 partition of the Maasai was never reversed and it was up to the people of the area - European and African - to try to reduce the impact of the boundary as much as possible. In such a difficult situation, it was vital that the DC's who operated along the border had a solid understanding of the environment and peoples with which they worked. Some did, but many did not. W.J. Lloyd, the ADO for Masai District in the late 1920s, believed that the Maasai were possibly unique in Africa in being divided by an international boundary. His solution to deciding the problems of the concessions of the Kenyan Maasai was to ask "to whom do these waters belong, Kenyan Maasai or Tanganyikan Maasai?".¹⁹ This demonstrates poor understanding of pastoralism and particularly of the fluidity of African ethnicities and polities. He completely accepted the artificial colonial constructs of Kenyan Maasai and Tanganyikan Maasai, as the main method of categorising the Maasai. Even if the various Maasai clans had been divided intact between Kenya and Tanganyika, many of their leaders were interrelated.

In 1929, the Tanganyikan Director of Surveys wrote that although few Maasai were actually living on the boundary, "they were constantly seen crossing and recrossing it, but chiefly proceeding South in search of water and grazing. They disclaimed any knowledge of the boundary's whereabouts and were distinctly hostile to any demarcation at all and gave one no assistance or information".²⁰ His view seems naive in the extreme. As has already been mentioned, the Maasai he encountered almost certainly knew the location of the boundary but had no inclination to help him. However, it would be wrong to put this refusal down to any romantic notions of

¹⁹ TNA: TS10298/II: 478-9, 24th January 1935. Letter from W.J. Lloyd, DO for Masai District, to the PC for Northern Province.

²⁰ TNA: TS13569: 1-5, 9th March 1929. Letter from Director of Surveys, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

nomadic pastoralists being unable to grasp the concept of linear boundaries. As has been shown elsewhere, the Maasai were fully aware of the concept and employed it themselves. Although pastoralists were a major challenge to the colonial borders, pastoralism is not the antithesis of linear boundaries. It was not so much a clash between linear boundaries and a sedentary lifestyle on the one hand and pastoralists on the other, but between competing powers. In the event, the British and Germans were stronger than the Maasai.

As was discussed in Chapter Three, it was virtually impossible for the colonial powers to have much understanding about the pre-colonial political map of East Africa, particularly because of the weakened and dispersed nature of many groups, including the Maasai. One of the causes of this had been a series of Maasai wars during the second half of the Nineteenth Century, the greatest of which was between the Loita and the Purko. In the early 1880s, the Purko gradually established their supremacy under their laibon, Mbatian. By 1884 he was the effective if not acknowledged paramount chief of all the En-aiposha. As with most Maasai conflicts, after one group defeated another, those defeated were often assimilated into the winning side (Galaty, 1990: 75). However, Mbatian died in 1890, and a great war followed between his two sons, Lenana, based around Nairobi, and Sendeyo, supported by Maasai living in DOA (Smith, 1907: 256). Sendeyo raided into British territory against Lenana, who was also harried by the Kikuyu, and eventually Lenana was forced to go to the British Fort Smith in BEA with 5,000 of his people (Beachey, 1996: 405).²¹ While great wars did occur, most conflict was on a more restricted scale. Inter-Maasai struggles can be described as George MacDonald Fraser described the clan struggles of the Anglo-Scottish borderlands: "the perpetual petty jealousies, the conflict of national, family and personal interest, the great criss-cross of vendetta and alliance, of feudal loyalty

²¹ An account of Maasai power struggles of the Nineteenth Century is given in (Being Maasai, 1993: 74-5).

and blood tie, the repeated changing of sides and allegiances, and the general confusion bordering on chaos" (Fraser, 1971: 8).

Disease was another major cause of the disorder of the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. Smallpox, rinderpest and pleuropneumonia all struck in the mid-1880s. British and Germans observers who visited the border area in the early 1890s, found many kraals but most were empty. Beachey quotes one British observer in 1891: "their cattle seem to be decimated by disease....the whole of the west shore of this lake is hardly approachable for the number of dead beasts....when owners of great herds of cattle and sheep, they were insolent and quarrelsome - now that their only possessions, cattle, are dead and dying, they are amenable enough!" (Beachey, 1996: 405). By the 1890s the Maasai were not the power they had been, and the Kikuyu and others began to react much more vehemently to their raids.

Colonial ignorance of Maasailand can also be demonstrated by the adoption of inaccurate African names. Smith gives many great examples of mistakes brought about by linguistic problems, such as the name 'Sonjo', which means Thingamabob in Maa (Smith, 1907: 258-9). It is easy to see where such names as a mountain named 'Atorigini' - the Maa for 'I forget' - came from. While working on a boundary commission, Smith himself marked one place name as Olotoiboilogunya, which he later discovered meant: "Your boy has gone on ahead." Although such mistakes indicate a lack of thoroughness in understanding the area and its peoples, they are understandable. It is perhaps more remarkable that so many African names were adopted by the colonial powers, than the fact that they occasionally got them wrong.

Maasai responses to the border will be examined in some depth throughout the remainder of this chapter, but it is worth considering what one of the most prolific writers on the Maasai - Homewood - has had to say about Maasai resistance to or use of the boundary. Homewood writes that Maasai responses manifested themselves in

"circumventing imposed boundaries, exploiting and in some cases attacking the resources boundaries are designed to protect, or in developing strategies to incorporate and utilise to good effect the opportunities that boundaries can present" (Homewood, 1996: 122). "What is interesting is the way the international frontier has set up a differential in terms of trade that invites exploitation and presents a new opportunity for traditional Maasai skills" (Homewood, 1996: 132). The Maasai Elmoran exploited their traditional skills: "They have turned the potential obstacle of the international border, and the complexities of the Kenya/Tanzania differences in livestock marketing, into an opportunity to develop a profitable if unofficial enterprise closely consistent with their traditional role" (Homewood, 1996: 133). Various Maasai groups exploited the international boundaries to gain grazing, water access and other benefits, at the expense of other Maasai sections. This could be perceived as colonial constructs provoking a policy of divide and rule. However, Maasai clans had exploited each other before colonial rule, the onset of the colonial period merely brought about changes in this way this was carried out. The large scale warfare of the 1880s and 1890s gave way to disputes over territory along the border, with each group exploiting the two colonial authorities in an attempt to gain what they could.

The German period

Cross-border activity was most active before 1914, when there was little colonial presence and the boundary had yet to be consistently enforced. It was during this time that the abaKuria first began to cross the border from DOA into BEA. Many crossed the Tanganyika-Kenya boundary in 1906-7, along with Maasai, abaSuba and Luo, so that some 2000 huts were discovered by the British DO, R. Hemsted, at the end of 1907.²² This is supported by the import of 7,220 head of stock via Karungu in the

²² KNA: PC/NZA/1/1/2. Nyanza Province Annual Report 1906/07.

same year.²³ Kjerland's research contradicts previous accounts, such as that by Prazak, which claim that the boundary split the abaKuria (Prazak, 1992: 62). By 1910, there were 4-5,000 abaKuria on the British side of the border (Kjerland, 1996: 116). The first Zebra (a branch of the abaKuria) to arrive at Kebaroti were allegedly fleeing the Germans,²⁴ and this may help to explain why thousands moved to Kenya between the years 1905 and 1914. Migrations on this scale, as well as more temporary crossings did not foster friendly Anglo-German relations. Herr Dernburg, the German Colonial Secretary gave a lecture in London at the African Society in 1909, and "mentioned that some time ago the Governor of British East Africa suggested to the German authorities that regular information about the movements of the natives in the neighbouring districts should be exchanged" (Brode, 1911: 84).

The Germans attempted to restrict the range of the Maasai in order to make it easier to control them and to give land over to European farmers who were moving in, in part because of the attraction of the railway. The first Maasai reservation was created in 1905 to the south of Kilimanjaro and Meru and on the east of the Great Rift Valley (Koponen, 1994: 648). This was witnessed by a Swedish botanist who saw askari burn Maasai huts forcing them onto reservation land. They were driven out with what goods they could carry and their cattle and were then chased out by whips (Sjøstedt, 1911: 298)

German actions were not always so brutal. In 1914, reports reached German officials of a Maasai raid.²⁵ The story was that some Maasai had taken their cattle over the boundary towards Moshi from BEA, when they came across an old Chagga man and young boy with cattle. They attacked and killed them, then seized the cattle. The

²³ KNA: PC/NZA/1/1. See Note 22.

²⁴ KNA: DC/KSI/3/3, 1910. Report "The History of the District".

²⁵ RKA: R1001 637: 122, 23rd February 1914. Telegram "Grenzzwischenfall an der Deutsch-Englischen Grenze" from a German officer, Wahl, based at Moshi. Sent to the government at Dar es Salaam.

following day, eighty to one hundred Chagga warriors with shields and spears went after them, and found that only two Maasai warriors and ten elders had been left on guard at a kraal. The Chagga killed three of the Maasai and seized sixty cattle and eighty to ninety goats and sheep.²⁶ The Germans intervened and questioned the Chagga and Maasai. The Chagga said they recognised many of the cattle among the Maasai's sixty, as they had been stolen during the past four years, but there was no way that the Germans could either support or deny this view. In the end, the Germans tried to be even-handed, and forced the Chagga to pay four cattle and two oxen for each of the three dead Maasai. In return, the Chagga received seventeen of their stolen cattle back.²⁷

One of the main problems was that salt licks lying very close to the boundary were used by both groups and even the Germans were not sure which side of the line they lay on. German officers based around Moshi investigated the situation. It appeared that a great deal of cattle raiding went unreported, and so the Chagga and Maasai were informed that they could not cross the international boundary without an *Ausweis* (pass), which was obtainable from German officers.²⁸ In addition, three Christian Maasai at a local Christian mission were suspected of passing on information and the officers requested their expulsion. Finally, the Germans wanted the British to set up border posts in the area to improve control - the British had difficulty in getting cattle back because they did not interfere as much.

British investigations into the same incident produced a totally different story.²⁹ A herd of cattle, sheep and goats, nearly 150 in all, were brought from the Mchagga Chief Salema to a salt lick in BEA. They were left there unattended and were

²⁶ RKA: R1001 637: 122, 23rd February 1914. See Note 25.

²⁷ RKA: R1001 637: 124, 23rd February 1914. See Note 25.

²⁸ RKA: R1001 637: 124R-125, 23rd February 1914. See Note 25.

²⁹ RKA: R1001 637: 117-120, 26th February 1914. Letter from Governor Belfield of Kenya to the Governor of German East Africa.

discovered by four Elmoran belonging to the Maasai Chief Metiagi. The story was that they collected them with the intention of handing them over to the BEA authorities, but this seems most unlikely. Before long, large numbers of armed Chagga accompanied by two DOA policemen came over the border to where Meriagi and his people were staying, killing three men and seizing 642 cattle, 2600 sheep and goats and twelve donkeys. Following the German intervention, only 642 cattle, 1390 sheep and goats and nine donkeys were returned. The size of the figures in this case indicate that the two raids may have been related, but were probably not the same raids. The British government wanted the people and the policemen punished and believed that it was a pre-meditated attack, although raids were traditionally pre-meditated. Whatever the European moral rights and wrongs of the situation, the European powers were attempting to impose an alien system.

In order to have greater control over the Maasai, both BEA and DOA introduced restrictions on where they could live. Game reserves were created where the Maasai were also permitted to live, but in many instances they were forced out because they were suspected of killing game. In 1906, the first reserves were established: the Northern and Southern Game Reserves in Kenya (Homewood, 1996: 124). The Maasai had begun to move from the area of the Northern to the Southern in 1904, and by 1912-13, the Kenyan government evacuated the remaining Maasai from the North on the Laikipia plateau, thereby increasing the population in the Kenyan borderlands. Over the next two decades, the Kenyan Maasai became concentrated in the former Southern Reserve (Ngong-Kajiado) with a western extension around Narok and the trans-Mara. The earliest moves from the Northern reserve were voluntary with some Purko occupying the lands of defeated and dispersed groups, but it was later forced and resisted. The Northern Reserve became used by settler ranches and other groups.

The Maasai in BEA generally fared better than those in DOA (Homewood, 1996: 124). Following a series of epidemics, the Olenana and Purko Maasai co-operated with

the British and re-built their herds at the start of the century, while the Kisongo and other groups in DOA, perhaps more badly hit by the epidemics and perhaps less cohesive as an alliance, were weakened by German punitive raids. In the First World War, the Maasai joined the British when the Germans retreated, partly because the Germans had forced them into a reserve (Iliffe, 1979: 252). "In the north the Masai had suffered most from German rule. Early in the war Masai spied for both sides and were alleged to meet and exchange information, but as the Germans retreated the Masai openly took the British side. They also seized the chance to escape the hated reserve into which the Germans had penned them. By 1917 Masai had regained most of their pastures north to the Kenya border, just as Chagga, Meru and Arusha occupied abandoned European farms and cut into forest reserves" (Schnee, 1920: 86).

Colonial policies in the inter-war years

"The transfer of Tanganyika Territory to British East Africa [sic.] did little to alter the potential impact of the boundary as different colonial policies applied in the two parts of Maasailand", "with all the corollaries for differences in infrastructure, trade, economy and direction of development" (Homewood, 1996: 124). Although the two territories were both under British rule, disputes between the two over border and pastoralist policy actually intensified. The fact that the same colonial power ruled both territories created the potential for increased control of the border and borderlands, thereby bringing the two administrations more regularly into contact, but simultaneously making policy differences more apparent. Although both governments wanted greater control over the area, both Kenyan and Tanganyikan policy over pastoralist problems was rather more reactive than pro-active. The Maasai and other groups on the border continued to raid each other and to cross the boundary when environmental and economic conditions favoured movement, and went against the grain of colonial control.

Some colonial debate over the reunification of Maasailand took place but such a move was not widely supported. Mr Longland, PC for Northern Province, suggested in the late 1920s that the inter-territorial boundary between the Kenyan and Tanganyikan Maasai should one day be removed, and made various recommendation for future cattle arrangements which will be considered in the next chapter.³⁰ Sir Edward Grigg, Governor of Kenya, met Cameron at the 1926 Conference of Governors of East Africa, where they discussed Maasai problems.³¹ Grigg refused to give up Kenya Maasailand to Tanganyika or to allow it to become independent, but he believed that Tanganyika Maasailand could become incorporated into Kenya, or that steps could be taken to improve policy co-ordination. Needless to say, Cameron refused. For the most part, the jealousies of the two administrations allied to the obstacle of the mandatory status of Tanganyika prevented serious consideration of the obvious solution to disorder in the borderlands.

The Kenyan government took a generally stricter line on restricting border crossing than the Tanganyikan authorities. Inter-territorial migration leading to semi-permanent migration was permitted by the Tanganyikan authorities, but the Kenyans often tried to block it. The Kisongo Maasai, who were considered to be Tanganyikan Maasai by the authorities, were refused permission to return with their cattle to Tanganyika by Loita council in Kenya and their DC. "The man may return, but he must abandon his cattle".³² It is interesting to note that Kenya imposed stricter controls on migration, but Tanganyika introduced tighter disease controls. This aspect of pastoralism will be discussed in the next chapter.

³⁰ TNA: TS10298/II: 366, 21st November 1930. Report of a Veterinary Meeting at Loitokitok.

³¹ CO691 86/6: 6-8, 11th September 1926. "Memorandum in regard [sic.] to the Masai Question". No author given.

³² TNA: TS10298: 3-4, 13th July 1927. Memorandum on Tanganyika-Kenya boundary problems by PC Mitchell of Northern Province, sent to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

Although the two governments did put control and stability ahead of the environmental difficulties of the region, they were not totally intransigent in their policies, and several sensible decisions were reached. There were many essential water holes right on the boundary and various concessions were set up to allow Maasai living on each side of the border access to water and grazing on the other side. For example, in the area between the Pangani River and the Central Line railway, there was a large area of uninhabited country which the Maasai trekked across, often during drought. German policy had been to keep the Maasai out because the Warusha and Chagga objected, but the British PC and his DCs could find no reason to do so, and access was permitted.³³ The DC for Maasailand and later PC for Northern Province, was Major E.D. Browne. He was effectively in charge of Maasai policy in Tanganyika from 1916 until at least 1926, and was greatly respected by the Maasai.³⁴ He understood the area very well, and it may be in no small part due to him that difficulties in the area did not intensify until 1927, when he left his post.

British policy on the Maasai can best be discussed through an examination of the correspondence of 1927-28, at a time when matters were brought to a head, and policies were introduced which formed the bedrock of British policy for the remainder of colonial rule. After the war, matters had been allowed to drift at territorial level and problems were dealt with by PCs or more usually DCs, without reference to Dar. Much of what follows is taken from a very useful Tanganyikan Secretariat report: "British Tanganyikan policy in 1927 on how and when to effect the division of the Tanganyikan and Kenyan Maasai".³⁵

³³ TNA: TS10298/I: 6, 13th July 1927. See Note 32.

³⁴ CO691 86/6: 17, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions". No author or correspondents given.

³⁵ TNA: TS10298.

Kenyan Maasai had been ejected from land south of Taveta as part of a plan to provide land for Asiatic colonisation, but the scheme never got off the ground. The Tanganyikan government pressed for them to be readmitted to the area in 1926, believing the Kenyan authorities had unjustly ejected the Maasai from this area.³⁶ The greatest problem of the Tanganyikan authorities was that while they seem to have tried to be fair to the Maasai - as far as colonial rule can be fair - they still believed that they could divide the Maasai into Kenyan and Tanganyikan branches, with some sub-groups in Kenya and some in Tanganyika.³⁷ The Loita and Purko Maasai in Tanganyika, for instance, are therefore seen as Kenyan Maasai who ended up in Tanganyika after the great disasters. The Tanganyikan government wanted them to return but they must not be "induced to move as it were on false pretences: they must be told their real destination from the first".³⁸ The colonial authorities considered that they had to, "set the stage for the tribe to sort itself out and settle down definitely according to its original sub-division by sub-tribes".³⁹ Although understandable, as has been discussed throughout this work, this was not an achievable goal.

The Kenyan Maasai who had been ejected were found living two miles over the border at Ol Molog in Rongai area during the mid-1920s. As this was in breach of the veterinary regulations, the Tanganyikan government wanted the kraals burned and the people removed. This demonstrates the confusion and ignorance of the colonial authorities and points out the impossibility of dividing the Maasai into Kenyan and Tanganyikan Maasai. The Maasai in this case were the Salei and the Laitayok, and the area on both sides of the border had been their home for generations.⁴⁰ The Tanganyikan government did not wish to stop the passage of cattle which accompanied

³⁶ TNA: TS10298/I: 5, 13th July 1927. See Note 32.

³⁷ TNA: TS10298/I: 3-4, 13th July 1927. See Note 32.

³⁸ TNA: TS10298: 7, 13th July 1927. See Note 32.

³⁹ TNA: TS10298: 9, 13th July 1927. See Note 32.

⁴⁰ TNA: TS10298: 13, 13th July 1927. Letter from PC Mitchell, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

marriage, inheritance and other social interaction, but wanted the bulk of that traffic to pass through Veterinary Control Posts.⁴¹ At the same time, local officials admitted that it was easier for the Maasai to pass illegally than legally. After consultation with local DCs, the kraals were not burnt and the Maasai in question were given a five year concession to the area, but the long-term intention was to turn the area over to the Chagga, who also grazed their cattle there from time to time.⁴² The Salei and the Laitayok agreed to keep the grass down to reduce the fire risk and to sell their surplus cattle when the area been fully stocked.⁴³

Further west, in the middle of Maasailand, the frequency with which Maasai crossed the border and the isolated nature of the area, caused the Tanganyikan government to set up a new post at Loliondo. With only a single ADO supported by three policemen, the post required some level of co-operation from the Maasai in order to maintain law and order. An Inter Colonial Native Court was set up at Pusi Moru on the border to deal with disputes between Africans. It was attended by the ADO at Loliondo, the DC for Narok and about 400 Maasai, some of whom were litigants, but most were just curious to hear rulings on border problems.⁴⁴ The influx of the Loita and Purko Maasai caused a massive amount of problems through raiding and by annoying the authorities through repeatedly crossing the border, and so the baraza attempted to deal with associated cases of theft. Once the trouble subsided - probably because of an improvement in environmental conditions⁴⁵ - it was decided to abandon the baraza. Such Native Courts existed in both territories, but had no "right to issue

⁴¹ TNA: TS10298: 14, 18th July 1927. Letter from PC Mitchell, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁴² TNA: TS10298/I: 10, 13th July 1927. See Note 32.

TNA: TS10298/I: 15, 30th June 1927. "Memorandum of Discussions at Longido on 27th, 28th and 29/6/27 on Kenya-Tanganyika Masai Boundary Question".

⁴³ TNA: TS10298: 16, 30th June 1927. See Note 42.

⁴⁴ TNA: Dist 7/III: 38, 28th April 1930. "Report on Inter-Colonial Boundary Affairs", from the Assistant DO for Loliondo, to the DO for Lolbeno.

⁴⁵ TNA: Dist 7/III: 34, 28th April 1930. See Note 44.

process calling upon a native to appear from a neighbouring Territory". Any transfer of summons had in any case to go through the DC of the opposing territory.⁴⁶

During the short lifespan of the court, cattle theft was a far greater cause for concern than the human deaths which accompanied raids. The ADO at Loliondo wrote "A man may kill another and little notice taken of it, probably because the heirs benefit thereby, but let that man interfere with stock the property of another and trouble of some description is bound to ensue".⁴⁷ This may be a slight exaggeration, but it is not far from the truth. Cattle meant respect and wealth to a Maasai. For the Kenyan authorities therefore to seize Maasai cattle which were being taken out of the country was therefore a massive blow. At the end of 1927, a new DC, Murrells, was appointed to Loliondo. In a letter in the March of 1928, he cited the case of Partabola Ole Parsoi, a Tanganyika Maasai who decided to return to Tanganyika, and so had all his cattle seized by the Kenyan authorities.⁴⁸ This seemed to be common practice and Murrells wanted it stopped. Ole Parsoi's story seems to have particularly touched Murrells. He had firstly lost his cattle to the Loita, then his land to the Germans; he fled the area to work near Moshi for an Abyssinian called Ailos as a herdboy. He worked hard and gradually built his own herd of twenty-seven cattle, before it was seized by the Kenyan authorities, as he returned from grazing his herd just over the border in Kenya.⁴⁹ His case seems particularly watertight, given that one of the witnesses was Ole Kere, a Loita Maasai who was on his way to steal Ole Parsoi's cattle.

⁴⁶ TNA: Dist 7/III: 46-7, 12th August 1930. Report "Inter-Colonial Baraza, Pusi Moru", by the ADO for Loliondo, to the DO for Monduli.

The dates of the setting up and disbandment of the baraza have not been ascertained, but it is assumed that it lasted for about two years, approximately 1925-7.

⁴⁷ TNA: Dist Acc.69:7/III: 38, 28th April 1930. Report "Inter Colonial Boundary Affairs", from Harvey, the ADO for Loliondo, to the DO for Lolbené.

⁴⁸ TNA: TS10298/I: 269, 15th March 1928. Letter from DO H.C. Murrells, to the DO for Narok.

⁴⁹ TNA: TS10298/I: 270, 15th March 1928. As Note 48.

By the end of 1928, both governments realised that they could not hope to prevent cross-border migration without a massive increase in manpower. The challenge was to make it orderly, in particular through the use of veterinary controls on migrating cattle.⁵⁰ Each of the various Maasai and non-Maasai groups who lived in the borderlands continued to raid each other throughout the inter-war years. There was little that the British could do, but just before the Second World War they began to respond by punishing chiefs who they themselves had appointed. For example, the Uasin Ngishu Maasai and the abaIrege and the abaNyabasi of the abaKuria took part in a series of tit-for-tat raids in 1939 (Kjerland, 1995: 98). On one occasion, the abaIrege and the abaNyabasi carried out five raids on the Maasai, taking most of the cattle across the boundary into Tanganyika. Chief Kisu and Chief Nyakimore of the two protagonist groups reported Maasai raids upon their herds as well as the counter-raids of their own people, but both lost their jobs.⁵¹ The British had attempted to consolidate the different branches of the abaKuria into a more manageable size, and so appointed chiefs to rule them as part of their policy of Indirect Rule. As a result they had a great deal of influence over such chiefs. This tactic could not work with the Maasai where the British had little influence on who the leaders were, and who did not have single political leaders.

Differences between Kenyan and Tanganyikan policy

Differences between Kenyan and Tanganyikan pastoralist, Maasai, border and veterinary policies - which were very often one and the same - were the leading causes of the strained relations which prevailed between the two British territories during the

⁵⁰ TNA: TS10298/I: 313. "Report on the Migration of Purko and Loita Masai of Kenya Colony into the Sonjo Area of the Tanganyika Territory" by G. Webster, Acting PC, Northern Province.

⁵¹ KNA: DC/KSI/1/4. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 1935.

late 1920s and early 1930s. There were several basic policy differences. Firstly, tax levels were substantially lower in Tanganyika. The Maasai tax was 20/- per head in Kenya and 10/- in Tanganyika during the 1920s - a much higher figure in Kenya than for any other group. This perhaps explains why many Maasai lived in Tanganyika but crossed into Kenya for grazing and water. The Maasai sold cattle to pay their taxes, and it was difficult to reduce the tax as it was the government's main method of controlling stock numbers.⁵² Secondly, the Maasai were permitted to carry their shield and white spear in Tanganyika, but not in Kenya. Cameron appealed for the Kenyan Maasai to have their right to bear weapons restored, but the Kenyan authorities blamed Maasai unrest on liberal Tanganyikan policies. Cameron replied that their problems were of their own making.⁵³ Thirdly, there were differences in quarantine policy which will be discussed in the next chapter.⁵⁴

Finally, differences in cattle purchasing policy encouraged cross-border trade. A long-established cross-border cattle trade existed between Kenya and Tanganyika, the direction depending upon market conditions. Tanganyika generally encouraged good market conditions and terms of trade, in an attempt to reduce herd sizes. This led to smuggling from Kenya into Tanganyika, while the Kenyan government discouraged Africans from entering the market at large (Ilfie, 1979: 132). Even in the post-war years, "People knew the price of stock on both sides of the border and when the price was higher in Kenya 'a steady flow of stock comes this way'".⁵⁵ The Maasai were not the only cattle people to exploit the border to their own advantage. The abaKuria were

⁵² CO691 86/6: 6-7, 11th September 1926. "Memorandum in regard [sic.] to the Masai Question". No author given.

⁵³ CO691/86/6: 22, 11th June 1926. Report "Masai Questions". No author or correspondents given.

⁵⁴ CO691 86/6: 7, 11th September 1926. See Note 52.

⁵⁵ KNA: DC/KSI/1/13 and 17. South Nyanza District Annual Report 1954. Kjerland, 1995: 87-88.

"quick to play off one administration against another and have already learned that it is no offence in Tanganyika to be found in possession of cattle stolen in Kenya".⁵⁶

Where a group had traditionally ranged across the borderlands, they now generally chose to be based in Tanganyika. The four main branches of the Maasai who lived in Tanganyika - Purko, Loita, Laitaiyok and Saleh - all traditionally used pasture over the border. The Kenyan authorities wanted the Laitayok and Salei returned to Kenya but they wanted to remain in Tanganyika Maasailand. The Kenyan authorities pressurised the Tanganyikan government to return them. The DC for Tanganyika Maasailand wrote sarcastically, the problem is "a disinclination on the part of the Masai to resume enjoyment of the delights of residence under that enlightened native policy which our Northern neighbours so frequently tell us about: the position however is the same, and I hope we shall not be obliged to drive them out at the point of the bayonet." These Maasai "are exceedingly affable to us because for ten years we have left them to do exactly as they pleased".⁵⁷ The Dar es Salaam government suggested that some military demonstrations in the area would be useful, but such gunboat diplomacy was ruled out by the local officials.

Case Study One: Migration of the Purko and Loita into Sonjo District

G.A. Webster, the Acting PC for Northern Province threw himself into his temporary role and attempted to research the migration of the Purko and Loita Maasai of Kenya Colony into the Sonjo area of Tanganyika Territory. The Purko and Loita first arrived in 1921, with the permission of the friend of the Maasai, E.D. Browne, who at that time was DC for Arusha. This was never reported to Dar, and only came

⁵⁶ KNA: DC/KSI/1/4. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 1935.

⁵⁷ TNA: TS10298/I : 93, 17th October 1927. Letter from PC Mitchell, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

to light when the veterinary officer for Northern Province, McCall, discovered pleuropneumonia 100 miles south of the Kenyan border in 1927.⁵⁸ The Chief Secretary complained about the Browne's actions; it was at this time that Browne disappears from the area, and he was presumably transferred elsewhere. A patrol under the new DO, Kitching, went in May 1927 to see if the Loita and Purko were there. Upon their arrival, the bomas had been hastily evacuated, but in the vicinity of Loliondo, warriors gathered to face the patrol, but negotiation led to talks.⁵⁹ The Maasai told the DO that they had believed the patrol was a cattle raid, and that some of their bomas had actually been in the area since 1916, tying in with the period of greatest drought. The patrol removed the people to Kenya, but they returned once the patrol moved on.⁶⁰

Kitching went back to the Maasai and informed them that Kenya-Tanganyika talks and then Kenya-Tanganyika-Maasai talks would have to take place, and emphasized that no hurried actions would be taken that would cause hardship.⁶¹ However, in the meantime, other unnamed government officials met the Maasai and informed them that migration was permitted if they paid tax in Tanganyika.⁶² This lack of co-ordination in government policy merely encouraged the Maasai to believe that they could manipulate officials. Kitching continued his pro-active line, the exact position of the boundary was checked and boundary cairns were re-built. It was discovered that the Kenyan government had regarded the boundary as lying some fifteen miles south of the official boundary, and that "the Kenya Government had for some years been administering a part of Tanganyika".⁶³ A stock inspection of Sonjo area revealed eighty-one kraals

⁵⁸ TNA: TS10298/I: 281, 22nd August 1928. Letter from the Acting PC for Northern Province, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁵⁹ TNA: TS10298/I: 284, 22nd August 1928. See Note 58.

⁶⁰ TNA: TS10298/I: 286, 21st August 1928. "Report on the Migration of Purko and Loita Masai of Kenya Colony into the Sonjo Area of the Tanganyika Territory", by G. Webster, Acting PC for Northern Province.

⁶¹ TNA: TS10298/I: 287, 21st August 1928. See Note 60.

⁶² TNA: TS10298/I: 289, 21st August 1928. See Note 60.

⁶³ TNA: TS10298/I: 291, 21st August 1928. See Note 60.

with 56,000 head of Kenya Maasai cattle, but only sixty-one were infected with rinderpest or bovine pleuro-pneumonia. The differences in approach and attitude of the DCs was massive. That the change of one official could so dramatically change the position along the most troublesome quarter of the Kenya-Tanganyika boundary, shows the power of the isolated European officials on the ground. That Browne's permission for the Loita and Purko and their 56,000 cattle to stay took six years to be discovered emphasises the isolated nature of the terrain and the thin spread of manpower.

Case Study Two: Loita Maasai in Lake Natron area

Prompted by the discoveries of Webster and McCall, the Acting DO of Maasai District, Murrells, toured the border in early 1928 and found Maasai kraals at the southern end of Lake Natron. All the Maasai said they were Kissongo who were considered to be Tanganyika Maasai, although in fact they were mixed Kissongo and Kenyan Loita. Mr Murrells informed them that Kenyan Maasai could either stay in Tanganyika and pay Tanganyikan taxes or return to Kenya.⁶⁴ Great movements of Kenyan Maasai followed in different directions and many moved further into Tanganyika.⁶⁵ Murrells gradually gained the confidence of the Purko and Loita in the area and before the year was out, they were bringing their disputes to him for adjudication and he was invited to attend circumcisions.⁶⁶ While staying with a group of Loita, Murrells gained information which is key to this entire thesis. The Maasai gave him their reasons for migration into Tanganyika at various times over previous

⁶⁴ TNA: TS10298/I: 297, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60.

⁶⁵ TNA: TS10298/I: 299, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60.

⁶⁶ TNA: TS10298/I: 299-300, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60.

decades, although his interviewees, friends and informants obviously had their own purposes to serve.⁶⁷ Their reasons were as follows:

- a) Restriction of tribal lands by alienation for various reasons.
- b) Curtailment and abolition of customs like carrying shields and white spears.
- c) Hatred or fear of Sendeyo, the Loita Ol Laibon.
- d) Quarrels between Sendeyo and one of his sons, which persuaded the son to take the Laitaiyok and Saleh over to Tanganyika.
- e) Drought caused migration in search of pastures and water.
- f) Resentment at the alienation of lands like Nau and Kinabop.
- g) Pressure by the Purko.
- h) The return of people like the Laitaiyok and Saleh to their ancestral lands in Tanganyika.
- i) They had asked for veterinary assistance and this had been denied by the Kenyan authorities
- j) Penetration of the Mara River area in Kenya by tsetse fly.

Murrells checked these claims with Tanganyikan and Kenyan officials, and all seemed to be valid. Various observations can be made on these reasons, some of which were also supported by Murrells:

- c): Sendeyo appeared to be hated by all sections of the Maasai, including most of the Loita. He was believed to have caused the death of the Tanganyika Ol Laibon, Parit, who was also his nephew, in January 1928.⁶⁸ This shows the extent to which the different sub-sections intermixed.

⁶⁷ TNA: TS10298/I: 300-302, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60.

⁶⁸ TNA: TS10298/I: 302, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60.

g) In 1889 there was a great battle at Elanairobi near Ngorongoro. The Loita, the greatest of the Maasai groups, lost almost all their cattle to the Purko. The Loita had since built up their herds again and had therefore returned to their former areas.⁶⁹

h) The Laitaiyok and Saleh had lost many cattle and men to the Loita, but had been driven out by the Germans. They rebuilt their herds and returned to their ancestral homes from 1916 onwards. This shows the failure of attempting to encapsulate Maasai geopolitics in a snapshot picture.

i) It seems possible that this comment was tongue in cheek, but it was actually given as one of the main reasons for migrating; a group suffering heavy losses to disease may have been attracted by veterinary help in Tanganyika.⁷⁰ At any rate, it indicates great awareness of differences in Kenyan and Tanganyikan policy.

j) "The only boundary which the Masai really respect is tsetse fly".⁷¹ It is true that all sections of the Maasai were greatly effected by environmental problems and showed an almost total disregard for the Tanganyika-Kenya border well into the period of British rule. Even when they did begin to pay more attention, it was as much in exploiting the boundary than in being restricted by it.

In general, Murrells' discussions indicate that African politics and migrations were as complicated as those in Europe. Attributing cross-border migration during this period to tax differentials or the search for grazing rarely tells the whole story. Nearly all the Maasai groups which Murrells stayed with, stated that they would like to return to Kenya, but that if conditions were bad, they would return to Tanganyika. They recognised that this could be an annual process, and that increasing colonial control would make it difficult, so they would therefore choose to stay in Tanganyika.⁷² This

⁶⁹ TNA: TS10298/I: 303, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60.

⁷⁰ TNA: TS10298/I: 304, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60.

⁷¹ TNA: TS10298/I: 304, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60.

⁷² TNA: TS10298/I: 307, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60.

demonstrates great Maasai awareness of the boundary, its function and value, and of the differences between Kenyan and Tanganyikan policy.

This was a rare example of a colonial administrator gaining the trust of an African group, then asking them what they thought of the boundary and recording it officially. On another occasion, a more aggressive DC in Pare District asked some Kenyan Maasai in the Kiria area in 1940, why they didn't return. They replied that it was because the boundary river was in flood. The poor grazing in the area of Maasailand to where they would have been removed seems a more likely suggestion, but the DO for Same was convinced by the river story.⁷³ Such brief, simplistic reasons may have been genuine, but it seems more likely that the lack of understanding between this particular Maasai group and the DC led to them giving him a reason they thought he wanted; that is, the high river would not last long and then they would leave. This at least would put off confrontation for a time.

The role of the DC

The role of the man on the ground has been discussed in some depth already, but it is worth citing several further cases. One ADO for Maasailand had an African staff of one Kissongo and many Purko and Loita. His every move was predicted by the Maasai groups whom he visited and he knew that his staff must be to blame. He could trust the Kissongo man, but doubted the rest. "I propose to wait my time and dismiss them for misbehaviour or other pretext; it is not proposed to dismiss them en bloc, as they will undoubtedly return to their bomas and air a grievance against me personally or the

⁷³ TNA: Dist 723/I: 53, 10th January 1940. Letter from L.H.L. Fost, PC, to the PC for Northern Province.

Government".⁷⁴ The DC's staff were very often locals, and he had to be very careful in how he treat them.

In-depth sociological or economic studies were normally carried out by interested DOs during the 1920s, as they did everything else. After the Second World War, professionals were more likely to be drafted in. H.A. Forsbrooke, the Senior Sociologist was called in to write a report on the presence of Maasai in Same District in October 1951.⁷⁵ Forsbrooke appears to have had knowledge of Maa, of pastoralism and of 'hamitic' cultures. He interviewed various Maasai elders and studied place names, and concluded that the Maasai had been present in the Toloha area from pre-colonial times, through the German period and up to 1951.

Other areas of responsibility were environmental concerns and policing. Lumley was DC at Mbulu between Lakes Eyasi and Manyara for a time. He wanted to relocate some of the Barabaig and Irakh to Mbulumbui, to the north, because of overgrazing (Lumley, 1976: 91). He applied for a three man police post for the area and intended to set up posts on high ground overlooking the area. His proposal was turned down by the PC who believed that the Irakh should look after themselves (Lumley, 1976: 92). The DC could move whole societies, yet was refused his request for three policemen (Lumley, 1976: 164). Lumley had been forced to ask his PC for permission as such a post would involve a substantial financial outlay. Where finance was not involved he and many others acted without involving the higher authorities.

⁷⁴ TNA: Dist 7/III: 38-9, 28th April 1930. "Report on Inter-Colonial Boundary Affairs", from the ADO for Loliondo, to the DO for Lolbene.

⁷⁵ TNA: Dist 723/III: 475-480, October 1951. Report "The Masai in Same District" by H.A. Fosbrooke, Senior Sociologist.

The Concessions

After 1927-28, the policies of both governments became more pragmatic. They could not hope to impose a watertight boundary and environmental and humanitarian considerations demanded that some form of cross-border movement be permitted. Several Maasai groups did not have access to water supplies and grazing at certain times of the year without crossing the border, and the Kenyan Maasai in particular required access to Tanganyikan resources. The Tanganyikan authorities conceded that the Matapatu Maasai had enjoyed the grazing in Tanganyika since "time immemorial" and that in the borderlands as a whole, it would be too expensive to locate new water supplies.⁷⁶ Moreover, several Tanganyikan groups periodically used Kenyan resources. The Chagga used salt licks and grazing in Kenya,⁷⁷ the Matapatu used the Meto water in German times⁷⁸ and several Tanganyikan Maasai groups used Manga water in Kenya.

The Kenyan administration seem to have swung the argument in their direction by arguing that Maasai "rights in this respect were recognised and admitted by the German Administration and it would be a matter of deep regret if the withdrawal of the concessions gave them cause to regard their treatment by His Majesty's Government as less generous and equitable than that accorded them under that regime".⁷⁹ As has already been seen, German tolerance of Kenyan Maasai in DOA was often very limited, but it does seem that the sheer lack of manpower meant that the existence of

⁷⁶ TNA: TS10298/II: 462, 26th November 1934. Letter from the Acting Colonial Secretary, Kenya, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

Another fine example of romanticising the situation.

⁷⁷ TNA: TS10298/II: 366, 21st November 1930. Report of a Veterinary Meeting at Loitokitok.

⁷⁸ TNA: TS10298/II: 452, 18th September 1934. Letter from the PC for Northern Province to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁷⁹ TNA: TS10298/II: 466, 26th November 1934. Letter from the Acting Colonial Secretary, Kenya, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

such Maasai within the borders of DOA often went unnoticed or was not acted upon. A formal agreement was, however, something new.

A handful of potential water, grazing and salt lick concessions were identified. The reports on these concessions on Tanganyikan soil demonstrate that what historical evidence exists shows that the Kenya Maasai had generally greater access to the concessions than the Tanganyika Maasai and "tends to show that the Matapata territory extended for some distance across the border and included the waterholes".⁸⁰ To introduce such concessions would in some ways compromise the western concept of the division of political space which the colonial powers were fighting to impose, but their introduction shows that the authorities were not entirely intransigent on this issue.

Four concessions were introduced in 1928: Sinya, Manga and Metu which survived into the post-Second World War years and the Ronya (Kilimanjaro) concessions which were cancelled within three years because of the creation of a forest reserve.⁸¹ It was agreed that the Kenya Maasai must pay a nominal rent in respect of each of the grazing areas, to indicate that they were not there by right. One heifer each was paid for Rongai and Meto concessions to a Tanganyikan Maasai Laibon.⁸² At Namanga, where Manga water lay, Kenya wanted access to water and grazing, but Tanganyika was only prepared to offer only water access. This seems absurd as good grazing often lay next to water supplies, and it would be impossible to stop the cattle from eating while they were drinking. The Tanganyikan government reasoned that mingling between Kenyan and Tanganyikan cattle at Manga water would help to spread disease and that if the

⁸⁰ TNA: TS10298/II: 465, 26th November 1934. See Note 79.

⁸¹ TNA: TS10298/II: 416-7, 28th April 1934. "Water Concessions Granted to Kenya Masai" by the Department of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry.

⁸² CO691/100/21: 41. "Note of the Conversation at the Office of the Chief Native Commissioner, Nairobi, 22nd November, 1927 - 10am" by P.E. Mitchell, Acting PC for Northern Province.

cattle were only watered at the site, then it would be easier to prevent interaction. However, the Kenyan government agreed to pay for demarcation around the concession⁸³ and introduced a cattle fence to keep the cattle off most of the grazing on their way to the water, to create a channel leading to the water. Within a short period, however, this became impractical; the fences became damaged by wild animals and the cost of repairs was rather high.⁸⁴

By 1933, the concessions were being given as the main reason for the failure to introduce a cattle free zone. Wherever a cattle free zone was set up, some important water sources would lie within it, thereby not being available to either side⁸⁵ In a region as bereft of water resources as Maasailand, this would not have been a popular decision. Drought in 1933 caused the Tanganyikan PC to ask his Kenyan opposite number to withdraw the Meto concession because of the needs of the Tanganyikan Maasai, but he refused to do so. Tanganyikan officials therefore gave Tanganyikan Maasai use of the waters as well.⁸⁶ With both groups of Maasai now in the same area, the rinderpest which was prevalent in Kenya spread more easily. In addition, the Tanganyika Maasai asked for the withdrawal of the concession; they had been subjected to raids by the Kenya Maasai to whom they had granted the favour.⁸⁷ Also, the *hongo* had not been paid, and they had had their waters and grazing in Forest Reserves, such as Rotian on Kilimanjaro, withdrawn from them.⁸⁸

⁸³ TNA: TS10298/II: 462, 26th November 1934. See Note 79.

⁸⁴ TNA: TS10298: 11, 13th July 1927. "Memorandum on Tanganyika-Kenya boundary problems" by PC Mitchell of Northern Province, sent to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁸⁵ TNA: TS10298/II: 413, 28th April 1934. See Note 81.

⁸⁶ TNA: TS10298/II: 416, 28th April 1934. See Note 81.

⁸⁷ CO691/141/12: 41, 4th August 1934. From Mitchell, Acting Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, to the Colonial Secretariat, Kenya

⁸⁸ TNA: TS10298/II: 418, 28th April 1934. See Note 81.

However, the Kenyan Maasai regarded these waters as theirs by inheritance, and Tanganyikan demands in 1934 that Sinya and Manga concessions be withdrawn immediately and Metu after one year were not received gratefully by the Kenyan DC.⁸⁹ The Kenyan government would not commit to evacuating the concessions, arguing that the grazing in that part of Kenyan Maasailand was worse than in Tanganyika.⁹⁰ The Tanganyikan PC believed the Manga concession should continue with a corridor of access, along the lines of the previous attempts with fences. He believed that the Sinya and Meto concessions should be removed, as more water supplies could be found on the Kenyan side, obviating the need to bring cattle over the border. Kenya claimed this as a prescription right from German times,⁹¹ and refused to withdraw the concession.

The concessions were maintained until after the Second World War, although they were occasionally withdrawn in theory by the Tanganyikan government in times of plenty in Kenya or of extreme drought in Tanganyika. It is interesting to note that the argument came down time and again to the pre-colonial state of affairs, and each side used the pre-colonial situation to justify their claims. That the Tanganyikans decided whether or not to support the concessions based upon environmental conditions during a single year, demonstrates the inferiority of the western system of dividing political space and determining access, in comparison with the pastoralist system of flexibility and adaptability. The pastoralist model, however, caused its proponents to pay a heavy price, in terms of cattle raiding and the conflict over resources which often developed. In time of need, when two groups had traditionally had the right to use the same water source, as at Matapato,⁹² military strength always won out and might was always

⁸⁹ TNA: TS10298/II: 413, 28th April 1934. See Note 81.

⁹⁰ TNA: TS10298/II: 451, 18th September 1934. Letter from the PC for Northern Province, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁹¹ TNA: TS10298/II: 453, 18th September 1934. See Note 90.

⁹² CO691/141/12: 46, 28th November 1934. From A.D.V. Wade, Acting Colonial Secretary, Kenya, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

right. Ironically enough, this was the same principle which led to the colonial occupation of East Africa and the imposition of the colonial boundaries. Everything was different but nothing had changed.

Case Study Three: the Toloha Maasai

Further to the east, around the shores of Lake Jipe and right on the border, the Toloha Maasai lived almost undisturbed by the boundary and by the colonial powers. They were known to both the British and the German authorities and by 1910 were already being seen as British Maasai.⁹³ They continued to live unnoticed until after the German period, although they were known by the Chagga, who used the territory around the lake as a hunting area. The northern and eastern shores of Lake Jipe lay in Kenya and the rest in Tanganyika, so defining them as either Kenyan or Tanganyikan could not have been logically possible. It seems that because there was no colonial presence or awareness, the Toloha, unlike the larger Maasai clans to west, were not aware of the border.

Tanganyikan DCs identified the Toloha in 1923, but it was not until 1933 that central government first learned about them, at which point the Kenyan authorities asked them to end their "trespass".⁹⁴ They were requested to return to Tanganyika with their 9,000 cattle and warned that they would not be allowed to graze or take water in future.⁹⁵ This proved impossible for the Toloha to do, as the Tanganyikan shores of Lake Jipe were now dominated by thick-growing reeds which made it impossible for the cattle to approach the water from that side.

⁹³ RKA: R1001 633: 199, 6th August 1909. Report on Kilimanjaro area by Methner.

⁹⁴ TNA: Dist S7/1/II: 407, 18th August 1948. Letter from Davies, PC for Coastal Province, to the PC for Tanga.

⁹⁵ TNA: Dist 723/I: 69, 26th June 1945. "Masai at Toloha" from an unknown source at Tanga, to the Director of Veterinary Services, Mpwapwa".

There was a concerted campaign by the Kenyan authorities and several local Tanganyikan officials from 1933 onwards to remove the Toloha Maasai, either to Maasailand or the lower Ruvu valley.⁹⁶ The Tanganyikans suggested that water should be piped into the Toloha area, but this was ruled out on grounds of cost. In 1948 the Kenyan PC for Coastal Province, Forster, recommended using police to round them up at Taveta next year and returning them to Tanganyika.⁹⁷ He attempted to use the 1948 census figures to support his assertion that they were Tanganyikan Maasai, but the census figures on pastoralists were often widely inaccurate. At the time of the 1948 census, it was not clear if the Toloha Masai were in Same District or over the border in Kenya.⁹⁸ Pressure for action built up until the Kenyan authorities finally seized some Toloha cattle in 1952. A trespass case was heard in the Kenyan courts and the seizure of cattle approved.

Tanganyikan officials accused the Kenyans of being heavy-handed, and the DC for Lushoto made several complaints which were supported by his PC. Firstly, more than five hundred cattle were taken, a far higher number than claimed in court and a disproportionate punishment. Secondly, fourteen people were arrested and charged, but the cattle were seized from only two men: five from Lasipitchi Ole Balidore and the rest from Lobitora Ole Sorisi.⁹⁹ Finally, the Toloha claimed that the calves were separated from the cows and therefore died.¹⁰⁰ In addition, further discrepancies can be pointed out: half of the accused were not made aware of their right to appeal; the price of 39407/- for the 500 cattle at 79/- per cow was very low; and one of the

⁹⁶ TNA: Dist 723/II: 211-7. "Precis of Correspondence" from 9th May 1933 to 13th October 1948. No author given.

⁹⁷ TNA: Dist S7/1/II: 406, 6th September 1948. "Tanganyika Masai - Trespass in Kenya" by P.F. Foster, PC for Coast Province. Sent to the PC for Tanga.

⁹⁸ TNA: Dist 723/III: 475, October 1951. Report "The Masai in Same District" by H.A. Fosbrooke, Senior Sociologist.

⁹⁹ TNA: Dist 723/III: 423. Undated, unauthored report "Masai, Katemboi Report".

¹⁰⁰ TNA: Dist 723/III: 423-4. See Note 99.

accused, Nete Ole Maina, was only ten years old and under Maasai custom, he almost certainly possessed no cattle.¹⁰¹

Thanks to the intervention of the Tanganyikan officials and their solicitors W.P. Holder & Co, the Maasai received compensation. Lobitor Ole Sorisi was given 15,000/- compensation immediately, and up to 82,098/- in total, when the figures had been worked out.¹⁰² The Tanganyika government had fought for the rights of the Maasai; and the Kenyan authorities seem to have known that they had acted wrongly, as they agreed not to seize cattle in that way again. The PC for Coast Province in Kenya assured the PC for Tanga that no more raids would be carried out until the boundary was clear on the ground.¹⁰³ Indeed, the DC for Voi wrote that in his opinion, the Toloha Maasai should still have access to northern Lake Jipe, and that the proposed National Park boundary in Kenya must exclude the area. Otherwise "the inter-territorial boundary must be amended to coincide with the de facto boundary".¹⁰⁴ In general, the Tanganyikan authorities seemed more prepared to defend African cultural and economic systems than their northern neighbours. It would be interesting to know if such border irregularities would have been tolerated if Kenya had not been a British colony.

¹⁰¹ TNA: Dist 723/III: 424. See Note 99.

¹⁰² TNA: Dist 723/III: 551, 9th November 1953. Letter entitled "re: Compensation for Masai cattle seized on the Kenya border", sent from W.P. Holder, a solicitor, to the PC for Tanga

¹⁰³ TNA: Dist 723/III: 365-6, undated. "Note on Impounding, in March 1952, of 500 cattle at Katemboi by DC Voi".

¹⁰⁴ TNA: Dist 723/II: 366. See note 103.

Restrictions on entry to Maasailand and reserves

International boundaries were not the only boundaries which pastoralists tried to overcome and which were defended by the colonialists. Game reserves, forest reserves and restrictions on entry into Maasailand added to the policy of control of the movement of people and cattle. Control and sedentarisation were attempted partly to ensure taxes were collected, partly to prevent crime and partly because of the potential for more widespread conflict if groups such as the Purko were allowed to move about unhindered. Another reason was the prevention of the spread of disease, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

A Maasai reserve was created in BEA at the turn of the century; it defined the territory within which the Maasai were free to roam and excluded certain areas which they had previously used. The Germans introduced their own version in 1906, but according to the British it was "badly conceived" in that it excluded several key water resources.¹⁰⁵ The Germans planned to improve it but the war intervened, and it was left to Byatt to extend it after the war. The Germans had created a neutral zone between the northern boundary of their Maasai reserve and the Anglo-German boundary; Byatt's change abolished this zone, thereby rejoining the two Maasai reserves.¹⁰⁶ This can be seen as an instance of the divisive nature of the border being reduced because both territories were ruled by the same power. The reserve was administered from Arusha by the PC who had two administrative officers working solely on Maasailand.¹⁰⁷ Several small scale forest reserves were also introduced between 1905 and 1930, but entry by the Maasai was common. It was not until 1924

¹⁰⁵ CO691/86/6: 3, 11th September 1926. "Memorandum in regard [sic.] to the Masai Question". No author given.

¹⁰⁶ CO691/86/6: 3-4, 11th September 1926. See Note 105.

¹⁰⁷ CO691/86/6: 3, 11th September 1926. See Note 105.

that enforcement became widespread, and Kenyan Maasai were arrested and punished for continued trespass in the forest reserve on the Tanganyikan side of the boundary.

The authorities on both sides of the border introduced by-laws to control the movement of people from the jurisdiction of one headman to another as well as across the international boundary. One man was arrested in the late 1920s on his way to sell honey at the Lolgorien Mine, as he didn't have a letter of admittance to Maasailand. He himself stated that it was because "any umuKuria heading towards Lolgorien was suspected of stock theft".¹⁰⁸ One by-law of 1951 in South Nyanza stated that no man could move from the jurisdiction of one headman to that of another without a permit, and no cattle could be moved between seven o'clock in the evening and five in the morning.¹⁰⁹ This was typical of by-laws aimed at preventing raiding, but they were widely disobeyed by Maasai who knew how and when to move to avoid detection.

It was not only pastoralists who were restricted in their movements in and around Maasailand. Previous policy had been to keep non-Maasai out of Maasailand but by 1945 'alien' settlements existed. Sikh traders had moved into certain areas and fighting had broken out with the Maasai.¹¹⁰ Many Purko - the bad men of the Maasai - had been migrating into the area from Kenya since the 1920s, although the other Maasai in Loliondo area, the Kisongo and Kiteo, were more reasonable. The Sikhs were blamed by the local DC, Robinson, but he had no power to evict them.¹¹¹ It seems that they moved on of their own accord. Nyamwezi and other groups had begun migrating to the village of Mto-wa-Mbu in particular, and it proved impossible to keep them out. The Maasai paid 15/- tax and aliens 12/-, although the local DC wanted to make both

¹⁰⁸ Kjerland, 1995: 89.

¹⁰⁹ KNA: DC/NZA/2/1/213. South Nyanza District Council Minutes 1951.

¹¹⁰ TNA: TS33146: 1A-2, 14th May 1945. Unknown author; sent to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

¹¹¹ TNA: TS33146: P1A, 30th April 1945. Letter from I.L. Robinson, DO for Masailand, to the PC for Northern Province.

up to 15/- to discourage immigration.¹¹² However, this would have recognised migration into Maasailand, and so was not implemented.¹¹³

Post-World War Two policy

In the years following the end of the Second World War, perhaps because of the reduced manpower of the war years, stock theft, including cross border theft, became an increasing problem. The Suna police post in Kenya was moved to Kehancha and an Assistant Inspector of Police was stationed in the heart of buKuria-Kenya in 1947, where they would be, "better situated to deal with stock theft on the Tanganyika Border".¹¹⁴ However, by 1949 raids across the border between the Maasai and abaKuria, by groups of up to 1000 men showed the uselessness of such a small post (Kjerland, 1995: 106). Assistant Inspector MacKenzie who was in charge of the post had his number of constables increased from four to sixteen. Their job "was to try to close the border with Tanganyika, trace the stock and find the guilty", and collective punishments were given in order to put pressure on the offenders to stop. In addition, "a border-committee was established between the buKuria and the Luo-Suba locations",¹¹⁵ and the authorities attempted to stop illegal trading by branding.¹¹⁶ Some groups began to forge stock brands, and although this was severely punished (Brown, 1958: 25-33).

¹¹² TNA: TS33146: 8-9, 8th August 1945. Letter from Bruce Hutt, PC for Northern Province, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

¹¹³ Today, Mto-wa-Mbu contains representatives from almost every ethnic group in Tanzania. It has the feel of a frontier town, although the Maasai continue to make up a sizeable portion of the population (From personal observation in the modern-day town).

¹¹⁴ KNA: DC/KSI/1/8, undated report "An Outline of the History of the District", South Kavirondo, Kenya. Written by M.P. Gordon.

¹¹⁵ Kjerland, 1995: 107.

¹¹⁶ TNA: Acc.544, Dist L5/10/II, undated. "Stock Theft and Raids within North Mara District, 1955-1967".

Local people lost faith in the ability of the police to act on raids and therefore often didn't even report thefts. Despite increased manpower in the Kenyan borderlands, the lack of resources, policemen and the scarcity of routine patrols made it an impossible task (Kjerland, 1995: 110). R.E.S. Tanner had been an officer in Musoma District and wrote a piece on cattle theft in Musoma in the late 1950s. He records that many raids were not reported; during the year 1958/9, he identified 447 raids, of which the police knew of about only fifty (Tanner, 1966: 31). He visited each chiefdom each month, and with the help of headsmen and elected councillors recorded cattle theft cases. The great problem with these figures is that no similar surveys have been carried out before or since, but it is useful to note that official figures on raiding offer little or no guide to the extent of the problem.

"Apparent general lawlessness" on the Maasai border prompted local administrative officers from Kenya and Tanganyika to hold discussions to consider control. Very close co-operation was proposed between the two police forces, "to prevent the border area being considered as a refuge",¹¹⁷ and near reciprocal powers were granted to the police forces. Despite this, the complexity of the area continued to thwart control. The Loliondo area continued to be populated by Loita and Purko, whose leaders remained in the Narok District of Kenya. The police forces wanted border restrictions to be removed and government to be strengthened, thereby unifying the colonial presence in the area. This did not prove to be possible, but Tanganyikan police did serve with the Kenyan forces and vice versa.

The balance of problems seemed to be moving from the far west and the Serengeti in the 1920s to Taveta and Lake Jipe in the 1950s. To take one example, at the start of 1951 an unknown group of Maasai rustled twenty-five Pare cattle, killing the

¹¹⁷ TNA: TS34276: 21st January 1946. Letter from Partridge, PC for Northern Province, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. NB: This is a very thin file - there are no page number.

herder.¹¹⁸ The Pare believed that the government was scared of the Maasai, and before they could act, the cattle were dispersed among various Maasai groups in Kenya and Tanganyika, indicating widespread collusion. Eventually Kenyan police traced the rustlers back into Kenya, to the area around Lake Jipe where the Toloha Maasai continued to be allowed to cross to water their animals, but not to graze.¹¹⁹ They found the Toloha with 7-8,000 head of Tanganyikan Maasai cattle, but they were being moved to the lake from inside Kenya, clearly abusing the unofficial concession. The DO charged them with the unlawful movement of stock under the Disease of Animal Rules, 1931, and they were fined, with 140 cattle taken in lieu of payment (after sale, any excess would be returned to the owners). Although the police were much better equipped in the 1950s than the 1920s - they were armed with automatic weapons, for example - it remained difficult for them to have much impact. One owner was said to have 12,000 head of cattle, and it was unlikely that such fines would have much effect upon him. It seems that checks were both random and seldom, and that the Maasai could take such losses occasionally.¹²⁰

More and more of the borderlands were turned into wildlife reserves during the post-war years, and step by step, the Maasai in particular were alienated from their traditional lands, in the often mistaken belief that they had a negative impact upon wildlife. The southern reserve of Kenya became Amboseli National Reserve in 1948, in the same year that the Masai Mara was also set up (Homewood, 1996: 125). In Tanganyika, the Serengeti/Ngorongoro area was awarded protected status in 1929, the Serengeti later becoming a national park and Ngorongoro a conservation area. In 1959, the Serengeti National Park was evacuated by the Maasai, but they were given

¹¹⁸ TNA: Dist 723/II: 312, 2nd January 1951. Letter from Ewart Grogan, DC for Taveta, to Thornley, an unknown DC.

¹¹⁹ TNA: Dist 723/II: 313, 19th January 1951. "Report on Lake Jipe Area", From E.G. Wright, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Mombasa, to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Mombasa.

¹²⁰ TNA: Dist 723/II: 314, 19th January 1951. See Note 119.

joint land use in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. Partly in return, the Maasai were permitted to remain in Mkomazi Game Reserve, permission which was revoked in 1976 (Homewood, 1996: 126). Ironically, the Maasai responded by attacking what they had formerly been accused of destroying. In Amboseli and probably elsewhere, the Maasai opposed restrictions, "by selectively killing the wildlife tourists most wanted to see" (Homewood, 1996: 126).

Conclusion

Pastoralism is a very strong way of life and colonialism had a fight on its hands in attempting to impose linear boundaries. Problems of control largely stemmed from the pastoralists' lifestyle. Moving across international boundaries, usually accompanied by thousands of cattle, they did not recognise any authority but their own. In continuing with their cattle-raiding traditions, they effectively thumbed their noses at the colonialists. Pastoral groups were affected to a great extent by the boundaries, but only after a long struggle and they were never controlled as easily as non-pastoralist groups. Even during the 1927-late 1930s period of concerted British efforts to impose control, the colonialists eventually gave it up as a lost cause, settling for countering the most negative implications of the cross-border movements. Indeed, the periodic calls for the reunification of Maasailand seem to have developed less out of concern for the Maasai, but rather from frustration over the colonial inability to impose the border. If such a policy had been put into practice, it would have been one of the few cases of abandoning a linear boundary as unworkable.

In such a remote area, there could be no effective boundary where borderlanders opposed it and the rule of law was weak. Despite the great increase in manpower at the end of 1928, colonial control remained weak and in several cases the location of the boundary remained unknown by the colonial officials of both sides. The colonial

authorities also seem to have been somewhat ignorant with regards to why the Maasai crossed the boundary. The many reasons given by the Loita demonstrate the complexity of the situation - it was not merely a matter of paying lower taxes.

The pastoralists and colonialists had great influence upon each other. Pastoralist reaction to colonial rule and colonial boundaries provoked repeated change in colonial policy, as the colonialists struggled to keep control of the borderlands. The failure of attempts to impose the boundary forced the colonialists to take more conciliatory steps, such as the introduction of the grazing, water and salt lick concessions. The Inter-Colonial Native Court on the boundary was another attempt at compromise. Colonial efforts were further complicated by the unpredictable effect of their policies. Attempts to divide the Maasai into Kenyan and Tanganyikan Maasai had the effect of producing yet more subgroups and provided further impetus for cattle raiding. Indeed, government sociologist Hans Cory went further in doubting the effectiveness of the boundary, stating that it was not a boundary to thieves, simply a boundary to those administering justice. The western system of boundaries was not suited to the Tanganyika-Kenya borderlands. The division of a group elsewhere in East Africa may not have been so important, but here, through the heartland of Maasai territory, it was unworkable. Access to water and grazing was vital, and the location of these resources moved from season to season and year to year.

Maasai culture was able to survive colonial rule but in a much altered form. The Maasai never came to dominate the Rift area as they had done in the years before partition and the great disasters of the 1880s and the 1890s, but this had as much to do with the impact of the disasters themselves and changes in the balance of power among African groups, as it was the result of colonialism. In many ways, it is difficult to distinguish the impact of the colonial boundaries from that of colonial rule in general. However, one of the most striking features of pastoralist society is freedom of movement, and the imposition of the DOA-BEA boundary upon lands occupied by the

Maasai and upon the existing political map, partly removed this freedom of movement from thousands of people. The numbers of people who appeared to have previously used water and grazing resources which now lay across the border bear testament to that. Of course many groups must have used the boundary as an excuse to gain access to resources, particularly over the issue of the concessions, but there were also others, such of the Toloha Maasai, who moved across the boundary at will for many years after partition. Moreover, the vast majority of raids continued to go unnoticed and unpunished throughout the colonial period. As always, the boundaries impacted upon different people in different ways, and only the very broadest trends can be identified. In order to expand upon the relationship between pastoralism and boundaries, and to further examine the impact of rinderpest on the Maasai, the next chapter will discuss the use of the colonial boundaries to control disease in East Africa.

CHAPTER NINE: DISEASE CONTROL

"They will marry and I fear love will laugh at Veterinary guards!"

(The Provincial Commissioner, Mwanza, responding to a plan for more stringent enforcement of the boundary dividing the Bakuria).¹

Despite the best efforts of the colonial medical and veterinary services, social and economic interaction across the borders of East Africa continued to ensure the influx of many of the most dreaded diseases of the age. The international boundaries were porous to a very large degree - as they remain today - yet they remained the weapon of choice of the Tanganyikan authorities against the massive threat posed by human and animal pathogens. As will be seen in the paragraphs which follow, this was not always the case with the other British territories in Africa. Animal disease was a massive problem in eastern Africa, and is by far the most pertinent issue with regard to the study of the role of boundaries. While the colonialists could at least attempt to control stock movements, human migrations were much more difficult to curb, but on balance, disease control throughout much of Africa could be summed up in one word - rinderpest. Rinderpest was and is a virulent disease which infects and kills large numbers of domesticated animals, particularly cattle, as well as many types of wild animals. The great numbers of pastoralists and semi- or agro-pastoralists who depended upon cattle for their survival made this a pressing issue.

The study of rinderpest and other disease policies are examples of the use of boundaries as functions of political control, as well as of socio-economic and veterinary control. The main problem regarding the control of rinderpest in Tanganyika was that as was seen in the previous chapter, the Kenya and Tanganyika Maasai, freely

¹ TNA: TS11910: 43, 4th September 1928. Letter from the PC for Musoma, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

mixed together in using borderland water resources and grazing. At the same time, the respective cattle and rinderpest policies of the two governments were widely divergent. The disease could therefore easily be passed from Kenya, where the disease persisted as a major problem throughout most of the colonial period, to Tanganyika, where government efforts periodically virtually eradicated the disease. Discussing the best anti-rinderpest policy is not the purpose of this chapter; rather it is to determine the use of the boundary in this dispute. Most colonial documentation on this issue is concentrated in the years 1927-28 and 1931, when the best efforts of the Tanganyikan veterinary service were undone by the recurrence of the disease. According to the Tanganyikan authorities, this was because of the ineffectiveness of Kenyan policy.

Eradication or control of rinderpest was important to the colonial governments for various reasons. Firstly, the economy of the whole territory could be affected by a severe outbreak. Secondly, it destabilised people who depended upon cattle, causing migration on the scale of that in the 1880s. Finally, British plans for the economic development of Tanganyika were heavily dependent upon the development of industries that were based upon local agricultural production. As far as cattle were concerned, they hoped to set up a meat industry, a dairy industry and then meat export industry.² This was never achieved on any great scale, partly because fears over rinderpest stunted the development of a meat industry during the key early years of British rule in the territory.

² CO691/141/12: 3, 1st January 1935. Mr Stockdale to unknown correspondent. Compares Kenyan and Tanganyikan rinderpest policies.

The Environment and the Nature of Rinderpest

The environmental context within which this study is set is a very harsh one. Much of Africa, including the savannah, lake areas and coast of East Africa, has seen an unequal battle as man has struggled to impose his will upon his environment and thereby increase his numbers. Some commentators have attributed the low population density of East Africa to the effects that the slave trade and international, sea-based trade had on the spread of disease (Ferguson, 1979: 312-4). These undoubtedly played a role but such views underestimate the environmental difficulties experienced by East Africa before contacts with the wider world intensified.³ Part of that difficult environment was the range of diseases which could effect the people, animals and development of the continent, and which often shaped the course of its history.

European colonialism entered East Africa in the slipstream of rinderpest. During the 1880s and 1890s, the disease had rampaged down the eastern half of Africa from Ethiopia to South Africa. One of the most likely causes for the introduction of the disease into sub-Saharan Africa, was the import of cattle and horses into Ethiopia by the Italian army.⁴ This theory, however, has never been proven. As the disease had been able to move relatively freely across the continent, the new boundaries became pivotal in preventing or stemming further outbreaks. Pre-colonial methods of confining bovine infections - predominantly controlled burning which kept wildlife away, especially from river banks, as well as improving grazing - did not work (Giblin, 1992: 32-33).

One factor may have been the general unhealthy environment of the period. As has been repeatedly mentioned in this thesis, a series of human and animal diseases struck

³ Highlighted by Iliffe in his 1995 book, Africans: The History of a Continent.

⁴ The cattle and horses had been purchased in India.

the continent in the final third of the Nineteenth Century. General weakness caused by one disease makes people and animals alike more susceptible to another. Rinderpest may have struck particularly weakened cattle herds, which in turn impacted upon already weakened people.

Western technology did little to counter rinderpest for several decades. Tanganyikan anti-rinderpest policy following the Great War was hampered by two particularly difficult factors. Firstly, the disease lies in its endemic centres in a rather passive state for years and then "assumes a more virulent form and an epizootic character".⁵ The causes of epizootics are unknown. It was therefore difficult to know on a spatial level whether the disease had been contained, and if so, within which regions. Secondly, throughout the period of British colonial rule, Tanganyika formed a buffer between the healthy but susceptible cattle to the south and the diseased but inured cattle to the North.⁶ It was the front-line in the battle, and was the first to be struck when the disease regained its strength and made another assault southwards.

The German Years

German rule in Tanganyika was enabled by rinderpest, and during the early years of their rule, the Germans had neither the means nor the inclination to make any efforts to combat it. Within a few years, however, as greater strides were made to develop or exploit the colonial economy, it became apparent that measures were needed to keep rinderpest out. The Germans adopted two strategies. Firstly, they attempted to impose cattle free zones along the border with BEA.⁷ When the colonialists first came to

⁵ CO691/141/12: 71, 29th November 1934. From MacMichael, Governor of Tanganyika, to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies.

⁶ CO691/141/12: 76, 29th November 1934. See Note 5.

⁷ TNA: TS11910: 29, 14th February 1928. Letter from G.S. Cowin, Veterinary Officer at Musoma, to the Director of Veterinary Services, Dar es Salaam.

Maasailand, the Maasai had been dispersed by the cumulative shocks of the 1890s. The Germans therefore decided to maintain the "uninhabited wilderness" and attempted to restrict any movement by the Maasai back into the area.⁸ Further west, despite the presence of settlements along the border in the Mwanza area, they kept all Africans, houses and cattle back from the border, partly to prevent the spread of disease and partly in order to create a zone of division: in effect, they imposed the border. Prevention of disease appears to have mainly been the responsibility of local officers. Many areas had no veterinary officer, including the far north-west around Bukoba, where it was left up to the local officer to stem the incursion of rinderpest from Uganda in 1901.⁹

German strategy involved preventing the entry of diseased animals from elsewhere whilst stamping out the disease internally. The "Contagious Diseases in Animals Ordinance" of 1909 ordered the slaughter of diseased animals and the inoculation of healthy cases. In addition, it was decreed around 1910 that all livestock entering DOA from British East Africa should be imported via one of the seaports" (Brode, 1911: 40). Exceptions were possible but had to be recommended by the Imperial Consulate of Mombasa, and recommendations were only possible if animals had been inspected by veterinary officers. As a result of the wide and regular movements of cattle by Africans, this measure can only have been aimed at European import.

The level of success of German policy is difficult to estimate. No records of success could be identified in either the Berlin, the Zanzibar or the Dar es Salaam archives. In

TS10298/I: 3, 13th July 1927. "Memorandum on Tanganyika-Kenya boundary problems", by Mitchell, PC of Northern Province, sent to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁸ TNA: TS1010298/I: 3. See Note 7.

⁹ RKA: R1001 626: 122, 17th January 1901. Letter from A.C. Hollis, Acting British Vice Consul, Dar es Salaam, to Van Estorff, Major and Acting Governor of Deutsch Ostafrika.

addition, the post-war situation offers little assistance, in that the war had greatly disturbed veterinary practices, or in the case of the German system, ended them, while tens of thousands of cattle had been hurriedly taken into Tanganyika to support the British Empire forces present there. The level of rinderpest during the German period of rule does not seem to have struck German observers as being particularly high, but given the rampant levels of rinderpest which existed in the run-up to the colonial occupation, this is hardly surprising.

Early British Rule

When the dust had settled following the First World War and the British were properly able to assess their inheritance, they discovered that rinderpest had returned in force during the course of the war, that every district was infected, and that herds were rapidly decreasing.¹⁰ However, elements of the German anti-rinderpest policy remained. When Mr McGally, the Dar Director of Veterinary Services toured the Kenya-Tanganyika border in 1919, the neutral cattle free zone which had been established along the Kisii-Mtende border was still being observed.¹¹ When McCall, the Tanganyikan Director of Veterinary Services travelled along the Mwanza area border in 1920, he agreed with the Kenyan senior vet that the division of the abaKuria by the border could cause problems with future veterinary control.¹²

Under South African pressure and with South African help, a commission was set up to stop the spread of the disease into the colonies to the south of Tanganyika. A cattle free belt was created on the Northern Rhodesia-Tanganyika border and an

¹⁰ CO691/86/6: 18, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions". No author or correspondents given.

¹¹ CO691/86/6: 19, 11th June 1926. See Note 10.

¹² TNA: TS10298/I: 3, 13th July 1927. Memorandum on Tanganyika-Kenya boundary problems by PC Mitchell, Northern Province, sent to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

immune cattle belt was created to the north of this, through a technique known as rinderpest suppression. This involved double inoculation: a combination of immunisation and exposure to the real thing. While this created a largely healthy and protected population, it must have caused hardship among many African groups, as many cattle were lost and compensation was often felt to be inadequate, and so a great deal of bitter feeling was created.¹³ Northern Rhodesia was secured relatively quickly, and Tanganyika continued to follow a process of rinderpest suppression, in an attempt to force the southernmost extent of rinderpest infection progressively northwards. Progress was slow, but the battle was slowly won as district after district became relatively rinderpest free. Once the line reached the Kenyan border, however, no further progress could be made; the Kenyan authorities based their entire policy upon serum immunisation of animals in infected areas. As this kept infected animals alive, interaction along the inter-territorial boundary allowed repeated re-infection from Kenya. McCall wrote to the Kenyan veterinary officer in 1930 that Tanganyika felt it was its duty to protect the countries to the south and did so, even if it affected Tanganyikan cattle in the short term. He wrote that "Perhaps it is old-fashioned to hope that Kenya can do the same".¹⁴

It is difficult to determine exactly why the policies of the Kenyan and Tanganyikan governments varied so wildly but there are three possible contributory factors. Firstly, a far greater proportion of the colonial officers in Kenya than in Tanganyika had served in India, and Indian policy was strictly one of serum immunisation. Secondly, the lack of veterinary officers and other colonial manpower, together with more limited financial resources, made the Kenyan option financially unviable in Tanganyika. Finally, most of Tanganyika's neighbours had brought the disease under control either through

¹³ CO691/86/6: 19, 11th June 1926. See Note 10.

¹⁴ CO691/112/19: 40-2, 5th August 1930. Letter entitled "Operations against Rinderpest" from F.J. McCall, Director of Veterinary Services to the Acting Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

policy or good luck, so the policy of rinderpest suppression stood some chance of success. All of Kenya's other neighbours, however, continued to provide a ready reservoir for the disease. Moreover, the Tanganyikan authorities had experienced the benefits of a suppression policy in southern Africa and so had reason to believe it would succeed in their territory.

The Tanganyikan system was applied in Uganda from 1920 until 1923, and during this time Uganda was rinderpest free away from the Kenyan border. In 1923 the controls were relaxed because it was no longer perceived to be a problem, and within a short time the disease again became widespread in the protectorate.¹⁵ This surely demonstrates the effectiveness of the Tanganyikan policy, and is also an excellent example of a positive use of international boundaries. Although both Uganda and Kenya had problems, Tanganyika was mostly in dispute with Kenya because there were many cattle in the Kenyan southern borderlands, and many traditional links existed across the boundary.

Tanganyikan policy from 1921 to 1931 was "pursued with zeal and energy" but the numbers infected in 1931 were the same as in 1921, and as is demonstrated in Table 2 below, the distribution of the disease was little changed.¹⁶ The fight against the disease and the debate over the best methods of combating it were never more strongly fought than during 1927 and 1928. Early in 1927, the Government of Northern Rhodesia asked Tanganyika to join it in introducing a ten mile cattle free belt on each side of the border, because it believed rinderpest to be endemic in Tanganyika at the time.¹⁷ Dar es Salaam was most offended and replied that there was no rinderpest within 600 miles

¹⁵ CO691/112/19: 5, 18th November 1930. Letter to Mr Montgomery on rinderpest control. Unknown author.

¹⁶ CO691/141/12: 68, 29th November 1934. From MacMichael, Governor of Tanganyika, to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies.

¹⁷ TNA: TS11295: 1-3, 1st October 1927. Letter from the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, to the Acting Governor of Tanganyika.

of the border, that the previous year's suspect cases had been unfounded, and also that the disease could not be spread over long distances because it required cow-to-cow transmission.¹⁸ This flew in the face of the evidence of the 1890s pandemic, where cow-to-cow transmission enabled rinderpest to sweep down the eastern half of Africa.

Table 2: Spread of Rinderpest by Province¹⁹

Province	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934
Northern	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mwanza	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Tabora	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				Y			
Central	Y	Y	Y	Y						Y	Y	Y	Y
Bukoba	Y	Y	Y							Y			
Eastern		Y											
Tanga			Y	Y								Y	Y
Iringa				Y	Y								
Lake											Y	Y	Y
Western											Y	Y	Y

The above table indicates the provinces in which rinderpest during the years 1922-34. Although the spread varied greatly during these thirteen years, it can be seen that the situation changed remarkably little between the early 1920s and 1930s. It can also be seen that the only province that was constantly infected with rinderpest was Northern Province - which was largely composed of the Tanganyika-Kenyan borderlands. Table 3 below gives the number of cattle actually affected by rinderpest, although the statistics given are obviously only for proven cases. The death rate is remarkably low throughout the period, and falls gradually from 1923 to 1927, indicating that either the cattle were becoming more inured or treatment was improving. Another interesting point is that the number of diseased animals remains fairly steady, despite the fact that the number of provinces infected varies from two to six. Moreover, inoculation does

¹⁸ TNA: TS11295: 4, 1st October 1927. Letter from F.J. McCall, District Veterinary Surgeon, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

¹⁹ CO691/141/12: 71, 29th November 1934. Report by Harold MacMichael, Governor of Tanganyika, sent to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies.

not seem to have been at all effective: in 1922, 11.04% of diseased cattle had been inoculated and the death rate stood at 7.3%. The level of inoculation stood at 33% in 1923, yet the death rate actually rose to 11.8%.

Table 3: Number of Rinderpest Cases²⁰

	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
Number of diseased cattle	337738	374100	298532	179201	150870	283810
Number of deaths from disease	26691	41140	28911	17620	7471	9885
Percentage of deaths from disease	7.3	11.8	9.6	9.2	4.3	3.7
No. of diseased animals inoculated	37229	130000	52414	73413	43925	132154
% of diseased animals inoculated	11.04	32.9	17.5	40.9	29.1	44.9

As a result of fears over the respread of rinderpest, the Northern Rhodesian government unilaterally introduced the ten mile zone on their own side of the boundary at the end of 1927, and the Tanganyikan government revealed racist tendencies in claiming that it should be removed because it was affecting European as well as African farmers.²¹ The zone was lifted in 1929, although Tanganyikan cattle were still forbidden from entering Northern Rhodesia.²²

The discovery of a large number of cases in northern Tanganyika within a few weeks of the initial Northern Rhodesian appeal, seems too soon afterwards to have been a coincidence. It seems likely that either Tanganyika's borders and defences had been breached without government knowledge, that the government was trying to ignore the problem in the hope that it would go away, or that the disease had been present in the territory throughout the 1920s, but in a much reduced or dormant state. While Tanganyika was hoping to get rid of the cattle free zone with Northern Rhodesia

²⁰ CO691/141/12: 71, 29th November 1934. See Note 19. Statistics taken from the Veterinary Department Annual Reports by Governor Harold MacMichael.

²¹ TNA: TS11295: 1-3, 1st October 1927. See Note 17.

²² TNA: TS11295: 29, 17th May 1929. Letter from the Chief Secretary, Northern Rhodesia, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

in 1927, it was simultaneously trying to introduce one with Kenya. Tanganyika unilaterally introduced a ten mile cattle free belt with Kenya, "where the policy of double inoculation keeps the disease active throughout the great part of that Colony."²³

The Tanganyika Veterinary Service believed that Kenyan adoption of Tanganyika's tactics would win the day, and McCall, the Chief Veterinary Officer, made a heartfelt plea to his opposite number in Kenya:

"all disease control propaganda in the first instance causes impassioned hardship. The identical measures which met with opposition in Musoma were originally opposed on the Rhodesian border, in the Rungwe District, in Iringa, in Dodoma and in the Northern Province. I ask were they not justified --- Where are the hardships now that disease is banished, and cattle movement unhampered goes on throughout these areas? Only give us time and the neutral cattle free zone will be along the Sudan-Abyssinian Frontier - From Musoma to the latter is a short cry compared to that from the Cape to Mwanza." [It must be solved] "lest the clock of progress be put back, discouragement set in, and the best chance we have yet had of finally clearing up the country be jeopardised".²⁴

Government documents and the official statistics from Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the Tanganyikan government knew that rinderpest was present in Northern Province. Cameron wrote that "each outbreak of rinderpest which has occurred in Tanganyika Masailand during the past six years has been directly attributable to the unauthorised entry of uninspected cattle from the north".²⁵ The other serious disease in the area,

²³ TNA: TS11295: 4, 1st October 1927. See Note 18.

²⁴ TNA: TS11910: 2, 14th February 1928. Letter from G.S. Gowin, Veterinary Officer at Musoma, to the Directory of Veterinary Services, Dar es Salaam.

²⁵ TNA: TS10298/I: 4, 13th July 1927. Memorandum on Tanganyika-Kenya boundary problems by PC Mitchell, Northern Province, sent to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

pleuro-pneumonia, also came via Kenya, and was very expensive in cash and cattle.²⁶ He may have been trying to shift the blame on to the Kenyan authorities, but he was acknowledging the very presence of the disease within Tanganyika that his officials would shortly deny in their correspondence with the Northern Rhodesian government. Cameron did not rate the Kenyan Veterinary Service at all highly, and was greatly concerned about the construction of a Kenyan meat factory.²⁷ The punishments which were meted out for the illegal movement of cattle across the border, however, were totally insufficient to have much impact. A man convicted in 1928 of bringing cattle from Kenya to Moshi without a permit, was fined 30/-, and his cattle were confiscated and sold for 2889/-. The High Court altered the sentence to 200/- and the man was repaid the balance of 2719/-.²⁸

Later Policy

With increasing fears about the re-emergence of rinderpest as a major problem in Tanganyika, local and national authorities began to consider and introduce more and more measures which would strengthen the border as a boundary of division.²⁹ The decision to reintroduce the German cattle free zone was not introduced along the whole border. Of the two provinces most directly involved, Northern Province introduced a zone, but Mwanza did not. The border in Mwanza district was largely unidentifiable and uncontrollable, so a plan was introduced to effectively withdraw the boundary some miles for the purposes of veterinary control, in order to place it along the line of a topographical feature. The PC for Mwanza considered that the concept of

²⁶ TNA: TS10298/I: 4-5, 13th July 1927. See Note 23.

CO691/86/6: 20, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions". No author or correspondents given.

²⁷ CO691/86/6: 21, 11th June 1926. See Note 24.

²⁸ CO691/112/19/25A. 3rd class court, Moshi, Criminal Case No. 42 of 1928.

²⁹ TNA: TS10298/I: 3, 13th July 1927. See Note 23.

having a division between controlled and uncontrolled territory on the Mara River was impractical: "a cleavage right in the heart of the country among our own stock and in the midst of our own people".³⁰ This showed that if non-political divisions are to be created, then it is easier and more practical to do so along or near the line of political boundary; it does not have to be on the international boundary but in the borderlands.

The AbaKuria cattle free area which had been established by the Germans had lapsed, and British Tanganyika DCs recognised the need for veterinary inspection posts. As has already been mentioned, attempts were made to reimpose the German cattle free zone. "This can be best arranged by the man on the spot in collaboration with the Administrative Officer and the Native Authority".³¹ Mitchell, the PC, displayed a remarkable level of naiveté in considering that if legal movement is as easy as illegal, the former will prevail. He was obviously not well acquainted with the Maasai dislike of being monitored. Kenyan Maasailand had no veterinary supervision, so the decision was taken to introduce veterinary guards on the border.³² Border patrols of twenty men with five relieves were introduced at a cost of £720 per annum, of which Kenya agreed to pay half. A complete cattle free zone would have been better, but border patrols with the help of Native Authorities and the establishment of markets under surveillance were felt to be the next best thing. The practice worked well amongst the Chagga, who widely backed the plans, but was much less successful further west, where the various Maasai groups and the abaKuria lived right along the line of border and could not and would not be divided.³³ Twenty patrol men, who were generally not local people, was wholly inadequate to patrol over 300 miles of border in a difficult environment. The PC for Mwanza admitted that for 1/- per head,

³⁰ TNA: TS11910: 37, 1st August 1928. Letter from McCall, Director of Veterinary Services, to the Acting Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

³¹ TNA: TS10298/I: 3-4, 13th July 1927. See Note 23.

³² TNA: TS10298/I: 4, 13th July 1927. See Note 23.

³³ TNA: TS11910: 38, 1st August 1928. See Note 28.

"owners of cattle need not even trouble to dodge the guards to cross the border".³⁴ In summing up the situation, he may have indicated his own prejudices, but he also expounded upon the helplessness of officialdom at the time: "one tribe [the abakuria], the best known cattle thieves, members of the same family, with nothing but good grass separating one village from another, rinderpest allowed full licence on one side of an imaginary line and stringent control measures for its elimination on the other, the most backward and unreliable Native Authorities governing an irresponsible people."

The central government in Dar es Salaam was often almost totally unaware of the actions of the borderland PCs and DCs. For example, upon hearing that the Ngorongoro area contained cattle, Mr Mitchell wrongly assumed that it had been thrown open to the Maasai. In fact, the DC for Masailand had authorised its use for at least a year as a kind of quarantine for herds which had recovered from pleuropneumonia. It was "an accessible grazing ground more or less under direct supervision".³⁵ In ignorance of this action, he wanted the Kenyan Maasai totally removed from Tanganyikan soil: "the recent serious outbreak of rinderpest amongst the Wachagga was directly attributable to the movement of infected stock into Masailand from this area".³⁶

G.S. Gowin, the veterinary officer for Musoma, wanted to identify the full extent and nature of the problem, before throwing his weight into the battle against rinderpest. During a long safari through the borderlands, he identified uncontrolled rinderpest on the Kenyan side of the border, and pointed out "the impossibility of clearing the Musoma district of the disease until the Kenya authorities will co-operate with us".³⁷ Suna and Kisii districts were particularly badly affected in Kenya. He

³⁴ TNA: TS11910: 42-3, 4th September 1928. Letter from the PC for Musoma, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

³⁵ TNA: TS10298/I: 5, 13th July 1927. See Note 23.

³⁶ TNA: TS10298/I: 6, 13th July 1927. See Note 23.

³⁷ TNA: TS11910: 22-23, 14th February 1928. Letter from G.S. Gowin, Veterinary Officer at Musoma, to the Director of Veterinary Services, Dar es Salaam.

traced the route of the spread of rinderpest into Tanganyika: each time the Kenyan cattle just over the border were infected, and he himself saw sick and healthy animals herded together. He cited one case of a man who brought sick cattle from one part of Nyabwassi subchiefdom to another, and in the process, moved from Kenya into Tanganyika. "The Kenya natives stated that they had not seen any members of the Veterinary Department there for many years." Following his safari, the DO Musoma did what he could to stop the interchange of cattle across the border, by working through the native courts, but lack of resources and manpower rendered his efforts useless. It is difficult to disagree with Gowin, when he wrote that it was ludicrous to impose quarantines on the offenders when there was no control just over the border.

Following such reconnaissance missions in 1927, it was decided that the Tanganyikan and Kenyan officials involved should get together to discuss their differences and to decide what could be done. The place which was chosen for their meeting was Longido, which by a happy coincidence was also the place chosen by the Tanganyikan authorities for a new post to keep watch for the movement of cattle into the mandate - cattle whose rinderpest infection was largely blamed on Kenyan policy by the Tanganyikan officials. Officials at the meeting pulled no punches regarding the discord between the two sides. The Tanganyikan contingent wrote to the governor in Dar es Salaam, that undoubtedly "there are.....divergent and quite irreconcilable veterinary policies".³⁸ In conciliatory mood, the Kenyan Veterinary services did not decry Tanganyikan policy, but stated that they thought it impossible that they could conform with Tanganyikan policy, at least not in the short term. Open hostility did not surface until Mr McCall said that, "Kenya must come into line with this Territory", and threatened to try to prevent all contact between Tanganyika and Kenya, except through veterinary control posts, unless this was achieved.

³⁸ TNA: TS10298/I: 2, 13th July 1927. See Note 23.

The continuing disagreement at the meeting does not require any more elaboration, but several decisions were taken that are of relevance to this work. It was agreed that any plans to change the shape of either Masai District or to stop most Maasai movement because of veterinary considerations, would take at least a year or two to bring about. It was recognised that from the Indian Ocean to Lake Jipe the presence of tsetse and desert, as well as the absence of cattle and existing administration was barrier enough and no patrols were needed in this area.³⁹ From Lake Jipe to Rongai (north of Kilimanjaro), veterinary patrols existed, and exchange and market posts had been established, so it was considered unnecessary to act further. It was felt that it was along the western third of the boundary that all the problems occurred. From Rongai to Lake Victoria, it was decided that more cairns were needed to indicate the extent of allowed grazing, with further cairns indicating the cattle free zone. As a result of topographical problems, this zone was set at between five and ten miles. The cost of further patrols and veterinary officers for this area was assumed to be prohibitive. In spite of the massive problems which rinderpest and the other bovine diseases posed, all that this meeting achieved was to sanction the construction of a few dozen cairns; cairns of the type that had so often been dismantled or ignored in the past.

The authorities did not have to wait long to judge the success of their efforts to create a *cordon-sanitaire* along the border. In 1928 the storm broke. The widespread re-introduction of rinderpest into Tanganyika from the north which had threatened for two years, occurred when Loita and Kenyan Purko Maasai - eighty-one bomas in all - broke through the Tanganyika quarantine lines and entered the colony.⁴⁰ Sadly, the extent of the outbreak is not recorded in the colonial records, while no secondary work has proffered a decent account of it. Suffice it to say that the Director of Veterinary

³⁹ TNA: TS10298/I: 1-2, 13th July 1927. See Note 23.

⁴⁰ CO691/112/19: 19, 1st October 1930. Report "The Present Rinderpest (Cattle Plague) Situation in Tanganyika Territory", by F.J. McCall, Director of Veterinary Services.

Services, Mr McGally considered the situation similar to that which had existed during the First World War.⁴¹ He wanted the re-establishment of the neutral cattle free zone of German times along the whole border, and believed that there was little chance of keeping the country rinderpest free until then. It was also recognised that it was impossible to patrol the whole boundary, and that nothing could be achieved without the co-operation of the various African groups who lived along the border. In order to secure this, it was decided to give the borderlanders a voice in the matter. It led to the setting up of the Inter Colonial Native Court at Pusi Moru, which was referred to in the previous chapter. The mainly Maasai African delegates and the colonial DOs and veterinary officers made four recommendations at the baraza, or meeting:

- i) a single cross-border veterinary policy would make everything easier.
- ii) the policy of cattle free zones had kept diseases out of South Africa and then gradually pushed the line northwards. It should therefore be continued in Tanganyika and adopted in Kenya
- iii) eventually free movement of cattle will occur and it will be easier to sell meat - this may lead to "a less nomadic way of living."
- iv) No changes in the present arrangements for now.⁴²

It is interesting to read that a "less nomadic way of life" was a favourable outcome. Nomadic pastoralism does not seem to have been a worthwhile activity to the colonialists, but it was rare that they ever directly referred to its downfall as a desirable outcome. Even during the times of greatest difficulty with the Maasai and abaKuria, the colonial records never mention any direct actions aimed at hastening its demise.

⁴¹ CO691/112/19: 19-20, 1st October 1930. See Note 38.

⁴² TNA: Acc.69 Dist 7/III: 34-47, 28th April 1930. Report "Inter Colonial Boundary Affairs", by Harvey, ADO for Loliondo. Sent to the DO for Lolbene.
TNA: TS 10298/II: 366, 21st November 1930. Report of a Veterinary Meeting at Loitokitok.

Differences between Kenyan and Tanganyikan policy

The Kenya-Tanganyika dispute over rinderpest control has been widely referred to, but several points can be made on the effectiveness of each strategy. Firstly, the Kenyan view that the disease was ineradicable⁴³ had no justification. Before immunisation was possible, the disease had been eradicated from Britain and much of Europe. In addition, during the pan-African fight against the disease in the 1890s, modern immunisation methods were developed, but played only a minor role in the battle.⁴⁴ Secondly, rinderpest generally has no carriers or reservoirs, so it is possible - at least in theory - to isolate infected herds from healthy cattle. The spread of disease by wild animals was a somewhat exaggerated factor. The Kenyan authorities considered it to be a major cause of the spread of the disease, but it seemed to have had little effect in Tanganyika, where wild animals and cattle often mixed together on the northern plains and in the Rift Valley.⁴⁵ "It spreads in the main only by intimate contact with the sick".⁴⁶ Segregation was therefore the answer, especially as diagnosis was usually straightforward. The disease was easily recognised by African owners.

Thirdly, one of the major problems with the Tanganyikan system of fighting rinderpest was that it created large numbers of susceptible cattle.⁴⁷ Should the borderland defences be breached, then a very large number of cattle came under threat. This explains that while rinderpest remained a substantial if not overwhelming problem in Kenya throughout the 1920s, the level of difficulty which it posed in Tanganyika fluctuated wildly. This is a problem common to many functions of boundaries. Linear

⁴³ CO691/112/19: 5, 18th November 1930. Letter to Mr Montgomery about rinderpest control. Unknown author.

⁴⁴ CO691/112/19: 5, 18th November 1930. See Note 41.

⁴⁵ CO691/112/19: 9, 5th December 1930. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on rinderpest control.

⁴⁶ CO691/112/19: 5, 18th November 1930. See Note 41.

⁴⁷ CO691/141/12: 2, 24th December 1954. Letter by unknown author to Mr Calder.

defences can be very effective, but once breached become totally useless. Finally, there is much to commend in the Tanganyikan view that if Kenya and Uganda had implemented the Tanganyika policies, then they would also achieve success in their battle with other diseases, such as pleuro-pneumonia, which were more difficult to combat by immunisation.

The Kenyan strategy did have some benefits. Reliance upon the use of serum reduced mortality, but made the disease linger, thereby extending the period of infectivity. It was costly in terms of money and time, although recovered animals were immune. Certain problems, however, affected both the Kenyan and the Tanganyikan methods of control. Ignorance of infection by stock owners was a major factor, while the activities of cattle traders hampered the most effective control schemes. The success of any policy depended upon genuine co-operation from the African authorities and vigorous punishment for evasion.⁴⁸

The standpoint of the Colonial Office (CO) in London on the disagreement seems to have changed over time. For much of the 1920s it appeared to back the Tanganyikan government. In response to a Tanganyikan complaint against Kenyan inaction, the CO wrote that: "It is not quite fair to say that the Kenya government policy is to do nothing about rinderpest", but went on to commend the Tanganyikan ambition of driving the disease up to the northern Kenyan boundary.⁴⁹ However, with improvements in the efficacy and reductions in the cost of serum towards the end of the decade, opinion began to turn against the mandate. The Colonial Secretary, H.M.M. Moore, wrote to the Chief Secretary at Dar, expressing the view that Tanganyika stood alone in its policy of relying upon quarantine and strong border

⁴⁸ CO691/112/19: 6, 28th November 1930. Letter from Mr Montgomery, commenting on rinderpest policy. Unknown correspondent.

⁴⁹ CO691/112/19: 2, 13th November 1930. Unlabelled notes written by Governor Cameroon of Tanganyika, on rinderpest control.

controls as opposed to immunisation among infected countries. Indeed, Egypt, India, Nigeria and others all followed Kenyan policy.⁵⁰ Also, at the Pan-African Veterinary Conference in Pretoria in 1929, the Tanganyikan methods received little support. It seems that while Tanganyika was following the policy, normally known as rinderpest suppression, which had been adopted by the German authorities before the First World War, the Kenyan authorities were following standard imperial policy.

Cattle price differentials greatly encouraged the smuggling of cattle over the border. As the colonial governments had a great deal of influence over price levels, and indeed, in some areas and for some types of cattle, they actually set the prices, it seems that the colonialists were making a rod for their own backs. "There is every incentive to the Kenya Masai to 'run' cattle across the border owing to the disparity in prices in the two territories and the facility with which it can be accomplished", wrote one DC.⁵¹ In order to obviate the problem, the Tanganyikan authorities occasionally held markets for Kenyan Maasai cattle in Kenya itself, thereby absorbing surplus cattle. The last market was held on the 15th July 1929, at Namanga, north of Longido, but by that stage a very high proportion of the stock was infected with rinderpest. The Tanganyikan officials increased the quarantine restrictions under which the cattle would be imported and the sale broke down as so few of the cattle could be accepted.⁵²

Efforts against rinderpest struggled on until 1930, with the outbreak showing no signs of either burning itself out, or of reaching the heights which it had attained in the 1890s. Repeated infection had probably created a pool of cattle which were somewhat more resistant to the disease. During the same year, the two borderland governments

⁵⁰ CO691/112/19: 29, 26th June 1930. Letter from H.M.M. Moore, Colonial Secretary in Nairobi, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁵¹ CO691/86/6, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions". No author or correspondents given.

⁵² CO691/86/6, 11th June 1926. See Note 49.

made further attempts to co-ordinate their actions. McCall seems to have reached a state of despair, writing of the border, "this imaginary line constitutes [an] insuperable obstacle in our path of progress"; [we are] "up against a blank wall".⁵³ The Senior Veterinary Officer for Northern Province, Lowe, after a hopeless three year campaign against the disease, shared his mood: "to patrol and guard efficiently such a frontier of nearly 200 miles is almost humanly impossible".⁵⁴ The progress from South Africa up to Arusha, which McCall seems to have seen as his personal mission to extent over the border into Kenya, had now come to a halt. He reiterated his desire to his Kenyan counterparts that he wanted Tanganyika and Kenya to co-operate in fighting rinderpest in Maasailand and among the abaKuria, effectively pushing the front line up to the Kenya-Uganda railway, and hopefully later up to the northern Kenyan boundaries. These were viewed as much more natural obstacles.

Lowe considered that veterinary control of the Purko and the Loita was very difficult; they were troublesome enough in their own right, but the presence of the border merely served to hamper colonial controls, and aid Maasai lawlessness. He considered that it was best to introduce light veterinary restrictions, "but that when such are laid down they must be adhered to and infringements will be detected and punished".⁵⁵ Overall, he felt that the Tanganyikan officials must bide their time until "effective Veterinary measures can be enforced in Kenya Masailand".⁵⁶

Another cross-border colonial meeting was attempted in 1930 - this time without much in the way of African input. The Kenyan and Tanganyikan PCs and veterinary

⁵³ CO691/112/19, 1st October 1930. Report "The Present Rinderpest (Cattle Plague) Situation in Tanganyika Territory", by F.J. McCall, Director of Veterinary Services.

⁵⁴ CO691/112/19: 25A, 20th December 1929. Letter from H.J. Lowe, Senior Veterinary Officer, Northern Province, to McCall.

⁵⁵ TNA: Acc.69 Dist: 7/III: 43, 28th April 1930. Report "Inter Colonial Boundary Affairs", by Harvey, ADO for Loliondo. Sent to the DO for Lolbene.

⁵⁶ TNA: Acc.69 Dist: 7/III: 44, 28th April 1930. See Note 53.

officials met at Loitokitok in Kijado District, Kenya. Whilst acknowledging differences in policy, they met to discuss which measures they could actually take jointly. Of the £10,100 per annum Tanganyika veterinary budget to be spent on the Maasai, the Kenyan government had added £360 to be spent on Kenya Maasai living on the southern side of the border. This was to be continued.⁵⁷ The Tanganyikan delegates proposed a blanket cattle free zone for the twenty miles south of the boundary from Lake Victoria to Lake Jipe, thereby cancelling the concessions to the Kenya Maasai. Such a cancellation would affect the Kenyan authorities, in that they would be faced with finding grazing and water for the Loita and Purko Maasai on their own side of the border. Two points can be made about such a suggestion. Firstly, while it was never introduced, it indicated that the Tanganyikan government was still angry with the Kenyan authorities. Secondly, the impact upon the Maasai would have been great, as there does not appear to have been any surplus grazing and water resources on the Kenyan side. Finally, there is little to suggest that the Tanganyikan authorities would have had any more success in forcing the Purko and the Loita over the border in 1930 than they had had in 1927.

Mr Deck, the PC Maasai Province, Kenya, stated that the Kenyan Maasai of the Matapato section with approximately 5000 cattle, must have the water supply at Meto - there was no other - although they could use grazing in Kenya as they had been doing for some time. Tanganyika officials reminded Kenya that Kenya had the right to pipe a water supply from Rongai (Ol Molog) in Tanganyika to Loitokitok. This right had not been exploited because of Kenyan inaction and because of the costs of such a project. Finally, the Kenyan side pointed out that the Chagga used salt licks and grazing in Kenya, so this right could also be withdrawn. The Tanganyikans concluded the meeting by advising all concerned that there would not be a problem if the Kenyan

⁵⁷ TNA: TS10298/II: 365-6, 21st November 1930. Report of a Veterinary Meeting at Loitokitok.

veterinary services were more effective. Such petty squabbles did nothing to resolve the situation and were probably borne out of general low-level animosity between the two territories, as well as frustration with the rinderpest situation.

The year 1931 saw several changes in the situation. For one thing, the situation deteriorated in Tanganyika, with rinderpest spreading to more areas and affecting greater numbers of cattle.⁵⁸ Not only had the disease comprehensively breached the Kenyan border, it also entered Bukoba District from Uganda.⁵⁹ Symes became Governor of Tanganyika in 1931 and his pro-Kenyan stance not only improved relations between the two territories, but also led to the Tanganyikan adoption of Kenyan policy. He did not value the protection afforded by the borders and was a firm believer in East African unity. Kenya was vaccinating all the cattle south of the Kenya-Uganda railway with a new vaccine, and hopes ran very high.⁶⁰ The new policy was followed throughout 1931 and 1932, but it too proved to be a failure.⁶¹ The use of inactive serum was abandoned in Tanganyika and a policy of double inoculation was adopted in its place. Despite the failure, the change in leadership had at least improved cross-border relations, and by 1932, Kenya agreed that the eradication of rinderpest should be targeted.⁶²

By 1933, overstocking was seen as a major problem in both Tanganyika and Kenya. Keeping as many cattle alive as possible was not a good idea, and the Colonial Office advised both Kenya and Tanganyika that low level rinderpest was no bad thing, as it

⁵⁸ CO691/141/12: 22, 22nd January 1935. "Extract from the Minutes of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Colonial Advisory Council of Agriculture and Animal Health".

⁵⁹ CO691/141/12: 32, 17th January 1935. "Rinderpest Control in the Tanganyika Territory", written by the Colonial Office.

⁶⁰ For more information see file CO691/117/12.

⁶¹ CO691/117.12: 81, 13th August 1931. From H. Martin, Governor's Deputy, Kenya to Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies.

⁶² CO691/141/12: 35, 17th January 1935. Report "Rinderpest Control in the Tanganyika Territory", written by the Colonial Office.

disposed of weak stock,⁶³ and overstocking was the greatest cattle problem in Tanganyika. As there was next to no interference with the disease in the native reserves in Kenya, overstocking was considerable with the Maasai, and as many of these reserves were in the central borderlands, it continued to provide a ready source of infection for Tanganyikan cattle. However, the Colonial Office believed that overstocking was as bad in Tanganyika as in the reserves, as many herds were isolated from rinderpest for long periods (Kenya, 1993: Ch X).

By 1934, the Tanganyikan authorities recognised that Kenya had been making good efforts to control and eradicate rinderpest and bovine pleuro-pneumonia.⁶⁴ As a result, the Dar es Salaam government agreed with matters being re-opened with the Kenyan authorities, and a more conciliatory mood developed.⁶⁵ A Tanganyikan ADC serving along the border, W.J. Lloyd, was asked by the Dar government to report on the situation. He admitted that rinderpest was almost constantly prevalent on both sides of the border, but was in two minds over whether this was the fault of Kenya, and commended several Kenyan initiatives. For instance, it was Kenyan policy to report outbreaks of all major diseases which occurred within ten miles of the boundary to the Tanganyikan authorities. In addition, Maasai bomas were moved back from the border where possible, in effect creating sections of depopulated borderland, thereby reinforcing the border. However, he considered that overall there was good evidence indicating that while the recurrence of rinderpest was not wholly the fault of the ineffective Kenya veterinary policy, it was almost certainly the largest contributing factor.⁶⁶ He also added what has already been mentioned with regard to earlier

⁶³ CO691/141/12: 78, 29th November 1934. From MacMichael, Governor of Tanganyika, to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies.

⁶⁴ TNA: TS10298/II: 420, 28th April 1934. Department of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry report on the Kenya-Tanganyika boundary 1927-33: "Water Concessions Granted to Kenya Masai".

⁶⁵ TNA: TS10298/I: 451, 18th September 1934. Letter from the PC for Northern Province, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁶⁶ TNA: TS10298/II: 480, 24th January 1935. Letter from W.J. Lloyd, DO for Masai

outbreaks, that once a major outbreak had passed into Tanganyika at a distance of perhaps fifty miles, Tanganyikan defences would have been breached and the disease would be free to advance towards North Rhodesia.

Lloyd also wrote to the central government that disease in Maasailand had compounded an already severe situation. Due to a shortage of water and grazing, partly caused by uncertainty over the concessions, over one thousand head of cattle were dying weekly, and the environmental effects were worsening day by day. "For the first time since the introduction of Pax Britannia into Tanganyika a famine has occurred in the above area which necessitates the Masai being fed by the Government".⁶⁷ Lloyd admitted that the "Europeans are endeavouring to settle an agreement over which neither side knows very much about [sic]." He suggested that Africans in the area be consulted much more often because of their knowledge of local conditions, but there is no evidence of his suggestion being followed up.⁶⁸ Once again, borderlanders with borderland knowledge were ignored by the power which ruled them.

By the time of the twenty-fourth meeting of the Colonial Advisory Council of Agriculture and Animal Health at the start of 1935, most colonies agreed with the notion that Tanganyika should change its rinderpest policy. The reasons for this were fourfold: the cost of the policy, overstocking and the existence of too many cattle of too little value were relatively straightforward.⁶⁹ Their fourth reason was the distrust of African cattle owners towards the cattle policies and this is more difficult to assess. It is true that cattle smuggling was widespread and that this contributed to the spread

District, to the PC Northern Province.

⁶⁷ TNA: TS10298/II: 481-2, 24th January 1935. See Note 64.

⁶⁸ TNA: TS10298/II: 481, 24th January 1935. See Note 64.

⁶⁹ CO691/141/12: 17-27, 22nd January 1935. "Extract from the Minutes of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Colonial Advisory Council of Agriculture and Animal Health".

of disease, and so it was probably true that the Tanganyikan government was fighting a losing battle in banking upon its border defences to protect the mandate. The policy seems to have been well meant but somewhat impractical as some cattle would always be moved across the border. To take one example, the Toloha Maasai of Lake Jipe, who were mentioned in the previous chapter, were thought to have spread rinderpest into the territory through the Ngulu gap to the Ruvu area, at least four times between 1920 and 1935.⁷⁰ This was in spite of the fact that they were so isolated that the colonial authorities did not know of their existence for several years into the life of the mandate. The idea that existing policy was too expensive, however, does not weigh up against the expense of attempting to inoculate all the cattle in Tanganyika.

From this time on, rinderpest was more-or-less accepted as a feature of life in northern Tanganyika. Simultaneously, it seems to have become less prevalent, as the level of attention paid to it in the archival records following 1935 is much reduced, and what attention remained, appeared to switch to the southern border. As the dream of pushing rinderpest beyond the Kenyan border was discarded, the pan-African fight against the disease became centred upon the Northern Rhodesia-Tanganyika border. This southern border had already been used to control disease, but from 1930, Nyasaland wanted to employ the new technique of using goat virus to inoculate cattle as a belt of defence in the Tanganyika-Nyasaland borderlands. The Tanganyikan government did not consider this necessary: it was expensive and they did not consider rinderpest to be a problem in southern Tanganyika at that time.⁷¹ This surely indicates that Tanganyika saw it as a matter of pride to be rinderpest-free, and did not want to admit to the scale of the problem. It also seems to demonstrate that while the notion of protecting southern Africa from rinderpest was a noble idea, ridding Tanganyika of the disease was by far the territory's greatest concern.

⁷⁰ TNA: Acc.69 Dist 723/I: 69, 26th June 1945. Report "Masai at Toloha" from unknown source at Tanga, to the Director of Veterinary Services, Mpwapa.

⁷¹ See CO822/111/7.

During the latter half of the 1930s, rinderpest appeared to become more and more of a threat to the British colonies to the south of Tanganyika. Much greater control over cattle movements seemed possible in the south, and this cannot be attributed to greater resources during the 1930s than in the 1920s. As a result of the 1930s depression, deep cuts were made into the expenditure of most government departments and the veterinary service was no exception. The main reason seems to have been that the Maasai and other mainly pastoralist groups of the northern borderlands made control much more difficult. At the same time, however, the fear of rinderpest being spread by wild animals became much more of a factor. The topographical and ecological nature of south-western and central Tanganyika dictated that animals moving from the spasmodically rinderpest-infected central regions across the Northern Rhodesian border were generally funnelled down a corridor formed by the Rukwa valley.

During the course of 1940, measures to prevent the movement of animals along this route were discussed. The obvious choice seemed to be to create a barrier at the inter-territorial or international border itself, but the Rukwa corridor petered out some distance from the border, allowing migrating animals to take a variety of routes across the boundary, so any physical defences had to be placed some distance inside the Tanganyikan boundary. The Chief Secretary to the Governor ambitiously proposed an electric fence across the valley,⁷² but this was considered unworkable by the British colonies to the south. As such a scheme required a broad financial base, the project was not pursued. H.J.Lowe, the Director of Veterinary Services advised that the alternative of bush clearing and game destruction would cause herds to scatter and would be difficult because the whole area was forested. He added, however, that localised game fences might work "across certain of the more dangerous areas

⁷² TNA: TS28987: 24A, 27th July 1940. Report on Measures to counter rinderpest by H.J. Lowe Director of Veterinary Services.

particularly the upper reaches of the Mbemkuru, Mboragandu and Pitu rivers where they are separated by only short distances from the south-flowing tributaries of the Rovuma - especially the Lunnescule river".⁷³ He estimated the cost of such an undertaking at thirty-five to forty pounds per mile.

The Chief Secretary wrote that, "short of erecting something of the nature of a Hadrian's Wall right across the area no action which we can take is likely to be effective in totally preventing the movement of game southward." However, the go-ahead was finally given for the fences to be built in 1941, and a solid twelve foot high elephant-proof wooden palisade was built across thirty miles of the valley.⁷⁴ This was later extended to 167 miles between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa. The number of game scouts in the area was increased to twenty-seven posts of three men each and rewards of 2/50 were given for confirmed cases. A game free zone of 20 miles was placed on the south side to support the barrier (Scott, 1996: 213). Breaks were quickly repaired and animals which broke through were shot and killed. The animals believed to be carrying and transmitting rinderpest were greater kuku, bushbuck, reedbuck, pig warthog, buffalo, eland, wildebeeste, sable, hartebeeste and waterbuck. The impact upon wildlife was certainly not a consideration.

As Scott writes, "Only one man-made border has ever stopped the relentless spread of rinderpest across the continents of the Old World, namely the fence across the Rukwa Valley in Tanzania" (Scott, 1996: 201). As the barrier was placed parallel to the line of a political boundary, in effect in the borderland which separated two systems of disease control and veterinary services, it emphasized the presence of the boundary and the borderland.

⁷³ TNA: TS28987: 24A-30, 27th July 1940. See Note 70.

⁷⁴ 3rd class court, Moshi, Criminal Case No. 42 of 1928.

The Wankonde: a case-study

Policies aimed at countering rinderpest and other cattle diseases could easily impact upon the use of cattle in social and economic interaction. The case of the Wankonde in the 1930s was brought about by an attempt to improve socio-economic conditions in the Tanganyika-Nyasaland borderlands. In 1936, the Tanganyikan DC for the area appealed to central government to help trade among the Wankonde and to help supply food to the Lupa. The Comptroller of Customs responded by abolishing duties on African produce moved between Nyasaland and Tanganyika.⁷⁵ In addition, at the end of 1937 an amendment was made to the Customs Tariff Ordinance of 1930: "Item 162(a).....Native foodstuffs and articles of native manufacture such as mats, utensils, etc....which are proved to the satisfaction of the Comptroller of Customs to have been grown, produces or manufactured by natives of the Nyasaland Protectorate.....Free [of duties]"⁷⁶

Unfortunately, this ordinance did not include cattle and was taken to mean that duties should be applied to them for the first time. The Chief Secretary at Zomba in Nyasaland wrote to the Dar es Salaam government to point out that he had asked the Tanganyikan DC over the border to ask for change with the precise intention of easing the transfer of cattle, which had become increasingly difficult because of rinderpest controls. The whole point had been "the desire to remove any obstacle to the circulation of ceremonial cattle between the kindred tribes residing on either side of the Songwe river".⁷⁷ He continued, "Ninety-nine % of cattle crossing the boundary are for

⁷⁵ TNA: TS25210: 1-1a, 12th November 1936. Letter from the Commander-in-Chief to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

⁷⁶ TNA: TS25210: 18, 27th October 1937. "Ordinance to amend the Customs Tariff Ordinance, 1930"

⁷⁷ TNA: TS25210: 25-6, 30th November 1937. Letter from the Chief Secretary, Zomba, Nyasaland, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

dowry purposes: the tribe lives on both sides of the river.⁷⁸ The Wankonde were divided by the river Songwe, "which, so far as they are concerned, is merely a river traversing their country, but which unfortunately for them, is an inter-colonial boundary".⁷⁹ Mr de Meza, the Nyasaland Chief Veterinary Officer also added, "arbitrary intercolonial boundaries should not inflict hardship on tribes resident on both sides, and I stated that a consistent aim of my department has been to arrange common veterinary policies along such boundaries in order to minimise their effect as tribal handicaps." Although Nyasaland wanted to allow free movement of cattle, it wanted guarantees that it would not be open to rinderpest problems. Social problems were inevitable because of border restrictions, but colonial officers frequently attempted to minimise the negative impact of such controls more frequently than they are often given credit for.

The control of human disease

Control of human disease is less relevant than animal disease to a history of Tanganyika's borders, but several instances do stand out. The most striking of these related to Rhodesiense Trypanosomiasis, or sleeping sickness as it is more commonly known. The disease had long been a major problem in tropical Africa, and attempts to control it have often employed international boundaries. For instance, no overland traffic was allowed between the Schirati District in DOA and BEA in 1910 because sleeping-sickness was endemic there (Brode, 1911: 61). The effect of this ban is not known. The disease was not a new problem in Tanganyika; the sleeping sickness belts extended from Ufipa, through Kigoma, towards Mwanza and Bukoba, but it had been

⁷⁸ TNA: TS25210: 35-9, OCTober 1937. "Extract from the Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 17th Session, held at Dar es Salaam, Ocotber 1937".

⁷⁹ TNA: TS23585: 7-10, 17th November 1936. Letter from H.E. Hornby, Director of Veterinary Services, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam.

gradually moving northwards.⁸⁰ In 1927, it was forty miles north-west of Tabora, and by 1928 it had arrived in Kahama, the area which provided the bulk of the migratory labour in Uganda.⁸¹ The Uganda government hoped to prevent the disease crossing into its territory, but the incubation period between infection and the development of signs of disease varied between six and twenty-seven days, so victims could appear healthy.

At least 25,000 poor Tanganyikans from the Biharamulo, Kahama and Kigoma districts of Tanganyika crossed the River Kagera to work in Uganda to pay their taxes and other things during the late 1920s and early 1930s.⁸² In September 1932, the Ugandan Government discovered several men from Biharamulo district in Tanganyika suffering from sleeping sickness and therefore suggested that the Kagera ferries, which lay entirely within Tanganyika, should be closed to emigrants.⁸³ The Tanganyikan government responded by closing some ferries and introducing control and medical examination of emigrants at others. The Ugandan government wanted more: the investigation of the distribution of infection in north-west Tanganyika; control of population movements from infected areas towards Uganda; and for the boundary to be closed in the meantime. At a conference in Entebbe in early 1933, the Tanganyikan government agreed to the following:

- i) closure of all ferries on the Kagera, except for four more tightly controlled crossings.
- ii) control of these ferries and refusal to carry prohibited natives
- iii) issue passes of entry only to inhabitants of non sleeping sickness areas, or to those who did not have to pass through such an area.

⁸⁰ CO691/128/6: 51. "Extract from a Memorandum No. SS100, dated 9th November 1932, addressed to the Chief Secretary by the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services".

⁸¹ CO691/123/6: 52. See Note 78.

⁸² CO691/128/6: 10, 25th May 1933. From D.J. Jardine, Acting Governor, Dar es Salaam, to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies.

⁸³ CO691/128/6: 10-11, 25th May 1933. See Note 80.

- iv) no passes to inhabitants of Western Province of Biharamulo District and of certain other parts of Lake Province, near to those passing through, except where they comply with special conditions of medical observation.
- v) investigation of sleeping sickness in the Missenyi area of the Bukoba District
- vi) investigation of sleeping sickness in Karagwe and other areas of Bukoba District.⁸⁴

This had a massive impact upon the people of north-west Tanganyika, as an estimated fifteen per cent of the taxpayers of Mwanza District worked in Uganda,⁸⁵ and the area had already been severely economically devastated by rinderpest and the First World War. The local DO, A.W. Wyatt feared that the area would become permanently depopulated if the restrictions were kept in place.⁸⁶ Africans from Rwanda and Burundi were also suspected of spreading the disease into Uganda and they too were restricted. In addition, fishermen from Tanganyika had their permits to fish on the Kagera withdrawn in 1932.⁸⁷ Luckily the outbreak died back during the course of 1933 and all restrictions were withdrawn, but once again international boundaries had been used as the main weapon in the fight to control disease in colonial Africa.

It was hoped at the outset of this research project that the provision of medical and education services in borderlands could have been assessed, but it was quickly realised that such a study could only be effective in a relatively small area, where an intensive study could be undertaken. Nevertheless, some examples of cross-border service provision did come to light. There was no colonial territorial policy on treating non-Tanganyikans in Tanganyikan hospitals - they were mostly run by charities and

⁸⁴ CO691/128/6: 13, 25th May 1933. See Note 80.

⁸⁵ CO691/128/6: 15, 25th May 1933. See Note 80.

⁸⁶ CO691/128/6: 16-22, 9th March 1933. From A.W. Wyatt, Acting D.O., to the PC Lake Province.

⁸⁷ CO691/128/6: 56-7, 9th February 1933. A.C. Weatherhead, Acting Chief Secretary, Uganda, to the Chief Secretary, Tanganyika.

churches - so there was no need for a policy. Many non-Tanganyikans were, however, helped by doctors who lived within the mandate and worked for missions and other groups.

David Stirling has written about his own life as a doctor in the borderlands of Tanganyika (Stirling, 1977).⁸⁸ While working at Masasi on the Makonde plateau, he received patients from beyond the Ruvuma, from PEA. Charges were moderate in the late 1930s, at one shilling per operation, so many people were able to come for treatment. The patients who came from PEA often brought food for their entire stay, as well as their families (Stirling, 1977: 44). Many patients came from deep in PEA, and some had never seen a white man (Stirling, 1977: 60). In keeping with most assessments of the level of colonial activity in most of PEA, it seems that there were better and more easily accessible medical facilities in Tanganyika than in PEA. Indeed, many Africans from northern PEA may have had more contact with the Tanganyikan colonialists than with those of their own colony.

Stirling gives a sense of people very remote from colonial control coming to this isolated medical centre for treatment. The frontier is one between colonial control and traditional African society, rather than one between PEA and Tanganyika. Many people from PEA did not speak either Swahili or Portuguese, so the doctor learnt the rudiments of three other languages. To help people living on both banks of the boundary river, a small dispensary was set up at Chihako, actually on the Rovuma, in 1938 (Stirling, 1977: 59). However, the people of the area moved away from the river after two years, and so the dispensary was closed (Stirling, 1977: 64). In 1963, Stirling set up a hospital at Kibosho, eight miles north of Moshi and very near to the Kenyan

⁸⁸ Stirling was firstly a doctor for the UMCA, then the Catholic Church, then became an M.P. and Minister for Health in independent Tanzania. He was a doctor at Lulindi near Masasi, then at Mnero, also in the south. Lastly at Kibosho near Moshi. Lulindi was on the edge of the Makonde plateau and about 20 miles from the Ruvuma.

border, although it appears that few Kenyans visited the hospital. It was a different time, geography and neighbouring state, and southern Kenya was much more developed in a western sense than northern Mozambique.

Conclusion

Rinderpest was a vital factor in the colonisation of East Africa in the 1890s, through the weakening of many groups, most famously the Maasai. It was therefore also one of the main factors in the creation of western style boundaries and in the political division of eastern Africa. It was also a major component in the imposition of the boundaries in practice, as the colonial powers fought to keep it under control. Control and eradication of bovine diseases proved to be the same thing: territory by territory, rinderpest and other related diseases were forced northwards into their heartlands. Measures were introduced to prevent their re-introduction, and international boundaries were convenient and effective places to introduce these measures, but this did not guarantee their success. Colonial control remained imperfect and the total separation of cattle by a boundary remained almost impossible. Even with a zone of separation it proved very difficult. Veterinary controls imposed at the border were also cultural and socio-economic controls, particularly for pastoralists. Preventing the Maasai from moving across the region was to restrict their way of life and ability to feed and water their cattle. With regard to the rights and wrongs of the Kenyan and Tanganyikan approaches to rinderpest control, it is difficult to determine which method was most effective. In the final assessment, Tanganyika was nine-tenths rinderpest free, and only reinfection from Kenya kept it alive; Kenya spent more on control, yet possessed no rinderpest free areas.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ CO691/112/19: 32-7, 3rd April 1930. Unauthored report, compares the comments of the Chief Veterinary Officer in Kenya, with that of the Director of Veterinary Services in Tanganyika.

CONCLUSION TO PART FOUR

Part Four has hopefully demonstrated that while control of pastoralists was an issue for the colonial powers, the primary policy concerns were the prevention of cattle disease and crime, rather than any attacks upon pastoralism as a way of life. The pastoralist policies of the DOA and Tanganyikan governments were mainly enforced in the borderlands, so these two chapters have also attempted to provide an interesting case-study of international relations. Borderland pastoralists were in an ideal situation to compare the policies of neighbouring territories as they were forced to experience both at first hand. Their experiences have demonstrated that pastoralism did not sit easily with international boundaries, and also that where environmental differences allowed it, pastoralists often voted with their feet and moved into the jurisdiction most favourable to their lifestyle. They have also demonstrated, however, that environmental needs - including grazing and water requirements - were far more important than the right to bear spears or the level of taxation. Environmental boundaries can have every bit as great an impact as political divisions.

In the final assessment, conflict on the Kenya-Tanganyika border was not so much a clash between pastoralism and linear boundaries, but between competing powers. In the event, the British and Germans were militarily stronger. Colonial attempts at control were greatly affected by their ignorance, particularly of the great changes which had occurred in the 1880s and 1890s. The fact that many colonial decisions - such as how and where to grant water and pasturage concessions - were based upon the pre-colonial state of affairs, made this particularly important. The problem of rinderpest encouraged the colonialists to impose the boundary to greater extent than would otherwise have been the case between two British colonies and this emphasized policy

differences. The pastoralist and rinderpest policies of the Tanganyikan and Kenyan governments were remarkably different, but despite all the disagreements and dispute, many aspects of border policy indicate that the boundary was more inter-territorial than international. For instance, by the 1950s, the two police forces had near reciprocal powers - something that never developed between colonial forces of different colonial powers.

For their part, the Maasai merely used their traditional skills to make use of the boundary. Cattle raiding was a major part of their pre-colonial culture and differences in colonial policy made it an even more attractive proposition. The case of the migration of the Purko and Loita into Sonjo district demonstrates how the Maasai could play one side off against another, with some Tanganyikan officials attempting to move the Maasai back over the border and others granting them access to the water supplies of Tanganyika. The Maasai were able to influence the colonialists to a greater degree than the more sedentary groups in the territory, and although their way of life was disrupted by the border, it survived in a recognisable form until independence. Cattle raid and cattle smuggling continued until after the last British DO left Tanganyika in 1961.

CHAPTER TEN: THE LEGACY

As was mentioned in the introduction, there is currently no large scale study of Tanganyika's boundaries. This thesis has hopefully made some contribution towards filling that gap by analysing the imposition of the western concept of dividing political space between the initial colonial intrusion in 1884 and Tanganyikan independence in 1961. The final chapter will set out the conclusions reached in this work under the title questions which were given in the introduction. It will then examine the legacy of the colonial boundaries for independent Tanzania, by examining border issues since independence. Lastly, it will consider the imposition of linear boundaries within the African continent as a whole, bringing the discussion back from the particular to the general.

To what extent did colonialism successfully impose the western system of dividing political space upon Africa?

Colonialism was almost totally successful in imposing the western system of dividing political space upon Tanganyika - the lack of control over the Kenyan-Tanganyikan borderlands is the only partial exception. Linear boundaries were not unknown in pre-colonial Africa, but they were merely one of many methods of dividing political space. What changed as a result of colonial rule, was that boundaries became the norm throughout the continent. Even in most regions which contained little or nothing of apparent value, boundaries were delimited and very often demarcated. The fluid pre-colonial political landscape was replaced by fixed colonial territories, and colonialism was the main agent of this imposition. The broad outline of Tanganyika's boundaries was largely determined during the early years of German rule, although minor alterations were made throughout the colonial period.

Existing African polities could never survive because fluid structures were incompatible with fixed colonial territories and because western military superiority was overwhelming. What opposition there might have been was avoided rather than defeated. The power of the Sultanate of Zanzibar was gradually eroded through diplomatic means, while much of the rest of the region was in a state of flux and upheaval, and so provided little initial opposition. In particular, militarised groups such as the Maasai never actually fought the colonialists because of local difficulties. The downfall of African polities was not immediate as they were adapted by the British in many areas as Native Authorities, but in reality many of these authorities were mere caricatures of their pre-colonial predecessors. Groups were amalgamated and reformed to fit the colonial notion of the 'tribe'.

One interesting aspect of the imposition of western-style boundaries was the variation in how important the borders were to the colonial powers. Borders dividing German and Portuguese territory, for example, were certainly important even if there was little colonial cross-border contact, because they divided competing colonial powers. British inter-territorial borders were far less divisive, even if there was more dispute between their respective officials. The British territories of East Africa can be seen as members of the same team - each competing for attention and each wanting to be the star of the show, but all were members of the British Empire and so under the same sovereign. The label of inter-territorial borders is not a common idea in the history of western borders, but some vague parallels can be drawn with the states of the Holy Roman Empire, with the states of the United States and perhaps even with the European Union.

To what extent were African political, economic and cultural systems affected by the boundaries?

Many African political, economic and cultural systems were disturbed, disrupted or destroyed by the new boundaries, but the impact upon them must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Some trade routes survived in some form and pastoralists continued to raid and smuggle throughout the colonial period. Yet overall the impact was massive. African pre-colonial polities and political systems were among the greatest casualties. Colonialism as a whole lay behind most of this disruption, but the boundaries themselves were one of the main agencies of the colonial imposition. One of the greatest problems in assessing the impact of the boundaries is the lack of knowledge of African systems. African polities were mainly fluid in nature, so it is impossible to know how they would have developed had the colonial intrusion not occurred.

On some occasions - as with the Wankonde on the Nyasaland border - the colonial authorities attempted to reduce the impact upon African systems. At other times, they actually sought to directly impose division. For instance, in the northern Tanganyika borderlands, the British authorities attempted to divide the various Maasai sub-sections into Kenyan Maasai and Tanganyikan Maasai. Despite this intention, the remoteness and geography of the area, the lack of colonial manpower and the intransigence of the pastoralists frustrated colonial attempts at every turn. Despite the co-ordination of British police and administrators on both sides of the border, the Kenyan-Tanganyikan borderlands were never entirely tamed. African pre-colonial systems were also able to survive in such areas as the Congolese-DOA borderlands, where the boundaries remained uncertain. Rebels, slave traders and deserters mingled together in a last-ditch stand in opposition to colonial control. Yet even during the 1897-1899 rebellions, the end was in sight for the uncontrolled borderlands, as German and Belgian soldiers and sovereignty came together and the African frontier was squeezed out of existence.

With regard to African economic systems, the colonial boundaries certainly disrupted pre-colonial trade routes, making some trade illegal and bringing much of what remained under colonial control. However, the impact of the colonial economies and traders had a greater impact than that of the boundaries in their own right. African iron production could not hope to compete with overseas imports, while the new railways could transport goods on land far more quickly than any African pre-colonial method of transport. This was a process which began long before partition.

In two main ways, African pre-colonial systems were able to resist colonial domination. Smuggling and pastoralism presented the two biggest challenges to border control. Much trade between the islands and the mainland which had once been the mainstay of the coastal economy was now restricted by duties, but continued and prospered to some extent, through a variety of efforts to avoid the new duties. Yet again, it was with the Maasai and the other pastoralists of northern Tanganyika that the greatest challenges were seen. The cross-border movement of cattle, whether for grazing and water supplies, as a form of smuggling, or just to exert the power of one Maasai sub-section over another, was something the British authorities struggled with for fifty years and never brought under control. Even today, many trade routes resemble those of pre-colonial times and pastoralists continue to cross the Kenya-Tanganyika boundary.

Despite the impact of colonialism, pre-colonial African systems have been disrupted and suppressed at least as much by post-independence governments as by the previous European regimes. Control of the Kenya-Tanganyika boundary is not absolute, but it has been tighter since the 1970s, than it ever was under British or German rule. It was also Nyerere's policies of detribalisation that finally removed the power of pre-colonial African leaders who had maintained some of their cross-border influence.

To what extent did the actions of the colonial government and the borderlanders regarding the boundaries influence each other?

While the policies of the colonial authorities influenced borderlanders whenever they had the means and the manpower to do so, the borderlanders themselves exerted little real influence upon the colonialists during the initial imposition of the boundaries. For both the British and German colonial authorities, the views and actions of neighbouring colonial powers were of far more relevance. The initial partition was achieved without any tangible African resistance. Once the broad division had been achieved, Africans were able to influence local arrangements, both with regard to boundary location and with regard to the functions applied at it. Fishing and pasturage rights were won in several areas, although the only boundary change which transferred a large number of people from one sovereignty to another was the League of Nations-inspired handover of territory to Rwanda in the 1920s. African campaigns for boundary alterations generally led to relatively minor - though numerous - adjustments. The influence of African borderlanders grew over time, yet mainly developed after all the big decisions had been made. The list of African groups which lived on both sides of a boundary was as long in 1961 as it had been in 1890 or 1919 although in many cases it is open to debate whether or not any group was actually divided. There can be no doubt that some groups were split in two by boundaries - the Maasai, for instance, certainly lived on both sides of the line before 1885. The abaKuria, on the other hand, surely divided themselves.

As can be seen from the extent of Maasai influence, the Tanganyikan-Kenyan borderlands were where African groups were repeatedly able to force the colonialists to rethink their plans. For instance, their actions convinced the colonial authorities to be less confrontational and they introduced such measures as the cross-border grazing and water concessions and implemented the Inter-Colonial Native Courts. Elsewhere,

the introduction of new anti-smuggling staff and policies is further proof of the influence that African borderlanders were able to exert upon the colonialists.

The creation of a new territorially-defined polity was perhaps the greatest result of the imposition of colonial boundaries. Tanzania has changed somewhat in the intervening years, but its land borders are almost identical to those of 1930 and the hundreds of loose, fluid pre-colonial polities have been replaced by a single fairly cohesive state. This is probably the greatest legacy of colonial rule in Tanganyika.

To sum up, the main conclusions of this thesis are threefold. Firstly, that colonialism did successfully impose the western system of dividing political space in Tanganyika, in East Africa and almost certainly in the continent as a whole. It was the driving force in the imposition and its impact was so great that - with the help of African political elites - the system of linear boundaries has survived to this day. Secondly, that the impact of partition fell most heavily upon African political systems, and was less devastating - although still considerable - upon economic and cultural systems. Finally, that the influence of African borderlanders varied considerably. During the early years of partition they had next to no influence. Once the colonialists felt more secure, they were able to influence colonial policy and indeed some colonial officials put a lot of time and effort into acting upon their concerns, although any changes that were made related to the local details of partition. They did not concern any major transfers of territory or wholehearted defence of African systems. In any case, African systems were generally not understood by the colonialists and were more flexible in nature than the Europeans recognised.

Appendix 1: List of Governors (stand in governors are given in brackets)

April 1889 - April 1891: Herman Wissman
 April 1891 - Sept 1893: Freiherr von Soden
 Sept 1893 - Jan 1895: Freiherr von Schele
 July 1895 - May 1896: Hermann Wissman
 May 1896 - Jan 1897: Rudolf von Bennigsen
 Jan 1897 - Aug 1900: Eduard von Liebert
 (Jun 1898 - Dec 1898: Fritz von d. Decken)
 (Aug 1900 - April 1901: Ludwig von Estorff)
 April 1901 - April 1906: Adolf, Graf von Götzen
 (Oct 1902 - May 1903: Franz Stuhlmann)
 (April 1906 - Sept 1906: Eduard Haber)
 Sept 1906 - Oct 1911: Freiherr von Rechenberg
 (Nov 1907 - June 1908: Carl Detlef von Winterfeld)
 (Dec 1909 - June 1910: Richard von Spalding)
 Oct 1911 - July 1912: Wilhelm Methner
 July 1912 - Nov 1918: Heinrich Schnee

1920-1924: Sir Horace Byatt
 1925-1931: Sir Donald Cameron
 1931-1933: Lieutenant Colonel Sir G.S. Symes
 1934-1937: Sir Harold MacMichael
 1938-1941: Sir Mark Young
 1942-1944: Sir Wilfred Jackson
 1945-1948: Sir William Battershill
 1949-1958: Sir Edward Twining
 1958-1961: Sir Richard Turnbull

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The structure of primary source references given as footnotes in the core chapters is as follows: the archive, followed by the file number and page number, then the date of the document, any title and the correspondents. For example: TNA: TS10298/I: 312, 21st August 1928. "Report on the Migration of Purko and Loita Masai of Kenya Colony into the Sonjo Area of the Tanganyika Territory", by G. Webster, Acting PC, Northern Province, meaning:

- TNA = Tanzania National Archives
- TS10298/I: 312 = Tanganyikan Secretariat file 10298; Part I of that file; Page 312
- 21st August 1928: Date the letter or report was written.
- "Report on the... Territory": title of report
- G. Webster, Acting PC, Northern Province: name and title of report's author

In some cases, no page number may be given in the file, or there may be some doubt over pagination. In such cases, a document should still be traceable by its file number and date. Where a file contains only one document, then no page number is given. The files of the Public Record Office are given as CO, FO or WO: Colonial Office, Foreign Office or War Office. RKA files are from the *Reichskolonialamt*, or the Imperial Colonial Office, and were transferred from Potsdam to Berlin during the course of the research. File numbers from the Tanzanian National Archives will be preceded by either TS - Tanganyika Secretariat - which signifies central government files from Dar es Salaam, or by Acc. No. plus a number, which signifies that they are district files which require an accession number to locate them.

The secondary materials given below include all works referred to in the text of this thesis, as well as those books and articles which have been of great help, even if no direct mention has been made of them.

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